
























This thesis explores the possibility of composite consciousness: phenomenally conscious states                     
belonging to a composite being in virtue of the consciousness of, and relations among, its parts. We                                 
have no trouble accepting that a composite being has physical properties entirely in virtue of the                               
physical properties of, and relations among, its parts. But a long­standing intuition holds that                           
consciousness is different: my consciousness cannot be understood as a complex of interacting                         
component consciousnesses belonging to parts of me. I ask why: what is it about consciousness that                               
makes us think it so different from matter?  And should we accept this apparent difference?  
‘Combinationism’ – the thesis that intelligibly constitutive composition is possible in the                       
experiential realm – bears on many debates in the metaphysics of mind. Constitutive panpsychism’s                           
need for combinationism is at the centre of recent criticism of the theory, but physicalists also need                                 
an account of how the consciousness, or lack thereof, in two cerebral hemispheres and a whole brain,                                 
or a human being and their head, or a social group and its individual members, can be intelligibly                                   
related. And further back in history, the supposed simplicity of the soul was held to rule out any                                   
form of materialism, in a tradition of argument stretching from Plotinus to Brentano. With an eye to                                 
this diversity of debates, I examine the prospects for combinationists with a range of different                             
background views about the nature of consciousness, the ontological status of the subject, the                           
behaviour of the physical part­whole relation, and the notions of constitution and explanation                         
themselves.  
The core difficulty for experiential combinationism is that subjects seem to be exclusive and                           
independent in their experiences: no experience of one subject can belong to, or even be deduced a                                 
priori from the experiences of, another subject. This separateness is thought necessary to do justice                             
to the privacy and subjectivity of experience, and seems to preclude the kind of ontological intimacy                               
ii
between subjects that combinationism demands. In my third chapters I show that this conflict is                             
soluble; a weakened form of exclusivity still preserves the distinctive privacy of experience, and is                             
compatible with a composite sharing the experiences of its parts. A second major problem concerns                             
the unity, interdependence, or even holism often attributed to each subject’s experiential field. In my                             
fourth and fifth chapters I develop a framework for accommodating and explaining this unity while                             
still allowing component experiences to belong to distinct component subjects. Each experience in a                           
unified field has a phenomenal character akin to that of amodal perception, indicating the other                             
experiences that it is unified with.  
Other challenges arise from particular sorts of wholes and parts. Panpsychists attribute                       
consciousness to our smallest microscopic parts; this raises special problems concerning the grain                         
and structure of consciousness, which I address in my fifth chapter. Other versions of                           
combinationism attribute consciousness to large overlapping parts of a human being, parts capable                         
of formulating self­referential thoughts. This generates problems for self­knowledge, which I                     
address in my seventh chapter. And any combinationist, having claimed that consciousness in a                           
thing’s parts accounts for consciousness in the whole, must confront the issues I address in my sixth                                 
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Much has been written about the relation of mind to body. A major issue that has not so far received a                                         
dedicated treatment is the apparent structural discrepancy between the divisibility of matter and the                           
unity of the mind. Material things seem to be essentially and importantly composites, each part of                               
which can be considered as a material thing in its own right, externally related to the other parts. The                                     
material world is one of galaxies containing nations, nations comprising human individuals, human                         
individuals made up of organs and systems and cells, and cells made up of molecules, atoms, and yet                                   
smaller particles ­ yet it also seems to be a smoothly unified world, where the things at each level are                                       
nothing over and above the things at the level below.  
Yet many have felt that minds are different: a mind is not composed of cooperating component                               
minds, each seeing the others from the outside. If we try to imagine a conscious galaxy containing                                 
conscious nations, conscious nations made up of conscious humans, conscious humans made up of                           
conscious organs and cells and yet smaller particles, we cannot then maintain the world we have                               
imagined is smoothly unified, for the minds at one level will necessarily be ‘something over and above’                                 




cannot have parts at all. This apparent discrepancy challenges any attempt to understand howmind and                               
matter fit together.  
In this work I will explore the arguments that have been adduced for the supposed indivisibility                               
of the mind, and argue that we should reject them. I do not positively assert that conscious human                                   
beings are made up of conscious organs or particles, or that they enter into conscious nations or                                 
galaxies, but I try to provide a coherent and intelligible framework within which such claims can                               




What makes the apparent indivisibility of the mind so striking is that in the physical case, we seem to                                     
have not only part­whole relations but highly explanatory ones. Understanding the physical facts about                           
a thing’s parts lets us understand facts about the whole: the micro­facts make the macro­facts                             
intelligible. So when I ask whether minds could be ‘divisible’, what I ammost interested in is whether                                   
1
they could display this sort of intelligibility, whereby facts about their parts fully explain facts about                               
them.  
But what does ‘explain’ mean here? My major point of reference is the supposed explanatory                             
gap between physical properties and consciousness, which contrasts with cases where one set of                           
physical properties intuitively suffices to explain another (see e.g. Levine 1983, Chalmers 1995a, Loar                           
1990, McGinn 1989). A complete understanding of the microphysical structure and dynamics of a                           






it in fact has (Levine: “our knowledge of physics and chemistry makes [such connections] intelligible”,                             
1983 p.357), yet would not allow us to ‘see’ why it feels a certain way to be that brain (Levine: it                                         
“leaves the connection… completely mysterious”, 1983 p.357). The microphysics explains the                     
macrophysics, but not the phenomenology.  
In chapter 2 I examine what this talk of ‘explanation’ ‘intelligibility’, ‘understanding’, and so                           
on really comes to. While many analyses are available, none is convincing enough to be adopted across                                 
the board, and so I will remain neutral, employing them collectively as a ‘tool­kit’ for sharpening and                                 
addressing questions about explanatory part­whole relations. The best I can do by way of fixing ideas is                                 
to index my discussion to the explanatory gap between consciousness and physics: could there be the                               
kind of connection between mental wholes and mental parts which defenders of the explanatory gap                             




Explanation is an epistemic relation, essentially connected to possible states of understanding by                         
cognising subjects. But it is natural to associate it with metaphysical relations: perhaps one set of facts                                 
can be fully explained by another, in the relevant sense of ‘explain’, only if they are also                                 
metaphysically ‘grounded in’ the latter. So we might naturally associate the explanation of macro­facts                           
by micro­facts with the grounding of wholes by their parts. The notion of ‘grounding’ at work here is                                   
just the rough and intuitive notion of one thing being ‘nothing over and above’ another. To use a                                   
popular metaphor, if a grounds b, then all God would have to do to create both is to create a: with a in                                             




potentially more specific relation: either a realises b, or b is reducible to a, or a and b are identical, or                                         
some other sort of ontological dependence is involved.   2
While it is plausible that explanatory relations generally reflect grounding relations, there are                         
two complications. First, as I discuss more fully in subsection 3.2, wholes might be explained by parts                                 
in virtue of grounding their parts, rather than vice versa. That is, understanding the metaphysically                             
more superficial fact might let us ‘see’ that the more fundamental fact must be the way it is, and so a                                         
given instance of explanation could run either parallel to or counter to the direction of grounding.                               
Second, even if wholes are grounded in their parts, there might be some stubborn cognitive fact about                                 
us which prevents us from understanding the one in light of the other: there might be an explanatory                                   
gap even without a real gap, just as it has sometimes been argued that the explanatory gap between                                   
consciousness and matter does not betoken any metaphysical difference, but only a limitation of our                             
understanding (e.g. Levine 1983, Loar 1990, Block & Stalnaker 1998, Diaz­Leon 2011). So someone                           
might claim that some subject’s consciousness was wholly constituted by that of its parts, even though                               
a full understanding of the latter failed to explain the former. However, such a postulate of ‘brute                                 
grounding’ is likely to be unsatisfying: it would seem ‘too easy’, with “the many advantages... of theft                                 
over honest toil” (Russell 1919, p.71). 
In this work, therefore, I focus on the question of explanation. This does not reflect any lack of                                   












I use the term ‘combination’ to refer to the sort of explanatory part­whole relation that I am                                 
investigating (inspired by widespread discussion of ‘the combination problem’ for panpsychism, a                       
phrase coined by Seager 1995, p.280). This means that ‘combination’ is something stronger than                           
‘composition’: composition is simply the part­whole relation, such that anything with parts is                         
‘composed of’ them. ‘Combination’ means composition in which facts about the parts fully explain all                             3
(intrinsic) facts about the whole; when qualified with an adjective, this explanatory relation is restricted                             
to facts of a certain sort. Thus ‘spatial combination’ means a spatial thing having other spatial things as                                   
parts, with the spatial properties and relations of the latter fully explaining the (intrinsic) spatial features                               
of the former; ‘mental combination’ requires the mental properties of a thing’s parts to explain the                               
(intrinsic) mental properties of the whole.  
Yet we should not take, say, physical combination to require that every single explanatorily                           
relevant feature of the parts be a strictly and distinctively physical feature: that would exclude any                               
appeal to ‘topic­neutral’ properties and relations, like causation, similarity, or temporal succession,                       
which can coherently be ascribed to mental things, physical things, or any other kind of concrete thing.                                 
We should make room for any particular sort of combination to incorporate these properties and                             















Though my project bears on mentality in general, I will focus my investigation specifically on                             
conscious experience, which is widely taken to be the hardest aspect of mentality to explain, and to                                 
which arguments for the indivisibility of the mind often make special reference. I define ‘experiential                             
properties’ as properties which are individuated by what it is like to have them : on this definition,                                 5
anything that instantiates experiential properties is a subject, something which it is like something to                             
be.   
I take it that we can also talk about ‘experiences’, where the property ‘experiencing X’ is                               
equivalent to ‘having an experience of X’. ‘Experiences’, unlike experiential properties, are particular                         
tokens rather than universal types; talking about them therefore raises questions both about their                           
ontology (what type of thing are they? events? property instances? tropes?) and about their                           
individuation (could an experience have occurred a little later or with a little more intensity than it did?                                   
could a subject have two simultaneous and qualitatively identical experiences?). These questions will                         
become important in chapters 2 and 3, where I defend the possibility of experience­sharing: single                             
token experiences with multiple subjects. For now all I am committed to is the stipulative equivalence                               
of ‘experiencing X’ and ‘having an experience of X’.  
Experiences themselves do not instantiate experiential properties: subjects do. ‘Experiential                   
combination’ thus involves the composition of subjects by other subjects: it goes beyond the familiar                             
idea that many experiences might together compose a more complex experience. That is, people often                             
suppose that ‘my present total experience’ contains as a part ‘my present visual experience’, which                             
itself contains as parts experiences of colours, shapes, and so on. However, this is not experiential                               








‘my present visual experience’ some subject which is conscious of only that. Similarly, while it is                               
common to analyse the mind as composed of various faculties and drives, it is not at all common to                                     







Anti­Combination: The experiential properties of a conscious subject cannot be explained by                       
the experiential (and topic­neutral) properties of, and relations among, its parts.  
Of these claims, each is weaker than those before it, and implies those following it (given the above                                   
stipulation that experiential properties can only be instantiated by subjects. Negating them yields what                           
we may call ‘the three mereological affirmations’, each stronger than those before it: 
Experiential Compositeness: A conscious subject may have parts. 
Experiential Nesting: A conscious subject may have parts which are themselves conscious                       
subjects. 
Experiential Combinationism: The experiential properties of a conscious subject may be fully                       
explained by the experiential (and topic­neutral) properties of, and relations among, its parts.  
Note that these six claims concern possibility, not actuality. Even if combinationism were granted, it                             
would be a further step to conclude that any actual subjects of experience are in fact composite, nested,                                   
or explained by their parts.  
Since Experiential Simplicity and Anti­Nesting both entail Anti­Combination, any arguments                   




what follows to: what reason is there to accept Anti­Combination? I will argue that these reasons are                                 
not conclusive, though they have some force given certain supplementary premises; thus the                         




The import of the mereological denials is widely felt but rarely articulated. My appendix lays out how a                                   
series of philosophical debates are impacted by explicit or implicit adherence to one or more of these                                 




First, many opponents of materialism, especially in the Early Modern period, have argued that                           
conscious subjects must be simple, and therefore cannot be material. For instance, in the Critique of                               
Pure Reason, Kant labels this argument ‘the Achilles of all dialectical inferences of the pure doctrine of                                 
the soul’ (A351): apparently invincible but in fact fatally flawed, though he himself rejects it only as                                 
part of his overall rejection of speculative metaphysics. Other versions of this ‘Achilles argument’                           
appear in authors as far back as Plotinus (1956, pp.255­258, 342­356), as well as in Proclus (1963,                                 
p.163), Avicenna (1952, pp.47ff), Descartes (1985, Volume 2, p.59), Butler (1860), Mendelssohn                       





Despite the differences among presentations of the Achilles argument, certain themes recur,                       
particularly the idea that “representations that are divided among different beings… never constitute a                           
whole thought” (Kant 1781, A353). This claim is often supported by an analogy to groups of people, as                                   
in this quotation from Brentano (Cf. Plotinus 1956, p.346, de Courcillon, 1684): 
If, when we see and hear, the seeing were the property of one thing and the hearing the property                                     
of another, then how could there be a comparison between colours and sounds? (It would be                               
just as impossible as it is for two people, one of whom sees the colour and the other of whom                                       
hears the sound.) (Brentano 1987, p.293) 
This suggests that a major driver of the Achilles argument is Anti­Combination: a composite cannot be                               
conscious because no set of facts about its parts could add up to a unified consciousness for the whole.                                     




More recently, experiential combination has been intensively discussed by defenders and critics of                         
panpsychism, the view that all the fundamental material constituents of the universe instantiate                         
fundamental experiential properties, making them each a conscious subject. Given this commitment to                         
‘micro­subjects’, the panpsychist has an obvious interest in experiential combination, to ‘build up’                         
familiar human consciousness from this fundamental level.  
Not all panpsychists are combinationists, but only those labelled ‘constitutive panpsychists’:                     




microsubjects. The apparent impossibility of experiential combination is sometimes used as an                       6
argument by emergentist panpsychists against constitutive ones, and as an argument against                       
panpsychists generally, by critics who assume that the only or best forms of panpsychism must be                               
constitutive. One common reason for this assumption is the perception that non­constitutive                       
panpsychism offers no advantage over non­panpsychist emergentism. Consequently many critiques of                     




Debates over the relative merits of functionalism, behaviourism, and mind­brain identity theory have                         
also been impacted by the mereological denials. For instance, Putnam’s influential formulation of                         
functionalism stipulates, in his suggested schematic definition of ‘pain’, that “No organism capable of                           
feeling pain possesses a decomposition into parts which separately [satisfy this definition]”(1965/2003,                       
p.215), this stipulation being intended “to rule out such ‘organisms’… as swarms of bees as single                               
pain­feelers” (p.216). Tononi also incorporates Anti­Nesting into his ‘Information Integration Theory                     
of Consciousness’ (2012, pp.59­68, Tononi & Koch 2014, p.6): consciousness is integrated                       
information, but if a system is contained within a supersystem with equal or greater informational                             
integration, or contains a subsystem with greater, it cannot be conscious.  
These principles are criticised by (Block 1978/93) and Schwitzgebel (2014), who present                       
thought experiments involving outwardly intelligent complexes formed of a large number of minute                         







defeat our natural inclination to ascribe consciousness to the whole based on its behaviour. Yet Block                               
himself makes much use of thought­experiments in which we are supposed to find consciousness in                             
certain beings composed of other conscious beings implausible: the ‘Homunculus­Head’ and the                       
‘Nation of China’. Block regards consciousness in such entities as “an absurdity” (p.79), and therefore                             
rejects forms of functionalism that imply it. While Block maintains that the mereological aspect of                             
these cases is irrelevant to their force, others disagree: David Barnett has argued (2008) that the best                                 
explanation for these intuitive judgements is that “our naïve conception of a conscious being demands                             
that conscious beings be simple” (p.309).  
Barnett applies this diagnosis also to John Searle’s ‘Chinese Room’ (1980/2003), and to his                           
own thought­experiment, where two human beings are shrunk to the size of someone’s cerebral                           
hemispheres, trained to exactly imitate the latter, and inserted into someone’s head as a replacement                             
(2008 p.312­315). In general, he claims, “whether the pair we consider is a pair of people, a pair of                                     




Real cases, as well as thought­experiments, force us to evaluate the mereological denials. Consider two                             
complementary pathological cases: the split­brain syndrome and dissociative identity disorder. Both                     
cases seem somewhat intermediate between what we would normally count as one subject and what we                               
would normally count as many subjects, but accepting Anti­Combination forces us to regard those as                             
the only available (and mutually exclusive) options. Moreover, the reflections prompted by these cases                           
– in particular, realising that each cerebral hemisphere can support consciousness even without the                           




Anti­Combination again constrains us by insisting that if my hemispheres were conscious, that would                           
necessarily have nothing to do with my consciousness, rather than intelligibly constituting it.   
These questions do not stop at hemispheres: a human head, or a                       
whole­human­being­minus­one­atom also seem intrinsically capable of being conscious. Merricks                 
(2001) and Unger (1980, 2004, 2006) have both argued that under standard materialist assumptions,                           
any situation we would count as containing “one person” actually contains a multitude of overlapping                             
persons, which they consider sufficiently absurd to motivate revising those assumptions to avoid such                           
multiplication. Both authors explicitly accept that a similar multiplication of inanimate objects is not                           
similarly absurd (Merricks 2001, p.49, 95, 106, Unger 2006, pp.378­379).  
What makes the difference is physical combinationism: any given material object can be                         
viewed as many million overlapping material object, but each of these overlapping objects are                           
metaphysically and explanatorily nothing in addition to the others. Similarly, if we ask how many                             
brains the split­brain patient has, any uncertainty as to whether to say ‘one’ or ‘two’ seems merely                                 
semantic, because we can always shift away from a language of discrete brains and speak in terms of                                   
neural parts and their relations. We can say that all the normal parts of a brain are present, but they are                                         
no longer interacting as they were before. But when we come to conscious subjects, Anti­Combination                             




A different class of real­life examples involve humans composing a group agent, like an organised                             




States, and similarly complex collectives, as conscious. However, while many philosophers have                       
argued for genuine collective mentality – most commonly intentions (Searle 1990, Velleman 1997,                         
Bratman 1999), but also beliefs, desires, and all the cognitive and conative apparatus of agency (Pettit                               
& List 2011) – genuine conscious experience in social groups is widely rejected. Even those who go                                 
furthest in defending genuinely collective mental states stop short of collective consciousness: Gilbert                         
2002 and Huebner 2011 both argue in support of collective emotions, but do so by trying to break the                                     
link between emotion and consciousness, arguing that genuine emotions may be devoid of                         
phenomenology. Thus they seek to prevent “the implausibility of collective consciousness…                     
impugn[ing] the possibility of collective emotions.”(Huebner 2011, p.102)   
I believe that Anti­Combination explains this discrepancy in attitudes towards collective                     
intentionality and collective consciousness. Authors wish to avoid irreducible, strongly­emergent group                     
minds which stand above individual minds; such beings are regarded as mysterious, unparsimonious,                         
and even ethically threatening (Searle 1990, p.404, Petit & List 2011, p.9). This allows for collective                               
intentionality, since that intentionality can be explained through and grounded in that of individual                           
members. But if consciousness in a whole cannot be explained by or grounded in consciousness in its                                 
parts, then this reductive attitude rules out collective consciousness. Combinationism dissolves this                       
conflict: social groups can be nothing over and above their members, while still being just as literally                                 




Combinationism is compatible with a wide range of views about experience and composition, but                           




ease of reference later on, and to indicate the range of views available, I will survey a few ‘types of                                       
combinationist’, explaining their differences and their different relationships to combinationism. All of                       
these views fall within a certain broad grouping, defined both by ‘weak metaphysical naturalism’, and                             
by a ‘level­connecting’ approach to composition. Views in this family give reason to expect, and to                               
hope for, the possibility of experiential combination, for they imply both physical combination and a                             
deep unity between the experiential and physical realms.  
Weak metaphysical naturalism is simply the view that consciousness is a natural phenomenon                         
in a broadly material universe. More precisely, it holds that the stuff of which paradigm material                               
objects are made, and which natural science investigates, is the only type of stuff in the concrete                                 
universe. If there are concrete things made of some other kind of stuff, naturalism is false; if different                                   
paradigm material objects, like spoons, brains, and toenails, are made of fundamentally different                         
substances, then naturalism collapses. According to naturalism thus construed, what differentiates                     
conscious humans from inanimate objects is not the kind of stuff they are made of but simply how that                                     
stuff is arranged: this covers both physicalism and many forms of property dualism or neutral monism.  
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A ‘level­connecting’ view of composition is any view on which the complete set of fact at one                                 
mereological level can ground all the facts about all the other mereological levels. On such views,                               
distinguishing among mereological levels never means distinguishing two independent sets of facts,                       
though they may disagree on what the privileged or fundamental level is. This conflicts with                             












My first two divisions are that between physicalist ‘primitivist’ combinationists, who differ on whether                           
all experiential facts admit of complete explanation in non­experiential terms, and that between                         9
panpsychist and non­panpsychist combinationists, who differ on whether experience is present                     
throughout the fundamental parts of physical reality. These two divisions usually correlate, since                         
panpsychists are much more likely to be primitivsts, and because non­panpsychist primitivists are                         
typically committed to strong emergentism and so are not combinationists. But exceptions are possible,                           
such as physicalist­panpsychists, who hold that experience is reducible to an omnipresent but                         
ultimately physical or functional property (Tononi’s ‘Integrated Information Theory’ comes close to                       
this).  
Panpsychists and their critics have been especially interested in the issue of experiential                         
combination recently, because it is central to their claim to offer a better explanation of                             
macroexperiential facts than physicalism can. The non­panpsychist combinationist has a different sort                       
of need for combinationism: rather than making component subjects part of the ultimate explanatory                           
base, they simply need to reconcile them with composite subjects so as to make their co­existence                               











groups of humans, confront the non­panpsychist as much as they do the panpsychist, even if the former                                 
accepts physicalism and hopes to ultimately explain both the parts and the whole by fundamental                             
physical facts.  
A second division concerns the possibility of ‘phenomenal overflow’: conscious experiences of                       
a subject who cannot access them. The everyday term ‘consciousness’ can mean both pure                           
phenomenality (‘there being something it’s like’) and cognitive access by a range of ‘content                           
consuming systems’ (Block 1995), but it is disputed whether these two meanings can come apart. (I                               
take ‘experiential’ to be synonymous with ‘phenomenally conscious’. ) On the ‘no overflow’ position                         
10
(e.g. Rosenthal 2007), my states can be phenomenally conscious only if I can report them, commit                               
them to memory, use them to guide future plans, etc. This is often expressed with the slogan that                                   
“conscious states are simply mental states we are conscious of being in” (Rosenthal 1986, p.329). On                               
this view, we can have fairly direct empirical evidence for whether a given state is phenomenally                               
conscious: its manifestation in report, memory, planning, etc. 
On the ‘pro overflow’ position (defended by Block 1995, 2005) there can be phenomenal states                             
whose subject is unaware of them – what it’s like to be me could go beyond what I can report, reflect                                         
on, etc. Certain empirical results – such as change blindness and inattentional blindness – have been                               
argued to support this possibility (Block 2005, 2011). Once it is accepted that phenomenal                           
consciousness can outstrip access­consciousness, it becomes an open possibility that we might find                         
reason to postulate vast reaches of inaccessible phenomenal consciousness – perhaps most of one’s                           











explained: on a no­overflow position, combinationists must explain not only the presence of certain                           
experiences in the whole, but also the absence of whatever is not accessible to that whole. On a                                   
pro­overflow position, some of the parts’ experiences might be present but inaccessible in the                           
consciousness of the whole.  
My third division is between what I call the ‘experience­first’ and ‘subject­first’ views. On the                             
former, experiences are ontologically prior to the entities we say ‘have’ them: a subject is nothing over                                 
and above a certain collection or stream of experiences, suitably related in some fashion. On the latter,                                 
the thing that has experiences is some sort of enduring substance, which is more basic than experiences                                 
and could exist without them. This substance might an immaterial soul, a material thing with                             
non­physical experiential properties, or something purely physical. The classic experience­first view is                       
Hume’s account of the mind as a ‘bundle of perceptions’ (1888, p.252), though other versions of the                                 
view may not identify the subject with any collection of experiences (Parfit 1984, 1999, Dennett 1990,                               
cf. Strawson 2009). Experience­first and subject­first combinationists relate in different ways to the                         
combination of experiences, as distinct from experiential combination, for the experience­first view                       
takes ‘part’ and ‘whole’ to have a specifically experiential meaning when applied to subjects: for one                               
subject to contain another as a part is for the set of experiences which constitutes one to contain as a                                       
subset those which constitute the other.  
The subject­first view seems implicit in our habit of ascribing experience to tangible human                           
beings, and regarding people as existing even when wholly unconscious. An adherent of the                           
experience­first view might analyse this as shorthand for ascribing the experiences to a subject who                             
then ‘has’ but is distinct from a certain material body. Nevertheless, most experience­first                         
combinationists will at least accept that there are enduring substances which metaphysically underlie                         




experience­first views disagree over whether an experience’s basis is also its subject. The                         
12
experience­first combinationist may end up saying things about part­whole relations among bases that                         
are similar to what the subject­first combinationist says about part­whole relations among subjects.                         
Alternatively, they might reject even bases (e.g. process­based ontologies, where events are more                         
fundamental than objects), putting them in a similar position to the physicalist combinationist: their                           
fundamental explanatory base does not involve any micro­subjects, but they still need an account of                             




Combinationists might take a number of views on the part­whole relation, within the broad class of                               
level­connecting views. The most natural view is probably an unspecific sort of ‘priority pluralism’ (as                             
defined by Schaffer 2010; cf. Nagel 2004, p.138, Russell 1985 p.36, McTaggart 1988, p.271), holding                             
that composites are entirely ontologically grounded in their parts, though nevertheless distinct from                         
them. This often goes with the idea that composition is widespread but not necessarily unrestricted.                             
This sort of vague pluralism contrasts with three more specific doctrines about the part­whole relation,                             
some of which raise specific issues for combinationism.  
The ‘composition­as­identity’ combinationist holds that the parts of something are, collectively,                     
numerically identical to that thing. ‘Parts’ and ‘whole’ are different forms of description for the same                               








e.g. Baxter 1988, Lewis 1991 pp.80­87, Cotnoir 2013, Baxter & Cotnoir forthcoming). On this view, as                               
on pluralism, the whole is grounded in (‘nothing over and above’) its parts, but the parts are not                                   
ontologically prior to the whole, for nothing is ontologically prior to itself. Composition­as­identity                         
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likely also implies ‘universalism’ about composition, since everything is self­identical: it is unclear                         
how a set of things could fail to compose anything (though see Cameron 2011). Given universalism                               
about composition, there is increased scope for experiential combination, since more overlapping                       
conscious entities will exist. 
The monist combinationist holds that facts about parts are grounded in more fundamental facts                           
about wholes, and everything is ultimately grounded in the properties of the maximal whole of which                               
everything is a part (Schaffer 2010, 2012). On an extreme version of this view, there is only one thing                                     
(Horgan & Potrc 2012): what we think of as a thing’s parts are in fact logical constructions out of its                                       
properties. The conjunction of monism with panpsychism, holding that the fundamental reality is a                           
14
conscious cosmos, has recently been labelled ‘cosmopsychism’ (coined by Gaudry, 2008). 
It may seem strange to hold that micro­facts both explain, and are grounded in, macro­facts, but                               
these two claims need not be at odds. Understanding something may shed light not only on what it                                   
grounds, but on the more fundamental reality that grounds it. Thus a pluralist’s account of what                               
15

















micro­facts ‘reflect’ or ‘express’ those same macro­facts. Monists, as much as pluralists, need to                           
vindicate their claims about ontological priority by explaining how their purported fundamental basis                         
gives rise to the observed middle­sized world. A system of intelligible cross­level connections in the                             
experiential realm is useful to both.  
Finally, the nihilist combinationist denies the literal existence of composite things: there are                         
only trillions of particles, and what we think of as ‘wholes’ are just logical constructions out of these                                   
simple objects (Sider 2013; the model for many nihilistic accounts of ordinary language is Van                             
Inwagen 1990, pp. 98­114). Combinationism might seem incompatible with nihilism: if there are no                           
wholes, what is there to explain? But the type of relations which combinationism claims between parts                               
and wholes are precisely those relations which the nihilist can easily do away with: if all the putative                                   
facts about experiential wholes are fully explicable through facts about their parts, then nothing is lost                               
if the former are eliminated in favour of the latter. If the parts, so to speak, do all the work, then cutting                                           
out the whole is more defensible. Thus the nihilist combinationist endorses something that preserves                           
the spirit of combinationism: 
Experiential CombinationismN: The experiential properties of some jointly­conscious things                 
may be explained by the experiential properties of, and relations among, those things.  
The above views conflict in various ways – some deny the reality of wholes, some deny the reality of                                     
parts, and some identify parts with wholes. Nevertheless they are all ‘level­connecting’ views, agreeing                           
that the universe is not a fundamentally multi­level place, with independent facts obtaining at different                             
mereological levels. Pluralism and nihilism take everything to be built up from the ‘bottom’ level,                             







Why should we accept Anti­Combination? While some authors reject experiential combination out of                         
hand with little explanation, others present challenging arguments against it. The least articulated                         
objection is simple incomprehension of how it could work, as in Nagel’s claim that: 
We cannot at present understand how a mental event could be composed of myriad                           
proto­mental events on the model of our understanding of how a muscle movement is                           
composed of myriad physico­chemical events... We lack the concept of a mental part­whole                         
relation. (1986, p.50)  
But to develop such a concept we must survey and analyse the problems it faces. In this section I do so,                                         




There are two types of argument against experiential combination per se: that experiential parts cannot                             
explain experiential wholes because of how little they imply, and that trying to connect experiential                             
parts with experiential wholes in an explanatory way will imply too much, yielding incoherence.  
The former arguments, which I will call ‘explanatory gap’ arguments, are divided by Chalmers                           
into three sub­problems: explaining the structure of macroexperience, explaining the qualities found in                         
macroexperience, and explaining how macrosubjects can be constituted by distinct microsubjects                     
(forthcoming­a, pp.4­5). This type of argument is often presented through the use of examples. First we                               
imagine a group of conscious human beings, standing in a circle or holding a conversation or related in                                   




nothing follows, then how do these individual minds explain anything? And how could component                           
consciousnesses go any way towards explaining our, supposedly composite, consciousness? This style                       
of argument appears in James’s seminal discussion of the combination problem for panpsychism (1890,                           
p.160), but also appears repeatedly in earlier authors arguing against materialism (cf. subsection 2.1)                           
which they construed as implying combinationism. A more elaborate way of pushing this argument,                           
employed by Goff (2009a) would imitate conceivability arguments against physicalism, by considering                       
a ‘microexperiential zombie’, a physical and functional replica of a human being, every part of which is                                 
conscious, but which lacks consciousness as a whole. A third way of presenting an explanatory gap                               
argument is to imagine a change in our parts, with them gaining or losing consciousness, and observe                                 
that this seems compatible with our consciousness being largely unchanged. Block argues along these                           
lines against Anti­Nesting (1978/92, pp.77­78), and Sebastian (2013), drawing on Chalmers (1995b)                       
has formulated such a challenge to panpsychism.  
Explanatory gap arguments against experiential combination seemmuch more compelling than                     
any parallel arguments against physical combination: this applies especially to the explanation of                         
macrosubjects (Goff 2009a, 2009b, 2010) I believe one major reason for this is the sense that                               
consciousness is ‘private’: each subject’s experiences are ‘cut off’ from those of others in a way that                                 
their physical properties are not, breaking any explanatory connection between them or at least making                             
it irredeemably mysterious.  
The other class of arguments, which I will call ‘latent incoherence’ arguments, take two forms.                             
The first claims that because of the holistic character of each subject’s ‘perspective’, no such                             
perspective can contain others. Any given element they share would have to have two phenomenal                             
characters: one qua element of the whole’s perspective (reflecting its unity with the rest of that                               




perspective). Call this the ‘incompatible characters problem’. Arguments of this sort (prominent in                         
recent work by Coleman, 2013, and Basile, 2010), could be expressed dramatically by saying that                             
having parts would ‘tear apart’ the unity of any supposedly composite perspective.  
A different worry could be put by saying that combining into a whole would ‘dissolve’ any                               
supposed component minds. This worry is expressed particularly by Rosenberg (1998, 2004), and                         
suggested in certain remarks by Dainton (2011, pp. 257­259); I follow Rosenberg in calling it ‘the                               
boundary problem’. The incompatible characters problem and the boundary problem work together to                         
make experiential combination appear incoherent: either the parts retain their distinctness and rip the                           
whole asunder, or the whole maintains its unity and swallows up the parts.  
A combinationist needs to address both types of argument, though in different ways. With                           
latent incoherence arguments, they need to identify a move in the argument which is unsound or                               
invalid, so as to avoid the purported consequences – or else explain why a consequence considered                               
absurd is actually not. But explanatory gap arguments demand something more constructive; an                         
exhibition of how and why certain sorts of composite mentality are explained fully by certain                             




As well as the above problems that apply to any sort of combinationism, there are also specific issues                                   
that arise from what we might call ‘exotic subjects’. First, consider ‘micro­subjects’, conscious beings                           
far smaller and simpler than we can easily imagine, at the level of cells and molecules and even                                   




beings, and monist combinationists might end up committed to them: if the consciousness of the                             
universe is expressed in the consciousness of its human­sized parts, why wouldn’t the same principles                             
imply that the latter expresses itself as consciousness in smaller parts?  
Setting aside the plausibility of micro­subjects existing at all, does it really make sense to think,                               
as panpsychist combinationists do, that our complex consciousness is based on these trillions of                           
micro­consciousnesses? It has been argued (Maxwell 1978, Lockwood 1993, Coleman 2012, Chalmers                       
forthcoming­a) that such an aggregation of many tiny parts would have to produce a form of experience                                 
very unlike ours – one that was qualitatively homogeneous, spatially structured, and enormously                         
fine­grained, while ours is qualitatively diverse, non­spatially structured, and relatively                   
coarse­grained.  
Next consider ‘mega­subjects’, conscious beings larger and more spatially disparate than                     
humans, such as nations, mereological sums of people, or the cosmos itself. Cosmopsychist views,                           
especially in the idealist tradition of Hegel and Schopenhauer, are already committed to the existence of                               
such beings, and other combinationists may find themselves committed to them by principles which                           
derive experiences in a whole from experiences in its parts. If we did accept the existence of                                 
mega­subjects, a dilemma arises: either their consciousness is unified, or it is not. If it is, then we can                                     
ask why our individual experiences as human beings seem so separate, so cut off from each other; if it                                     
is not, we can ask whether it really makes sense to posit such massively disunified consciousness.  
Third, large overlapping sections of subjects pose distinctive epistemological problems. Beings                     
such as my head, my brain, and my left half are, if conscious, plausibly capable of self­awareness, and                                   
of distinguishing themselves from others. But their overlap seems to make this problematic – for they                               








These problems will be successively addressed in the coming chapters. Chapter 2 lays the ground for                               
this discussion by examining in more detail the notion of ‘explanation’ at play, and investigating                             
physical combination as a standard. In Chapter 3 I then directly confront the explanatory gap problem,                               
through an examination of experience­sharing, experiential ownership, and the idea of property                       
inheritance. I will argue that combinationists have good prospects if they endorse the principles I call                               
‘Weak Sharing’ and ‘Conditional Experience Inheritance’. I also discuss here how different versions of                           
combinationism may become committed to micro­subjects or mega­subjects, in their attempts to close                         
their explanatory gap.  
In Chapter 4 I address latent incoherence arguments, and expand on the explanatory proposal of                             
the previous chapter, through an exploration of the unity of consciousness. I will argue that                             
combinationists have good prospects if they analyse the unity of consciousness as involving a relation                             
of ‘adumbration’ holding among experiences, whereby each gives its subject a partial, indirect,                         
‘sketchy’ awareness of the others.  
In the next three chapters I examine the issues raised by exotic subjects: chapter 5 considers the                                 
structural issues raised by supposing our consciousness to be constituted by that of micro­subjects,                           
chapter 6 considers the possibility and status of mega­subjects, and chapter 7 considers the epistemic                             








In this chapter I introduced a cluster of theses regarding the mereological structure of the mind                               
–whether conscious subjects can have parts, whether those parts may be themselves conscious, and so                             
on. But I identified one particular thesis as crucial, and as the target of my investigation in what                                   
follows: 
Anti­Combination: The (intrinsic) experiential properties of a subject of experience cannot be                       
explained by the experiential (and topic­neutral properties) of, and relations among, its parts. 
This is a claim about conscious experience, rather than mentality in general, and about explanatory                               
composition (‘combination’), rather than composition in general. I called the negation of this thesis                           
Experiential Combinationism; someone who endorses Experiential Combinationism can be called a                     
‘combinationist’. This dissertation amounts to an examination of the dispute between combinationists                       
and their opponents.  
Combinationists may be physicalists or panpsychists, accept or reject phenomenal overflow,                     
make subjects or their experiences ontologically prior, and hold a number of different views on the                               
part­whole relation, ranging from nihilism to monism. But they all face a variety of serious challenges,                               
which I divided into explanatory gap challenges (addressed in chapter 3), latent incoherence challenges                           
(addressed in chapter 4), and challenges relating to various exotic subjects (addressed in chapters 5­7).                             





















In the last chapter I defined 3 theses: that conscious subjects cannot be divisible into parts, that they                                   
cannot be divisible into parts which are themselves conscious subjects, and that their consciousness                           
cannot be explained by the experiential (and topic­neutral) properties of and relations among their parts                             
­ i.e. ‘experiential combination’ is impossible. In the rest of this work I make a case for rejecting these,                                     
and in particular the third, weakest, thesis, which I called Anti­Combination. But evaluating claims                           
about combination requires some understanding of the notion of ‘explanation’ at play (and related                           
notions like ‘understanding’, ‘intelligibility’, and ‘mysteriousness’), and so this chapter is devoted to                         
distinguishing and contrasting available accounts of explanation. I discuss a priori entailment,                       
simplicity of laws, continuity of natures, and identity of tokens: none is clearly the correct model to                                 
adopt, and so rather than deciding among them, I will keep all four in play, investigating which, if any,                                     
experiential combination can satisfy.  
The significance of Anti­Combination derives particularly from its seeming to reveal a contrast                         
between the mental and physical realms. The physical properties of composite objects are often thought                             




So the best way to investigate the kind of explanation needed for experiential combination is to see                                 
what kind of explanation seems to be present in physical combination.  
Not all sorts of explanation are relevant here. First, since combination is a synchronic relation,                             
explanation of events in terms of distinct, temporally prior, events is not directly relevant. Second, I                               
wish to abstract from considerations of practical feasibility: combinationists about some domain claim                         
only that macrofacts in that domain are explicable through microfacts ‘in principle’, i.e. for some                             
arbitrarily smart subject under arbitrarily good conditions. Third, we must differentiate the sort of                           
explanation combinationism requires from certain kinds of ‘explanation’ that have usually been                       
regarded as falsifying combination – in particular, explanation by reference to ‘emergence laws’, since                           
(strong) emergentism is often understood as the denial that microfacts fully account for macrofacts. We                             
might put this by saying that combinationism involves ‘reductive’ rather than ‘emergentist’                       
explanations. But both of these terms are ambiguous. It is common to distinguish ‘strong’ from ‘weak’                               
emergence (e.g. Bedau 1997, Chalmers 2006, Wilson 2010, Seager forthcoming), and ‘reductive’ can                         
also be read in a stronger sense, in which it entails identity and rules out multiple realisability, and in a                                       
weaker sense, in which it entails just some kind of intelligible grounding (e.g. Chalmers 2003, Fn.4).                               
‘Non­reductive physicalism’ is weakly but not not strongly reductive in my sense, and while weak                             
emergence can be weakly reductive, strong emergence cannot. My use of the terms ‘reductive’ and                             
‘emergentist’ will typically mean ‘weakly reductive’ and ‘strong emergentist’, respectively.  
A convenient framework for considering competing accounts of explanation is to consider                       
conditionals with purely microscopic antecedents and macroscopic consequents, such that we can                       
explain the holding of the consequent in terms of the holding of the antecedent. Principles of roughly                                 
this sort are called ‘principles of composition’ by Broad (1925), and ‘application conditionals’ by                           




use Broad’s term ‘principle of composition’, or ‘composition principle’, defining it as a principle of the                               
form: 
If a set of parts p1, p2, p3… possess properties F1, F2, F3… and stand in relations R1, R2, R3…                                       
then they compose a composite c which possesses property G.   
1
So if combination occurs for some class of properties (e.g. experiential properties), that means that                             
there are composition principles in which G, some of the Fs, and possibly some of the Rs, are                                   
properties and relations of that sort (e.g. experiential properties and relations), and in which                           
consequently c and some of the ps are entities of the sort that bear such properties (e.g. conscious                                   
subjects).  
However, simply asserting one or more composition principles would amount to stating what is                           
to be explained, and what is supposed to explain it, without guaranteeing the success of that                               
explanation. Even a strong emergentist posits composition principles – they claim that these principles                           
are basic laws of nature. For the same reason, it would be insufficient to simply claim that macrofacts                                   
supervene with nomological necessity on microfacts (cf. Horgan 1993, pp.559­560). Reductively                     
explanatory composition principles must be, we might say, ‘intelligible’: they not only state that certain                             
macrofacts obtain when certain microfacts obtain, but allow us to ‘see why’. Some kind of criterion is                                 
needed which would separate out properly intelligible composition principles, so my investigation into                         










My first proposed criterion for suitably explanatory composition principles is that they be knowable a                             
priori. On this view, to say that microphysics explains macrophysics is to say that an idealised reasoner                                 
could infer all the macrophysical truths from the microphysical truths a priori, and thus could know a                                 
priori the truth of a composition principle connecting them. This is the primary criterion used by                               
modern property dualists to establish the ‘explanatory gap’ between matter and consciousness. It is                           2
implicit in ‘conceivability arguments’: if P explains Q it should entail Q a priori, and so the situation                                   
where P&¬Q obtains should be inconceivable, and so if that situation is conceivable, P does not entail                                 





What is knowable a priori is the conditional, not the antecedent or the consequent. In particular, if the                                   
antecedent is disjunctive (or if there are many different antecedents that all imply the same consequent),                               
it need not be a priori which disjunct actually obtains. Composition principles are not supposed to                               
reflect any a priori insight into the world’s actual nature, but rather our grasp of the concepts involved                                   
in the consequent: this grasp ensures that if we understand the antecedent, and reason ideally, we can                                 
apply those concepts to the hypothetical situation described. For instance, Jackson explains the                         
existence of composition principles for ‘solid’ thus: 
The story science tells about tables, chairs, pens and the like being aggregations of molecules held                               
in a lattice­like array by various intermolecular forces…tell[s] us that these lattice­like arrays of                           








encroaching on each other’s spaces. And this is what it takes, according to our concept, to be solid.                                   
(Jackson 1998, pp.3­4, emphasis added) 
Horgan says similar things about the liquidity of water: 
We understand well enough the essential features, or defining conditions, of liquidity: if a quantity                             
of stuff is liquid, then it will neither spontaneously dissipate into the atmosphere nor retain a rigid                                 
shape when unconstrained… explaining why liquidity supervenes on certain microphysical                   
properties is essentially a matter of explaining why any quantity of stuff with these microphysical                             
properties will exhibit those macro­features… it seems explanatorily kosher to assume a                       
"connecting principle" linking the macro­features to liquidity, precisely because those features are                       
definitive; the connecting principle expresses a fact about what liquidity is. (Horgan 1993, p.379,                           
emphasis added)  4
This allows the standard of a priori entailment to be applied to the decidedly a posteriori practice of                                   
scientific explanation. Scientists often ‘explain’ some observation by postulating a contingent, a                       
posteriori, mechanism or law. What is held to be a priori is not the existence of this explaining factor,                                     
but simply the conditional statement that, given this postulate, the observation must follow.   5
When I say that the antecedent of a composition principle contains only ‘micro­level facts’, this                             
includes both particular facts, like the existence and location of certain particles, and general facts, like                               
the laws governing the properties and behaviour of those particles. The physical combinationist, for                           
example, can include the laws of gravitational, electrical, and other forces, as well as the laws of                                 
motion and the geometry of spacetime, in their ‘explanatory base’. However, the antecedent does not                             












H2O”), since these explicitly mention macro­level phenomena (e.g. “water”). This is important to note,                           
because the ‘deductive­nomological’ model of explanation (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, Hempel                     
1965) purports to explain particular macro­level facts by deducing them from the conjunction of such                             
bridge laws with properly micro­level laws and conditions. However, the two models of explanation                           
can be made equivalent, if the purely micro­level facts allow us to deduce the bridge laws themselves,                                 
(as when the bridge law “water is H2O” follows logically from the microphysical fact that H2O                               
molecules are what ‘plays the water role’). Of course, bridge laws cannot be deduced from purely                               
positive micro­level information. Any set of facts about the properties and distribution of H2O (or any                               
other substances) leaves open the possibility that there might be some other substance that fits the                               
specifications involved in our notion ‘water’ better than H2O does. Similarly, any list of laws of nature                                 
will fail to entail anything about macroscopic forces, if they do not rule out the existence of other laws                                     
of nature. This leads some authors (e.g. Chalmers & Jackson 2001) to include a ‘that’s all’ clause ,                                   
stating that there is nothing else in the world than what is stated in the micro­level facts, and what is                                       
constituted by them. By allowing for the derivation of bridge laws, the ‘that’s all’ clause permits a                                 6




A particularly extensive defence of an a priori entailment analysis of physical combinationism is given                             









Now, mass additivity itself is not a priori – indeed, mass additivity is empirically false, at least for rest                                     
mass, in Einsteinian physics. Rather, McQueen’s claim is that mass additivity (or the similar principle                             7
of ‘relativistic mass additivity’) follows a priori from the physical laws operative in classical physics                             
(or in Einsteinian physics). Note two particular features of this derivation (see McQueen 2014a for the                               
full discussion).  
First, McQueen’s derivation (modelled after derivations often given in physics textbooks)                     
assumes, as one of the microphysical facts, the principle that the total force on an entity is the sum of                                       
all forces exerted on it by other entities, even though some writers (e.g. Mill 1843, p.458 ff) regard this                                     
as itself something like a composition principle, involving the ‘composition of causes’. Insofar as we                             
think of the vector­additivity of forces as itself a composition principle, it seems hard to regard it as a                                     
priori. But this principle meets plausible requirements for being considered a micro­level law: it                           
“come[s] into play at or below the atomic level of organization” (Wilson 2002, p.74), among                             
microscopic entities. It makes no mention of any composite thing: it is simply that multiple forces are                                 
exerted on one (perhaps simple) entity, by multiple other (perhaps simple) entities. Thus there is some                               
plausibility in treating it, as McQueen does, as an a posteriori, microphysical, law of nature.  
Second, McQueen explicitly presupposes that it is a priori, for some objects, that they compose                             
a whole which is located wherever they are. This is what lets him say that the mass of the whole, which                                         
is to be explained, can be identified with whatever property is appropriately mathematically related to                             
the average acceleration of the parts (which, he shows, is the sum of the masses of the parts). If a priori                                         









We might take the British emergentists’ classical distinction between emergent and mechanistic                       
composition principles to rely on on a priori entailment, since Broad, for instances, describes                           
emergence as occurring when: 
The characteristic behaviour of the whole could not, even in theory, be deduced from the most                               
complete knowledge of the behaviour of its components, taken separately or in other combinations,                           
and of their proportions and arrangements in this whole. (1925, pp.59, emphasis added) 
That is, we might define emergent phenomena as ‘not predictable’ or ‘not deducible’ from their                             
emergence bases, even in principle (Broad 1925, p.61, McLaughlin 1992, Kim 1999 p.5ff, Wilson                           
2010, pp.32­38), and conclude that since strong emergence is usually taken to lack the sort of                               
explanation we are interested in, it makes sense to focus on a priori entailment as what is missing in                                     
such cases. The distinguishing feature of the emergentist’s composition principles, on this analysis, is                           
that they cannot be derived from anything else: they are brute, fundamental, laws of nature that can                                 
only be discovered by empirical investigation.  
However, Broad explicitly denies that any composition principles, even mechanistic (aka                     
‘reductive’) ones, are knowable a priori: 
...in no case could the behaviour of a whole… be predicted merely from a knowledge of the                                 
properties of these constituents… and of their proportions and arrangements... Whenever this seems                         
to be possible it is because we are using a suppressed premise which is so familiar that it has                                     
escaped our notice. The suppressed premise is the fact that we have examined other complexes in                               
the past and have noted their behaviour; that we have found a general law connecting the                               




are assuming that this law of composition will hold also of the particular complex whole at present                                 
under consideration. (1925, p.63) 
So while Broad does deny that emergent properties are deducible a priori, even with perfect                             
knowledge of the microphysical base, this is true of all properties of wholes. What distinguishes                             
emergent composition principles from non­emergent ones is not their epistemology, but their structure                         
of application: they are specific only to a particular collection of components in particular relations,                             
rather than providing a general rule for deriving the properties of a wide variety of composites.  
This gives us a second criterion for explanatory composition principles: their pattern of                         
application. As Broad puts it, the non­emergent, or ‘reductive’, or ‘mechanical’, composition principles                         
are those in which the features of the whole are “compounded in a simple and uniform way” from those                                     
of their parts (p.44), providing a “general law” that is not restricted to any specific configuration. The                                 
task for the experiential combinationist, then, is to find similarly simple, general, and uniform                           
experiential composition principles. In contrast to section 1’s approach, these principles might be a                           
posteriori laws of nature, holding in the actual world but not in all other possible worlds. Thus                                 
combinationism might be true in the actual world, but not necessarily true: its truth does not require the                                   
necessity or a priority of its composition principles, but merely their generality. Presumably, we would                             8
need empirical evidence that we live in a world where combinationism is true, but this might be                                 
supplied by the two observations that i) we are conscious, and ii) we are to all appearances composite                                   
things, fully material and to that extent explicable through our parts. Thus we may distinguish two                               










The idea of a structural criterion of intelligibility could be developed in two directions, focusing either                               
on the overall set of principles, or the internal structure of particular ones. On the first approach, we                                   
would think of a set of composition principles as properly explanatory when they are few in number                                 
and general in application, each entailing a broad range of macrofacts; ‘emergent’ composition                         
principles are manifest only when certain specific conditions obtain, so that we make little explanatory                             
progress in our attempts to unify phenomena. The sense in which emergent composition principles are                             
less ‘explanatory’, on this account, is that they do less well at accounting for many observations by                                 
progressively fewer, or progressively better­understood, mechanisms, so as to minimise the number of                         
distinct unexplained phenomena (the fundamental laws and initial conditions), and weave observations                       
together into a single connected web by their reflecting the same underlying principles (cf. Friedman                             
1974, Hempel 1965).   9
Rather than looking at the overall set of laws, we might alternatively look at the internal                               
structure of individual composition principles, as suggested by the recurrent talk of their being ‘linear’                             
(alternatively, “additive and subtractive only”, Morgan 1923, p.3, or “broadly additive”, Wilson                       
2013­a, p.201). But while such talk makes it clear that a formula involving simple addition (a=b+c)                               
meets the criterion, it does not make clear how to apply the criterion beyond that. Vector addition and                                   
scalar addition are already somewhat different mathematically, and the addition of other mathematical                         
forms like squares, logarithms, or integrals hardly seems a mark of emergence. The problem intensifies                             







the role of non­linear equations in modelling chaotic systems, generally taken as straightforwardly                         
non­emergent, threatens to undermine the criterion in any form (as argued byWilson, 2013­a). Thus it                               
seems that the best way to capture the appeal of the ‘linear combinations’ criterion, understood as                               
constraining the internal structure of a composition principle, may be to interpret it as simply requiring                               
combinationists to find, in Broad’s words, some “simple and uniform way” (1925, p.45) of                           




A third approach holds that a composition principle is intelligible when the concepts used in the                               
antecedent and consequent are in some sense akin to each other: this imposes a priori constraints                               
without requiring a priori deducibility. For example, it might be intelligible for one set of movements                               
in space to explain another set, but not for a set of non­spatiotemporal facts to explain an occurrence in                                     
space and time. More specifically, we might require that explained and explaining properties be                           
determinates of the same basic determinables, related in the way that different shades of red are related                                 
to each other through the determinables ‘red’ and, ultimately, ‘coloured’. 
Strawson (2006, p.13ff) uses this standard to argue that intra­mental explanations are more                         
intelligible than the arising of experience from a non­experiential basis, for only in that case do we                                 
“move wholly within a completely conceptually homogeneous (non­heterogeneous) set of notions”                     
(p.15). Mørch (2014) elaborates this as requiring that intelligible explanations involve different forms                         
inhering in the same matter, the same ‘basic stuff’. As James, whom she quotes, says: “all the new                                   
forms of being that make their appearance are really nothing more than results of the redistribution of                                 




the demand for continuity in our explanations of consciousness, voiced by authors such as James and                               
Clifford: that each change must be relevantly gradual, rather than a discontinuous “irruption… of a new                               
nature” (James 1890, p.148).   10
For instance, the explanation of macroscopic liquidity by appeal to microscopic physical and                         
chemical facts about bonding and charges may, on this approach, involve a posteriori composition                           
principles, but what makes it intelligible is that both what explains and what is explained deal                               
essentially with how things in space move in space in response to the movements of other things in                                   




Continuity of natures may seem an easy standard for the experiential combinationist to meet.                           
Microexperiential facts are clearly akin to macroexperiential facts, both being experiential. However,                       
there is a way to strengthen the continuity of natures requirement that makes it much more challenging                                 
for combinationists to meet, by extending it to the relations involved in the antecedents of their                               
composition principles, which we may call ‘bonding relations’. We might require the natures of these                             
bonding relations themselves to be continuous with the properties they bond; as Coleman puts it: 
Such relations [should] visibly flow from the intrinsic natures of the relata… [just as] it is                               
because of the relative looseness of hydrogen electrons, coupled with the convenient gap in the                             
oxygen’s outer shell, that electron sharing happens so readily in the constitution of water. For                             
phenomenal bonding to work, we would need some analogue of this... taking into consideration                           
10  Mørch also takes the idea of preserving the same ‘matter’ to require quantitative conservation of some underlying 
quantity. However, as far as I can tell this criterion makes sense primarily in relation to the particular sort of ‘causal 
combination’ that she discusses, in which a group of simpler consciousness at one time are entirely replaced by a 




the intrinsic features of microsubjects [should] sugges[t] to us the mechanism for their                         
phenomenally bonding. (forthcoming, p.18)  
So the experiential combinationist should look for a relation between distinct subjects that ‘flows from’                             
the intrinsic features of those subjects, so as to be conceptually akin to the experiential properties of the                                   
whole thereby created. Yet it is hard to see what relation satisfies this description: the apparent privacy                                 
of experience makes it hard to see relations among distinct subjects as essentially experiential.  
Of course, we can trivially define an inter­subject relation intelligibly connected with the                         
experiential properties of the whole those subjects compose, by speaking of relations such as ‘jointly                             
composing a conscious subject’, or ‘jointly giving rise to phenomenal unity’. But this fails to connect                               
them intelligibly with the properties of the components: we still need some grasp of what the relations                                 
in question are, beyond being simply ‘the relations which give rise to such­and­such an experiential                             
composite’. Call this the independent grasp requirement. Physical combination easily meets this                       
requirement, for we can understand spatial relations, causal relations, energy­transfer relations, and so                         
on at least as well as we understand any of the complexes they enter into. For instance, we can                                     
understand a whole’s shape in terms of distances between parts, and these distance relations meet the                               
independent grasp requirement; relations such as ‘jointly composing a whole with such­and­such a                         
shape’ do not.  
So while the experiential combinationist can easily satisfy the ‘continuity of natures’ criterion                         
when it comes to the intrinsic properties of parts and wholes, they need to also satisfy it regarding their                                     
bonding relations by providing some micro­level account of what these relations are. It has been argued                               
that this cannot be done:  
Human beings are able to have neither introspective nor perceptive experience of relations                         
between subjects of experiences qua subjects of experience. We are unable to perceive [them]                           




subjects of experience) through the senses... [and since] we can introspect only one subject of                             
experience [ourselves]… we cannot introspect how subjects of experience qua subjects of                       
experience are related, for [then] we would have to be able to introspect more than one subject                                 
of experience. (Goff forthcoming, pp.9­10)  11
So we cannot grasp experiential relations through external perception, for that does not reveal anything                             
distinctively experiential, or through introspection, for that reveals only one subject, and thus cannot                           
reveal the links between multiple subjects: thus we cannot grasp experiential relations at all.                           
Consequently Goff concludes that while there may be such relations, and while they may play the                               
metaphysical role that constitutive panpsychists (and other combinationists) claim, they are of no                         
explanatory use; the link between experiential parts and wholes remains mysterious.  
There are at least three ways for combinationists to address this challenge: they might claim                             
that the experiential bonding relations are graspable via external perception, or via introspection upon                           
only one of the relata, or via introspection upon both relata. The first of these options is probably open                                     
only to the physicalist combinationist, who might hold that experiential properties, being ultimately                         
physical, can be be directly observed in others. They might claim that neural synchrony (cf. Crick &                                 
Koch 1990), for instance, or information integration (cf. Tononi 2012) is the experiential bonding                           
relation, and that we learn of it by observing brain structure. But primitivists about consciousness, such                               
as the panpsychists at whom Goff’s and Coleman’s arguments are directed, will find this unsatisfying.   
The second approach is to claim that we can grasp the experiential bonding relations through                             
standing in them. For instance, perhaps in some social interactions, the distinctive way in which our                               
experiences represent those of our conversational partners or co­operators allows those experiences to                         







‘being in the world’ constitutes the cosmic composite mind. However worked out, this implies that we                               
can grasp the nature of a relation through being one of the relata, contra Goff’s implicit claim that we                                     
grasp a relation only if we are acquainted somehow with both relata. Moreover, it implies that we                                 
sometimes stand in the experiential bonding relation to something else: we actually stand to external                             
things in some of the relations which bond our component subjects into a composite subject. This                               
virtually guarantees that combinationists must countenance what in chapter 1 I called ‘mega­subjects’,                         
with all the attendant difficulties. Call this the ‘outward­looking’ approach to grasping the bonding                           
relations.  
A final way to satisfy the independent grasp requirement is to claim that we are introspectively                               
acquainted with the relations among our component subjects, because they are somehow present to us                             
in our own experience. In particular, combinationists might point out that we do seem to be                               
introspectively acquainted with relations among experiences, and that these might constitute relations                       
among subjects that meet Coleman’s requirement that bonding relations ‘grow out of’ the natures of                             
their relata. This helps only if our experiences belong not only to us but also to our parts. That is,                                       
combinationists might seek to meet the independent grasp requirement by endorsing the sharing of                           
token experiences: the experiential relations among our parts are mediated by relations among their                           
experiences, which are then introspectively revealed to us as internal relations within our own                           
experience.  
Call this the ‘inward­looking’ approach: it aims to identify the ways that elements of                           
experience are related to each other, and abstract those relations from the particular configurations of                             
them that we find, hoping to extrapolate to their holding between distinct component subjects and                             








A final account claims that in genuinely intelligible combination, the properties of the whole are not                               
really distinct from the properties of its parts: they are either the very same token properties, shared by                                   
whole and part, or are reducible to some set of properties that are thus shared. We can make this idea                                       
more precise by distinguishing three sorts of principles (with two alternative variants of the second                             
sort): 
Token­Sharing of x: Particular tokens of property x can belong simultaneously to two                         
different entities.  
(Conditional) Inheritance of x: A whole has property x whenever one of its parts does (and                               
when, moreover, that part is appropriately related to its other parts), simply in virtue of the part                                 
having x (and being appropriately related to the other parts). 
x­y Connections: Something can have property y simply by having properties x1, x2, etc... 
Call these three sorts of principles ‘token­sharing principles’, ‘inheritance principles’, and ‘connection                       
principles’; they are logically independent, yet fit naturally together. If all three hold for some                             
properties, then a whole may have those properties and yet there be no properties involved that are not,                                   
ultimately, grounded intelligibly in the parts. Yet these principles are far from trivial: they commit                             
combinationists to some strong metaphysical claims. It would be implausible to demand that the                           
experiential combinationist must fit experiential combination into this schema, if there were no                         







It is intuitively plausible that token physical features are often shared between parts and wholes. For                               
instance, an object with an uneven surface seems to share that instance of unevenness with its surface                                 
(and all sections of it that include that surface). A red surface seems to share, with each of its red                                       
subsections, their particular instances of redness. A car may be dented when its roof is dented, and this                                   
seems to involve only one instance of the property ‘being dented’: similarly for being perforated, or                               
wounded. If I can be said to be ‘metabolising alcohol’ when my liver is, it seems wrong to think of this                                         
as two instances of that activity. In all of these cases it seems natural to say that there is a single                                         12
instance of the property in question, which can be truly ascribed both the whole and the part. These                                   13
cases are at least intuitively different from cases where there are two separate and independent                             
instances of the same property (two red things side­by­side, two distinct dents or wounds, etc.). 
Obviously the interpretation of these cases will depend on one’s metaphysics of properties, for                           
token­sharing is meaningful only if there are such things as particular instances of properties. If our                               
basic ontology admitted only objects and universals, we might have to construct the idea of an instance,                                 
for instance by saying that there is an instance of a property for every triple of an object, a property, and                                         
a time such that that object instantiates that property at that time. Depending on how we construct this                                   
idea, we might find that the sharing of instances between objects is simply ruled out. However, I find                                   
the above examples compelling enough, and widespread enough, to consider it a requirement on any                             
theory of properties that it be able to do justice to the distinctive form of ontological dependence                                 













dentedness from each of its dented parts, we should still recognise that the dentedness of the car is                                   
nothing over and above that of its roof. The current proposal is that this sort of ‘nothing over and                                     
aboveness’ is part of what makes physical combination intelligible, and that the experiential                         
combinationist should seek to employ it in their own theory. This proposal does not depend on how we                                   
characterise this ‘nothing over and aboveness’, whether in terms of a single shared instance, or as a sui                                   
generis sort of compositional grounding, or in some other way.  14
Many of the above examples are also compelling cases of ‘conditional inheritance’, with the                           
whole ‘inheriting’ the relevant properties from its parts, having them simply as a consequence of                             
containing a part which has them. Yet not all wholes would inherit these properties: many mereological                               
fusions of which I and my liver are parts (e.g. ‘the fusion of me and the CN tower’) should not be said                                           
to ‘metabolise alcohol’, for they lack a metabolism. The property is inherited by the whole only if the                                   
part instantiating it is integrated with the other parts of that whole so as to give the whole the                                     
appropriate sort of structure. Consider an example from Kriegel:  
By punching Johnny's nose, Jimmy punches Johnny, but does not punch the galaxy, because                           
Johnny's nose is integrated into Johnny in a way it is not into the galaxy: the interconnections                                 
between Johnny's nose and the rest of Johnny are very tight relative to the interconnections                             
between Johnny's nose and the rest of the galaxy. (2009, p.227) 
Here the property ‘being punched’ is conditionally inherited: the whole (Jonny) having these properties                           
is both intelligibly explained by, and metaphysically grounded in, the possession of those properties by                             












Are there examples of unconditional inheritance of physical properties? Several authors have endorsed                         
the following principle:  
Location Inheritance: A whole is located at a given point or region of space whenever one or                                 
more of its parts is, simply in virtue of the part being located there.  
This principle is affirmed by Van Inwagen (1990, p.44) Lewis (1991, p.85), Sider (2004, p.52 and                               
throughout), Bennett (forthcoming, p.10), and McQueen (2014a), with Sider and Bennett both                       
expressing it as ‘inheritance’ of location properties. These authors take this principle to be obviously                             
true: Van Inwagen calls it “self­evident.”(p.54), Sider says that “everyone accepts” it (p.75), and                           
Bennett calls it “fairly uncontroversial and not really in need of argument... [something] that can                             
legitimately be taken as data [and is] hard to deny.” (p.11) We can attribute this plausibility in part to                                     15
the plausibility of token­sharing for location properties: if both part and whole occupy a particular                             
location, that location is not occupied twice over, but only once; the same instance of occupying it                                 
belongs to two entities. 
Moreover, these authors do not regard location inheritance as expressing an idiosyncratic fact                         
about space – rather, they accept it as just one instance of a more general mereological phenomenon,                                 
though their other examples diverge somewhat. Sider pairs “Inheritance of location” with “Inheritance                         










(p.70), while Van Inwagen accompanies it with principles governing mass (a whole’s mass is the sum                               
of its parts’) and surface area (a whole’s surface area is equal to or less than the sum of its parts’)                                         
(p.44). Lewis speaks more generally of “the ease of describing fusions”(p.85): if you “describe the                             
character of the parts [and] describe their interrelation… you have ipso facto described the fusion”                             
(p.81).  
16
Of course, location inheritance is defensible only if its meaning is properly qualified. There is                             
an obvious sense in which I am located in a different (larger) area than, say, my foot. Sider (2007, Fn4,                                       
p.52) replies that there is an ambiguity in ‘located’: it can mean ‘wholly located’, and this is not                                   
inherited, but this sense can be defined in terms of another, more non­committal sense: to be ‘wholly                                 
located’ in some region is to be ‘located’, in this basic and non­committal sense, at all and only the                                     
points in that region. And location in this sense is inherited. Here we see a pattern that will be repeated:                                       
something can be located somewhere in a sense which is sensitive to its total set of location properties,                                   
and in a sense which says nothing about where else it is located. Call properties of the first sort                                     
17
‘systemic’, and properties of the second sort ‘additive’. Systemic properties are sensitive to the overall                             
set of properties belonging to their bearer; additive ones are not.  
It might be objected that many composite objects occupy large regions of space even though                             
their parts occupy only point­sized parts within this region. This illustrates a different ambiguity in                             
‘located’. To be located is to occupy some amount of space, and we might analyse ‘occupying’ as                                 
meaning (roughly) exerting forces that exclude other, discrete, things from that space. Then something                           










say that the parts are located only at points, since they exert forces much more widely than that. In the                                       
sense in which they occupy only points, the whole does as well, according to the defender of location                                   
inheritance. We simply need to keep our notion of ‘location’ univocal. 
One striking thing about location inheritance is how readily it suggests a set of ‘connection                             
principles’ to complete the combinationist account of geometrical properties. Obviously many                     
geometric properties are not inherited: something made of circular parts need not be circular, nor must                               
something made of small parts be small. But location properties, which plausibly are inherited, provide                             
a basis for determining other geometrical properties: by a priori principles, we can derive a thing’s                               
shape, size, orientation, etc. from knowing which points or regions of space it is located at. For                                 
instance, if it occupies approximately those points whose distance from a single specific point is less                               
than a certain value, then it is spherical. Different geometrical connection principles will place more or                               
less importance on the relations among the inherited properties, and in the limiting case may be entirely                                 
insensitive to these: a thing’s volume depends merely on how much space it occupies, regardless of                               
how that space is arranged, while its surface area depends crucially on how this space is distributed.                                 18












Power Sharing: Particular token causal powers can belong simultaneously to two different                       
entities.  
Power Inheritance: A whole has a given causal power whenever any of its parts do, simply in                                 
virtue of the part having that power. 
These could be glossed as saying that what a whole does is just all the things which its parts do.                                       
19
Connection principles would then allow us to deduce various other physical properties, such as                           
brittleness, mass, density, and so on, from the whole’s set of causal powers. Many connection                             
20
principles will be analytic, simply definitions of intuitively­understood properties; we might look for                         
examples to the explanations of solidity and liquidity given by Jackson (1998, pp.3­4) and Horgan                             
(1993, p.379), already quoted in section 1.  
Several authors say things which seem to suggest acceptance of power sharing and power                           
inheritance, at least for non­emergent physical cases. Merricks says that when a baseball shatters a                             
window, “every atom arranged baseballwise causes something, and when what one of them causes is                             
added to what each of the others causes, the ‘sum’ is the shattering of the window.”(2001, p.111)                                 
21























something like this. In the homopathic (non­emergent) case, the combined effect is simply the two                             
component effects, both existing and composing the joint effect just by existing. That is, in such cases                                 
“one cause never, properly speaking, defeats or frustrates another; both have their full effect” (1843,                             
p.458). With heteropathic combinations, by contrast, the normal effects are absent, being replaced                         
according to a new and different law.  
There is a complication here in the fact that Mill is not talking of persisting composite objects                                 
like molecules, but only about ‘composite causes’. We could translate this into talk about the causal                               
powers of composite things, by supposing that when there is an effect of two or more causes, there                                   
must be a single thing (‘the cause’) which may be attributed the causal powers of all the things                                   
producing effects, which can then be called its parts. But such a conversion goes beyond what Mill                                 
says, and is not uncontroversial; it seems to presuppose or imply unrestricted composition, insofar as it                               
requires a whole containing any two things which both have effects on the same thing. If we did                                   
translate Mill’s distinction in this fashion, we might say that a whole’s properties are transparently                             
explained by those of its parts when its causal powers are simply the combined causal powers of all of                                     
its parts (perhaps restricted to those which are actually exercised, or could be exercised compatibly with                               
that part still composing that whole), which is just what power sharing and power inheritance claim.  
Others might endorse only a conditional form of power inheritance. Some authors have                         
defended the view that particular instances of mental states are nothing over and above the physical                               
states that realise them, because they possess a proper subset of the realising state’s causal powers                               
(Wilson 1999, pp.45­51, Shoemaker 2000, p.28). The realising state in turn may be regarded as the                               
collection of physical states of the relevant brain parts (see Gillett 2002, p.319, Wilson 2013­a, Fn.3).                               
Indeed, some advocate extending this to all special science entities, whose causal autonomy lies                           




forthcoming), yet whose ontological dependence on the physical lies in their sharing a subset of those                               
causal powers.  
Like location inheritance, power inheritance naturally suggests accompanying connection                 
principles. In particular, any functionalisable property ­ any property which can be analysed as the                             
playing of a certain ‘causal role’ ­ can be analysed as a certain set of causal powers. The earlier contrast                                       
between ‘additive’ and ‘systemic’ properties recurs here: a causal profile (the property of playing a                             
certain causal role) is a ‘systemic’ property, dependent on a thing’s total set of properties, and might be                                   
lost by the gaining of new powers. By contrast, causal powers (like any inherited property) must be                                 
understood in an ‘additive’ sense, as having no implications about the other properties of their bearer.  
A much more basic connection principle might be that exerting two or more forces on the same                                 
object is no different from exerting a resultant force equal to their vector sum on that object. Together                                   
with power inheritance, this implies that a composite exerts on any object the sum of the forces which                                   
its parts exert on that object: in McQueen’s derivation of mass additivity from Newtonian physics, he                               
explicitly relies on this principle (2014a, p.13), though treating it as a microphysical law.  
This connection principle could be rejected: perhaps we must distinguish exerting a single total                           
force on something from exerting many smaller forces on it. For one thing, as has been noted                                 
repeatedly (Russell 1903, p. 477, Wilson 2009, p.541), component forces are not ‘parts’ of a resultant                               
force in the usual sense of ‘part’, since a single force can be seen as having any number of sets of                                         
components – a diagonal motion as two perpendicular motions, or a greater motion in the same                               
direction and a lesser motion in the opposite direction, and so on. So the idea of the component effects                                     








a number of accounts have been offered that vindicate the presence of component forces in combined                               




So there are at least two cases ­ causal properties and spatial properties ­ where a physical                                 
combinationist might endorse unconditional inheritance. It is worth asking whether conditional                     
inheritance can be analysed in terms of unconditional inheritance, specifically unconditional inheritance                       
of the additive components of a property whose proper analysis shows it to be a conjunction of additive                                   
and systemic components.  
Recall Kriegel’s example, ‘being punched’. Someone might maintain that there are some                       
properties that the galaxy instantiates simply in virtue of someone punching Jonny’s nose: the galaxy’s                             
basic physical features (mass, charge, etc.) come to be differently distributed by the compression,                           
changing its causal powers in various miniscule ways. These physical properties, if formulated in an                             23
appropriately additive way, might be claimed to be unconditionally inherited. And if this does not                             
suffice for us to say that the galaxy has been punched, the reason might be that to be punched is not                                         
only for punching­events to take place in you, but for them to play some sort of overall systemic role in                                       
you. For instance, perhaps they need to be in some sense prominent among the things taking place in                                   
you: the punching events involve both Jonny and the galaxy, but involve Jonny more heavily. The                               










Jonny, on average, than in other parts of the galaxy, on average (even though all of the former changes                                     
are among the latter). The punching­events are not prominent in the overall goings on in the galaxy,                                 
since most of the galaxy is unaffected, whereas they are prominent in the overall goings on in Jonny. Or                                     
maybe for you to be punched, the punching­events need to impact your overall physical or biological                               
integrity and self­maintenance, either positively or negatively. Or maybe the overall role is something                           
else: the point is that any such role will be non­heritable simply because it is systemic, not additive.  
Perhaps all cases of conditional inheritance admit of a similar analysis: the properties in                           
question resolve into an unconditionally inherited ‘core’, which is additive in that its possession does                             
not depend on a thing’s total set of properties, and a non­inherited systemic ‘role’ for that core to play.                                     
A composite ‘conditionally inherits’ the full property in that it instantiates it only when the inherited                               
core plays the right overall role. Alternatively, perhaps conditional inheritance is just as basic as, or                               
more basic than, unconditional inheritance. This question will recur in chapter 3.   
There can be further variation among inheritance principles, beyond conditional and                     
unconditional. What I have discussed so far, and will generally have in mind, is ‘upward inheritance’:                               
inheritance by wholes from parts. We could also evaluate ‘downward inheritance’, where a part has a                               
property because the whole has it. ‘Both­ways inheritance’ conjoins downward and upward inheritance                         
into a biconditional, as would be particularly appropriate for supporters of composition­as­identity,                       
who take wholes and parts to be symmetrically related.  
Note that given an inheritance principle for x and an x­y connection principle, we can derive a                                 
composition principle for y: a principle saying that when certain things exist with certain properties and                               








schema simply adds a ‘middle­man’ that the composition principle does not, in the form of the                               
properties the whole inherits from its parts, and which themselves determine its possession of the                             




For experiential combination to fit the sharing­inheritance­connections schema, we would have to                       
suppose that token experiential properties can in some cases by shared by distinct subjects, that at least                                 
some are conditionally or unconditionally inherited, and that those which a whole possesses but its                             
parts lack can be analysed as some set of more basic experiential properties connected together.  
This proposal faces serious challenges, most obviously over the apparent conflict between the                         
requirement that experiences be shared by part and whole, and the idea that each subject’s experiences                               
are ‘private’, belonging essentially to that subject and never also to another subject. In physical                             
combination, the difficult questions are generally about properties: can we explain properties like                         
‘being water’, ‘being alive’, ‘being liquid’, in terms of other, simpler, properties? There is little concern                               
that the composite entities bearing those properties are themselves specially inexplicable, by nature cut                           
off from the other entities which are their parts. But conscious subjects have been claimed by some to                                   
be ‘metaphysically insulated’ from each other by their basic nature: Coleman (2012) calls them                           










subjects are “the most absolute breaches in nature.” (p.226) This seems to rule out token­sharing, which                               
in turn makes inheritance hard to maintain.  
The schema potentially also threatens to ‘overgenerate’, in at least two ways. First, any sort of                               
unconditional inheritance of experiential properties is liable to entail consciousness in many systems                         
we would normally have considered clearly non­conscious, such as the solar system, the galaxy, or any                               
number of scattered mereological sums. This will apply also if the inheritance of experiential properties                             
is conditional, but based ultimately in the unconditional inheritance of their additive ‘core properties’                           
(as was suggested for ‘being punched’). For then whatever core there is to experiential properties, not                               
captured by their overall functional role, will be inherited by mereological fusions. For similar reasons,                             
panpsychist combinationists will find that the multitudinous experiences of the micro­level subjects                       
they postulate may be inherited by human beings: our experience will be, contrary to initial                             
appearances, ‘over­stuffed’ with trillions of microexperiences. These problems were prefigured in the                       
last chapter, in the discussion of mega­subjects and micro­subjects; they will be addressed in chapters 6                               
and 5.  
Despite the difficulties just canvassed, there are also advantages in pursuing a                       
sharing­inheritance­connections analysis of experiential combination. For a start, it provides a direct,                       
and distinctly metaphysical, sense in which the experiences of the whole are nothing over and above,                               
and thus may be explained by, those of the parts. Indeed, some critiques of combinationism (in the                                 
form of constitutive panpsychism) start from the assumption that it must involve something like the                             
token­sharing of experiences if it is to be intelligible (James 1909, p.181, Basile 2010, p.108, Coleman                               
forthcoming, pp.14­16). Moreover, it is parsimonious: explaining a composite mind as involving the                         





There is even an advantage in being open to all the challenges discussed above: the                             
sharing­inheritance­connections schema brings directly into focus what seems problematic about                   
experiential combination, such as the conflict between token sharing and the privacy of experience, and                             
the threat of overgeneration and its relationship to the possibility of phenomenal overflow. Other                           
frameworks run together the transition from component subjects to composite subjects with the                         
transition from one set of experiential properties to another: by separating these steps, this schema                             
allows a clearer discussion of specific objections to each.  
Finally, as noted at the end of the last section, the sharing of experiences between part and                                 
whole gives combinationists a way to meet the independent grasp requirement on experiential bonding                           
relations: if our component subjects share our experiences, then our introspective grasp on the relations                             




We have reviewed four models of what makes physical combination intelligible, and what is therefore                             
needed for experiential combination. These models are not necessarily opposed: they might all capture                           
fragments of the truth. For instance, it might be that continuity of natures, a metaphysical criterion,                               
dovetails with a priori deducibility, an epistemological criterion, because only when the explained and                           
explaining properties are conceptually akin to one another can one conceptually entail the other. Or the                               
idea of properties being shared and inherited might be judged more attractive because general in                             





Consequently I will not choose any single criterion, but keep all on the table. As we explore                                 
various challenges to combinationism ­ most especially its apparent explanatory gap, the topic of                           
chapter 3 ­ we will be able to see the different implications of adopting different standards of                                 
intelligibility, and can evaluate which ones combinationism can and cannot meet. That said, this                           
chapter has revealed some interesting choices in how we approach combinationism, which it will be                             
useful to run over here. This discussion (of different approaches to making combinationism intelligible)                           
complements the discussion in chapter 1 section 3 (of different versions of combinationism for                           
different prior views of consciousness and composition).  
First, there are a priori and a posteriori approaches: adherents of the former think that in order                                 
for microexperiential facts to genuinely explain macroexperiential facts, even just in our world, they                           
must entail macroexperiential facts in every world. On this view the very natures of parthood and                               
experience guarantee combinationism. On the a posteriori approach, only the laws of nature operative                           
at our world allow microexperiential facts to explain macroexperiential facts: what makes these laws                           
suitably intelligible is their generality of application, or the metaphysical relations between the                         
experiential properties and relations they deal with.  
We should also distinguish different approaches to our grasp of the experiential bonding                         
relations. A physicalist combinationist need not see an especially pressing problem here: the relations                           
involved in experiential combination need not be fundamentally experiential relations, and so might be                           
detectable in fairly normal ways. But a primitivist combinationist might feel a need for distinctively                             
experiential bonding relations, and these would have to be grasped in one of two ways: the                               





In fact, I believe that there is a suitable bonding relation which we can grasp in both the                                   
outward­looking and the inward­looking ways, a relation which I call, inspired by Husserl,                         
‘adumbration’, and which forms the centrepiece of chapter 4’s discussion of the unity of consciousness.                             
The principal remaining difference between the two approaches is then the further commitments they                           
imply: the outward­looking approach requires accepting mega­subjects, while the inward­looking                   
approach requires accepting the token­sharing of experiences.  
Finally, we can connect views on experiential inheritance with views on phenomenal overflow                         
(phenomenal consciousness without cognitive access). If phenomenal overflow is possible, then there                       
may be more space for a combinationist to accept unconditional experiential inheritance, and the                           
resultant profusion of cognitively­inaccessible phenomenal consciousness both in mega­subjects and in                     
human beings (if there are micro­subjects). Thus combinationists might pursue two divergent                       
approaches: using the possibility of phenomenal overflow to argue that the consciousness of composite                           
things may in fact include all or much of the consciousness of all their parts, or using the impossibility                                     
of phenomenal overflow to explain why so much of the consciousness of a thing’s parts is excluded                                 
from the consciousness of the whole. Call these the ‘inclusionary’ and ‘exclusionary’ approaches to                           
combinationism: a combinationist who defends any unconditional inheritance of experiential properties                     
must take the inclusionary approach, while others may take the more conservative exclusionary                         



































The experiential combinationist claims that understanding the consciousness of a thing’s parts explains                         
­ renders intelligible, lets us understand ­ the consciousness of the whole thing. Yet it is far from                                   
obvious that it does anything of the sort, and a central strand of this apparent ‘explanatory gap’ is what                                     
I call, following Goff (2009b) and Chalmers (forthcoming­a, p.4) the ‘subject­summing’ problem, the                         
problem of whether the mere being­conscious of a composite with conscious parts can be explained by                               
the consciousness of those parts. Subjects, qua subjects, seem insulated from each other in a way that                                 
precludes any experiential facts about one subject from explaining experiential facts about another. So                           
the experiential combinationist must confront a principled concern that the experiential properties of a                           





Other strands of the explanatory gap problem involve explaining particular features of the                         
consciousness of a composite subject, such as its unity or qualitative diversity, or considering                           
experiential changes in a thing’s parts that seem compatible with experiential invariance in the whole.                             
These directly connect with other problems, involving what I earlier called ‘latent incoherence’                         
arguments about phenomenal unity and the implications of ‘micro­subjects’ of the sort postulated by                           
panpsychists. I address them in detail in chapters 4 and 5. But addressing these problems would be                                 
pointless if the more basic subject­summing problem remained unresolved, so in this chapter I consider                             
that problem. I first outline the problem, and a minimal proposal to address it, involving the conditional                                 
inheritance and token­sharing of experiential properties. The final three sections then evaluate this                         
proposal, arguing that given the right premises, versions of it can provide adequate explanations of                             





No Summing of Subjects (NSS): It is never the case that the existence of a number (one or                                   
more) of subjects of experience with certain phenomenal characters a priori entails the                         
existence of some other subject of experience. (2009a, p.302; a slightly different formulation                         
appears at 2009b, p.130) 
However, while the NSS principle is a good start, it is not quite the right principle to be evaluating, for                                       
at least two kinds of combinationist might happily endorse it. First, it does not make any mention of                                   
relations among subjects, and so a combinationist who assigned a crucial role to relations might accept                               




employed some other standard for intelligible explanations might accept it. For a claim that all                             
combinationists must deny, we should consider a slightly adjusted version of NSS: 
Explanatory Gap between Subjects (EGS): It is never the case that the existence of a number                               
(one or more) of subjects of experience with certain phenomenal characters, standing in                         
independently intelligible relations , renders intelligible the existence of some other subject of                       1
experience. 
There is at least some plausibility in this claim: it seems that conceiving of any number of conscious                                   
subjects, aware of their experiences, does not entail any further subject, aware of its experiences. In this                                 




The explanatory gap between subjects is sometimes dramatised by considering groups of human                         
beings, and claiming that nothing said about the human beings individually seems to entail                           
consciousness in the group itself.   
For instance, Brentano and Plotinus both, in arguing for the simplicity of the mind, claim that                               
sensory experiences in distinct parts of something could not be directly compared, because they would                             
be analogous to experiences in two people, and pluralities of people cannot directly compare their                             
experiences (Plotinus 1956, p.346, Brentano 1987, p.293). Louis de Courcillon makes the same point,                           






we sense in this room the pleasure that those who are at the Opera are presently sensing.” (1684, trans.                                     
Schachter 2002, p.250) James makes a similar claim in arguing against a certain form of panpsychism: 
Take a hundred [feelings], shuffle them and pack them as close together as you can (whatever                               
that may mean); still each remains the same feeling it always was, shut in its own skin,                                 
windowless, ignorant of what the other feelings are and mean. There would be a                           
hundred­and­first feeling there, if, when a group or series of such feelings were set up, a                               
consciousness belonging to the group as such should emerge. And this 101st feeling would be a                               
totally new fact… Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each one                                     
word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as                                           
intently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence. (1890, p.160) 
One way to read such analogies is as presenting reductio arguments, with one conditional and one                               
negative premise: if conscious parts produced conscious wholes, then groups of human beings would                           
have a collective consciousness; but they do not; hence conscious parts do not produce conscious                             
wholes. But this reading is uncharitable, because the first premise seems needlessly strong: it is hardly                               
fair to assume that if something is possible, it must occur in all cases. Moreover, the second premise,                                   
while intuitive, is actually denied by James: he does not say that the ‘101st feeling’ definitely does not                                   
appear, but that even if “by a curious physical law” it did, it would not be explained by the component                                       
feelings (p.160).  
The reading I prefer is that the analogy to a group of people simply illustrates the failure of                                   
explanation claimed by EGS: by considering the parts of composite subject as though they were many                               
little humans, we see vividly that no specification of facts about them could by itself entail any                                 
consciousness in the group. After all, we routinely attribute consciousness to people while refusing to                             
do so with groups of them.  
Two things are worth noting about this argumentative strategy. First, the parts of a human                             




bound together more tightly, are more sensitive to each other’s state, transmit information more quickly                             
and directly, and so on. Since this difference in relations may well play a role in the constitution of a                                       
composite subject, these analogies provide stronger support for the NSS principle than for the EGS                             
principle. Second, James’s discussion is not as specifically directed at experiential combination as has                           
often been assumed (Cf. Shani 2010): he is in fact a mereological nihilist who holds that “Atoms of                                   
feeling cannot compose higher feelings, any more than atoms of matter can compose physical things”                             
(1890, p.161, emphasis added). Nevertheless I include James’s passage because it has taken on a life of                                 
its own, being repeatedly quoted by authors registering an intuitive difficulty specifically with                         




A different way to show the explanatory gap is inspired by the ‘philosophical zombie’, a being                               
physically and functionally identical to a human being but wholly lacking in consciousness, whose                           
apparent conceivability threatens physicalism. The possibility of such an argument is already noted by                           
Carruthers and Schechter (2006, p.38), but Goff (2009a) develops it at length, arguing for the                             
conceivability of a ‘microexperiential zombie’, defined as a “physical duplicate of an actual organism                           
which is such that there is something that it is like to be each of its ultimates [but which] does not have                                           
o­experience”(p.296), where ‘o­experience’ is “the conscious states pre­theoretical common sense                   
attributes to organisms”(p.290). An example of such a zombie is:  
My itchy twin… a physical duplicate of me such that each of its physical ultimates feels itchy…                                 
my itchy twin has no o­experience. If you stick a knife in him he will scream and run away, but                                       






Now, the conceivability of microexperiential zombies in this particular sense does not actually support                           
EGS, for it is no part of the definition of a microexperiential zombie that it lacks experience altogether                                   
and thus fails to be a subject; it may have the simple and disconnected experiences of its parts. Thus the                                       
conceivability of Goff’s itchy twin does not establish that experiential facts about one subject cannot                             
explain experiential facts about another ­ but merely that they cannot explain a certain sort of                               
experience.  
But we can define a being which is physically and functionally identical to a human being,                               
wholly lacking in consciousness, but composed of conscious microscopic parts. Call this being, whose                           
conceivability would support EGS, a ‘microexperiential super­zombie’. As with microexperiential                   
zombies, we can devise any number of specific types (itchy, pained, euphoric, etc.) by attributing                             
different experiences to the parts. The difference is that when you stick a knife into an ‘itchy                                 
microexperiential super­zombie’, not only does it feel no pain, it also feels no itch. 
Even the microexperiential super­zombie is a threat only to a priori forms of combinationism.                           
A posteriori combinationists can accept the conceivability of such a being, but say that what is being                                 
conceived of is simply a world with different laws of nature ­ in particular, without the laws of nature                                     
that govern the generation of macroexperience by microexperience in our own world. The fact that a                               




Here is another way to think about subject­summing. Plausibly, ‘x is a conscious subject’ is equivalent                               




to sympathetically imagine being x’, where ‘sympathetic imagination’ is the mental process of                         
“put[ting] oneself in a conscious state resembling the thing itself”( Nagel 1974, Fn11). If something has                               
experiences, it should be possible to ask what it is like to be it, and imagine various answers. It may be                                         
that accurately imagining being some creatures is in practice impossible for us, as it is likely impossible                                 
for us to imagine the sensory experiences of someone or something with different sensory modalities                             
from us, but there should be at least some possible act of sympathetic imagination which would count                                 
as accurate if directed onto the being in question. 
Granting this equivalence of consciousness with imaginability, the question of                   
subject­summing is whether, given some collection of subjects somehow related, each of which we                           
could imagine being, some further act of imagination qualifies as imagining being the whole they                             
compose. Does it make sense, given some conscious beings, to try and imagine ‘being all of them’?                                 
What imaginative act could be appropriate to the group? It might seem impossible to make sense of                                 
imagining being all of them: as Barnett says, even if we can imagine being Descartes and can imagine                                   




The examples considered in the last section tend to undermine the plausibility of combinationism, and                             
in particular of explanatory relations between distinct subjects. However, there are other cases which                           
may push us in the opposite direction, such as those which fit a certain abstract specification I will call                                     
‘the easy case’. Building off these cases, combinationists can develop a systematic account of                           








Suppose a group of entities compose a highly­integrated whole, and one of them is a conscious subject.                                 
Suppose that this one part’s stream of consciousness plays a central role in guiding the overall activity                                 
of the whole ­ when that part wishes another part to move a certain way, the other part does so, and                                         
events happening in the other parts produces conscious perceptions in this part. 
It seems plausible that, given these facts about its parts, the whole entity has experiences ­ more                                 
precisely, has exactly the same experiences (both type­ and token­identical) as its one conscious part. It                               
is at least overwhelmingly plausible that if the composite has experiences, its experiences are simply                             
those of its one conscious part ­ at least, given something like a ‘that’s­all’ premise, ruling out any extra                                     
emergent forces or extraneous factors. Moreover, if the whole shares the experiences of this part, it                               
clearly has them in virtue of that part having them (and, perhaps, being appropriately connected to the                                 
other parts), and its having them is explained by that part having them (and being so connected).  
This plausibility appears especially when we consider two particular instances of the easy case:                           
first, the human body as described by materialists, which might be thought conscious in virtue of events                                 
going on in its brain, and second, the human being as described by substance dualists, a composite of                                   
soul and body which might be thought conscious in virtue of events going on in its soul. Even here, the                                       
explanatory claim a combinationist might want to make is not uncontroversial: a dualist might deny                             
that the soul­body composite is really conscious, while a materialist might either deny that the whole                               




think cases like this are the best place for combinationists to look for a starting point of intuitive                                   
plausibility.   2
The plausibility of thinking that the whole in the easy case shares the experiences of its part is                                   
reflected in the fact that even Goff, in his defence of NSS, actually accepts it. The relevant instance of                                     
the easy case is a particular type of microexperiential zombie, which Goff calls the ‘homuncular                             
zombie’. This is a physical and functional replica of a human, which lacks all complex human                               
experience, but one microscopic part of which does have all the richness of human experience. Given                               
that NSS (and a fortiori EGS) entails the conceivability of homuncular zombies, it is surprising that                               
Goff holds such creatures to be inconceivable precisely because by attributing complex experiences to a                             
part of the zombie one ipso facto attributes experiences to the whole zombie – i.e. because mental                                 
properties are inherited in this case, in spite of NSS.  
This tension in Goff 2009a has not been widely recognised, but could be resolved in two ways                                 
(in correspondence with Goff both were mooted). On the one hand, one might weaken NSS to the                                 
different version given in Goff 2009b, which rules out subjects summing into a subject with different                               
experiences from theirs. This version of NSS no longer concerns subjects, but only how to get the right                                   
experiences for those subjects. Thus it amounts to giving up the strict denial of explanatory relations                               
between distinct subjects. On the other hand, one might qualify the inconceivability of homuncular                           
zombies by saying that the homuncular zombie has experiences ‘in a merely derivative sense’, allowing                             










properties ‘in a merely derivative sense’. This demands a brief digression on the meaning of this                               
phrase.  
In one sense, saying that an inherited property is had in a derivative sense just means that the                                   
bearer derives it from something else, i.e. has that property in virtue of something else having it. But it                                     
could also mean something stronger: that the whole doesn’t really have that property at all. This would                                 
be like a demographer counting the children of Christians as Christians, regardless of their actual                             
beliefs or practices: the children are ‘Christians’ in a merely derivative sense, which contrasts with                             
actually being Christians. In the experiential case, we can approach this question by asking whether, for                               
some intended meaning of ‘derivative’, we ourselves might have experiences ‘in a merely derivative                           
sense’. If we might – if our acquaintance with our phenomenology does not rule that out – then it is no                                         
defect in a compositional explanation of our minds that it attributes us experiences in that kind of                                 
derivative sense. If, on the other hand, we can be sure that we do not have experiences ‘in a merely                                       
derivative sense’, because that would contrast with literally having experiences, then nothing I say                           
about inheritance principles should be read as speaking merely in that kind of derivative sense.  
In particular, any principle of inheritance that ascribed the inherited properties in a ‘merely                           
derivative’ sense, where that contrasts with ascribing them literally, would be uninteresting, and                         
perhaps even tautologous. For instance, if the claim “everything with a square part is ‘square’” uses the                                 
term ‘square’ in a non­literal sense, as meaning ‘has a square part’, then it is a boring tautology. The                                     
claim is substantive (and in this case, false) because it attributes properties in their literal, primary sense                                 







Extrapolating from the easy case, a combinationist might propose the following two theses to bridge                             
the explanatory gap between distinct subjects: 
Token­Sharing of Experiences (TSE): Particular experiences can belong simultaneously to                   
two different entities.  
Conditional Experience Inheritance (CEI): A whole has an experiential property whenever                     
one of its parts does and that part is appropriately related to its other parts, simply in virtue of                                     
the part having that experiential property and being appropriately related to the other parts. 
One immediate question is what ‘appropriately related’ means in Conditional Experience Inheritance:                       
this will be explored in more depth in section 4, but can be summarised here as some combination of                                     
phenomenal unity, causal integration, and intelligent joint control of behaviour. Whatever relations are                         
involved in the conditions specified by CEI will to that extent function as experiential ‘bonding                             
relations’ of the sort discuss in chapter 2, subsection 3.1.  
Another question is how we are to think of ‘experiences’, these particulars that TSE asserts can                               
be shared; as noted in chapter 1, subsection 1.2, I have so far left their ontology open beyond the                                     
stipulation that we have experiences whenever we instantiate experiential properties. Their ontology                       
will become more important now, because a key part of the motivation behind the above two theses is                                   
the idea that wholes do not generally have new experiences distinctive to them: rather, they inherit                               
(under the right conditions) the experiences of their parts ­ these token experiences belong both to the                                 
whole and to the part. This allows combinationists to shift their focus away from explaining the                               





Insofar as the easy case makes it plausible that wholes can have the experiences of their parts in                                   
at least some cases, combinationists may hope that it provides an initial motivation for the these two                                 
theses, which I will refer to collectively as ‘the inheritance proposal’. But a more compelling case for                                 
this proposal demands a more thorough investigation of the nature of the properties under discussion.                             
Thus the remainder of this chapter provides a three­step defence of the inheritance proposal. In section                               
3 I clarify and defend TSE, arguing that it can be made consistent with most views on the ontology of                                       
token experiences, as well as with a qualified doctrine of ‘privacy’ for experiences. In section 4 I then                                   
undertake a conceptual analysis of the relation between subjects and their experiences, arguing that                           
several candidate accounts of the relation entail CEI. Finally, in section 5 I consider the remaining                               
accounts of this relation, on which it is primitive and fundamental, arguing that given certain                             




My proposal for a combinationist account of the explanatory connections among subjects is compatible                           
with many versions of combinationism, though they may require subtly different interpretations of its                           
two component theses.  
A first difference is between what in the last chapter I called ‘inclusionary’ and ‘exclusionary’                             
approaches to combinationism. The former excludes many of the parts’ experiences from the                         
consciousness of the whole, while the latter includes them as a form of ‘phenomenal overflow’. An                               
inclusionary combinationist will explain Conditional Experience Inheritance in terms of some kind of                         
unconditional inheritance ­ of experiential properties, or more plausibly of those components of                         




to be logically capable of being unconditionally inherited (what I earlier called ‘additive’ properties).                           
This parallels the last chapter’s suggestion that ‘being punched’ requires both having certain                         
punching­type events transpire in you (an inherited, additive property) and also having those events be                             
prominent in your internal goings­on (a non­heritable, systemic property), and is thus inherited by a                             
person from their nose, but not by the universe from said nose. The exclusionary combinationist, on the                                 
other hand, may take Conditional Experience Inheritance to be prior to any sort of unconditional                             
inheritance.  
A second important difference arises between subject­first combinationists, who can endorse                     
CEI straightforwardly, and experience­first combinationists, who must consider experiential                 
combination (the combination of subjects) in relation to what they consider more basic, the                           
combination of sets of experiences. For one subject to be part of another, on their view, means for it to                                       
be constituted by a subset of the experiences which constitute the other. Reading CEI with this notion                                 
of ‘part’ in mind, it amounts to saying that when some set of experiences constitutes a subject with                                   
certain experiential properties, any set of experiences which contains that set, and whose members are                             
appropriately related to one another, will also constitute a subject with those same experiential                           
properties.  
Experience­first combinationists can also take CEI and TSE in a secondary sense, as speaking                           
not of subjects strictly so­called, but of enduring material things which indirectly constitute subjects by                             
generating (or ‘underlying’, or ‘constituting’, etc.) experiences. Since the only ‘experiential properties’                       
such things can have are ‘generation properties’ (the property of generating, realising,, giving rise to,                             
etc. an experience of a certain sort), the analogues of CEI and TSE would state that any composite,                                   





A third difference is between the a priori combinationist and the a posteriori combinationist.                           
While both may regard TSE as a mere statement of metaphysical possibility, they will differ in their                                 
understanding of CEI (as well as any claims of unconditional inheritance that, on the inclusionary                             
approach, are meant to explain it): the a priori combinationist will treat it as a conceptual necessity, a                                   
mere consequence of the nature of experience and composition, while the a posteriori combinationist                           
may treat it as basic law of nature, nomologically necessary but metaphysically and conceptually                           
contingent. For the former, the explanatoriness of the inheritance proposal lies in its a priority; for the                                 
latter it lies in something else, such as the metaphysical connection forged by TSE, the conceptual                               
continuity of antecedent and consequent, or the simplicity and explanatory power of the posited laws.  
Fourth, while the physicalist combinationist and the primitivist combinationist may endorse the                       
same principles about experiential properties, they will understand those properties differently: for the                         
physicalist they are ultimately reducible to some other sort of properties, while for the primitivist they                               
are not. This will affect what sort of explanation they can offer for CEI ­ if experiential properties can                                     
be analysed in non­experiential terms then it is reasonable to try and establish CEI through a conceptual                                 
analysis of the sort explored in section 4, but if not this may prove impossible: establishing CEI might                                   
then require the different approach pursued in section 5.  
Finally, combinationists with different views of composition will understand CEI differently:                     
the pluralist combinationist will take the whole’s having the relevant properties to be grounded in the                               
part’s having them, while the monist will reject the ‘in virtue of’ clause of CEI , instead endorsing the                                     
related principle CEIM:  
Monistic Conditional Experience Inheritance (CEIM): A whole has an experiential property                     
whenever one of its parts does and that part is appropriately related to its other parts, and that                                   





The supporter of composition­as­identity will accept both CEI and CEIM (I take grounding to be                             
reflexive insofar as identity claims are one way to substantiate a claim of grounding). A nihilist                               
combinationist will take the whole notion of the whole’s inheriting these properties as a circumlocution                             
for CEIN: 
Nihilistic Conditional Experience Inheritance (CEIN): Some things have an experiential                   
property collectively whenever one of them does so individually and that thing is appropriately                           
related to the other things, and the things have that experiential property collectively simply in                             
virtue of the particular thing having that experiential property individually, and being                       
appropriately related to the other parts. 




TSE could be contested in two styles. First, it might be rejected as incoherent, because the way we                                   
individuate token experiences do not allow us to make sense of their being shared ­ as on Bayne’s                                   
‘tripartite account’, on which experiences are individuated by their phenomenal character, subject, and                         
time (Bayne 2010, pp.24­29). But this kind of objection to experience­sharing parallels the way that                             
some ontologies of properties might refuse to countenance the sharing of tokens in general, as                             
discussed in subsection 4.1 of chapter 2. However, we do have compelling examples of a distinctive                               
form of intelligible grounding between property instances in wholes and in their parts (e.g. the redness                               
of a surface and its sections, the torn­ness of a coat and its sleeve), and this grounding is naturally                                     
expressed by saying that a single property token belongs to both. If our ontology or our definitions do                                   





Moreover, we have significant freedom in how we individuate experiences, and could employ                         
different criteria for different theoretical purposes: as Bayne says, “Counting experiences is arguably                         
more like counting the number of objects in a room… [than] like counting the number of beans in a                                     
dish… the idea that there is only one way in which to proceed is somewhat farcical.”(2010, p.24) Thus                                   
I will put aside this kind of technical objection to TSE, assuming that we can if necessary define or                                     
construct some way of formulating what is important in the claim, namely that a whole’s consciousness                               
could be ‘nothing over and above’ that of its part in the same way that a whole’s being striped could be                                         
‘nothing over and above’ a certain part of it being striped.   3
The interesting question is whether there is some substantive reason for thinking that                         
experiences cannot be analogous to material property instances in this regard. Claims of such a                             
difference are not hard to find: TSE conflicts with the intuitive idea that experiences belong to their                                 
subjects ‘exclusively’, an intuition expressed emphatically by James: 
Each of [our] minds keeps its own thoughts to itself. There is no giving or bartering between                                 
them. No thought even comes into direct sight of a thought in another personal consciousness                             
than its own. Absolute insulation, irreducible pluralism, is the law… The breaches between                         
such thoughts are the most absolute breaches in nature. (1890, p.226) 
Dainton gives a more precise formulation of this idea, writing that "it seems plausible to think that                                 
subjects and experiences are governed by an Exclusivity Principle along these lines:” 
















Exclusivity concerns sharing experiences between one subject and ‘another’, but there are two ways to                             
read this ‘another’: we might mean simply a ‘distinct’, i.e. non­identical, subject (as in Dainton’s                             






WS and SS are two versions of TSE, the Token­Sharing principle discussed in the last subsection. WS                                 
is the negation of SE, while SS is the negation of WE; SE entails WE and SS entails WS. But,                                       
crucially, WE and WS are compatible – experiences might be weakly shareable yet also weakly                             
exclusive. I will argue that we have good reasons to reject SS, but not WS, so that combinationists can                                     
4  We could get a hypothetical example of overlapping subjects that did not form any overarching whole by extending 
the real-world phenomenon of craniopagus twins, conjoined twins fused at the skull. Such twins can have nervous 
tissue connecting their brains, and there is no reason in principle that there could not be shared brain parts, 
connected with and integrated into both brains. There might then be a single experience, arising from this shared 
brain area, belonging simultaneously to both twins. An actual case does exist in which a ‘bridge’ of nerve tissue 
connects the thalami of two twins, and anecdotal evidence indicates that this allows some sharing of perceptual 
information. Relatively little study has been done on this case because the twins, Krista and Tatiana Hogan, are 








Both subject­first and experience­first views of the metaphysics of subjects provide resources to argue                           
for exclusivity: however, under scrutiny they turn out to support only WE, not SE.  
On the one hand, the subject­first view permits the following argument: experiences are                         
‘adjectivally dependent’ on their subjects, in a manner so metaphysically intimate that they lack the                             
independence needed to belong to any other subject. Experiences are simply modifications of, or acts                             
of, or exercises of the powers of, subjects. This is the view Noonan expresses when he writes:  
The concept of someone’s having a perception is logically prior to the concept of a                             
perception… the relation between the self and its perceptions is analogous to that between the                             
sea and its waves. The waves are modifications of the sea and perceptions are modifications of                               
the self. (Noonan, 1990, p.71)  
5
This may be a good argument against Strong Sharing, for it is hard to see how two discrete,                                   
independent, substances could share a modification. However, all this is compatible with Weak                         
Sharing, because the intimacy and ontological dependence of the experience­subject relation is also                         
present in the whole­part relation. For an experience to be ontologically dependent on a subject does                               
not conflict with its also being ontologically dependent on some part of that subject, as becomes                               
obvious when we consider that the very examples used to convey ‘adjectival dependence’ seem to                             
admit of sharing. There is no incoherence in a wave depending on multiple overlapping parts of the sea,                                   






sharing does not conflict with the priority of material substances over their modifications, it should not                               
conflict with the priority of subjects over their experiences. So I conclude that the subject­first view                               
provides prima facie reason to reject Strong Sharing, but not Weak Sharing.  
The experience­first view, on the other hand, seems to make sharing of experiences impossible,                           
because if subjects are constituted by their experiences they may well be individuated by them too,                               
making it hard to see how two subjects sharing experiences could really be two. Here we should                                 
distinguish ‘total’ and ‘partial’ sharing: the former involves different subjects who share all their                           
experiences, while the latter involves different subjects who share some but not all of their experiences                               
with each other.  
Now, total sharing seems impossible on the experience­first view, for if two subjects have all                             
the same experiences, and are nothing over and above their experiences, then surely they will be the                                 
same subject. Moreover, partial sharing between discrete subjects also seems impossible, because for                         
entities made up of their experiences, to ‘overlap’ simply means to be made up of overlapping sets of                                   
experiences, in which case any subjects who share experiences will presumably both be partly                           
constituted by the shared experience, and just on that basis will not be discrete.  
Even if these arguments are accepted, however, they leave ample room for the kinds of                             
experience­sharing that combinationists would want to postulate. For a start, they clearly allow for                           
partial sharing between distinct­but­overlapping subjects. Admittedly it does not allow for total sharing,                         
even between overlapping subjects, but it allows for a straightforward work­around: shared generation                         
properties. Wherever a subject­first combinationist would posit total sharing (e.g. a human being and                           
their head), the experience­first combinationist can say that two entities (the human being and the head)                               
share all the same instances of properties of generating experiences ­ that is, they generate all the same                                   




bases. Thus insofar as we read ‘experiential properties’ broadly, as including generation properties, the                           6




Plausibly, it is definitional of conscious experience is that it is in some sense ‘subjective’, not                               
‘objective’, and this plausibly entails that experience is ‘private’, directly knowable by only one                           
subject. This distinguishes it from the world of matter, all facts about which are ‘public’, directly                               
knowable by all subjects equally. Obviously much depends on what is meant by knowing ‘directly’, but                               
it will not matter here what account we give of this distinctive form of knowledge. What matters is that                                     
we can argue from privacy to exclusivity: plausibly, my undergoing an experience is both necessary                             
and sufficient for my being in a position to know it directly, while others, who are not me and hence                                       
cannot undergo my experiences, cannot know them except indirectly.  We can express this as:  
7
Knowledge by Ownership (KO): Having an experience is necessary and sufficient for being                         
able to know it directly.  
8
Given KO, TSE seems to violate privacy, making experience public by allowing multiple subjects to                             
know the same experience directly. Now, there might be ways to break this link between exclusivity                               
and privacy, somehow barring all but one of the subjects which undergo an experience from knowing it                                 
















Combinationists can try to capture the intuitive force behind Strong Privacy by endorsing Weak                           
Privacy in its stead. In particular, they can point to the sharp contrast that remains between Weak                                 
Privacy and the publicity of physical fact; to parallel the distinction betweenWeak Sharing and Strong                               




Physical facts are strongly public, while experiential facts are merely weakly public. Whereas a                           
physical fact can in principle be known equally well by any subject, an experience is directly knowable                                 
only by those intimately and directly involved in its occurrence. The fact that more than one distinct                                 
subject may be intimately and directly involved in a single experience’s occurrence need not render this                               
contrast less significant.   
On the other hand, making experiences strongly public would undermine this contrast, and to                           
that extent seems to go against a defining characteristic of experience. Given KO, Strong Sharing                             







Some authors claim that we really have only a single experience at any one time, and what we                                   
distinguish within it are just aspects, not parts (Searle 2000, Tye 2003, Ch.1­3, Raymont 2005). Had                               
my present total experience been qualitatively different in any way, it would be a distinct total                               
experience, and rather than saying that one of my experiences would have been different but others the                                 
same, we should say that my experience would have been a different one that resembled our actual                                 
experience in some ways. We can abstract out these resemblances but should not construe them as                               
particular things which would have been present in both cases, and which could be experienced alone                               
by a subject.  
If I have only one experience at a time, then partial sharing seems to be impossible: I cannot                                   
share simpler experiences with another subject, discrete or merely distinct, for I have no simpler                             
experiences to share. Parts of me like ‘my head’ might still share my total experience, but we could not                                     
explain my total experience as a complex of simpler experiences shared between me and various parts                               
of my brain. So we must ask what is supposed to motivate adopting the one­experience account. Some                                 9
motivations are easy enough for combinationists to accommodate. Some might be attracted by the idea                             
that the whole experience is ontologically prior to its ‘parts’ (e.g. Searle 2000, Raymont 2005);                             
combinationists can retain this idea of priority while accepting the existence of parts (Cf. Bayne 2010,                               
pp.225­249), especially if they are monist combinationists who make component subjects                     
correspondingly dependent on the whole. And Tye alleges that any multi­experience account would be                           
unable to make sense of phenomenal unity without facing a vicious regress from the need to unify the                                   










relation is reflexive, so that a total conscious state trivially unifies itself with its component experiences                               
(Bayne 2010, pp.29­30).  
The most challenging motivation for the one­experience view, however, is what I call the                           
‘Incompatible Characters’ argument. This argument has been particularly developed in the literature,                       
with Basile (2010) giving the clearest presentation. He offers it as a problem for constitutive                             
panpsychists, supposing that they need “an experience…[to] be felt by two different subjects” (p.109).                           
Sharing is precluded by an argument which he attributes to James, involving two premises: 
PHENOMENAL ESSENTIALISM: … for an experience, to be is to feel a certain way… in the                               
case of experience, ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ are one and the same. 
PHENOMENAL HOLISM: …within a person’s total psychical whole, the nature of a single                         
identifiable experience... is essentially determined by the other experiences occurring alongside                     
it… within the whole… (p.107) 
Phenomenal essentialism implies that experiences cannot be numerically the same while feeling                       
different, but Phenomenal Holism implies that an experience will feel different when unified with                           
different sets of other experiences. Hence an experience cannot simultaneously be part of two different                             
sets of experiences, and thus cannot be shared by two experientially different subjects. The experiences                             
of the parts as experienced by the parts cannot be among the experiences of the whole as experienced                                   
by the whole, because the whole would have to experience them both with and without the changes in                                   
phenomenal character which come from being united with each other.   10
The same argument is made by Coleman (2013) who imagines two subjects, named ‘Blue’ and                             







To say these points of view were present as components in the experiential perspective of the                               
uber­subject… would therefore be to say that [it] experienced a unitary phenomenal blueness                         
and a unitary phenomenal redness, i.e. had synchronous experiences as of each of these                           
qualities alone, to the exclusion of all others. For it is these qualities each on their own that                                   
characterise, respectively, the perspectives of the original duo. Experience excludes, as well as                         
includes. (p.15)  
I construe this as a version of the Incompatible Characters argument because Coleman’s claim that                             
“experience excludes, as well as includes”, and that each part’s experience is best captured as a certain                                 
quality “to the exclusion of all others”, amounts to an assertion of phenomenal holism, emphasising the                               
role of absences. Implicit in the claim that experience e’s phenomenal character depends on the                             
experiences it is unified with is the claim that its phenomenal character would be different, had that set                                   




I believe that the Incompatible Characters argument involve an ambiguity at a crucial point. To see this                                 
most clearly, consider the following formulation, which draws heavily from Basile’s version but adds a                             
third premise to mark the argument’s specific relevance to partial, rather than total, sharing.  
Phenomenal Holism (PH): The phenomenal character of an experience depends partly on its                         
phenomenal context, i.e. by the set of other experiences it is unified with.  
Phenomenal Essentialism (PE): The phenomenal character of an experience is essential to it. 
Different Contexts (DC): If a whole, all of whose experiences are unified, shares only some of                               
its experiences with a certain part, then each experience of the whole will have a different                               





C1: Therefore If a single experience were shared by part and whole, it would have a different                                 
phenomenal character relative to the part and to the whole (by PH and DC).  
C2: Therefore If a single experience were shared by part and whole, it would differ from itself                                 




How might combinationists resist this argument? Denying PE is difficult, for as soon as the denier of                                 
PE claims that a single experience is ‘experienced differently’, with different phenomenal characters,                         
the suspicion arises that it is these phenomenologically different ‘experiencings’ that we should be                           
talking about, and referring to as ‘experiences’. On the other hand, there is considerable room for                               
denying PH, as Basile himself admits:  
[W]hile there are very obvious illustrations of [holism] (a glass of wine has a better taste when                                 
enjoyed in a pleasant surrounding), the principle does seem somewhat implausible in other                         
circumstances. Would the red of the book’s cover in front of me have a different feel if I were                                     
not hearing music at this moment? (2010, p.110; for further discussion of holism see Gurwitsch                             
1964, p.120ff, Dainton 2000, pp.181­213, and Chudnoff 2013) 
The claim that every experience I have is sensitive to allmy other experiences does seem very strong.                                   
12
Yet I think combinationists should grant PH for the sake of argument, partly just to maintain neutrality                                 
on substantive phenomenological claims, but also because even more limited examples of phenomenal                         
interdependence, such as Basile’s glass of wine, or the elements of a Gestalt perception, can support a                                 
similar argument. If we replace PH with a more modest claim about some particular experience being                               











cannot be shared with different parts, and this may be enough to rule out certain theoretical applications                                 
of sharing (especially for constitutive panpsychists).  
Rather than denying PE or PH, I believe the best option for the defender of sharing is to argue                                     
that while a form of PH is true, and a form of DC is true, they are true for different senses of                                           
‘phenomenal context’. I earlier defined an experience’s phenomenal context as “which experiences it is                           
unified with”. But there are two ways to read this appeal to unification, which are easy to conflate                                   
because if Strong Exclusivity is true, they are equivalent.  
On the first reading, ‘unified’ is relative to a subject, so that an experience counts as unified                                 
with another only relative to a subject which experiences both together. A single experience shared by                               
multiple subjects may be unified with certain experiences relative to a subject which experiences them                             
all together, but simultaneously not unified with those experiences relative to a subject which does not                               
experience them. Call this the ‘subject­relative’ reading of phenomenal context:  
Subject­Relative Phenomenal Context: The phenomenal context of an experience e for a                       
subject s = the set of experiences of s with which e is co­conscious for s. 
Alternatively, ‘unified’ could be read as pertaining to how two experiences are related, irrespective of                             
which subject or subjects we consider them relative to. If some subject experiences one but not the                                 
other, they still experience the one in the same phenomenal context – in the context of another                                 
experience which that subject does not share. Call this the ‘absolute’ reading of phenomenal context:  
Absolute Phenomenal Context: The phenomenal context of an experience e = the set of                           
experiences with which e is co­conscious. 
It is the subject­relative reading of phenomenal context which is needed for DC. On the absolute                               




experiences the context and the other does not. Hence the defender of Weak Sharing can argue as                                 
follows: the argument from Incompatible Characters is equivocal, because PH is true on the absolute                             
reading, but not on the subject­relative reading. That is, ‘experience is holistic’ means simply that each                               
experience is phenomenally altered by the other experiences which, in that concrete situation, are                           
unified with it.  
This response requires that Phenomenal Holism is true for absolute phenomenal context, but                         
false for subject­relative phenomenal context. Is this plausible? Most discussions do not distinguish the                           
subject­relative and absolute readings, because they assume it makes no sense to consider one                           
experience relative to different subjects. Moreover, the phenomenological observations that are used to                         
support holism work equally for both readings: when an author says ‘consider the experience of x –                                 
wouldn’t it feel different if you experienced it in a different context?’, the defender of the                               
subject­relative reading can say ‘yes, it would feel different relative to a different subject’s total                             
experience’, and the defender of the absolute reading can say ‘yes, it would feel different if it occurred                                   
in a different situation’.  
There may nevertheless be theoretical reasons for preferring one reading over the other, in                           
particular the following: the absolute reading requires making sense of the sort of phenomenal character                             
which experiences acquire through being part of a unified whole, inhering in the experiences of a                               
subject who does not experience most of that whole. And this may seem hard to make sense of: what                                     
could it be like to have only a few experiences, but for their character to somehow reflect their                                   
unification with a whole host of other experiences? How could the sort of infusion and interpenetration                               
we (supposedly) find amongst our various experiences somehow obtain between an experience                       
someone has, and an experience they do not? But this is no longer a deductive argument for                                 




adequately captures the way that (according to PH) the phenomenal character of each experience                           




Coleman claims that if two subjects composed another, we could not “understand the original two                             
points of view as components of the third”, because that would require the composite to “experience                               
red­to­the­exclusion­of­(blue­and)­all­else [and] blue­to­the­exclusion­of­(red­and)­all­else… both       
together.”(2013, p.15) Since it is clearly incoherent to have such experiences together, subjects cannot                           
combine. Insofar as this is a version of the Incompatible Characters argument, the response explained                             
above can be extended to cover it. Combinationists can insist that characterising each component                           
subject’s experience as ‘something­to­the­exclusion­of­all­else’ is ambiguous, and that when properly                   
understood, we can see that when in the composite, each part’s experience is altered by the other’s so as                                     
to lose its ‘exclusive’ character. 
If ‘to the exclusion of’ denotes a phenomenal character, something experiential, something                       
positively present in experience, then combinationists may accept that it is impossible for the whole to                               
experience it in the way described, but go on to say that the parts do not experience it either. Perhaps                                       
each does, when isolated, experience their redness or blueness as excluding all else, but once they are                                 
connected into a unified whole, their experiences are changed, and lose this exclusive character. Just as                               
the whole experiences the red as unified with blueness, so does the part: it experiences its red as unified                                     





On the other hand, the phrase ‘to the exclusion of’ may simply report the negative fact that                                 
nothing other than red (or blue) is being experienced. We cannot deny this of the parts – the one is not                                         
experiencing anything other than red, the other is not experiencing anything other than blue. But it is                                 
not true of the whole, and this is unproblematic, for there is absolutely no reason to expect a whole to                                       
inherit this sort of property from its parts. It is a trivial logical point that a whole may have some parts                                         
which are not X, but nevertheless be X (a house can have parts which are free of asbestos, yet contain                                       
asbestos because it has other parts which contain asbestos). And if we read ‘to the exclusion of’ in this                                     
way, we are dealing with trivial logical points, not with phenomenology.  
Coleman’s argument turns on going from the logical claim “this component subject                       
experiences no blue” to the phenomenological claim “this component subject experiences something as                         
excluding blueness”. This is a substantive inference, which combinationists can and should reject.  
In essence, my response to the incompatible characters argument is to point out that the                             
character of an experience for one subject might be altered by its relation to another experience, even                                 
though that subject does not have that other experience: there is no need for me to be conscious of                                     
everything that affects the phenomenal character of what I am conscious of. The full vindication of this                                 




TSE lets combinationists begin to address the challenge of subsection 1.3: what act of sympathetic                             
imagination is appropriately directed onto a collection of subjects? Combinationists can now say that                           
the experiences that one is to imagine having are simply (some of) those belonging to the parts. So to                                     




all the imaginative acts we would perform to imagine the parts, but simultaneously as a single act of                                   
imagination.  
It might be worried at first that this makes no sense, because we will not be performing any                                   
single imaginative act, but several. What makes this a single act, and differentiates it from simply                               
performing many acts, imagining being each part, in turn, separately? While the nature of imagination                             
is complex and difficult, we can distinguish at least three stages or moments. There is the ‘simulation’                                 
of whatever state one takes the target to be in, but if this occurred on its own it would not be imagining                                           
them, but simply entering some mental state. There must also be the right sort of intention ­ the                                   
intention to imagine being that particular target, which confers on the resulting simulation an                           
intentional relation to an external being. And, once this intention has led the mind to simulate the                                 
appropriate mental state, there must be something like a judgement that this is what it is like to be the                                       
target. Given this three­stage analysis, combinationists can distinguish the imaginative act they                       13
prescribe to target the whole from a sequence of imaginative acts targeting the parts: the former                               
involves a single intention and a single judgement, both directed onto the whole as such, while the                                 
latter involves multiple intentions and judgements directed onto distinct parts. Thus the claim of                           
combinationists who accepts the inheritance proposal is that to imagine being a composite requires                           




Even if TSE, the token­sharing of experiences, is accepted, it remains to justify CEI, the conditional                               






have to do to make CEI intelligible. Rather than explaining why there are experiences there, they need                                 
only explain why, given the presence of certain experiences, the composite qualifies as their subject.                             
Thus their focus shifts from experiential properties per se to the relation of ‘having’ that subjects bear                                 
to experiences. Note that subjects ‘have’ experiential properties, and ‘have’ experiences, in different                         
senses of ‘have’. They ‘have’ experiential properties in the sense of instantiating them, just like any                               
property is ‘had’ by its bearers. But subjects ‘have’ experiences in a different sense, which I will label                                   
‘experiential ownership’. In this section I analyse this relation to see whether it is such that a                                 
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composite automatically bears it, given certain conditions, to the experiences belonging to its parts.  
It is clearly beyond the scope of this work to definitively establish the nature of experiential                               
properties, so I shall not argue for any particular analysis of the experiential ownership relation. Rather,                               
I will review a number of candidate analyses, while remaining neutral about which of them, or which                                 
combination of them, is correct. My aim in this section is to show that, if TSE can be assumed, then                                       
many of the available analyses will make CEI an intelligible truth, while also identifying those analyses                               
which do not: for the former the explanatory gap problem, at least as it concerns subject­summing, is                                 
resolved, while for the latter it requires the further arguments of section 5 to be resolved.  
Subject­first and experience­first combinationists have different perspectives on the                 
experiential ownership relation, reflecting their different views of subjects. For the subject­first                       
combinationist, it makes sense to consider some entity (a human head, a planet, a neurone, etc.), and                                 
some experience, and ask whether they are related in the appropriate way. For the experience­first                             
combinationist, however, this will seem an awkward framing, for most ways of picking out a particular                               








framing of an equivalent question would be this: given the existence of some set of experiences, do                                 
they constitute a subject which then ‘has’ each of them? What is really in question here is something                                   
like ‘collective self­ownership’: the experiential ownership of each experience by a subject constituted                         
by them together. My discussion of the question ‘when does some entity stand in the experiential                               
ownership relation to some experience?’ is meant to also cover the question ‘when do some                             
experiences together constitute something to own them?’ 




The first sort of factor that may be involved is causal: having an experience may require, reduce to, or                                     
confer certain patterns of causal powers. Functionalist accounts of experience make this central to their                             
analysis of experiential properties, but even non­functionalists might assign importance to some sort of                           
causal role in their account of the ownership relation.  
Consider, for instance, why it seems so natural to ascribe experiences to a human being but not                                 
to various large wholes which contain that human being, such as the galaxy. Knowing, for instance,                               
that an experience of enjoyment occurred in my brain while watching a certain film, lets you predict                                 
much more about the what my body will do than it does about what the galaxy will do. The fact that I                                           
enjoyed the film lets you infer many interesting facts about what I will do – the expressions of pleasure                                     
or displeasure I will make during the film, what I will say when asked about it, how likely I am to do                                           
things I believe will cause me to see it again, and so on. By contrast, that same fact tells us little about                                           




solar system’s asteroid belt to arrange themselves into “four out of five stars”. Perhaps for us to say that                                     
something ‘has’ an experience, that experience must control its behaviour so as to be useful in                               
predicting that behaviour.  
Of course, the enjoyment does let us predict some of what the galaxy does – namely, the things                                   
that it does with one particular part, me. (Just as the tapping of my foot can be counted as behaviour of                                         
the whole of me, even though most of my body stays immobile, so my walking back to the cinema to                                       
see the film a second time could be counted as one of the many things the galaxy does.) What this                                       
shows is that ownership depends not just on control of some behaviour, but control of enough                               
behaviour – or, to put it another way, control of overall behaviour.  
There are many approaches we could take to capturing this idea: we might speak of Turing                               
machines and machine­tables, or some richer and less formal notion, perhaps invoking evolutionary                         
concerns of ‘proper function’. We need not to venture too deep into the details, and may instead                                 
employ some deliberately intuitive and loosely­defined notions.  
First, for the experience­first combinationist the relevant causal relations will be those among                         
experiences themselves. Let us say that some set of experiences are ‘causally integrated’ to the extent                               
that various kinds of information­sensitive interactions go on among them ­ interactions in which the                             
particular content and character of each experience is important. This would cover the way that, for                               
instance, beliefs and desires jointly serve to produce volitions when and only when the successful                             
execution of those volitions would, were all those beliefs accurate, promote the fulfilment of those                             








Note that these patterns of interaction are holistically defined, in that each individual action,                           
representation, or goal plays the appropriate role only relative to a certain set of others. Adding a                                 
hundred new desires to such a structure can potentially bring it about that its original members no                                 
longer play their roles. For instance, those desires might entail that actions which previously made                             
sense in light of certain beliefs no longer do so, unless the representations are also changed to                                 
compensate.  
The experience­first combinationist might say that a set of experiences constitutes a subject,                         
and are therefore owned by that subject, only when they are sufficiently causally integrated relative to                               
each other. But the subject­first combinationist will want a relation which obtains between experiences                           
and underlying material entities, which requires expanding on the above notion. Say that an experience                             
‘controls’ some entity to the extent that the events going on in that entity are guided by a set of                                       
experiences containing that experience, in the kind of goal­driven, information­sensitive way that                       
events in my brain influence other events in my brain or body ­ that is, in the way characteristic of                                       
causally­integrated experiences. For instance, we could first label some events in that entity as                           
‘sensory’ or as ‘actions’, and then observe the degree to which conscious beliefs, perceptions, desires,                             
and so on can be systematically matched up with these events in rationalising ways. We might then                                 
propose that the entity ‘has’ the experience only if that experience sufficiently controls its behaviour.   
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Both integration and control are clearly a matter of degree. Moreover, to say that some                             
experiences are integrated, or that they control an entity, will be a vague claim, since there does not                                   
seem to be any non­arbitrary threshold: for instance, not all of the events occurring in my body are                                   
affected by my experiences, but still it seems true to say that my experiences control my body, while                                   






the notions we regularly employ. This is no barrier to considering them as possible analyses of                               
experiential ownership, which is important for combinationism because neither notion is heritable.  
The example of the galaxy illustrates this well. There are far more events happening in the                               
universe than in me – the events in me are a miniscule fraction of those in it. And so even if most of the                                               
events in me are influenced, in the right way, by my enjoyment, it does not follow that most of the                                       
events in the universe will be. In the terminology employed in chapter 2, it is a ‘systemic’ property, not                                     
an ‘additive’ property, and so not heritable. However, the non­heritability of control and integration is                             
not problematic for combinationists, since they need only defend the conditional inheritance of                         
experiential properties, and can easily take control, integration, or some similar causal notion, as one of                               
the conditions for inheritance. That is, precisely because ownership of an experience may require being                             
(e.g.) controlled by it, a whole will not inherit ownership of their parts’ experiences unless those parts                                 
are related to their other parts so as to let that experience control the whole; control and integration,                                   
along with any other systemic component of ownership, will have to be treated as an experiential                               
bonding relation. Combinationists must, of course, maintain that the relations appealed to are                         




The above discussion of control spoke of influencing the events occurring ‘in’ an entity. But they did                                 
not require experiences themselves to occur ‘in’ the entity which they controlled. Hence an entity might                               
be controlled by a set of mental events occurring ‘elsewhere’. For instance, consider a human brain                               
housed in an immobile container, communicating remotely via radio signals with its brainless body,                           




mental events which, if we are materialists, we will likely regard as identical to or grounded in certain                                   
neural events which are clearly occurring ‘in’ the brain, and thus ‘outside’ the body. Should we say, in                                   
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this case, that the brainless body experiences anything? We might, but we might not: there is some                                 
intuitive plausibility in the idea that an entity cannot be the subject of a mental event unless the event                                     
occurs ‘in’ it, and so the brain but not the body is a subject in this case. If so, there is an ontological                                             
component to experiential properties, which we could express by saying that to have an experience you                               
must underlie it.  
This is particularly plausible if one thinks of experiences as simply modifications of a subject,                             
or otherwise constitutively dependent upon a subject. This might be the whole account of experiential                             
properties for Cartesian dualists, for whom a subject’s nature is so essentially experiential that anything                             
it underlies can only be an experience. But other theorists might also think it significant: for instance, a                                   
mind­brain type­identity theorist, who takes experiences to be brain events, might well suppose that to                             
have an experience is to ‘have’ a brain event, i.e. to have a brain ‘in which’ those events happen.   
All of this presupposes a subject­first view: the experience­first combinationist, insofar as they                         
make subjects ontologically dependent upon experiences, will probably deny that the subject underlies                         
those experiences. But they have an equally straightforward ontological criterion for ownership                       
available: they can say that to have an experience one must be partly ontologically dependent on it. An                                   
experience can belong to me only if it is involved in constituting me. Obviously this is a trivially weak                                     
criterion, for obviously any subject constituted by some set of experiences will be partly ontologically                             
dependent on them, and thus will satisfy this requirement for ownership.  
Suppose we accept the subject­first view, and the importance of ‘underlying’: can we make this                             






a property which is clearly and uncontroversially heritable: spatial containment. If some part of                           
something contains X (at a time), it must be the case that the whole contains X (at that time).                                     
Underlying might be simply identified with containment, or more plausibly it might be presented as an                               
ontological analogue to it: rather than containing something spatially, what underlies X ‘contains X                           
ontologically’, in that nothing ‘outside’ that thing is constitutively involved in X. We might express this                               
by saying that the underlying thing is ‘ontologically sufficient’ for X. And just like spatial containment,                               
ontological sufficiency for any X is clearly unconditionally inherited.  
Leaving this notion of ontological sufficiency rough and intuitive for now, here are two doubts                             
as to whether it captures our target notion of ‘underlying’. First, perhaps subjects must be ontologically                               
both necessary and sufficient, so that something cannot be counted as the subject of an experience if it                                   
has any additional parts beyond those necessary to produce that experience. Then, for instance, the                             
universe does not count as underlying my experiences, because most of the universe is unnecessary,                             
given one part, for those experiences. 
However, this principle would yield some strange results when applied to human subjects,                         
since it implies that any experience that does not depend on every single part of me cannot be mine. For                                       
a start, then, any experiences which my brain underlies cannot be attributed to the whole human being.                                 
For another thing, if two experiences are underlain by slightly different brain regions, they cannot be                               
attributed to the same subject. It might be maintained that in fact every single neurone in my brain, or                                     
even every peripheral nerve, is strictly necessary for a given experience to occur: without that neurone,                               
it would be a numerically different experience, even if that neurone makes no appreciable difference to                               
its character. But this seems a rather forced claim, since our only basis for identifying as necessary                                 




experience’s character, is a desire to preserve our prior ideas of what should count as underlying the                                 
experience. We provide no independent criterion of underlying.   
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Second, subjects might not be ontologically sufficient for their experiences if the identity of an                             
experience depends also on its objects. Perhaps a visual experience, for instance, depends not only on                               
its subject but also on the visible items which it presents – without these, there would have been a                                     
different token experience (even if a phenomenologically indiscernible hallucination). But if we accept                         
this view of perceptual experiences, we are unlikely to regard underlying as necessary for ownership,                             
unless we think that everything we see thereby becomes part of us.   
Consequently, I believe that the ontological component of experiential properties, if any, is best                           
captured (at least on a subject­first approach) by the notion of ontological sufficiency, and sufficiency                             
is heritable: a whole is sufficient for anything that its parts are sufficient for, and hence underlies                                 
whatever its parts underlie. Of course, if ownership has components other than underlying, such as the                               




Causal and ontological analyses employ topic­neutral concepts, but perhaps the experiential ownership                       










One way this might be true is through a ‘unity requirement’: all the experiences a subject owns                                 
must display ‘the unity of consciousness’, in some sense of that phrase. Bayne defends a position of                                 
this sort, recommending that we “think of selves as… entities whose identity is determined by the                               
cognitive architecture underlying a [unified] stream of consciousness.”(2010, p.289) If a subject                       
necessarily has unified consciousness, then to have an experience (i.e. to be a subject) requires that it be                                   
unified with all of one’s other experiences. Dainton (2008) also defends an account of the self on which                                   
it is individuated by a unified stream of consciousness; in a more equivocal vein, Nagel 1971 argues                                 
that the apparent lack of conscious unity in the split­brain syndrome poses a problem for regarding the                                 
split­brain patient as a single subject.   19
A second option involves the sort of quasi­epistemic ‘awareness’ we seem to have of our                             
experiences. Intuitively, experiences are essentially the sort of thing which we know in a special,                             
subjective way – we can only know ‘what it is like’ to have an experience if we have ourselves had that                                         
experience (or, perhaps, a very similar one). This sort of knowledge is derived from the basic                               
‘acquaintance’ we have with the experience when we experience it (Cf. Nagel 1976, Chalmers 1996,                             
Siewert 2013, Kriegel 2009). Conscious experiences, we might say, are essentially things that we are                             
conscious of, where ‘conscious of’ indicates this distinctive epistemic relation (theorists who deny that                           
we are strictly aware of our experiences might place similar importance on the way that an experience                                 
confers on a subject awareness of its content: I have only those experiences that do this for me).  
This sense of awareness is clearly epistemic on some level, but it cannot be sufficient by itself                                 
for the kind of introspecting powers which we find in human beings. If awareness is a component of                                   









conscious animals lack the concepts to introspect as we do. Hence, while awareness of an experience                               
may be necessary for reflecting on it, it cannot be sufficient. 
Reductive analyses of awareness and unity can be attempted (see Kriegel 2009 for a                           
particularly developed example of the former), on which they are ultimately nothing more than certain                             
causal, correlational, or informational patterns among physical goings­on. But equally, maybe unity                       
and awareness are among the basic ingredients of reality ­ or maybe experiential ownership itself is a                                 
fundamental primitive. What would follow about the heritability of experiential properties?  
A unity requirement on experiential properties will rule out their being unconditionally                       
inherited, for having unified consciousness is a systemic property. If two parts of something are each                               
the subjects of some unified experiences, which are not unified with those of the other part, the whole                                   
would inherit both sets, and be the subject of disunified experiences, in violation of the unity                               
requirement. But as with causal factors, this is not a problem for CEI, since conscious unity may be one                                     
of the conditions which must be met before the property can be ascribed to the whole, one of the                                     
bonding relations.  
On the other hand, the heritability of fundamental monadic experiential properties themselves,                       
or the primitive awareness involved in them, is left undetermined by any formal or logical                             
considerations. No straightforward contradiction follows from either affirming or denying inheritance                     
principles for them. Indeed, the same holds if experiential properties are not properly viewed as                             
involving any sort of relation to ‘an experience’, but as fundamental properties with no further structure                               







This investigation of the experiential ownership relation allows us to flesh out the idea of conditional                               
experience inheritance, first introduced thus:  
Conditional Experience Inheritance (CEI): A whole has an experiential property whenever                     
one of its parts does and that part is appropriately related to its other parts, simply in virtue of                                     
the part having that experiential property and being appropriately related to the other parts. 
Now we can understand ‘is appropriately related to the other parts’ as meaning one or more of ‘has                                   
only experiences causally integrated with those of the other parts’, ‘has only experiences which jointly                             
control the whole together with those of the other parts’, or ‘has only experiences unified with those of                                   
the other parts’. Just as I have remained neutral on the proper analysis of experiential ownership, I will                                   
now remain neutral on the proper filling out of the conditions in CEI: if we think that such factors are                                       
essential to ownership, that provides a clear and direct rationale for incorporating them.  
Is CEI now a sufficiently intelligible claim, i.e. one which provides an adequate explanation of                             
the presence of experiential properties in the whole? We have supposed that the experiences the whole                               
inherits are numerically the same as those of the parts, and that the relations among the parts provide                                   
the whole with the necessary overall structure for those experiences to be owned by it. Does this suffice                                   
to explain why the whole does in fact own them? That depends on the other components of experiential                                   
ownership, those which are not systemic, not a matter of how each part relates to every other part, but                                     
are what I called in chapter 2 ‘additive’.  
The physicalist combinationist has good prospects here, because for them there is nothing                         
irreducibly experiential in the ownership relation, and so it is natural to think that, if there are any                                   




experience will just mean underlying it and having it play the right overall role. Since underlying is                                 
unconditionally inherited, this provides the physicalist combinationist with an explanation of CEI. 
It is not only the physicalist combinationist who can make CEI intelligible based only on what                               
has been said so far. A primitivist combinationist must think that there is something irreducibly                             
experiential in experiential properties, but they might locate this entirely in the experience which is                             
had, and not in the ownership relation that subjects bear to it. This would be particularly natural for an                                     
experience­first combinationist, who thinks that the basic experiential reality is a vast array of                           
experiences, with larger aggregates of these constituting subjects just when their members are suitably                           
related.  
But what about the subject­first primitivist combinationist? In particular, what if they think that                           
experiential ownership, or some component of it, cannot be explained in terms of anything else? They                               
still seem to face the problem of the explanatory gap over subject­summing: no analysis of what it is                                   
for something to be conscious, to undergo experience, can reveal why a whole should inherit                             
consciousness from its parts. 
But even for this type of combinationist, the presence of an explanatory gap problem depends                             
on what criterion of explanation one adopts. In particular, the a posteriori combinationist might                           
endorse CEI as basic law of nature, arguing that its intelligibility can come from the conceptual                               
continuity between the properties ascribed in its consequent and antecedent, or from the sharing of                             
token experiences, or from its being an inheritance principle.  
Can the a posteriori combinationist claim that CEI is intelligible for its simplicity and                           
generality? Perhaps not, for though it is explanatorily powerful (any number of different experiences in                             
any number of different composites might follow from it) it suffers from a significant degree of                               




pending a systematic, unifying account of the so­far rough and intuitive notion of causal integration, it                               
will seem unsatisfying to build it into a fundamental law of nature. On the other hand, the a posteriori                                     
combinationist who incorporated only conscious unity into the conditions in CEI, and who moreover                           
took unity to be a more or less primitive relation, has a good case for CEI being a simple, and therefore                                         
intelligible, law.  
Finally, observe the following possibility, which will become important in chapter 5, section 1.                           
Some analyses of experiential ownership leave open the possibility that a set of experiences might                             
satisfy them together but not individually. For instance, a set of experiences might collectively produce                             
the right effects to meet some causal requirement for ownership by a certain subject, or might give that                                   
subject knowledge of overall facts about the set, even while none of them individually had the causal                                 
powers to do so, or could be known about by that subject. We might then say that they composed a                                       
composite experience that belonged to that subject, even though none of them individually did                           
(assuming some meaning can be given to the idea of a composite experience with experiences as parts).                                 
Conversely, other analyses of ownership, such as one based on underlying, do not seem to allow for                                 
this: I could not be metaphysically sufficient for a composite experience without being metaphysically                           
sufficient for its parts. 
This opens up the possibility of what I will call ‘quasi­inheritance’: a whole having an                             
experience in virtue of its parts having, not the property itself, but its parts. Here no token experience                                   
would be directly shared: the relationship between the whole’s experience and the parts’ experiences                           
would be composition, not identity. Either of the above two approaches to justifying CEI ­ by reducing                                 
ownership entirely to systemic factors like causal role, or by making it a basic law of nature ­ can be                                       
extended to cases involving quasi­inheritance rather than full inheritance, in any situation where the                           




satisfy the conditions for inheritance collectively but not individually (whether those conditions come                         
from conceptual analysis or a posteriori laws of nature). By contrast, the approaches to justifying CEI                               




Here is another approach, that may appeal both to the a priori combinationist and to the a posteriori                                   
combinationist concerned with simplicity, if either is convinced of the irreducibility of (some                         
component of) experiential ownership. They might explain CEI by reference to a mixture of conceptual                             
analysis (explaining the complex causal conditions it imposes by reference to our complex intuitive                           
notion of ‘having an experience’) and the unconditional inheritance of what I will call                           
‘basic­experiential properties’. Basic­experiential properties, properties of ‘basically­having’             
experiences, abstract away from whatever components of experiential ownership are systemic. They                       
involve bearing to an experience whatever in the experiential ownership relation is primitive and                           
additive. To emphasise the contrast, we can call any experiential properties that do involve a systemic                               20
component ‘full­experiential properties’, involving ‘fully having’ an experience.  
It bears emphasising that basic­having and full­having are schematic notions, to be filled in                           
according to different views of experiential ownership. Physicalist and primitivist combinationists will                       
thus differ on what they come to ­ indeed, a functionalist might deny that there is even such a thing as                                         










experiential ownership. But on the other hand, a primitivist about consciousness might take                         
basic­ownership to be simply the same as experiential ownership, because they deny that any systemic                             
factor is essential to experiential properties.  
So we are considering the following unconditional inheritance principle, governing these                     
‘basic­experiential properties’ that some combinationists might regard as non­existent, and others                     
might regard as simply experiential properties by another name:  
Basic­Experience Inheritance (BEI): A whole has a certain basic­experiential property                   
whenever one of its parts does, simply in virtue of the part having that property. 
Suppose that basic­ownership is a coherent notion, and is distinct from full­ownership. Then since                           
having an experiential property is simply a matter of having a basic­experiential property involving an                             
experience which is then connected with one’s behaviour, and the other experiences one basically­has,                           
in the necessary ways (if any), BEI would entail CEI. However, BEI faces a number of problems. One                                   
is that, since systemic features like control and unity cannot be unconditionally inherited, BEI implies                             
that a being might basically­have an experience but not have it in the normal full sense, i.e. might in                                     
some sense enjoy ‘phenomenology’ which was not reflected in its behaviour or fully unified. If this                               
kind of inert and disunified phenomenology is not possible, and if this is not because phenomenology                               
reduces to control and unity, then BEI must be false. Moreover, BEI would imply that anything with                                 
human beings as parts, like the galaxy or James’s 12­man group, has basic­experiential properties, and                             
to that extent is ‘conscious’, albeit in an inert and disunified sense. If basic­experiential properties are                               
just experiential properties, the same worries arise even more directly, without a need for                           
quotation­marks around ‘phenomenology’ and ‘conscious’. 
But quite apart from these problems with the possibilities or actualities that BEI entails, there is                               




basic­experiential properties. Why should BEI hold?Why should wholes have this primitive relation to                           
experiences just because their parts do? The a posteriori combinationist need not be worried by this:                               
they could claim that it is simply one of the laws of nature in our universe, and deflect charges of                                       
emergentism by noting its other virtues. But the a priori combinationist cannot rest content with this:                               
BEI is still a claim connecting different mereological levels, and it demands explanation. If it cannot be                                 
justified a priori then it does not explain the consciousness of composite subjects.  
So I conclude this section with the following claim: the explanatory gap remains, even given                             
TSE, and even in light of a systematic analysis of the experiential ownership relation, ifwe focus on a                                     
particular sort of combinationist. The combinationist in question is a primitivist, most likely a                           
panpsychist, regards conscious subjects as ontologically independent of their experiences, takes                     
experiential ownership to involve some primitive, irreducibly experiential relation, and uses a priori                         
entailment as their standard for intelligible explanation. Though highly specific, this version of                         
combinationism is not marginal: believers in the a priori entailment criterion are particularly likely to                             




Basic­Experience Inheritance is not a priori in the way that, say, location inheritance, is evident simply                               
through consideration of the properties involved. Yet it may be a priori in a more indirect way, in                                   
virtue of a general background view of composition. That is, the a priori necessity of BEI may derive                                   
from the nature of the part­whole relation rather than the nature of basic­experiential properties. In this                               
section I will argue that if any of the ‘level­connecting’ views of composition is true (i.e. if either parts                                     




default, i.e. heritable unless their inheritance is demonstrably impossible. Since it is only the view that                               
basic­experiential properties are fundamental and additive that faces the explanatory gap problem, a                         
response which shows that precisely such properties are inherited would resolve that problem. More                           
precisely, I will argue for the intelligibility of the following conditional:  
Heritability of Fundamental Properties (HF): If a property is fundamental, and if one of the                             
level­connecting views of composition is true, and if the heritability of that property would not                             
yield demonstrable incoherence, then that property is both­ways inherited. 
When I speak of properties whose heritability would yield demonstrable incoherence, I primarily have                           
in mind systemic properties, which are sensitive to the total set of properties possessed by their bearer.                                 
But I also have in mind ‘properties’ whose precise nature depends on their bearer. For instance, the                                 
property ‘releases acidic fluids’ is implicitly the property of releasing them from oneself, and so will                               
mean different things when ascribed to an organ and to an organism – someone might have an organ                                   
which releases acidic fluids, but only into another of their organs, so that they themselves do not release                                   
such fluids. There may be other ways for inheritance to yield demonstrable incoherence. The point of                               
HF is to shift the burden of argument: rather than needing reasons to think a given fundamental                                 
property heritable, an adherent of one of the level­connecting views needs reasons not to. 
HF will only be plausible given certain views about what the fundamental properties are. I take                               
it as definitional that ‘fundamental’ properties are those which ground all other properties; thus it is not                                 
definitional that fundamental properties are all and only those which are instantiated by fundamental                           
entities (implying, e.g., that ‘mass’ as a determinable quantity is not fundamental, but only ‘having the                               
mass of one electron’, Cf. Gillet & Rives 2005, Wilson 2012). Moreover, it will be hard to accept HF if                                       







Instead, we should take the fundamental properties to be the conceptually primitive ones, those                           
on a grasp of which our grasp of all other properties depends. This means that the fundamental physical                                   
properties are not ‘mass’ and ‘charge’, or some specific determinates thereof, but rather the notions of                               
causal power, spatial location and extension, and time: we grasp the properties ascribed by the                             
equations of physics only because we grasp what it is for some property to govern causal interactions                                 
and movements in space. And there is, I think, no antecedent implausibility in thinking that wholes                               
inherit their spatiotemporal and causal powers from their parts ­ indeed, this seems to be a necessary                                 
presupposition for deducing a priori the additivity of the properties ascribed by physics (see McQueen                             
ms, 2014a; cf. Chapter 2 subsection 4.2 and 4.3). 
I do not have space here to defend this view of fundamentality: my aim is just to illuminate                                   
what seems to me an available route to a priori combination, and the substantive premises it requires. I                                   
will simply try to illuminate why we should think, given a level­connecting view of composition, and                               




The case for HF is most straightforward for one particular level­connecting view,                       











Of course, this cannot apply straightforwardly to all properties, since not all properties are                           
heritable. This reflects the fact that for composition­as­identity to be defensible, it needs an appropriate                             
semantic apparatus for explaining how, as Lewis says, “It does matter how you slice it – not to the                                     
character of what's described… but to the form of the description.”(1991, p.87) Without wishing to                             
wade further into this debate than is necessary, we can observe that for many properties, the conditions                                 
for their possession distributively by many parts diverge from the conditions for their possession                           
collectively by those parts, i.e. by the whole qua whole.  
For instance, composition­as­identity should not entail that parts being spherical entails the                       
whole being spherical – not because the whole is anything other than them, but because it requires                                 
different things for sphericality to be instantiated distributively or collectively by the one thing                           
involved. And we can see why by analysing sphericality as ‘occupying all and only points within a                                 
certain distance of a certain point’. The ‘only’ makes it a systemic property and so not heritable, and                                   
moreover the reference to ‘a certain point’ indicates how the conditions for distributive and collective                             
possession can diverge (in the first case there may be a different centre­point for each part; in the                                   
second there is a single centre).  
If we are considering a fundamental additive property, however, we cannot scrutinise the                         
analysis of the property to find some element that can be interpreted differently (as with, e.g., the                                 
‘centre’ for sphericality), because there is no such analysis available. If there were some positive                             
argument that we must deny heritability, it would have to show a difference between collective and                               
distributive possession. But without that, why should we believe in such a difference? It would seem an                                 




adopting composition­as­identity gives good reason to make heritability our default assumption for                       
fundamental properties.  22
But how is HF to be supported on the other views, which treat parts and wholes as distinct but                                     
hold that one is entirely grounded in the other? I think it is harder to construct a really satisfying                                     
argument, or provide a really rigorous motivation. But we could give an unsatisfying argument and a                               
rough and sketchy motivation, and hope that together they are sufficient.  
The rough and sketchy motivation is similar to that based on composition­as­identity: wholes                         
(or parts, for the monist) are nothing over and above their parts (or wholes), and so anything they have                                     
they must get from their parts (or wholes). While there may not be identity here, neither is there                                   
independence, and so if a truly fundamental property is instantiated, we cannot ascribe it to one but not                                   
to the other. There is, so to speak, nothing else there for the fundamental property to belong to, save the                                       
parts (or whole), or to put it another way, there are not separate ‘truthmakers’ available for the two                                   
things’ instantiating the fundamental property.  
In attempting to provide a rigorous argument for HF, we will need to distinguish motivations                             
for upwards heritability and for downwards heritability. First, consider how a pluralist might support                           
downward inheritance for some fundamental property F – the principle that if a composite has F, at                                 
least one of its proper parts must. According to pluralism, all facts about wholes are grounded in some                                   
fact about their parts – so the fact that a whole has F must be grounded in some fact about its parts. But                                             
if F is a fundamental property, then its instantiation cannot be grounded in the instantiation of any other                                   









F must be grounded in some fact which a) involves the property F, and b) pertains to the parts of that                                         
whole. The natural ground would be the fact of some part itself having property F, and so we may                                     
conclude that some part has F, just as downward inheritance claims.  
A monist can make a precisely analogous argument in support of upward inheritance. Facts                           
about parts must be grounded in facts about wholes, and facts about property F can be grounded only in                                     
other facts about property F. Hence a part having property F can be grounded only in the whole having                                     
property F, from which it follows that the whole has property F, in accordance with upward inheritance                                 
(ideas along these lines are attributed to some Stoics by Helle, 2013).  
What about supporting downward inheritance for monists, or upward inheritance for pluralists?                       
Here we should recall the condition that nothing positively rules out heritability for property F; this                               
entails that it is at least possible for both wholes and parts to instantiate fundamental property F, even if                                     
one or the other of them is non­fundamental. But if instantiation of F by non­fundamental entities is                                 
23
possible, something must still in each instance ground it. By the arguments given above, this will have                                 
to be the instantiation of F by one of the corresponding fundamental entities (wholes on monism, parts                                 
on pluralism). But plausibly, grounds necessitate whatever they ground, and so the corresponding                         
inheritance principle will be necessarily true: given the property’s possession by the fundamental entity,                           
it follows that the non­fundamental entity possesses it, for if that did not follow, there could be no                                   
explanation for the non­fundamental entity’s possessing that property.   
24
This argument is somewhat unsatisfying on its own, because it simply notes that, given the                             










fundamental properties by parts (or wholes) would ground and explain their instantiation by wholes (or                             
parts). This is a little like the way that physical combinationism, to be a priori, must incorporate a                                   
‘that’s­all clause’ into its explanatory base: a key part of the explanation for certain facts is the                                 
unavailability of any alternative explanation. Establishing in this way that one fact must explain another                             
does not tell us how it does so. But for this we should return to the rough and sketchy motivation                                       




HF implies heritability for properties unless there is positive reason to deny heritability, and in section                               
4 I noted two possible reasons to deny heritability for basic­experiential properties. One of these, the                               
threat of ascribing basic­experiential properties to mega­subjects, will be discussed in chapter 6. But the                             
other will be confronted here: given that systemic properties and relations like unity, integration, and                             
control cannot be unconditionally inherited, BEI entails that basic­experiential properties might come                       
apart from them: that there could be something like phenomenology, but inert and disunified, with no                               
tendency to produce any of the effects we are used to associating with it. And someone might deny                                   25
that this is possible: they might maintain that the very nature of basic­experiential properties is that,                               
while they do not definitionally require such systemic relational structures (i.e. it is not part of what we                                   
mean by speaking of them), they always confer them on any being that possesses them. In virtue of                                   







This objection relates to a question we have already encountered, about the possibility of                           
phenomenal overflow. BEI entails the possibility not only of everyday sorts of cognitive overflow (e.g.                             
hard­to­notice visual experiences) but of a far more radical sort, as exemplified in the case of                               
mega­subjects like the galaxy, who enjoy the core of my conscious phenomenology but are not guided                               
by it in the way I am. So to address the explanatory gap problem, I believe that an a priori subject­first                                         
primitivist combinationist must also be a pro­overflow combinationist, or as I put it in chapter 2, an                                 
‘inclusionary’ combinationist. I do not see any way to address the explanatory gap problem from the                               
position of an anti­overflow, a priori, subject­first, primitivist combinationist.  
Fortunately for the a priori subject­first primitivist combinationist, there are several reasons for                         
them to be sceptical of the anti­overflow position that phenomenology is neither reducible to nor                             
dissociable from control and unity. For a start, this claim amounts to an a priori limitation on the                                   
possible forms which consciousness can take, even in entities quite different from us. We might be                               
sceptical of such claims in general, suspecting them of being over­generalisations from our own                           
parochial nature. Second, it is involves a somewhat awkward middle road between reducing                         
phenomenology to its overall causal behaviour, and making it independent of its overall causal                           
behaviour. The intuition that there is more to experience than its functions seems to push us further, to                                   
saying that this ‘something more’ might occur without those functions. 
Third, if the anti­overflow position is right, and yet experience is irreducible to the physical,                             
then consciousness has causal powers which are hard to square with naturalism. Any being which                             
basically­has an experience will immediately find that experience unfailingly connecting and                     
interacting, in deep and sophisticated ways, with all its behaviour and other experiences. This kind of                               
power would be in certain respects non­local and unlimited, since it works however many experiences                             
and behaviours there are to connect with, and wherever they are. We might think it implausible that                                 




simple animals, or neurologically damaged or abnormal humans, even ourselves when we are                         
absent­minded or drugged – already show us that unity and behavioural control are fallible and                             





Here is a final argument against BEI: the dissociation of basic­experiential properties from control,                           
integration, and unity is impossible, because combinationism’s own recipe for sympathetic imagination                       
breaks down in such cases. In subsection 3.7, I proposed that to imagine being a composite required                                 
simply imagining all the experiences one would imagine if imagining being the parts, at once, tied                               
together by a single intention and a single judgement. But it might be alleged that we cannot do this for                                       
disunified composites: to bring many experiences that are in fact not unified, into a single imaginative                               
act, must either collapse into impossibility or else falsify their real nature. But if we cannot                               
sympathetically imagine being a disunified composite, we should not attribute even basic­experiential                       
properties to it, for sympathetic imaginability goes with phenomenology.  
Of course, combinationists might deny that final claim, accepting that disunified composites are                         
not suitable targets of sympathetic imagination but maintaining that this does not preclude their having                             
basic­experiential properties. But their position is stronger if they can accept the link between                           












Consider Barnett’s example once again. Suppose we say that imagining being Descartes and                         
Hobbes is a matter of both imagining being Descartes, and imagining being Hobbes, at the same time,                                 
prompted by a single volition, and feeding into single final judgement. What makes this seem                             
implausible is that this act of imagining being two people seems to be not veridical but fantastic,                                 
because what we are doing would be appropriate if Descartes’ and Hobbes’ bodies were in fact just                                 
two organs of some kind of supra­personal mind­linked entity, with a single unified consciousness,                           
seeing through four eyes and responding with four arms. Then, this act of imagination would be                               
reasonable and successful. But since they are not, it is misguided.  
Combinationists can accommodate this point by saying that in practice, someone imagining                       
being this composite would most likely do so inaccurately. They would most likely integrate the two                               
sets of experiences they imagined, just as they would normally integrate different experiences they                           
imagined as had by a single human being. This would involve things like noticing comparisons or                               
connections, identifying interactions, being able to draw contrasts, linking desires to affordances, and                         
so on. That is the mistaken imaginative act that the objection is thinking of. We could accurately                                 
execute the intention to imagine being both only by scrupulously refraining from integrating Descartes’                           
and Hobbes’ imagined experiences. Of course, Descartes’ should be integrated with Descartes’, and                         
Hobbes’ with Hobbes’, but no member of either group should be connected with any member of the                                 
other group. If the simulations were kept dissociated, the defender of BEI can claim, that would be a                                   
successful and accurate imagination of what it is like to be the fusion of Descartes and Hobbes.  
In practice this kind of ‘quarantining’ is difficult, and perhaps impossible, simply because our                           
brains tend to actively connect whatever we are thinking of. Just having the two sets of imagined                                 
experiences at once would tend towards connecting them; it has been more evolutionarily useful for us                               
to have a brain that connects things constantly and compulsively, than to have a brain capable of                                 




being a single act of imagination will force them together – they must both be connected in the right                                     
way to our intentions and to our judgements, and so there will be a further structural tendency pushing                                   
them together. Thus the perspective of a disunified composite is in­practice unimaginable because its                           




For the a priori combinationist to address the subject­summing problem, they must show that failures                             
of their preferred basic principle (CEI or BEI) are inconceivable. In section 1 I introduced the figure of                                   
the microexperiential super­zombie to dramatise this issue: what should the a priori combinationist say                           
about these creatures? That will depend on how we read the experience ascriptions used to define them.                                 
If the super­zombie does not fully have any experiences, but its microscopic parts do, then                             
combinationists can allow that it is conceivable. For it might be that the relations of causal control and                                   
of unification that would be needed for it to fully have any of the experiences of its parts in fact fail to                                           
hold.  
But if the super­zombie is a composite which does not even basically have any experiences, but                               
whose microscopic parts do, then the a priori combinationist should say that such creatures (call them                               
microexperiential super­duper zombies) are inconceivable. Their inconceivability is a special case of                       
the more general inconceivability of a composite lacking the fundamental properties of its parts, which                             
in turn is a special case of the inconceivability of both affirming and denying certain properties of                                 
something. 
This analysis is most obvious if composition is identity, since then there is literally a single                               




is nothing in addition to, or nothing ‘over and above’, its parts. For then talking of the whole is not                                       
talking about anything over and above the parts, and to that extent is a way of indirectly talking of the                                       
parts. Conversely, the monist, who thinks that the parts are nothing in addition to, nothing ‘under and                                 
below’ the whole, can also rule out super­zombies as instances of both affirming and denying certain                               
properties of something.  
An opponent of BEI may be unconvinced. A microexperiential super­duper zombie may still                         
seem to them positively conceivable, especially if they are strongly attracted to the NSS principle.                             
Indeed, they may regard the apparent conceivability of the super­duper zombie, together with the                           
reasoning presented in this section, as providing a good reason to reject the level­connecting views of                               
composition. I think the best that the defender of BEI can do is to present the following two reasons                                     
why the microexperiential super­duper zombie may seem conceivable even though it is not.  
First, the distinction between full­having and basic­having allows the defender of BEI to                         
identify something which is conceivable, and which might easily be confused with the                         
microexperiential super­duper zombie. This parallels the strategy by which many philosophers have                       
claimed that the apparent conceivability of, say, water having the chemical structure H2N, arises from a                               
conceptual confusion. It seems conceivable that water might have been H2N because we confuse the                             
essence of water with the features of water by means of which we fixed our reference to it.                                   
Consequently, when we conceive of some chemical other than water having all the features which fixed                               
our reference to water, we mistakenly describe that as water having a different chemical structure                             
(Kripke 1980, Chalmers 2009). Similarly, microexperiential super­duper­zombies seem conceivable                 
because we fail to distinguish different components of ownership. Consequently, when we conceive of                           




experiences (because they are, for the composite, disunified and inert), we mistakenly describe that                           
simply as ‘a non­conscious composite with conscious parts.’  
Second, the defender of BEI can suggest that a tacit commitment to Strong Exclusivity lies                             
behind the apparent conceivability of microexperiential super­duper zombies, and behind the NSS                       
intuition more generally. If Strong Exclusivity is true, then any experiences belonging to the whole                             
zombie would be distinct entities from those belonging to its parts, but if Weak Sharing is true they                                   
may simply be the same experiences, shared by another, intimately connected, subject. If the zombie’s                             
experiences are shared with its parts, but we try to conceive of it while retaining Strong Exclusivity, we                                   
may wrongly perceive the fact that there need be no additional experiences belonging to the whole as                                 
the fact that there need be no experiences at all belonging to the whole.  
The a priori combinationist attracted to BEI could claim that these two strategies suffice to cast                               
doubt on the apparent conceivability of microexperiential super­duper zombies, and that the earlier                         
arguments from the level­connecting views suffice to judge them inconceivable. This inconceivability                       
is, however, heavily qualified. First, it is qualified by the need to presuppose one of the                               
level­connecting views of parthood. If that is not what parthood is – if parthood in fact has a different                                     
nature, a nature which allows for autonomy between mereological levels, with each having and lacking                             
properties in their own right ­ then super­duper­zombies are probably conceivable. But a combinationist                           
is likely to already endorse a level­connecting view; my question in this work is whether a generally                                 
combinationist approach to reality can be extended to the experiential realm in particular. 
The second qualification is that the above reasoning is defeasible, if the metaphysical structure                           
of experience or parthood turns out to involve complexities which explain why this particular                           








How can facts about one subject ­ one conscious being, one phenomenal perspective ­ explain facts                               
about a distinct subject? Surely we can give a full description of one subject’s experiences without                               
specifying anyone else’s experience? This is the problem of subject­summing, a central component of                           
the explanatory gap that seems to face combinationism.  
When we consider cases like James’s twelve men standing in a circle, it seems compelling that                               
their experiences do nothing to explain any the group might have, but when we consider other cases,                                 
those fitting the schematic description I labelled ‘the easy case’, it seems more plausible that a                               
composite (like the human body, or human body­and­soul) can ‘inherit’ the experiences of a part of it                                 
as long as those experiences are suitably connected to the composite’s overall behaviour and other                             
experiences. Extrapolating from this intuition, I considered the ‘inheritance proposal’, consisting of two                         
claims, TSE and CEI, respectively asserting the token­sharing and conditional inheritance of                       
experiences. 
In section 3 I defended the coherence of token­sharing, arguing that sharing between                         
overlapping subjects can be made compatible with (slightly adjusted versions of) most views of the                             
epistemology and metaphysics of experience. This allowed me, in sections 4 and 5, to focus on the                                 





The first holds that, as a matter of conceptual analysis, to own an experience means simply to                                 
be causally and ontologically related to it in the right ways, and so once the relevant causal structures                                   
are built into the conditions in CEI, it becomes an a priori necessity. This approach is open both to                                     
thorough­going physicalists, and to non­physicalists who locate the irreducibly non­physical element of                       
experiential properties in the experiences, not their relation to subjects.  
The second holds that CEI, though not a priori, is still true and explanatory: it is a basic law of                                       
nature, which qualifies as explanatory in virtue of its simplicity and elegance, its moving within a                               
homogeneous set of concepts, or the ontological parsimony it gains through conjunction with TSE. To                             
substantiate a claim to simplicity, the conditions in CEI might be restricted to a fundamentally                             
experiential ‘unity’ relation, rather than any complex causal role.  
The third and fourth strategies both explain CEI in terms of a more basic principle BEI, the                                 
unconditional inheritance of ‘basic­experiential properties’, which are like experiential properties                   
except that the relation they assert between subject and experience need not involve any systemic                             
features, such as control, integration, or unity. One approach would be to take BEI as an a posteriori                                   
law of nature, preferring it to CEI on the basis of its simplicity and then deriving CEI from it by                                       
conceptual analysis of the remaining components of experiential ownership. The other would be to                           
derive BEI from HF, a general principle that fundamental properties are inherited if they logically can                               
be inherited, on the basis that wholes and parts are not fundamentally distinct things. In either case,                                 
combinationists commit themselves to the surprising conclusion that phenomenology (or something                     
like it) is inherited not only in easy cases (e.g. from the brain to the human being) but in all cases (e.g.                                           





If one of these four approaches can be made to work, combinationists can claim to have                               
addressed the problem of subject­summing. But explaining the existence of a composite subject is not                             


































Each of us, at each moment, experiences many things, but we do not experience them separately.                               
Rather, we experience them together, which may be captured by saying that our many experiences are                               
linked by a relation of ‘co­consciousness’ or ‘unification’, so that our total experience (or ‘phenomenal                             
field’) displays ‘the unity of consciousness’. Combinationism has to account for this unity: a common                             
concern is that while combinationism may explain the multitude of diverse experiences we have, it                             
cannot explain the intimate connection amongst them. If this were true, an explanatory gap would                             
remain even once all concerns about subject­summing were resolved: a gap between merely having                           
many experiences and having them together. Moreover, if unified consciousness is a precondition for                           




explanation of unity. Unity would then function as a crucial ‘bonding relation’ that served to forge a                                 
single subject out of many component subjects.  
Part of what makes it a challenge to explain unity is what I called, in subsection 3.1 of chapter                                     
2, the ‘independent grasp requirement’. We could always postulate a relation that, by definition, entails                             
unity in the whole when it holds between two subjects, but this would give us no idea what this relation                                       
is, except in terms of a whole with unified experience. If we are to grasp the relation in a way not                                         
parasitic on our grasp of the thing it is meant to explain, we need some idea of what the relation is at                                           
the level of the parts, not just at the level of the whole.  
But does combinationism’s explanation of unity need to be distinctively combinationist? There                       
is already research in both psychology and philosophy on how to explain the unity among different                               
experiences (e.g. Treisman 1980, Shoemaker 2003b, Tye 2003, Bayne 2010), and if some relation is                             
successfully shown by non­combinationists to explain conscious unity (e.g. the synchronisation of                       
neural firing rates in different brain areas), why couldn’t combinationists just adopt that account into                             
their own theory? In particular, if the full explanation of unity involves some form of complex causal                                 
interaction among brain regions ­ which seems very likely ­ combinationists are not barred from                             
appealing to that sort of causal interaction, since causal relations are ‘topic­neutral’ and thus part of the                                 
acceptable explanatory base for any sort of combinationism.  
One initial response is that combinationists have a distinctive question to answer: unlike others,                           
they have component subjects to think about, and insofar as those subjects share experiences with the                               
whole, they will have experiences that are unified with other experiences they do not share. Thus there                                 
arises the question ‘what is it like to have one’s experiences unified with other experiences one does                                 





But perhaps it is not like anything in particular to be a component subject in a unified                                 
composite subject. Perhaps, that is, the relation among component subjects that explains unity in the                             
whole does not make any special difference to their experiences. In this case nothing about component                               
subjects would play an explanatory role in combinationism’s account of conscious unity, and then this                             
chapter would be largely unnecessary, since there would be no distinctive problem for combinationism.                           
Call this ‘minimalism’: 
Minimalism About Conscious Unity: Conscious unity among the experiences of a composite                       
subject does not imply anything about the experiences of its component subjects, but is entirely                             
explained by the topic­neutral or physical relations among them.  
There are, however, two reasons to resist minimalism. One is specific to primitivist combinationists: if                             
purely physical processes fail to explain consciousness, why should purely physical relations suffice to                           
explain the unity of consciousness? That is, primitivists about consciousness might find physicalist                         
accounts of unity unsatisfying just as they find physicalist accounts of other aspects of consciousness                             
unsatisfying: they would then naturally look for distinctively experiential facts about component                       
subjects and their relations that might provide a better explanation.  
The second reason to resist minimalism is not specific to primitivists about consciousness, but                           
can appeal to physicalists too. We have already encountered it in subsection 3.4­3.6 of the last chapter,                                 
where we considered Basile and Coleman’s versions of the ‘incompatible characters’ argument: Strong                         
Exclusivity follows from Phenomenal Holism (PH), because experience­sharing would require a single                       
experience to have two different phenomenal characters, reflecting its unity with the different                         
phenomenal fields of the whole and the part. The combinationist response I defended there accepted the                               
key premise PH, the claim that an experience’s phenomenal character is dependent on its ‘phenomenal                             




only for the ‘absolute sense’ of phenomenal context: the other experiences a given experience is unified                               
with irrespective of which of its subjects we consider.  
If PH is true, then it cannot be right to look for an explanation of a composite subject’s unified                                     
consciousness that has nothing to say about the consciousness of its parts. For those parts will have                                 
experiences that are unified with those of other parts, and according to the absolute reading of PH this                                   
will change the phenomenal character of these experiences. The character of each component                         
experience will somehow reflect that of all the others, and so each component subject will have an                                 
experience that is somehow ‘suffused with’ many other experiences that it is not having. Call this                               
‘maximalism’: 
Maximalism About Conscious Unity: When there is conscious unity among the experiences                       
of a composite subject, the experiences of its component subjects are phenomenally                       
interdependent, and this experiential interdependence is crucial to explaining the unity of the                         
whole’s experience.  
Of course, PH might be false, and primitivism with it, and then minimalism might be a perfectly                                 
reasonable approach to conscious unity, in which case my defence of combinationism in this chapter                             
succeeds before it has even begun. But many combinationists may be drawn towards maximalism,                           
particularly because, while very strong forms of PH may be counter­intuitive (e.g. the claim that every                               
experience I have makes a difference to the character of every other experience), it is much more                                 
plausible that some experiences I have make a difference to some others, that my many unified                               
experiences are not simply there beside each other but interpenetrate to some degree.  
So for the sake of defending combinationism as fully as possible, I will assume in this chapter                                 




some other experience I have. This yields a distinctive challenge: characterising the phenomenology of                           
component subjects whose experiences interpenetrate with experiences they do not themselves have.  
In fact, there may be a further challenge, in the form of what has been called ‘the boundary                                   
problem’. The core observation here is not the unity among experiences but the limits of this unity, the                                   
essential ‘boundedness’ of a subject’s phenomenal field. According to some authors, this boundedness                         
is incompatible with conscious unity extending beyond that field, connecting the experiences of one                           
subject with those of another. But in that case whenever there is a composite subject with unified                                 
experiences, we would have to deny the boundedness of each component subject’s phenomenal field,                           
and thereby deny something essential to their being genuine subjects. I must admit that I have never                                 
found it very obvious what the boundary problem is supposed to be: everything depends on the                               
meaning of the term ‘bounded’, and it is hard to give this term a meaning that both fits with what                                       
proponents of the boundary problem say about it, and substantiates a genuine problem. Nevertheless it                             
needs to be discussed, especially because on some construals it imposes constraints on combinationist                           
accounts of unity that complement the constraints imposed by PH; this discussion occupies section 1.                             
In section 2 I then review the different phenomena which fall under the umbrella term ‘unity of                                 
consciousness’. In section 3 I introduce what I call ‘perceptual adumbration’, a phenomenological                         
structure in which we are aware of something being outside our awareness. In the final two sections I                                   




Two distinct arguments can be placed under this heading, but the first does not threaten                             








One version of the boundary problem is simply a worry that combinationist accounts of unity may                               
over­generate, producing conscious unity between experiences which we know to be disunified (such                         
as those of different humans). Here is how Chalmers expresses this worry: 
To yield human consciousness, we presumably want [experiential combination] to bond a                       
limited multiplicity of microsubjects associated with the human organism, without bonding                     
these to microsubjects elsewhere. It is not at all easy to see what sort of fundamental                               
microphysical relation has this character. (Chalmers forthcoming­a, p.23) 
Why do we ‘presumably’ not wish experiential combination to bond human minds and their parts with                               
other minds? Note that this is not the question ‘why does a given consciousness not include more                                 
experiences than it does?’ ­ that is a question about individuation that I discuss in chapter 6, subsection                                   
3.3. My concern here is a question about unity, about the relations among experiences. So, what is our                                   
evidence that our own experiences are not unified with experiences that are not ours? Equivalently                             
perhaps, what is our evidence no larger composite containing a human being (the type of entity I have                                   
been calling a ‘mega­subject’) enjoys unified consciousness? One answer is that mega­subjects,                       
observed from the outside, typically do not display the kind of integrated and intelligent behaviour                             
characteristic of beings with unified consciousness; this observation is discussed at more length in                           
chapter 6.  
But a second answer, more relevant to this chapter, is that we know that unity relations do not                                   




to imply anything about conscious unity with things outside us (such as would yield unity in the                                 
consciousness of mega­subjects), we would need an additional premise, to the effect that no set of                               
experiences is ‘bounded’ when its members are unified with other experiences not belonging to that set.                               
Then we could argue from the boundedness of our own experiences to the lack of unity between them                                   
and any other experiences. We would then need only a premise to the effect that for the experiences of                                     
a composite subject to be unified, the experiences of its component subjects must be unified with each                                 
other, and the conclusion that no mega­subject could have unified consciousness would follow. Call                           
this the first boundedness argument:  1
Human Boundedness (HB): Each normal human has a bounded set of experiences.   
Unity Incompatible with Boundedness (UIB):A subject’s set of experiences is bounded only                         
if its members are not unified with experiences outside that set.  
C1: Therefore our experiences are not unified with any experiences that are not ours.  
Unity in Part and Whole (UPW): For the experiences of a composite subject to be unified,                               
the experiences of its component subjects must be unified with each other, 
C2: Therefore we are not component subjects of any subject with a wholly unified experience.  
However, once HB and UIB are accepted, they may suggest arguments for a stronger conclusion. For                               
instance, Rosenberg argues as follows:  
It can seem that the flow of interaction in the universe is inherently unbounded, and no merely                                 
abstract pattern presents a natural condition for containing it… This makes for the possibility                           
of… some kind of cosmic consciousness. Unfortunately, no room exists for the more mundane,                           










[combinationism] banishes middlelevel individuals from existence. (2004, p.88, emphasis                 
added) 
The concern here is not simply that if whatever relation accounts for our unified consciousness were to                                 
also connect us to external things, so that we and they together compose a subject with unified                                 
consciousness, then we would not have the kind of experience we do (‘bounded’), but that we would                                 
not even exist (‘banished from existence’). This makes sense only if we human subjects do not just                                 
happen to have bounded consciousness, but do so essentially. Tononi provides a theoretical rationale                           
for this: by his ‘Exclusion Principle’, no part of a conscious being can itself be conscious. The primary                                   
motivation he offers for this is the “Phenomenological Axiom” that “experience is exclusive – in that it                                 
has definite borders, temporal, and spatial grain.” (2012, pp.59­60). On this view, boundedness is                           
essential to conscious subjects as such. We might thus formulate a second boundedness argument: 
Essential Boundedness (EB): The set of experiences belonging to any subject is bounded.   
Unity Incompatible with Boundedness (UIB):A subject’s set of experiences is bounded only                         
if its members are not unified with experiences outside that set. 
C3: Therefore no experiences of any subject are unified with any experiences that do not                             
belong to that subject.  
Unity in Part and Whole (UPW): For the experiences of a composite subject to be unified,                               
the experiences of its component subjects must be unified with each other.  
C4: Therefore no component subjects can compose a composite subject with unified                       
consciousness.  
Unlike the first boundedness argument, this one is a threat to combinationism in general, not just those                                 
forms that imply mega­subjects. Combinationists might respond by denying UPW, but doing so is                           
incompatible with the last chapter’s defence of TSE, the token­sharing of experiences, especially                         




phenomenal context (rather than by subject­relative phenomenal context, or not by any form of                           
phenomenal context). Given these prior commitments, combinationists must regard unity relations                     
among a whole’s experiences as being absolute across subjects, rather than relative, and as connecting                             




It is surprisingly hard to get clear on what Rosenberg and Tononi actually mean by speaking of                                 
experience as ‘bounded’ or ‘exclusive’. For instance, Rosenberg speaks of the fact that “Only some                             
experiences are part of my consciousness; most experiences in the world are not” (2004, p.80), and                               
Tononi says that “an experience encompasses what it does, and nothing more” (2012, pp.59­60). This                             
suggests that ‘boundedness’ means simply excluding some things, so that for a set of experiences to be                                 
bounded is simply for it to not contain all the world’s experiences (or to inconsistently contain                               
experiences it also excludes). Call this the ‘containment’ sense of boundedness:  
Containment­Boundedness: A set of experiences is containment­bounded just if there are                     
some experiences it does not contain. 
But this is an implausible reading, since this sense of boundedness is trivially easy to satisfy ­ anything                                   
except the entire universe, or a self­contradictory object, is containment­bounded, since anything                       
‘contains what it contains, and does not contain what it does not contain.’ And by setting such a low                                     
bar, this sense of boundedness makes UIB very implausible. Why should it follow, from the members                               
of some set being related to other things, that the set must include those other things? This is not the                                       
case with other relations: the left half of a table is bounded, for it does not include the right half (among                                         




compose a whole table. My liver and lungs are both bounded, but closely related to each other. Even                                   
overlapping things are bounded in this sense!  
Alternatively, we might read ‘boundedness’ as being an essentially epistemic notion ­ not so                           
much ‘excluding some things’ as ‘knowing that some things are excluded’. This is suggested by                             
Tononi’s appeal to the fact that “No matter how hard I try, I cannot become conscious of what is going                                       
on within the modules in my brain that perform language parsing… [and] while I can interact with                                 
other people, I have no access to their internal workings.” (2012, p.59)  
One epistemic reading would focus on the inaccessibility of certain information: my set of                           
experiences is bounded in that it gives me no knowledge about the experiences beyond it. Call this the                                   
‘negative epistemic’ sense of boundedness. But what sort of ‘knowledge’ is meant here? Clearly, after                             
all, our perceptual experiences give us some idea of what other people are thinking and feeling, so our                                   
experience cannot be ‘bounded’ in any sense that would rule that out. We might say that boundedness                                 
involves a lack of direct knowledge, but given the Knowledge­by­Ownership principle discussed in                         
subsection 3.3 of the last chapter (by which we directly know only our own experiences), this would                                 
collapse into equivalence with the containment sense of boundedness. In between ‘no knowledge’ and                           
‘no direct knowledge’ we might try to carve out an intermediate criterion, such as the following: 
Negative Epistemic Boundedness: A set of experiences is negatively epistemically bounded                     
just if its members confer on their subject no knowledge of other experiences outside that set                               
which is not dependent on knowledge of something non­experiential.  
This criterion allows for my experiences to give me knowledge of my friend’s emotions, and still count                                 
as bounded, as long as this knowledge is dependent on some non­experiential knowledge (of their                             
utterances, their facial expression, their habits and so on). What boundedness rules out is knowledge of                               




doctrines of privacy in that the experience known, and the experience that gives knowledge, may be                               
distinct.  
But maybe we should focus not on whether or not a subject can know about particular                               
individual experiences, but on whether they can know general statements about which experiences they                           
do and do not have. In particular, maybe references to ‘including only some experiences’, that seemed                               
to suggest the containment reading, are really about being able to know what is included and what is                                   
excluded. This gives us a third reading, which we may call the positive epistemic sense of                               
boundedness:  
Positive Epistemic Boundedness: A set of experiences is positively epistemically bounded                     
just if any subject who experiences all and only those experiences is thereby enabled to know                               
that they experience all and only those experiences.  
The phrase ‘enabled’ is meant to allow that this knowledge might not actually be achieved, and might                                 
not in practice be possible, if the subjects lacks the necessary concepts, or has insufficient processing                               
power, or is in an unsupportive environment; this parallels the implicit qualifications on ‘able to know’                               




Since the second boundedness requires both EB and UIB to be true, combinationists can escape it by                                 
showing that no single sense of boundedness makes both compelling.  
On the one hand, as noted, the containment sense makes EB plausible but UIB very                             




composite subject with unified consciousness. To make UIB plausible, on the containment reading, we                           
would need the premise that if my experiences are unified with some other experiences, then I have                                 
those other experiences: the unity relation confers both its relata on the subject of either. Thus when a                                   
human being’s experiences are unified with those of external things, the human being comes to share                               
all the experiences of those things, and so if co­consciousness runs universally within some whole, each                               
component subject would become conscious of everything in the whole. And then, having all the same                               
experiences as the whole, there would be no clear reason to consider them distinct subjects. Component                               
minds would ‘vanish’ by apotheosis. But why should we accept this claim about unity? The only reason                                 
I can see is an over­reading of PH: going from the idea that each part of a unified phenomenal field                                       
somehow reflects the others, to the idea that anyone experiencing one part of the field thereby                               
automatically experiences all the others. But we need not accept this: one experience can reflect other                               
experiences without conferring them wholesale on those who experience it. The lesson of the second                             
boundedness argument, on this reading of ‘containment’, is simply a constraint on acceptable accounts                           
of unity: they must not be such that each experience confers on its subject all the experiences it is                                     
unified with.  
On the other hand, the negative epistemic sense of boundedness makes UIBmore plausible, at                             
least if PH is accepted. If two unified experiences each reflect the other in their own phenomenal                                 
character, then it seems that the subject of one must have at least some idea of the other, and this might                                         
be independent of any knowledge of non­experiential things. However, even if combinationists                       
accepted UIB for epistemic boundedness, they need not accept EB in the corresponding sense. Why                             
should it be essential to a subject that their experiences should be bounded in the epistemic sense? If                                   
my experiences were highly informative about other experiences, why should it follow that I do not                               
really have any experiences? Admittedly, combinationists need to elucidate, at least in broad outlines,                           




other experiences in this manner? But they are already under this burden, given PH, and if the argument                                   
of the next three sections is successful, they can discharge it.  
Finally, is positive epistemic boundedness incompatible with unity ­ would conscious unity                       
between one’s own experiences and other experiences undermine one’s ability to know which was                           
which? I do not see why it would: that X and Y are somehow connected does not usually stop us from                                         
distinguishing one from the other.  
Even if it positive epistemic boundedness was incompatible with unity, must all subjects have                           
positively epistemically bounded experience ­ could some subject be unable to ascertain which                         
experiences were its and which were not? It seems a strange possibility, but not obviously impossible,                               
and arguably actual in certain pathological cases like schizophrenia and DID (cf. Lane & Liang 2011).                               
Even if we thought, as exclusionary combinationists might, that it is a conceptual requirement for an                               
experience to be called ‘mine’ that I be able to know that it is mine, EB for positive epistemic                                     
boundedness goes beyond this, claiming that it is necessary for an experience to not be mine that I be                                     
able to know that it is not mine, and it is not clear why we should accept this. However, the core issues                                           
here are not really about unity, but about knowledge, in particular introspective self­knowledge. The                           
questions of whether component subjects in a unified composite would lack knowledge of their own                             
boundaries, and whether this is implausible or absurd, is taken up at length in chapter 7, where I argue                                     
that we should deny EB for this sense of boundedness; some subjects are unable to know the                                 







Combinationists can reject UIB on its containment reading, and reject EB on its epistemic readings.                             
The experiences of component subjects in a unified composite need not be epistemically bounded, and                             
their containment­boundedness is compatible with the whole’s unity. But what about HB, the claim of                             
human boundedness that drove the first boundedness argument? Since we have rejected UIB in the                             
containment sense, the argument requires that one of the epistemic readings of HB is true, and this is                                   
certainly much more plausible than either epistemic reading of EB. It does seem that the average                               
human being’s phenomenal field does not give them the knowledge of any other experiences, except in                               
virtue of knowledge about non­experiential things like spoken words and facial expressions. And it                           
does seem that human beings have some overall grasp of what is and what is not part of their                                     
consciousness, though whether this grasp is entirely accurate will depend on whether phenomenal                         
overflow is possible: if there can be experiences of mine that I cannot cognitively access, and if my                                   
beliefs about my total set of experiences are based on some form of cognitive access to those                                 
experiences (as seems to be almost definitionally true), then those beliefs may be inaccurate in                             
excluding certain ‘peripheral’ experiences. But insofar as these inaccuracies are likely to be minor, HB                             
seems plausible.   2
However, there is ambiguity not only in the term ‘bounded’, but also in the term ‘unified’. The                                 
phrase ‘unity of consciousness’ is used in a range of ways, and not all of those meanings will equally                                     
support UIB even in one of the epistemic senses. In particular, if there is such as a thing as bare                                       
phenomenal unity, it might be compatible with a significant degree of negative epistemic boundedness,                           
which might then give an illusory sense of positive epistemic boundedness. This would undermine not                             









character of our experiences is compatible with their belonging to a mega­subject who (like some                             
interpretations of the split­brain patient) has a phenomenally unified consciousness but weak and                         
uninformative causal connections among many of their experiences, a possibility to which I return in                             
chapter 6, section 2.  
This shows the need for a preliminary investigation of what exactly we mean by ‘conscious                             




Having announced my goal of offering a combinationist explanation of the unity of consciousness, I                             
ought to say more exactly what ‘unity’ is. This is controversial, but by reviewing different phenomena                               
grouped under this heading, I hope to at least let those who disagree over its nature track the import of                                       
their disagreements on my subsequent discussion.  
The biggest distinction is threefold, between ‘phenomenal unity’, ‘representational unity’, and                     
understandings on which unity is a matter of experiences being disposed to interact in certain                             
interesting ways. My first two subsections review these three categories, while my fourth is taken up                               
with the topic of attention, which is importantly related to both sorts of unity. In my fifth subsection I                                     







On some accounts of conscious unity, being unified is like being ‘in touch’: when two people are in                                   
touch, there need be nothing they are actually doing at every moment, but their capacity and                               
willingness to communicate constitutes their constantly being in touch. One good example is                         
‘access­unity’, which connects two experiences when “the conjunction of their contents is available for                           
verbal report, reasoning, and the deliberate control of behavior” (Bayne & Chalmers 2003, p.10). A                             
single mental state is ‘access­conscious’ whenever its content can be used by most or all of the                                 
subject’s major faculties, and two states are ‘access­unified’ when they are jointly accessible. But in                             
fact the idea that experiences are unified insofar as they are disposed to interact in particular ways is                                   
broader than access­unity specifically.  
For example, unified experiences rationalise actions together. Conscious beliefs and conscious                     
desires give reasons to act only when unified: my belief that X will lead to Y, and your desire for Y,                                         
will not lead either of us to do X. Yet when those beliefs and desires are in the same unified mind they                                           
3
do so, with sufficient reliability that failures are noteworthy. The structure of consciousness somehow                           
ensures this (see Shoemaker 2003b for an analysis on which this tendency is partly definitive of the                                 
unity of consciousness).  
The relevant sort of interactions will depend on the sorts of experiences involved. Two                           
conscious thoughts might interact by informing and revising each other’s content. Two conscious                         
intentions might interact by mutual adjustment. Two experiences may interact by producing a new                           
experience whose content and properties reflect both. Another sort of interaction, which might be seen                             
as the failed version of another sort, is the generation of dissonance or tension. Two firmly­held but                                 
contradictory beliefs, for instance, often interact by producing, not a consistent belief, but a (vague or                               






produce tension, a unified mind will tend to have a single consistent worldview, and a single consistent                                 
will – conflicts get resolved by the jostling among experiences (Cf. the ‘problem of Inconsistent States’                               
discussed in chapter 6).   4
Another example is the way that, as Nagel puts it, “the relations among experiences can be                               
substantially captured in experiences of those relations” (1971, p.408). For instance, if I am aware of                               
red and also of purple, I can usually become aware that they are different, contrasting, colours (the                                 
absence of this ability in split­brain patients is part of why Nagel finds them so challenging to the usual                                     
individuation of minds).  
The sort of interactions in question might perhaps be summarised as experiences interacting in                           
ways that reflect their fine­grained phenomenal characters and contents. They do not merely interact,                           
but interact qua conscious states. Note that dispositional unity is a matter of degree: two experiences                               5

























thus be said to be ‘more unified’ than two which would rarely connect, like a foot­sensation and an                                   
abstract plan. 
Insofar as dispositional unity is a causal matter, it is the form of unity that most easily fits into                                     
the minimalist approach. Combinationists can simply say that the intricate physical­causal structure of                         
the brain explains the overall causal dynamics of human experience, including why certain experiences                           
are able to produce certain effects on other experiences. But maximalists about unity might still think                               
that a purely causal account will leave something out, though they will certainly not dispense with it                                 
entirely. For instance, they might demand a distinctively experiential account of what it is for a                               




Even apart from my experiences being disposed to interact, they are always in some sense ‘there                               
together’, occurring beside each other in some sort of shared field. Part of this is that they are                                   
experienced as representing the same objective world, and often as representing the same object; call                             
this ‘representational unity’ (Cf. Bayne & Chalmers 2003, pp.3­4, Tye 2003, pp.73­75). For instance,                           
my visual experience of the left half of a cup is representationally unified with my visual experience of                                   
the right half, as well as with my tactile experience of the parts I am touching, because they are                                     
experienced as directed onto a single object.  
There is also a basic sense in which, possibly even apart from what they represent, experiences                               




this is what has been called ‘phenomenal unity’ (Bayne & Chalmers 2003, Tye 2003, p.11). This most                                 
general and most nebulous sense of unity has been given a variety of treatments.  
On one analysis, two experiences are phenomenally unified when there is some single thing it                             
is like to have both, so that there is a third experience that ‘subsumes’ them. (Bayne 2010, Ch.2). This                                     
subsumption relation is one way of spelling out the idea that experiences are composites of other                               
experiences, particularly through the principle that a subject who experiences the composite                       
experiences automatically experiences the components that it subsumes.   6
On another analysis of phenomenal unity, it consists in some very basic form of representation                             
unity (e.g. experiential contents being ‘closed under conjunction’, Tye 2003, Hurley 1994, or                         
representing a single spatial world ­ for some discussions of this proposal see Tye 2003, pp.76­78,                               
Dainton 2004, pp.9­10, Bayne 2010, pp.262­266, and Roelofs 2014b, pp.91­93). This makes the most                           
sense if all conscious states have content, and all conscious contents are in ‘the same format’, e.g. all                                   
propositional, all perceptual, all in the ‘language of thought’ (see Bayne 2010, Ch.3 for an argument                               
against conjunctive closure based on denying this).  
Both subsumptive and representational accounts of unity violate the independent grasp                     
requirement. Neither gives us a grasp of how two unified experiences are related, except in terms of                                 
some overarching whole or conjunction that they (or their contents) both feature in. As Masrour                             








about one­ness” (forthcoming, p.6), whether the one­ness of a total experience or the one­ness of a total                                 
content.   7
Masrour offers his own rival account, called ‘the connectivity view’, on which experiences are                           
unified if they are either “connected by an experience of a specific relation” (p.7), or by a chain of such                                       
connections. Being connected by an experience of a relation is then defined in terms of a primitive sort                                   
of ‘attachment’, which relates an experience of an n­place relation with n experiences of objects, such                               
that the objects are experienced as standing in that relation. The connectivity view is similar to the view                                   
I will defend in section 4, but as it stands it does not satisfy the independent grasp requirement. Our                                     
grasp on ‘attachment’ is in terms of what it is like to experience things as standing in relations, but this                                       
is still an experience we attribute to the composite subject who has all of the connected experiences. It                                   
does not yet tell us what it is like to be a component subject who has only one of these connected                                         
experiences.   
8
There are opposing views on the relations among representational unity, phenomenal unity, and                         
dispositional unity. Perhaps phenomenal unity provides the basis for dispositional unity: my                       
experiences can communicate qua experiences only because they share a field, so that phenomenal                           
unity is the more basic phenomenon. Or perhaps phenomenal unity is not really any primitive or                               
distinctive structure, but just a sort of vague impression we have of our experiences’ systematic                             
proneness to interact in certain ways, so that dispositional unity is the more basic phenomenon. Perhaps                               












different level ­ representational unity among the contents of experiences, phenomenal unity among the                           
experiences themselves as bearers of that content.  
Another question, especially important for evaluating the first boundedness argument’s premise                     
HB: since dispositional unity is a matter of degree, how much dispositional unity is guaranteed by                               
phenomenal unity, and how much requires additional conceptual capacities, or contingent neural                       
architecture, to realise? This question is posed especially by the possibility that split­brain patients have                             
a single phenomenally unified consciousness, with two clusters of experiences that are highly                         
dispositionally unified internally but not with each other (see Bayne & Chalmers 2003, pp.18­20, Tye                             
2003, pp.121­125, Bayne 2010, pp.197­198). If this account of the split­brain case is even possible,                             
then phenomenal unity is compatible with quite radical disunities of function. It might even be                             
compatible with the degree of negative epistemic boundedness found in human minds: this possibility                           
will be taken up in section 2 of chapter 6.  
Finally, note that the formal character of phenomenal unity has been explicitly discussed (e.g.                           
Bayne & Chalmers 2003, pp.20­29), and it is generally taken to be symmetric and reflexive, though its                                 




A particularly important feature of our mind’s structure is attention. What I take to be essential to                                 
attention is that it privileges some contents over others: attended content is processed faster, more                             
accurately, and in the light of a greater range of considerations, and is more accessible to the mind’s                                   




1986, Johnsto & Dark 1986, Corbetta et al. 1990, Treue & Maunsell 1999). Moreover, attention can                               
shift, sometimes voluntarily and sometimes involuntarily, so that something can first be unattended,                         
come ‘into attention’, and then pass ‘out of attention’.    9
Attention relates to dispositional unity in that the interactions which define dispositional unity                         
are much more likely to occur when one (or both) of the experiences in question is attended. What we                                     
are attending to is subject to greater influence from other experiences, and conversely exerts greater                             
influence over them. Attending to, for instance, a conscious belief will greatly increase the likelihood                             
that any conflicting beliefs or perceptions we have will come to mind and be used to revise it; attending                                     
to a percept makes us more likely to think of things we could compare with it, conclude from it, or do                                         
with it. Indeed, Nagel’s characterisation of conscious unity as allowing relations of experiences to be                             
captured in experiences of relations, quoted above, is immediately followed by the qualification “if [the                             
subject] attends to the matter”(1971, p.407). Moreover, we might count transferring attention as itself                           
one of these interactions: two experiences are more dispositionally unified to the extent that attending                             
to one makes the other more likely to enter attention.  
Attention also relates to phenomenal unity through the ‘field’ image. Phenomenal unity is often                           
glossed as experiences sharing a ‘phenomenal field’; attention is often glossed as having something at                             
the centre of some kind of field. James, for instance, says:  
In most of our fields of consciousness there is a core of sensation that is very                               
pronounced. You, for example, now, although you are also thinking and feeling, are                         
getting through your eyes sensations of my face and figure, and through your ears                           






Sebastian Watzl has attempted to define attention specifically in terms of this ‘structuring of                           
consciousness’ (Watzl 2010), while other writers have tried conversely to identify phenomenal                       
consciousness with attention (Prinz 2012). Whether or not one accepts such strong claims, it is plausible                               
that the ‘field’ in the two cases is the same: our natural inclination to think of consciousness as an array                                       
laid out before us, and of attention as organising a less­attended periphery around a more­attended                             
focus, reflect different aspects of the same basic impression.  
The ‘field’ metaphor suggests some idea of proximity or distance between experiences, and in                           
Roelofs 2014b I suggest a way to spell out this suggestion that seeks to connect attention, phenomenal                                 
unity, and dispositional unity. It starts from the idea that dispositional unity is a matter of degree: two                                   
experiences are more unified if they are disposed to communicate more readily. We might say that they                                 
are ‘closer’ when they are more unified, and ‘further apart’ when less unified. Directions could then be                                 
constructed out of the relations among distances.  
10
We would then say that the attentional focus is at the centre of the field in the sense that it is                                         
closer to the other points on average than any other point is, reflecting the above observation that                                 
attending an experience increases its dispositional unity with other experiences. And since transferring                         
attention is itself one of the interactions constituting dispositional unity, the field would be a sort of                                 
attentional terrain, through which attention moves quickly and easily over short ‘distances’, and with                           



















In trying to explain conscious unity, combinationists must bear in mind several choices about how to                               
think of this unity. Each choice will impact what their eventual explanation has to look like.  





The answers to these questions will determine the kind of relation combinationists need to explain                             
unity: whether that relation is in terms of contents or not; whether it is primarily dispositional or                                 
primarily categorical; whether it is transitive or not; and whether it is fundamental or reducible to some                                 
underlying non­experiential relations.  
These choice­points relate to divisions among combinationists we have already observed. For                       
instance, the relationship of dispositional to phenomenal unity will reflect the relationship of                         
access­consciousness to phenomenal consciousness, and thus the possibility of phenomenal overflow.                     
If experiences can be phenomenally conscious without having the suite of causal powers that would                             
make them access­conscious, perhaps they could be phenomenally unified without having the suite of                           
causal connections that would make them access­unified, or otherwise dispositionally unified.                     
Similarly, whether conscious unity is reducible to non­experiential relations will reflect the reducibility                         




ultimately reducible to non­experiential relations, while property dualists and Russellian monists may                       
(but need not) regard them as basic ingredients of reality.  
The most important division for this chapter, however, is the first: is phenomenal unity a matter                               
of representational or non­representational features? This reflects a broader question about how to                         
conceive of consciousness. Many theorists have been attracted to the idea that consciousness is, in                             
general, ‘transparent’ or ‘diaphanous’, in that the only things manifest in experience are the external                             
objects and features which experience represents (Harman 1990, Tye 1992, Dretske 1994, Hellie 2010).                           
Combinationists attracted to this sort of view will naturally look to experienced contents for a unifying                               
relation. Masrour’s connectivity account, mentioned in subsection 2.2, is an example of a view intended                             
to be consistent with transparency (pp.7­8). 
Conversely, other theorists (e.g. Block 2003) have defended the view that experiences have                         
manifest non­representational properties (and may sometimes lack representational properties). Also at                     
odds with transparency are those who take all experiences to represent (or better, to ‘present’)                             
themselves, being “phosphorescent, like tropical sea­water, which makes itself visible by the light                         
which it itself emits.” (Ryle 1949, p.159, meant as parody but endorsed “while cancelling his mocking                               
tone” by Strawson 2013, p.9, who attributes this view to “Aristotle, Dignāga, Descartes, Arnauld,                           
Locke, Brentano, Sartre and many others”, p.1). While self­representation is not strictly a                         
non­representational property, it cuts against transparency by making the subject aware of the                         
experience as such (though see Kriegel 2009 for a self­representationalist account which seeks to retain                             







Let us recap what has been established so far. Combinationists are looking for a relation among                               
subjects that will unify their experiences; if they accept either primitivism about consciousness or the                             
phenomenal interdependence of unified experiences, then their explanation must involve an account of                         
the phenomenology of these component subjects, the way that their consciousness is changed by their                             
becoming part of a unified composite subject. Moreover, the relation appealed to must meet the                             
independent grasp requirement, and in subsection 3.1 of chapter 2 we saw three ways to do this. First,                                   
combinationists might look for some physical or functional relation which intelligibly explains                       
conscious unity, and which can be grasped entirely from a third­person point of view. Second, they                               
might look for a distinctively experiential relation that we ourselves bear to things outside us (this is the                                   
‘outward­looking’ approach). Third, they might take the unity relation among our own experiences, and                           
seek to abstract it from that context (this is the ‘inward­looking’ approach).  
I think the third of these is the best to focus on, because its major theoretical commitment ­ the                                     
sharing of experiences between part and whole ­ has already been established as a major plank of the                                   
combinationist scheme I have been suggesting. By contrast, the other two approaches both carry                           
contentious further commitments ­ the first to reductionism about unity, the second to the existence of                               
mega­subjects. However, the approaches are not mutually exclusive: indeed, the relation I discuss in                           
this section, though I will claim it obtains amongst our experiences, is most easily recognised in the                                 
phenomenology of our perceptual relation to external things.  
In section 1 of this chapter, and section 3 of the last chapter, I refuted two arguments against                                   
combinationism (the incompatible characters argument, and the second boundedness argument), from                     
which emerged two constraints on an adequate account of phenomenal unity. First, it must do justice to                                 




character of the others. Second, it must do this without implying that the subject of one experiences the                                   
other, so as not to violate the containment­boundedness of each subject’s consciousness. In section 2 of                               
this chapter I then distinguished some elements of the conscious unity that combinationists hope to                             
explain, and noted some live questions about it.  
In this section, I present my candidate for an independently intelligible relation which can                           
explain conscious unity: the phenomenological structure that has come to be called ‘amodal                         
perception’. In amodal perception we are aware of something yet also aware of its being somehow                               
concealed from us. While a lot of work has been done on amodal perception (E.g. Michotte 1965,                                 
Clarke 1965, Noë 2005, Matey 2013), this work has tended to focus on the relation between the subject                                   
and the concealed­yet­perceived object. I believe amodal perception also involves an interesting                       




It is a pervasive feature of everyday perceptual experience that we experience objects as having                             
features beyond the immediately perceptible, and thus are perceptually aware of those features despite                           
in some sense being unable to perceive them. The term ‘amodal perception’ reflects the idea that we                                 
somehow perceive these features without sensory stimulation and thus not in any sensory modality,                           
though I use the label without any commitment to this claim of non­modality.  
The standard examples involve visual occlusion. Consider seeing three­dimensional objects                   
with fronts and backs. At present I am looking at a coffee cup; in a narrow sense, I see only the front of                                             




front and back. I am in some indirect sense aware of the back of the cup, but simultaneously aware that                                       
I am not aware of it in the same sense that I am aware of the front; I perceive it amodally. Consider also                                             
the relation between the cup and the table it stands on. I perceive this table as having a broad, brown,                                       
unbroken surface – but part of this surface is behind the cup, where I cannot directly see it. Yet I am                                         
aware of the surface I do directly see as continuous with the surface I do not, perceiving some sections                                     
through vision and other sections ‘amodally’.   
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Other visual examples might involve conditions of poor visibility, when darkness, distance, or                         
fog prevents us from seeing something clearly. We rarely experience the obscured object as being                             
somehow itself fuzzy or lacking in detail – rather, we experience it as having plenty of detail, whichwe                                     
cannot make out. Insofar as we are aware of this detail as not visible, we could be said to perceive it                                         
amodally. There can also be non­visual examples; for instance, Nanay (2010, p.241) discusses the                           
13
tactile experience of feeling the handle of a cup as the handle of something with other, unfelt parts.                                   
Similarly, we might think of the concealed aspects of a sound or smell as the greater intensity or                                   
complexity which any given percept might yield if we moved closer, took our hats off, or sniffed                                 
harder.  
Different authors have pursued different questions about amodal perception. Some have asked                       
how we can properly account for its phenomenology, and the role this phenomenology plays in our                               
impression of the object’s independence (Husserl 1982, Merleau­Ponty 1962, Kelly 2004). Others have                         
focused on which representational faculty amodal perception involves – perception, cognition,                     
imagination, or something else (Noë 2005, Nanay 2010, Briscoe 2011). In particular, this latter                           









that all perception is in some sense infused with imagination. Whatever the proper analysis of amodal                               




Combinationists are looking for a relation to bind together experiences, and amodal perception is                           
usually analysed as a relation between subjects and objects. So my discussion will need to extract, from                                 
the amodal perception of objects by subjects, some relevant relation among experiences. The first step,                             
undertaken in this section, is to identify a relation between objects; in sections 4 and 5 I will define two                                       
relations between experiences based on this.  
I will call this relation among objects ‘adumbration’. When we perceive something as                         
adumbrating something else, we are aware of it as intimately connected to, and revealing, that other                               
thing, of which we are aware of not being aware. The word ‘adumbration’, an obscure term for                                 
‘shadowing’ or ‘sketchily indicating’, was suggested to me by certain passages where Husserl uses the                             
term ‘Abschattungen’ , which several translators translate using the word ‘adumbrations’. Husserl                     
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writes that: 
What is perceived is given in adumbrations in such a way that the particular givenness refers to                                 
something that is not­given, as what is not given belonging to the same object. (2001, p.41, my                                 
emphasis) 
In Husserl’s usage the adumbration is a thing that we experience, rather than a relation among                               







the visible side interpreted as a side of the transcendent object that goes beyond it.”(2003, p.119, my                                 
emphasis). Thus I use the term slightly differently than Husserl, though hoping to pick out a different                                 
element of the same phenomenon. I take no stand on how exactly to interpret Husserl; moreover he                                 
endorses certain theses on which I remain neutral (cf. subsection 3.5). So Husserl is an inspiration and                                 
source of language, but my meanings do not exactly match his.  
As well as having different relata, amodal perception and perceptual adumbration in my sense                           
have different definitional commitments. Amodal perception is sometimes defined in ways orthogonal                       
to my purposes, as the conjunction of perception with an absence of actual sensory stimulation (Nanay                               
2010, pp.241­242), or even narrowly in terms of occlusion. But this makes it impossible to think about                                 
amodal perception in hallucinations, dreams, and so on, though intuitively we can easily experience                           
dream­things as having blocked or concealed features. By contrast, my focus is on the particular sort of                                 
phenomenology in which we are not only aware of something but also aware that it is concealed or in                                     
some sense not given to us. This sort of experience can occur whether or not we are actually receiving                                     
any given sort of sensory input.    
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The principle by which I will flesh out my idea of perceptual adumbration is that when we are                                   
amodally aware of something, this is in virtue of something we are modally aware of – what is unseen                                     
is nevertheless experienced as present in virtue of its connection with what is seen. So we can move                                   
from ‘I am amodally aware of object x in virtue of being modally aware of object y’ to ‘object y, of                                         








First, when I am amodally aware of the back of the cup, this is clearly in virtue of being aware                                       
of the front of the cup, which is facing me. Indeed, the back of the cup is in a sense seen ‘in’ the front,                                               
because I see the front as the front of something which also has a back. My awareness of the back lies                                         
in my perceiving the front as one aspect of something with other aspects. Let us say that the front is, for                                         
me, the ‘revealed aspect’, and the back the ‘concealed aspect’. The front adumbrates the back (for me),                                 
and while I am aware of the former as ‘given’, I am aware of the latter only in a weaker sense, as ‘not                                             
given’.  
Similarly, when I perceive the table as having parts which are occluded by the cup, this is                                 
because my perception of the surface which is not occluded reveals it as just a portion of a single,                                     
unbroken surface. Here the revealed and concealed aspects are two portions of a single surface, rather                               
than two surfaces of a single object.  
In the case where we amodally perceive the unseen detail of something, or the ways it would                                 
show itself under better viewing conditions, the revealed and concealed aspects are not spatially                           
separate, but the broad outlines and fine details of a single object. The rough aspect that is given                                   
adumbrates the detailed aspect, by presenting itself as a rough and imperfect view of an object that can                                   
be seen in better ways.  
In each case there is a revealed aspect and a concealed aspect, experienced as intimately                             
connected in a single object. One aspect is given and the other is not, but in a broader sense we are                                         
aware of both. I leave unanalysed the exact meanings of ‘revealed’, ‘concealed’, ‘aspect’, and                           
‘connected’: they mean whatever they must to accurately describe this sort of experience. Perceptual                           
adumbration is defined as the relation between the revealed aspect and the concealed aspect when one                               
is given to a subject and the other, though not given, is experienced as present in virtue of the first                                       








Let us sharpen up the notion of adumbration. First, we can contrast it with deferred perception, which                                 
Dretske (1994) analyses as “com[ing] to know that k is F by seeing and hearing, not k itself, but                                     
h.”(p.263). In deferred perception, there may be no link between the thing directly perceived (‘h’) and                               
the thing learnt about (‘k’), save that one carries information about the other. I might, by perceiving h                                   
here and now, learn about k which only existed a hundred years ago, or on another planet. There need                                     
not even be any causal interaction between h and k, since they might be joint effects of a common                                     
cause. By contrast, perceptual adumbration presents the concealed aspect as in some sense ‘there’, in                             
my immediate environment, in virtue of the connection it is experienced as having to the revealed, as                                 
another aspect of the same thing. I not only learn about k, but experience k as somehow present.  
I am not sure exactly how to analyse this ‘presence’; it does not seem to be simply a matter of                                       
the object’s spatial closeness, perceived importance, or ability to produce intense sensations, for these                           
can all be very low (as when I survey a distant scene from a hilltop) without removing the impression                                     
that things have concealed aspects, and that these are present to me. Hence I leave it unanalysed.   
However, perceptual adumbration does resemble deferred perception in that one thing tells us                         
about another. Though the concealed aspect is not given to me, I do learn about it, via the revealed                                     
aspect. I may not be able to see the rear side of my coffee cup, but I can tell a fair bit about its overall                                                 




patterning, etc. And as with deferred perception, background information is important – an aspect may                             
be more informative to one who knows what to look for, or how to interpret what they see.  
Different cases may give more or less information. For example, a brief glimpse through a                             
window at night may reveal a slight movement, experienced as that of some vast creature without                               
yielding any definite information as to its nature or shape – by contrast, when the same vast creature is                                     
seen in daylight, it will still have concealed aspects (e.g. its opposite side) but their nature will be much                                     
more closely specified by what is then revealed. I will call this the ‘informativeness of the revealed’;                                 
some revealed aspects are more informative than others.  
This information may be veridical or not: sometimes what is given in my experience misleads                             
me regarding what is not given, as when I perceive a piece of flat stage scenery as having a filled­out                                       
rear side. Moreover, what the revealed aspect tells us might not be susceptible of explicit propositional                               
formulation: it might merely allow us to recognise the concealed if it comes to be revealed – to say                                     
either ‘yes, that’s what was previously adumbrated’, or ‘no, that surprises me’. For example, when we                               
look through the fog at a building whose fine detail is concealed, we may not be able to put into words                                         
what the revealed contours tell us about that fine detail. But we may still have a constrained enough                                   
impression of it that when we get closer, we could be either surprised or not at its details, and feel that                                         
our previous adumbration had misled us or not.  
Next, note that perceptual adumbration can be more or less motivationally salient, in two ways.                             
On the one hand, what is concealed may be important – it may matter for our plans what is on the rear                                           
side of that object. The concealed aspect may have this importance in virtue of what the revealed aspect                                   
tells us about it, or simply because of how little we know about it (i.e. it may arouse our curiosity). Call                                         
this the salience of the concealed. On the other hand, the concealment of the concealed may itself                                 




actions to reveal the concealed (e.g. rotating the object, moving closer), actions to make something                             
presently revealed become concealed (e.g. turning away, positioning things to block it out), or actions                             
to keep the revealed in view, or the concealed out of view. Call this the salience of concealment.  
Generally, the salience of concealment depends on two things – the salience of the concealed,                             
and whether the revealed is sufficiently informative. If I can know everything I need to about the                                 
concealed just from what the revealed tells me, I need not attend to the fact that it is concealed, or take                                         
steps to reveal it. In such cases I may not even notice the fact of concealment, and may later not                                       
remember which aspects were revealed and which concealed. For instance, if the contents of a cup                               
matters to me, but the interior is concealed due to my angle of view, I may still know enough just by                                         
seeing the logo on the front, and take the cup without noticing whether I had actually seen the contents                                     
or not.  
So concealed aspects or their concealment may be salient, and revealed aspects may be                           
informative about them. It may be that these two features exhaust the phenomenon of perceptual                             
adumbration: our experience of the concealed aspect is just our partial knowledge of it via the revealed                                 
aspect, and the motivational salience of this knowledge. Were we to reduce informativeness and                           
salience to zero, so that we neither knew about nor cared about the concealed aspect in any specifiable                                   
way, it would vanish from our experience.  
Alternatively, there might be something in perceptual adumbration irreducible to                   
informativeness and salience, which remains when those are set to zero. This would be a sort of ‘pure                                   
openness’, a sense that what is presently given is continuous with something more, even though this                               
‘something more’ is left entirely unspecified. We might call this as a phenomenological “etc.” or “…”,                               






simply add specificity to this pure openness, without constituting or explaining it. Merleau­Ponty seems                           
to suggest something along these lines when he writes: 
Suppose we construct, by the use of optics and geometry, that bit of the world which can at any                                     
moment throw its image on our retina. Everything outside its perimeter, since it does not reflect                               
upon any sensitive area, no more affects our vision than does light falling on our closed eyes.                                 
We ought, then, to perceive a segment of the world precisely delimited, surrounded by a zone                               
of blackness… The fact is that experience offers nothing like this… The region surrounding the                             
visual field is not easy to describe, but what is certain is that it is neither black nor grey. There                                       





So perceptual adumbration, by definition, involves two or more aspects, some revealed and others                           
concealed, which are experienced as connected to each other in some intimate fashion. This connection                             
ensures that when the revealed aspect is perceptually present to us, the concealed aspect is also present                                 
(or as Husserl says, ‘co­present’), even though not ‘given’. The revealed aspect may be more or less                                 
informative about the concealed aspect, and the concealed aspect, or its concealment, may be more or                               
less salient. Beyond this, there are several questions philosophers might ask about how to analyse                             
perceptual adumbration. In this subsection I will note some, though I remain neutral on each point.  
First, I have spoken of ‘aspects’, revealed and concealed, without saying much about their                           
ontology; this is a deliberate attempt to avoid taking a stance on the ontology of perceptual objects. On                                   




world – a set of properties, parts, or powers of a real object. Conversely, on an ‘indirect realist’ account                                     
of perception, ‘aspects’ might be mental things.  
A second question is whether perceptual adumbration is properly counted as ‘perceptual’ at all,                           
or as a form of rapid and automatic ‘inference’, or an exercise of sensory imagination. This will depend                                   
largely on what kind of content perception can have (Cf. Siegel 2006, Hellie forthcoming­b), and on                               
how one draws the distinction between perception and imagination (Cf. Kind 2001, pp.89­95); if                           
perception were defined in a way that excludes perceptual adumbration then all my talk of ‘seeing’ and                                 
‘perceiving’ what is concealed should be interpreted as a loose way of speaking of ‘representing’,                             
‘intending’, or ‘being aware of’.  
A third question is whether the content of perceptual adumbration is conceptual or not. I do not                                 
think that this affects the uses I make of the concept later in this chapter, except insofar as it relates to a                                           
fourth question: who is capable of it? Does perceptual adumbration require the suite of special                             
cognitive capacities which adult human beings tend to have, or is it something which other, ‘simpler’,                               
minds may have?  
On the one hand, it seems overwhelmingly plausible that many non­human animals, and                         
pre­linguistic infants, experience perceptual adumbration. First, such creatures are capable of                     
exploratory behaviours, approaching, circling, or manipulating objects so as to reveal more of their                           
aspects to perception; second, they display evidence of modal completion, which may be neurologically                           
akin to amodal completion (Nieder et al. 2002); third, they can sometimes pass tests of ‘object                               
permanence’, i.e. give indications of understanding that objects continue to exist when unperceived                         
(Bower 1974, Baillargeon 1991, Miller 2009, Doré 1984). While there is controversy over exactly how                             





We cannot be so confident about simpler minds like new­born babies or shrimp (though Prete                             
2004 collects some supportive evidence from predatory invertebrates). An observed failure to grasp                         
object permanence might result from the absence of perceptual adumbration, but might equally result                           
from a lack of memory, reliability, etc. in the deployment of perceptual adumbration. Perceptual                           
adumbration with very low informativeness might not produce any specific pattern of behavioural                         
capacities, leaving no empirical way to establish its absence in a given creature. In particular, if one                                 
accepts the possibility of pure openness, one might attribute perceptual adumbration to absolutely all                           
subjects, however simple. On this view, perceptual adumbration does not require any particular sort of                             
sophistication: it simply means that one’s experiences are ‘open­ended’, bearing a sense of their own                             
failure to exhaust all that there is.  
A fifth question: is adumbration a universal feature of perception, for those subjects who                           
experience it at all? That is, do subjects like us experience adumbration in absolutely all our                               
perceptions, or only in some? Certainly, the perception of occlusion is widespread in vision, but it                               
might not be strictly omnipresent, and it might not be similarly pervasive for the other senses. While I                                   
do not see any clear way to decide this issue, Husserl and Merleau­Ponty seem to regard adumbration                                 
as universal, Husserl saying that: 
every perception… points to… multifarious continua of possible new perceptions… in which                       
the same object would show itself from ever new sides. (2001, p.41, emphasis added) 
Sixthly, can there be non­perceptual adumbration, i.e. adumbration among objects not given to sense?                           
There are some promising examples, but they are less compelling, and may not involve a genuinely                               





One interesting example is the flow of time. Supposing that it makes sense to say that we are                                   
aware of moments of time, it is arguable that they are experienced not as entirely new and separate                                   
from the last, but as elaborating on and continuous with it. One way to think of this would be as each                                         
moment adumbrating the next – each moment is experienced as merely the revealed aspect of                             
something which includes the next moment as concealed. Thus each moment comes to us not as                               18
something so far unperceived, but as something already roughly grasped but not given. I find this idea                                 
attractive, but developing it would require wading into the topic of time­consciousness, which is both                             
deeply perplexing and largely outside my present focus.   
So I have left numerous questions open, including:  









But all I need insist upon is that perceptual adumbration is a genuine and widespread feature of our                                   












If unified experiences are phenomenally interdependent, then component subjects in a unified                       
composite must be aware of their own experiences, but also of how those experiences form an                               
intimately­connected whole, other parts of which they do not experience directly. In perceptual                         
adumbration we are aware of things as aspects of a continuous whole, other parts of which are not                                   
given to us. As such, perceptual adumbration is a good candidate for the relation combinationists need                               
to explain conscious unity.   
However, as it stands, perceptual adumbration is not a relation between subjects but between                           
objects perceived by one subject. So more definitional work is needed, and this work will be much                                 
briefer and more direct if the transparency thesis is true, so that facts about an experience’s contents are                                   
the only phenomenologically manifest facts about it ­ that is, all that the subject is aware of is the                                     
non­experiential world presented by the experience. Thus in this section I suppose transparency to be                             
true – that is, I suppose that all manifest features of experience, including phenomenal unity, can be                                 
accounted for in terms of content. In the next section I relax that assumption and consider how to                                   
explain conscious unity apart from content.  
In this section, therefore, I am assuming a certain answer to the first of the four questions in                                   
subsection 2.4. In subsection 4.1 I define a relation among experiences, and by extension among                             
subjects, and in subsection 4.2 I argue that this relation provides an intelligible explanation of                             
conscious unity, if transparency is true. The following subsections flesh out this proposal by drawing                             
on more specific notions laid out in section 3, and I close by showing how different variants of this                                     







Suppose that two experiences represent objects which adumbrate each other. That is, each experience                           
has an object, which is experienced as merely the revealed aspect of an object whose other aspects                                 
include that which is revealed to the other experience. This establishes a sort of ‘sideways                             
representation’ of each experience by the other, in that each is aware of the other’s content (its only                                   
phenomenologically manifest feature) as something not given. This need not involve any representation                         
of the other experience as an experience, but merely as the actual revealedness of an aspect of the                                   
object. Call the relation between these two experiences ‘mutual object­adumbration’.  
Mutual object­adumbration is still not suitable for our needs. For it leaves open that two                             
experiences might have the relevant content without interacting, just by coincidence. This will be true,                             
for instance, whenever two people look at opposite sides of the same object: the object of one subject’s                                   
experience is side 1, which adumbrates side 2, which is the object of the other subject’s experience.                                 
This seems much too easy a relation to yield conscious unity.  
Let us say that two experiences stand in ‘the OA­relation’ if their contents mutually,                           
veridically, adumbrate each other, each doing so in virtue of the other doing so. That is, each                                 
experience presents something as revealed, and what it presents adumbrates what the other presents as                             
revealed, and does so because the other experience presents that thing as revealed (this ‘because’ might                               
be causal, constitutive, or any other sort of ‘because’).  
Crucially, we can define an extended sense of the OA­relation between two subjects, which                           
obtains when at least one experience of one stands in the OA­Relation to at least one experience of the                                     




dependence of the experiences is important: we do not have the OA­relation when two people look at                                 
opposite sides of the same object, for each is aware of the far side as concealed because of their own                                       
visual and cognitive systems, not because that side is seen by the other person.  
Note that the OA­relation satisfies the two constraints arising from my earlier responses to the                             
boundary problem and the problem of incompatible characters: it makes the phenomenal character of                           
each experience reflect that of the other, but does not confer both experiences on the subject of either. It                                     




Having defined the OA­Relation, how might we construct a combinationist analysis of conscious unity                           
in terms of it? The first step is:  
Unification­by­Object­Adumbration (UOA): A subject has a unified experience of                 
X­and­Y­together whenever they experience X, and experience Y, and these experiences are                       
OA­related. 
This says that conscious unity among a subject’s experiences is nothing but their standing in the                               
OA­Relation. That is, if we imagine having two experiences, each containing in itself an implicit                             
awareness of the other’s content as something beyond its own but intimately connected – each                             
indicating the other as an aspect of the same whole as itself – what we are imagining is simply                                     
conscious unity. This aims to satisfy the independent grasp requirement in an ‘inward­looking’ way,                           
because our basis for accepting UOA is ‘introspection’, or more broadly our acquaintance with what it                               




over and above the OA­relation, something of which we have an independent grasp via the notion of                                 
perceptual adumbration.  
It might seem contradictory for two of a single subject’s experiences to be OA­related. How                             
can my awareness of one object involve ‘awareness of not being aware’ of another, if in fact I am                                     
aware of both? But while there is a negative component to the definition of perceptual adumbration                               






Of these, I think C. is strongly preferable, because it does seem that we can experience adumbration                                 
while simultaneously experiencing the concealed aspect as given through another experience, and such                         
cases do not give us any sense of contradiction or impossibility. For instance, I may see a                                 
three­dimensional object as having a concealed rear side, while also seeing that rear side directly in a                                 
mirror placed behind it. Hence I conclude that the negative moment of perceptual adumbration is best                               
captured as “this aspect is not given through this experience (which adumbrates it)”. Given this, a                               
subject whose experiences are OA­related need not have a sense that they both are and are not being                                   
given each aspect, but merely that each aspect is given in one experience, and adumbrated but not given                                   
in the others.   
Does UOA satisfy chapter 2’s criteria for intelligible explanation? I think it is clearly                           
compatible with the sharing­inheritance­connections schema, in which it functions as a ‘connection                       








but to any subject with OA­related experiences. But there are two more difficult questions: first, is the                                 
OA­relation ‘conceptually continuous with’ conscious unity ­ is it the right sort of thing to explain it?                                 
and second, does it follow a priori from some subject having two OA­related experiences, that they                               
experience those two together, as unified? These questions can be answered only by phenomenological                           
reflection, but I think UOA is as plausible as substantive phenomenological claims ever are. Each                             
experience of such a subject carries a sense of the others without actually giving them: it ‘connotes’ or                                   
‘indicates’ the others, while internally announcing its own failure to capture their full richness.  
Note that since this account assumes transparency, it assumes that the unity of my                           
consciousness is reflected in some kind of represented relation among the contents of my                           
consciousness. Conscious unity is not something connecting ‘experiences’, but the web of experienced                         
connections among the sights and sounds and smells that experience presents to us. This brings the                               
account close to Masrour’s ‘Connectivity View’, on which experiences are unified whenever they are                           
linked by a primitive ‘attachment’ relation to an experience of a relation among their objects. The                               
difference is just that UOA satisfies the independent grasp requirement, by saying how the unity of my                                 
many experiences together is reflected in the content of each experience individually. Consequently this                           
account, unlike Masrour’s, can explain the unity of a composite subject’s experience in terms of the                               
experiences of its parts. From UOA and the principle that experiences, including their adumbrational                           
character, are inherited by wholes from their parts, we can derive the following: 
Unified Composites from OA­Related Parts (UCOP):A composite subject enjoys conscious                     
unity whenever its component subjects are OA­Related.  
This gives us a unified composite subject just from having each component subject’s experienced                           
contents OA­related to those of the others: each is aware of what is given to the others, but as not­given                                       
– as concealed aspects of the unified whole which their own experience partially reveals. The whole                               




aspect of that world as unified with (‘continuous with’, ‘intimately connected with’, ‘revealed                         
alongside’) other aspects which are not given to that part.  
Note that UCOP says nothing about what happens in the whole when component subjects are                             
related in ways that fall short of the OA­Relation – when they are isolated and insensitive to each other,                                     
or when one’s content adumbrates another’s but not vice versa. It leaves open that such cases give rise                                   
to no unified state of the whole, or to exotic and unfamiliar sorts of consciousness.  
Both UOA and UCOP speak indifferently of ‘conscious unity’ and ‘adumbration’. In section 2                           




Representational unity comes in many forms, depending on what relation is represented. These forms                           
can be rich and complex or rudimentary. Combinationists might explain this by appealing to the                             
informativeness of the revealed. Each content adumbrates the other, and insofar as they do so                             
informatively, they represent the other as being related to themselves in some specific manner:   
Complex Contents from Informative Adumbration (CCIA):A subject’s experiences jointly                   
represent complex contents whenever, and in proportion as, they informatively adumbrate each                       
other’s contents.  
For instance, to have an experience representing P­or­Q might involve having one experience                         
representing P, and another representing Q, each of which adumbrates the other’s content as ‘an                             
alternative’. The experience representing P need not be so informative as to indicate what the other                               
represents; it might only demonstratively refer to it as ‘that alternative to P’, just as my visual                                 




opposite side of what I directly see’. An experience can be informative by indicating only how what it                                   
adumbrates relates to what is revealed.  
Similarly, perhaps conjunction is a matter of adumbrating another experience’s content as ‘also                         
true’, ‘true along with’ one’s own, without specifying what it is. And if conjunctive closure is a mark of                                     
conscious unity, this might be explained by saying that adumbrating something as ‘also true’ is the                               
basic and minimal way to adumbrate it informatively.  
Which forms of informative adumbration, among which simpler contents, correspond to which                       
representational relations, is obviously a huge topic. It is not clear even what format to think of these                                   
representations in – pictorial, propositional, linguistic, or something else. So I cannot give even the                             
beginnings of a full compositional explanation for complex contents. The key thing is that adumbration                             
allows a subject to incorporate reference to another’s content into their own, without fully grasping or                               
deploying that content themselves. We might use the metaphor of citation: when one text cites another,                               
its content is enriched without what does that enriching being actually in the text. Many authors citing                                 
each other may lack the skills or even the concepts to understand what the others do, but can still                                     
jointly create an intellectual edifice richer than any could create alone.  
Presumably, rich representational unity, and the informative adumbration which underlies it,                     
correlates with physically­detectable information transfers. Thus in highly­integrated systems like the                     
human brain, where huge quantities of information are rapidly shared and integrated, each part would                             
not only be conscious of the other parts’ contents as concealed aspects, but would have a fairly rich                                   
impression of those contents. This would not rival the awareness each part has of its own workings, but                                   







One major form of dispositional unity is that two simple contents can, if experienced together (and                               
especially if attended) generate a new content which reflects the contents of both. This could be put by                                   
saying that the content of each experience is available to the other. Combinationists can explain this as                                 
simply a disposition to adumbrate the other in the kind of informative way discussed above, in virtue of                                   
a generalised causal sensitivity to each other.  
But another form of dispositional unity is agential: my beliefs interact with my desires to give                               
me reasons, and my reasons interact with each other and my motor systems to generate actions. These                                 
sorts of interactions do not generally characterise beliefs, desires, reasons, and motor systems spread                           
across different unified minds. The combinationist explanation of this must go beyond informativeness                         
and appeal to the motivational salience of the concealed and of its concealment. I suggest that unified                                 
experiences in beings like us represent the other contents they adumbrate as extremely salient, but do                               
not represent their concealment itself as at all salient, and so generally ignore it. Correspondingly, each                               
component subject in a unified composite perceives things going on in the others as extremely relevant                               
to its actions, without caring or even recognising that they are concealed from it.   
Agential Integration from Salient Concealed and Non­Salient Concealment (SCNC): A                   
subject’s experiences are disposed to guide its behaviour in an integrated way whenever, and in                             
proportion as, they adumbrate each other’s contents as highly salient, while finding no salience                           
in their concealment. 
On this picture, what motivates each part of me is its sketchy second­hand awareness of contents in                                 
another part. For instance, suppose I decide that praying is good, because it is an expression of piety                                   
and piety is good; a subject­first combinationist might say that this reasoning takes place in one part of                                   
my brain, P1. Another part of my brain, P2 (closely connected to my cerebellum and muscles) knows                                 




happens is that P2, receiving information from P1 in virtue of which it constantly adumbrates “the stuff                                 
going on over there” in greater or lesser detail, comes to adumbrate P1’s contents specifically as                               
“praying is good”. It may well not adumbrate in any further detail – it may have no ideawhy praying is                                         
good, nor care, taking that conclusion as sufficient reason to implement the ‘praying’ schema. We                             
might compare P2, in different respects, to an underling who receives and acts upon instructions                             
without thinking to ask why they were sent, or to a human being who acts on a gut feeling without                                       
thinking to analyse it.  
Similarly, P1 is set up so that its response to judging “praying is good” is simply to convey that                                     
information outwards, making it accessible to other parts like P2. Since this then leads to praying, P1                                 
will likely feel that it has successfully prayed, and done so on the basis of its own reasons, at least if it                                           
is capable of receiving and interpreting the relevant feedback. We might compare P1 to a manager who                                 
decides ‘to do X’, sends a memo to that effect, and gives no thought to how X will actually be                                       
implemented, merely checking that it has been done and then thinking “good, I have done X”. We                                 
might also compare P1 to a whole human being who forms an intention, receives feedback from its                                 
being carried out by their muscles, and does not enquire as to the causal chain connecting the two.  
SCNC implies that component subjects in a unified mind both do and do not ‘perceive each                               
other’. They do perceive each other in the sense that each is aware of the experiences going on in the                                       
others, but they do not perceive each other in the sense that they do not recognise these experiences as                                     







CCIA and SCNC together provide combinationists with an explanation of representational and                       
dispositional unity. What about phenomenal unity? Since I am here assuming transparency, I will treat                             
phenomenal unity as the most basic form of representational unity. As noted in subsection 2.4, there is                                 
a question about how independent this can be of dispositional unity, i.e. how far it makes sense to think                                     
of two experiences being ‘merely phenomenally unified’, yet substantially unable to interact. To the                           
extent that they cannot be merely phenomenally unified, the explanation for phenomenal unity will not                             
go beyond the principles already laid out. Being phenomenally unified will just mean being OA­related                             
with some greater or lesser degree of informativeness and salience. But if inert bare phenomenal unity                               
is possible, as suggested by some accounts of the split­brain phenomenon, how do combinationists                           
explain this?  
In subsection 3.4 I described the possibility of ‘pure openness’, adumbration without specific                         
informativeness or motivational salience about what it adumbrates. This inarticulate sense of there                         
being something more than the given seems to me the best candidate for a compositional explanation of                                 
pure phenomenal unity, the inarticulate sense of things being ‘there together’ in the mind. That is,                               
combinationists might say that experiences can be OA­related uninformatively, i.e. without any definite                         
suggestion of the content or specific features of the other content. 
If pure openness really is entirely uninformative, it cannot be described as veridical or                           
non­veridical in the normal way. But the fact that pure openness has no truth­evaluable content does                               
not imply that it has no content at all; it may still have reference. That is, when two contents are each                                         
experienced as “just one aspect of something”, the ‘something’ may behave rather like a demonstrative                             
(“just one aspect of this thing”, said without any idea of the character of that thing) and refer to the                                       
other content, despite containing no descriptive information about the latter. Does it still make sense to                               




of qualitative facts about the other, but it might still be in virtue of some causal or ontological relation                                     
between the two. In the split­brain case, for instance, experiences might refer to each other in virtue of                                   
their belonging to the same organism. So we should count entirely uninformative adumbration as                           
‘trivially veridical’, as long as it involves successful reference by each experience to the other’s                             
content.  
Of course, one or both of pure openness and pure phenomenal unity might be non­existent, a                               
mere theorist’s hypostatisation. The point is that a combinationist has at least two tenable views here –                                 




So combinationists can give either a positive or a negative answer to the second question from                               
subsection 2.4. What about the other two questions in that subsection? The third was whether                             
phenomenal unification is transitive, and it remains unclear whether the relevant, minimal, form of the                             
OA­relation is transitive (obviously highly informative forms will not be, just as sophisticated forms of                             
representational unity are not transitive). However, it might be made so in two ways. Firstly, we might                                 
simply allow for experiences to count as ‘indirectly unified’ if they are ‘indirectly OA­related’,                           
connected by a chain of OA­relations. Being indirectly OA­related is definitionally transitive, and so                           
might be a better candidate for consisting phenomenal unity than being directly OA­related. But insofar                             





A second way to make the OA­relation transitive would appeal to certain theses about                           
reference. Reference often works by a kind of ‘chain’ – I can refer to something named long ago                                   
because a succession of acts of reference, each in some sense deferring to a previous act of reference,                                   
connects me to that first naming. So we might plausibly suppose that whenever an experience refers in                                 
a basic adumbrational way to another experience, it also thereby refers to all the experiences which the                                 
second experience thus refers to, thus making the basic OA­relation transitive. That is, when a single                               
experience represents itself or its object as merely the revealed aspect of something of which there is                                 
‘more’, this ‘more’ refers inarticulately to many other experiences, including any experiences which are                           
themselves thus adumbrated by an experience referred to.  
Finally, the fourth question of subsection 2.4 was whether phenomenal unity could be given a                             
physicalistic explanation, and this will depend on whether the basic OA­relation can be explained                           
physicalistically. If physicalistic explanations are available for consciousness in general, then there                       
should be no special problem about explaining the OA­relation: physicalists can presumably give some                           
account of perceptual adumbration in terms of their favoured theory of perception, and then connect                             
this with their favoured account of what an experience is, and what content is, to derive an account of                                     
what it is for two experienced contents to mutually adumbrate each other. If the OA­relation is                               




In section 2 I noted that combinationists might choose to present an account of conscious unity in terms                                   
of experiential contents, or in terms of the non­representational features of experiences. In section 4 I                               




object­adumbration between experiences in virtue of some real relation, or the ‘OA­relation’. But                         
someone who regards conscious unity as a non­representational phenomenon might object that this is                           
missing the primary thing to be explained. While the OA­relation might explain representational unity,                           
the unity of the experienced world, this is distinct from phenomenal unity itself, the unity of the                                 
phenomenal field which represents that world but has other phenomenological features.  
I believe combinationists can address this challenge by claiming that experiences themselves,                       
not just their objects, can adumbrate each other. In the subsection 5.1 I argue that if we deny                                   
transparency, it is reasonable to allow for such direct adumbration between experiences; in subsection                           




When an experienced object adumbrates another, we are aware of it as merely the revealed aspect of                                 
something with concealed aspects, of which the adumbrated thing is one. For an experience itself to                               
adumbrate another experience, then, we would have to be aware of it as the revealed aspect of                                 
something with concealed aspects, of which another experience is one. This raises two questions: first,                             
can we be aware of an experience as the revealed aspect of something; and second, can an experience                                   
be adumbrated as the concealed aspect of something?  
The first question asks about our direct awareness of experiences, and if we endorsed the                             
transparency thesis we might have reason to answer it negatively, on the grounds that we never have                                 
direct awareness of experiences, but only of their objects. But in this section I am supposing                               




nevertheless a real question about what sort of awareness this can be, and whether it is properly                                 
described as a form of ‘representation’. A particularly serious issue for combinationists is whether it                             
depends on mental­state concepts, or is available to creatures lacking such concepts. If creatures                           
without mental­state concepts cannot be aware of experiences, even in a thin sense, but nevertheless                             
enjoy unified consciousness, then combinationism’s account of unity runs aground, unable to apply to                           
simple minds and unable to explain our complex minds as composed of simpler minds. Such a position                                 
has the odd consequence that such creatures cannot in any sense be aware of the unity of their                                   
consciousness, but it is not absurd. Thus I believe combinationists must either endorse transparency and                             
reduce phenomenal unity to some sort of representational unity, or else suppose that awareness of                             
experiences is involved in all consciousness, even if in a thin way perhaps not best described as                                 
representation. And if we can be aware of experiences, I think it is hard to deny that we can be aware of                                           
them as mere aspects of something bigger.  
The second question is whether we can be aware of experiences as concealed. I think we can,                                 
though Husserl seems to say we cannot: 
A mental process... is not adumbrated. If I look at it, I have something absolute; it has no sides                                     
that could be presented sometimes in one mode and sometimes in another. (1982, p.96)  21
However, I think there are familiar cases which are easily interpreted as involving adumbrated                           
experiences, which make it plausible to deny Husserl’s claim. My first example is the                           











…a gap that is intensely active… A sort of wraith of the name is in it, beckoning us in a given                                         
direction, making us at moments tingle with the sense of our closeness, and then letting us sink                                 
back without the longed­for term. If wrong names are proposed to us, this singularly definite gap                               
acts immediately so as to negate them… the gap of one word does not feel like the gap of another,                                       
all empty of content  as both might seem... (1950, p.251) 
We might think of this ‘active gap’ as the revealed aspect of a psychic whole whose concealed aspect is                                     
a full and explicit memory. This revealed aspect may be more or less informative and often makes the                                   
concealment of the name itself highly salient. It is not clear if we should think of what is here concealed                                       
as an experience: it is clearly something mental, but it might be an unconscious mental process.                               
Alternatively, it might be phenomenally conscious but not access­conscious (an instance of                       
phenomenal overflow) – or access­conscious to an insufficient degree, and less so than the ‘active gap’                               
(Cf. Block 2011, Hellie forthcoming­b, pp.6­7).  
Similar uncertainty attends my second example: we might think of unattended experiences as                         
partly adumbrated, if we supposed that they are phenomenally rich but cannot be accessed in all this                                 
richness while unattended. The revealed aspect of this experience is the kind of peripheral awareness                             
we have of its broad outlines, while attending to something else, which is accompanied by a sense that                                   
there is more detail there which we could appreciate or access more fully if we shifted our attention.  
My third example is our awareness of the experiences of others, which I think is better handled                                 
as a case of perceptual adumbration than as a case of either inference or direct perception. For instance,                                   
when two people conversing see and hear each other’s facial expressions and voices, they may perceive                               
these expressive actions as the revealed aspect of a mental state which is not directly given, but is                                   
nevertheless experienced as ‘present’ through its expression. We do not generally feel as though we                             
have to infer someone’s anger from their words and expressions, at least in the intellectual way that we                                   




face’ – and yet we also tend to think that the anger itself is private: we are aware that it is fully given                                             
only through this other experience that we do not have.   22
Note that in these cases an external perceptual object – a face, a voice, a gesture – adumbrates                                   
an experience. Thus these are not instances of experiences adumbrating experiences, and moreover they                           
do not bear on the issue of epistemic boundedness, since they confer knowledge of the other’s                               




For the opponent of transparency who has rejected section 4’s explanation of conscious unity, but who                               
has accepted the arguments of subsection 5.1, I propose an explanation of phenomenal unity based on                               
the ‘EA­relation’. Just as the OA­relation obtained between two experiences whose objects adumbrated                         
each other, largely veridically and each in virtue of the other’s content, the EA­relation obtains between                               
two experiences which adumbrate each other, largely veridically and each in virtue of the other                             
likewise adumbrating it. And just as two subjects are OA­related when an experience of one is                               
OA­related to an experience of the other, so two subjects are EA­related when an experience of one is                                   
EA­related to an experience of the other. I now propose the following principles: 
Unification­by­Experiential­Adumbration (UEA): A subject has a unified experience of                 










Unified Composites from EA­Related Parts (UCEP): A composite subject enjoys conscious                     
unity whenever its component subjects are EA­Related.  
These explain phenomenal unity in a composite subject by appealing to the EA­relation among the                             
experiences of component subjects. As with UOA and UCOP, the second principle follows from the                             
first given the principles of inheritance defended in chapter 3.  
This account can take over unaltered the principles CCIA and SCNC from section 4, explaining                             
representational and dispositional unity in terms of the adumbration relations among experience’s                       
contents. Rejecting transparency poses no problem for these principles, since doing so is consistent                           
with thinking that representational and dispositional unification depend heavily on the contents of the                           
unified experiences.  
Combining UEA with CCIA and SCNC raises the question of how phenomenal unity is                           
connected with dispositional unity, the second open question of subsection 1.4. If phenomenal unity is                             
the categorical basis for dispositional unity, then we should say the following: in a unified mind each                                 
experience’s adumbration of the other experiences is what allows it to interact with them in the various                                 
ways constitutive of dispositional unity. It is because each experience involves awareness of the others                             
that they can connect their contents, influence each other’s development, etc. If we thought the priority                               
was reversed, we should say that the experiences adumbrate each other, i.e. are experienced as                             
connected, merely because they are prone to interact. 
The second, third and fourth open questions in subsection 2.4 were whether phenomenal                         
unification is more basic than, and dissociable from, dispositional unity; whether it is transitive; and                             
whether it can be explained in physicalistic terms. Just as with the OA­relation, combinationists who                             
relies on UEA can accept both positive and negative answers to each of these questions. Phenomenal                               




transitive either by defining it to include both direct and indirect links, or by supposing that the relevant                                   
sort of reference is transitive – that an experience which adumbratively refers, via pure openness, to                               
another experience, thereby refers also to all those to which the latter thus refers. And just as with the                                     




Let us assume that either section 4 or the above two subsections have provided an adequate explanation                                 
of the nature of conscious unity in general. Combinationists can draw on that framework to aid in                                 
understanding the specific architecture of minds recognisably like ours, in which the details of different                             
processes are accessible to consciousness to different degrees, and in which there is competition for                             
focal attention amongst those things present to consciousness.  
The particular way a set of component subjects adumbrate each other will reflect the contingent                             
causal connections among them, in the human case realised neurally. More informationally isolated                         
subjects will adumbrate others less informatively and less saliently, while being adumbrated less                         
informatively and saliently in turn. Other systems may adumbrate each other more informatively and                           
more saliently; these will be, in the terms of subsection 2.1, ‘more unified’ in the dispositional sense. If                                   
we adopt subsection 2.3’s suggestion of plotting each experience’s position in the ‘conscious field’                           
according to its degrees of unity, then this field’s geometry will reflect the contingent pattern of                               





This applies in particular to the way that at each moment a few particular elements in the mind                                   
occupy a ‘focal’ or ‘central’ position. Following the suggestions in subsection 2.3, we could say that                               
this involves one element being especially strongly unified with the rest of the mind generally;                             
following the proposal of this section, this would then mean one element coming to both adumbrate the                                 
other elements, and be adumbrated by them, either more informatively or as more salient (most likely                               
both). It would ‘loom larger’ in the view of all the other elements.  
There are multiple ways to implement this structure: compare the following two models. On the                             
first, each component subject keeps its own proprietary experiences the same throughout a shift in                             
attention: what changes is the strength of the connections among them, so that first one subject, then                                 
another, has increased ‘bandwidth’ for communicating with the others. On the second, the strength of                             
the connections stays the same, but some or all of the component subjects adjust their own internal                                 
processing, and hence their own experiences, to ‘mirror’ the experiences of the others, so that first one                                 
experience­type or content, and then another, is being instantiated by a critical mass of component                             
subjects. It is an empirical matter which model better matches the way human brains work. Brains                               
might use a combination of the two, or use one to realise the other: e.g. a mechanism for synchronising                                     
groups of neurones (closer to the second model) might make one particular brain region better able than                                 




I began this chapter by identifying a challenge for combinationists: to explain conscious unity, in a way                                 
that meets the independent grasp requirement. This might be easy, if ‘minimalism about unity’ is true,                               




component subjects. But many combinationists have reason to doubt this, if they accept either                           
primitivism about consciousness or the phenomenal interdependence of unified experiences. They then                       
need to explain how conscious unity in the whole is experienced by the parts. And, as section 1                                   
explained, they need to do so in a way that does not make each part the subject of all the others’                                         
experiences.  
I then advanced a combinationist proposal, with different versions reflecting different answers                       
to independently contentious questions about the nature of conscious unity. The guiding idea was that                             
amodal perception – the perception of the unperceived – gives us a grasp on what it is like for a subject                                         
to experience an experience as unified with another experience it does not have. This basic claim can                                 
accommodate most positions on the nature of conscious unity. To have a convenient label for this                               
23
proposal, define ‘the A­relation’ as obtaining between two experiences if either a) experience is                           
transparent and they are OA­related, or b) experience is not transparent and they are EA­related.                             
(Similarly, two subjects are A­related if they have experiences that are A­related to the other’s.) Then                               
section 4’s UOA and UCOP, and section 5’s UEA and UCEP, can be combined into: 
Unification­by­Adumbration (UA): A subject has a unified experience of X­and­Y­together                   
whenever they experience X, and experience Y, and these experiences are A­related. 
Unified Composites from A­Related Parts (UCAP): A composite subject enjoys conscious                     
unity whenever its component subjects are A­Related.  
Call these two principles, together with the supplementary principles CCIA and SCNC from                         
subsections 4.3 and 4.4, the ‘adumbration proposal’. Does the adumbration proposal provide an                         
adequate explanation of the unity of consciousness? Is it intelligible to us that simply from two                               
experiences being A­related, they must therefore be unified? Ultimately, whether one sort of experience                           
23  An exception is the view that i) we are not aware of experiences themselves, but only of their content, but ii) 
conscious unity is not a matter of content. Section 4’s account of unity denied ii), and section 5’s denied i), but if both 




suffices for another is a phenomenological question, and one which may not admit of empirical                             
investigation. Consequently, it is hard to conclusively resolve this question; the best combinationists                         
can do is to ‘pump intuitions’ by repeatedly describing the two experiences in terms intended to make                                 
them sound similar.  
If the adumbrational proposal fails, that does not conclusively show that all combinationist                         
proposals fail, but it does not bode well. By contrast, if the proposal succeeds, that is a major step                                     
towards a comprehensive combinationist explanation of consciousness. In the next three chapters, I                         
consider whether the framework developed so far (chapter 3’s inheritance proposal together with this                           
























This chapter addresses several issues connected by the theme of experiential structure. In part, this is an                                 
attempt to expand combinationism’s positive explanatory scheme: the last chapter’s ‘adumbration                     
proposal’ explains why many experiences might be experienced together as a unified phenomenal field,                           
but what explains the particular way this field is structured? But addressing the topic of experiential                               
structure is also important to rebutting some specific objections to combinationism in general, and to                             
panpsychism, or any other theory which posits microsubjects, in particular.  
What makes it seem especially hard for combinationism to account for experiential structure is                           
the apparent discrepancy between how the physical brain is structured and how our consciousness is                             
structured. This difference has been recognised as a problem not just for combinationism but for                             
mind­brain identity theory in general, for it seems to tell against identifying brain processes with                             
consciousness or regarding one as the basis for the other. Here is a representative statement of this                                 
supposed discrepancy from Maxwell: 
How is it that the occurrence of a smooth, continuous expanse of red in our visual experience                                 




numbers of electrons, ions, or the like? Surely being smooth or continuous is a structural                             
property, and being particulate or discontinuous is also a structural property… incompatible                       
with being smooth and continuous. (1978, p.398) 
For a more detailed plan, I am indebted to Lockwood (1993) who distinguishes three specific strands of                                 
the problem:  
1. Our experience is relatively coarse­grained, while any plausible composite basis is very                       
fine­grained.   
2. Our experience is qualitatively diverse, while any plausible composite basis has only a few                           
qualitative ingredients.  
3. The type of structure found in experience “seems not to match, even in coarse­grained fashion,                             
that of the underlying physiology.” (p.544)  
These three problems are addressed sequentially in the three sections of this chapter: I call them the                                 
‘blurring problem’ (of how fine­grained structure disappears from the whole’s perspective), the                       
‘blending problem’ (of how qualitative diversity appears from the whole’s perspective), and the                         
‘mismatch problem’ (of why the types of structure diverge).   
1
The first two of these problems are more definite, but do not face all versions of                               
combinationism. Comparisons of qualitative diversity, or fineness of grain, only arise for those who                           
postulate a microexperiential level that closely mirrors the microphysical level. Thus the problems of                           
blending and blurring particularly face panpsychist combinationists, or other combinationists who posit                       
microsubjects, conscious subjects on the scale of a cell, molecule, or fundamental particle. This special                             
relevance is reflected in the repeated invocation of the problem of structural discrepancy as a worry for,                                 









Non­panpsychist combinationists, by contrast, might hold that below a certain level of                       
decomposition one finds physical parts without any experiential properties, so that only some physical                           
structure needs to be matched in the experiential realm. Experience appears only at a certain scale, and                                 
2
experiential combination explains experiential structure above this scale in terms of experience at this                           
scale. So for non­panpsychists, the problems of blending and blurring are more or less removed:                             
whatever account is given of how experience arises from a complex non­experiential basis will take                             
over the job of explaining why their structures differ. That job may still be challenging, especially for                                 
mind­brain identity theorists, but the challenge does not concern experiential combination specifically.  
The problem of mismatch, however, faces even non­panpsychist combinationists, because even                     
large parts of the physical brain are arranged in ways that seem not to match the structure found in                                     
experience. Admittedly, this problem is more nebulous than the other two: it is not easy to say, in                                   
general terms, what the two kinds of structures are that are meant to be discrepant, especially when we                                   
remember that strictly we should be comparing experience not with the brain but with brain activity.                               
Nevertheless a few specific worries can be placed under this heading, such as the lack of correlation                                 
between which brain structures are spatially near or far from each other, and which things we                               
experience as close to each other, or even with which things we experience as distinct or identical.  
Another aspect of the mismatch problem is the problem that allowing any role for                           
microexperiences seems to allow for ‘dancing qualia’ (Chalmers 1995b, cf. Block 1992, p.77ff). If we                             
accept the premise that where there is no difference in how a system reports its phenomenology, there                                 
is no difference in actual phenomenology, it seems that any change between functionally equivalent                           
systems ­ e.g. a change in the microscopic parts that make them up ­ will make no difference to                                     







whole’s experience, we would expect a chance in the former to mean a change in the latter.                                 
Combinationists need to explain how this ‘screening out’ of certain aspects of microexperiences from                           
macroexperience is compatible with the explanation of the latter by the former (cf. Sebastien 2013).  
Addressing the problems of blurring, blending, and mismatch involves developing two                     
alternative responses in parallel, one for the ‘inclusionary’ and one for the ‘exclusionary’ approach. I                             
distinguished these two versions of combinationism in chapter 2, connecting them with different views                           
of phenomenal overflow and of physical combination. By emphasising the whole’s ontological                       
intimacy with and dependence on its parts, we get ‘inclusionary’ combinationism, on which the whole                             
inherits all the (basic­) experiential properties of its parts, even when they are not unified with, or                                 
cognitively and behaviourally integrated with, each other. Conversely, by emphasising the whole’s                       
ontological autonomy from its parts, we get ‘exclusionary’ combinationism, on which the whole may                           
lack many of the properties of its parts, including any (basic­) experiential properties which are not                               
suitably connected to others. Then in chapter 3 I argued that for a certain sort of combinationist ­ the a                                       
priori, subject­first, panpsychist ­ only the inclusionary approach can provide an intelligible connection                         
between part and whole.  
How combinationism handles the issue of experiential structure will reflect the choice between                         
these two approaches. Inclusionary combinationists must say that everything making up the structure                         
of the parts’ experiences – the same qualitative palette, the same types of relations, the same degree of                                   
detail – is present in the whole’s. This forces them to pursue the difficult line that our experience is                                     
actually radically more fine­grained than we took it to be.   
For the exclusionary approach things are more complicated. The exclusionary approach holds                       
that experiential goings­on in the parts appear in the whole only when they meet certain conditions. Do                                 




particular, do they play the right causal roles to guide the whole’s thought and behaviour?While some                                 
microexperiences clearly do not (e.g. whatever experiences a panpsychist attributes to particles in my                           
hair), this question is hard to answer for experiential events in the parts of a live human brain.                                   
Considered together, this mass of experiences seems to be precisely the thing that directs the person’s                               
behaviour. But considered individually, no single microexperience makes an appreciable behavioural                     
difference.  
I think exclusionary combinationists should say that the part’s microscopic experiences are                       
inherited by the whole as a composite experience but not individually: thus no single experience is                               
shared between microscopic part and macroscopic whole, but the whole’s experiences are composed of                           
the experiences of its microscopic parts. So exclusionary combinationists, but not inclusionary ones,                         3
accept a radical difference between the whole’s consciousness, with its characteristic structure, and the                           
many consciousnesses of its parts, with their characteristic structure. Of these two approaches, it might                             




The blurring problem concerns the absence from our experience of the sheer degree of detail that                               
physics tells us is present in our brains. Consider someone smelling a simple odour, or hearing an                                 
unchanging pure tone. From the subject’s point of view, these events may appear entirely simple and                               









neurones, each with billions of billions of parts. So we may wonder, “how do all these microstructural                                 
discontinuities and inhomogeneities come to be glossed over?” (Lockwood 1993, p.544) For                       
convenience, I will put this by saying that human experience appears ‘coarse­grained’, while its neural                             
basis is ‘fine­grained’.   
Exclusionary combinationists will approach this problem by granting that the whole’s                     
experience really is coarse­grained, and explaining why the fine­grained collection of experiences                       
belonging to the parts gives rise to this distinct coarse­grained experience. Inclusionary                       
combinationists, by contrast, claims that the experience of the whole is in fact fine­grained in the                               
relevant sense, since it contains all the experiences of the parts; they then explain why we are inclined                                   
to wrongly think that our experience is coarse­grained. Both approaches, however, should base their                           
explanations on the notion of radical confusion, though employing it in different roles: either to explain                               
why the details of microexperiences fail to appear in consciousness (the exclusionary approach), or to                             
explain why details in consciousness fail to be noticed as such (the inclusionary approach).  
In subsection 1.1 I elaborate this notion of ‘confusion’, inspired by similar doctrines held by                             
Spinoza and Leibniz. In subsection 1.2 I define the notion of radical confusion, and in subsection 1.3 I                                   
explain why we should expect the experiences of our small parts to be radically confused. In                               




I think the combinationist should claim that our experience seems coarse­grained because the details of                             
our parts’ experiences are ‘confused’ one with another. What does this mean? I take the inspiration and                                 




blurring problem. In particular, Spinoza and Leibniz are both committed to the claim that every single                               
event occurring in the human body has a corresponding mental event which is present in the human                                 
mind. How is this fantastic level of mental detail to be reconciled with our apparent ignorance of the                                   
4
processes occurring in our bodies? For both authors, the solution appears to rest upon the idea of                                 
confusion: bodily sensations are always confused, and thus while the mind perceives them in some                             
sense, it is in another sense unaware of them.  Consider a famous passage from Leibniz: 
5
The perceptions of our senses even when they are clear must necessarily contain certain                           
confused elements… [for] while our senses respond to everything, our soul cannot pay                         
attention to every particular… It is almost like the confused murmuring which is heard by those                               
who approach the shore of a sea. It comes from the continual beatings of innumerable waves.                               
(2012, p.96) 
And here is one from Spinoza:  
The human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming a certain number of                             
images within itself at the same time… if this number is exceeded, the images will begin to be                                   
confused, and if the number… is largely exceeded, they will all be completely confused with                             
one another… When the images become quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all                               
bodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as it were, under one                           
attribute. (1994, p.140).  
Both passages seem to present the same idea: the finite capacities of the human mind ensure that many                                   
of its ideas will be ‘confused’ in the sense that it will be unable to distinguish them, i.e. think or attend                                         
to them separately. Michael Della Rocca helpfully offers the following definition: “For Spinoza, an                           









these things by having an idea that is just of one of the objects and an idea that is just of the other of the                                                 
objects.”(2008, p.113) 
Since there is scholarly dispute about what exactly Leibniz and Spinoza mean by confusion, I                             
do not propose an interpretation, but simply note an inspiration. I define confusion thus: two mental                               
elements are confused with each other, relative to a subject and a mental operation, when that subject                                 
can perform that mental operation on both at once, but not on either separately. They are                               
distinguishable insofar as they are not confused. This definition is deliberately very broad: shortly I will                               
zoom in on the particular form of confusion that I think can help combinationists.  
What are the ‘mental elements’ and ‘mental operations’ this definition speaks of? I intend these                             
phrases to cover any kind of mental thing which can be the object of any kind of mental process: the                                       
notion of confusion can be neutral among different accounts of how the mind is organised. Prominent                               
examples of mental operations might include ‘thinking’ or ‘entertaining’, ‘introspecting’ or ‘being                       
aware of’, ‘attending’, ‘imagining’, or ‘recognising’ in the sense of categorising under concepts or of                             
judging distinct from or identical with something else. Mental elements might be ‘experiences’                         
6
(however individuated, cf. Chapter 3, section 3), or ‘ideas’, ‘contents’, or ‘phenomenal qualities’                         
understood as the things awareness of which constitutes the having of an experience.   
7
Note that confusion is different from indiscriminability, the relation between two items which                         














indiscriminability involves two tokens seeming qualitatively equivalent to a subject even while they are                           
recognised by that subject as numerically distinct. Note also that since confusion is subject­relative,                           8
the same element might belong to both part and whole but be confused for one but not for the other.                                       
Indeed, for small enough parts confusion might disappear simply because the parts each experience                           




Let us draw three distinctions among types of confusion. First, recall that confusion must be relative to                                 
some particular sort of mental operation. A particularly interesting sort of confusion would be that                             
which applies to all the mental operations a subject is capable of. Call this ‘strong confusion’, and call                                   
the contrasting case, where elements are confused only relative to some operations, ‘weak confusion’.                           
For instance, we might be unable to call to mind the flavour of coffee without at the same time calling                                       
to mind the bitterness of its taste, yet nevertheless able to attend (and perhaps apply concepts, like                                 
‘bitter’) to them separately. Then the experiences of flavour and bitterness would be confused relative                             
to some mental operations (like ‘calling to mind’), but not relative to others (like ‘attending’), and so                                 
would be weakly, not strongly, confused.  
Second, distinguish symmetric and asymmetric confusion. There seems to be nothing                     
impossible in the idea that someone could think of two things together, and think of the first without the                                     










involved regarding the one but not regarding the other. Let us say that these two elements are                                 
‘asymmetrically confused’. For example, perhaps we can never experience certain bodily sensations                       
(e.g. pain, itching, discomfort, or nausea) without also experiencing displeasure, and cannot even attend                           
to the distinctive sensory element of the sensation without attending also to that displeasure.                           
Nevertheless we can experience and think about displeasure independently of the sensory element, and                           
to that extent might come to suppose that there are two distinct elements present here which are                                 
asymmetrically confused.  
Third, confusion may depend on circumstances. Someone who is tired, distracted, drunk, or                         
having to respond quickly may be unable to distinguish things which they would be able to distinguish                                 
given better conditions: that is, their experiences may qualify as confused only relative to those                             
circumstances. Confusion may also be relative to a subject’s conceptual repertoire – it might be that                               
they cannot distinguish two ideas using their present concepts, but would be able to if they refined their                                   
concepts, or learnt new ones. Indeed, a common activity of philosophers is to claim to have identified a                                   
confusion of this sort in our everyday concepts, which requires the introduction of technical concepts to                               
remove.  
For example, consider someone who does not distinguish between something being customary,                       
and its being the right thing to do. They would be unable to think that a given action was customary                                       
without thinking that it was the right thing to do. This might well be strong confusion, if they could not                                       
even focus attention on the one idea without also attending to the other. Yet they could come to                                   
distinguish the different ideas by learning appropriate concepts – after which they could retrospectively                           
recognise their previous, shallow, confusion. Let us call confusion which can be removed either by                             
adjusting the subject’s bodily surroundings or condition, or by improving their conceptual repertoire, or                           




ideal conditions, ‘robust confusion’ (the boundary between the two being as well­defined as the notion                             
of ‘ideal conditions’ allows).  
Having defined confusion, and divided it into symmetrical and asymmetrical, strong and weak,                         
and robust and shallow versions, let us define radical confusion as confusion which is symmetrical,                             
strong, and robust. That is, mental elements are radically confused with each other when the subject                               
cannot distinguish any of them, by any means, under any circumstances.  
It is important to see that radical confusion is likely to be undetectable to the subject; someone                                 
having radically confused experiences (say) could not tell that they are. This is because noticing                             
confusion requires some sign of there being multiple elements, and if we are completely unable to                               
distinguish them, the normal signs will be unavailable.  
For instance, we have an easy way to identify shallow confusion – we remove it, then contrast                                 
the resulting distinction with the earlier confusion. With robust confusion, that is impossible, but we                             
might notice the confusion if it was only weak, for we would then be able to distinguish the elements in                                       
one fashion while noting our inability to do so in another fashion. For example, if we could not imagine                                     
one sensation without another arising alongside it, but could still attend to the two separately (and go                                 
on to name and conceptualise them independently), the possibility of two attentive acts would be a sign                                 
of two different mental elements. Finally, if confusion is asymmetrical, we can distinguish the confused                             
pair from at least one element, and thereby infer the existence of a contrasting element which we cannot                                   
distinguish from the pair.  
Lacking all three of the above means of recognising confusion, it seems we could not tell that                                 
we were suffering from radical confusion. An apparent counter­example is ‘cacophonous’ noises. For                         
instance, if we enter a bar and are overwhelmed by the combined noise of many voices, chair                                 




focus on any one of them individually (cf. discussions of the ‘problem of the speckled hen’, Ayer 1940,                                   
Tye 2009). However, I think this is better analysed as a case of shallow confusion exacerbated by the                                   
brevity and equal salience of the elements. The component noises could be separately attended with                             
time and effort, but are so short in duration that we cannot focus on them before they are gone, and so                                         
similar in salience that we cannot select one to devote the necessary effort to. In such a situation, if we                                       
do decide to arbitrarily seize upon one component and focus on it, we usually succeed if it persists for                                     
more than a few moments. So this is not a case of radical confusion.  
Is radical confusion even possible? If I am right that it would be unnoticed by the subject, we                                   
cannot establish its possibility by adducing positive examples. But I think we should regard it as                               
possible on weaker grounds: we can and do find cases of robust but weak confusion, strong but shallow                                   




With the notion of radical confusion on the table, we can sketch two combinationist responses to the                                 
blurring problem. The inclusionary response claims that all the experiences of the parts are had by the                                 
whole, but that they are, for that whole, radically confused and as a result are misinterpreted as                                 
comparatively coarse­grained experience. The exclusionary response claims that the experiences of the                       
parts are not individually had by the whole because they are confused relative to the operation                               





In both cases, the experiences of our tiny parts are said to be radically confused with one                                 
another, when considered relative to the whole. That is not to say that each one is confused with every                                     
single other one, taken pairwise, but that each element is radically confused with a great many other                                 
elements. This claim of confusion underlies a combinationist response to the blurring problem, but                           
9
itself demands explanation: why are the experiences of our smallest parts radically confused for us? 
The simple answer is that the human brain is not constructed so as to be able to individually                                   
register and distinguish all the trillions of events in its neurones, nor to direct attention onto them,                                 
report them verbally, encode them in memory, or otherwise access them. This lack of sensitivity to                               
minute internal fluctuations is not anomalous: any plausible physical mechanisms would display it as                           
well. To actually be sensitive to every internal event, if possible at all, would require something like a                                   
trillion electron­microscopes each pointing at each other’s constituent parts. Why would evolution                       
produce such a fantastic structure? Clearly, it has not – our sensitivity to internal events is low enough                                   
that small ones cannot reliably be detected or discriminated from each other. This inability is why the                                 
experiences of the parts are absent from, or at least not discernible in, the consciousness of the whole.  
Mental operations typically involve the deployment of finite cognitive resources, and the                       
fainter the elements to be distinguished, the greater the resources needed. To reliably extract                           
information about something, a system must be receiving some sort of ‘signal’ from it, and must be                                 
able to discern that signal from background noise. In a sense all the tiny parts of the brain send ‘signals’                                       













on their surroundings. But these signals will be very weak and stand out from background noise very                                 
little. Consequently, for small enough elements, the resources required to distinguish them are greater                           
than the brain can muster, even under ideal circumstances, and hence they will be radically confused.                               
To use a social analogy, it is hard for everyone in a room to hear everyone else, especially if some have                                         
weak voices. In a room of a trillion people, no individual’s voice would be distinctly audible, because                                 




On the exclusionary approach, the experiences of my brain’s smallest parts are not experiences of mine,                               
though they can still be described as my ‘mental elements’ in the weaker sense of ‘experiences going                                 
on in me.’ Considered as mental elements of mine, they are radically confused for me. But what I do                                     
experience is the composite experiences they compose. The exclusionary combinationist still accepts                       10
experience­sharing for subjects of similar size (e.g. my head and my brain), but not between                             
microsubjects and macrosubjects: the former’s experiences compose those of, but are not shared with,                           
the latter.   11
Why does the whole not share the experiences of its microscopic parts? Exclusionary                         
combinationists already (in light of chapter 3’s discussion) recognise certain necessary conditions on                         
how an entity must be related to an experience to be called its subject, conditions including some set of                                     









entity. Whatever the exact details of those conditions, we can stipulatively describe this as a certain                               
mental operation being performed on that experience, an operation which serves to make its target an                               
experience of the entity performing it. Call this operation ‘bringing into consciousness’. The specifics                           
of this operation can be filled in with whatever is one’s preferred account of what makes certain brain                                   
events my conscious experiences: maybe they need to be sufficiently informationally integrated with                         
the system’s other events (Cf. Tononi 2012), or be attended in some degree (Cf. Prinz 2011, 2012), or                                   
play the right functional roles in guiding behaviour (Cf. Putnam 1965, Shoemaker 2003b), or be                             
phenomenally unified with other events (Cf. Bayne 2010). We need not even think of this as a distinct                                   
specific operation; we might regard is as a disjunction or determinable of many sorts of operation, so                                 
that all the specific operations that we perform on our experiences are just different ways of bringing                                 
them into consciousness.   
Given that confusion was defined in terms of deliberately broad notions of ‘mental element’                           
and ‘mental operation’, strongly confused elements will be confused relative to this operation as well as                               
others; and so the informational limitations discussed in the last subsection would entail that the whole                               
cannot bring one of its smallest parts’ experiences into consciousness without bringing many others                           
into consciousness at the same time. The exclusionary combinationist can then affirm the following                           
principle: 
Experiential Compression (EC): For two experiences to belong to a subject, they must be                           
distinguishable (i.e. not confused) with respect to the ‘bringing into consciousness’ operation,                       
relative to that subject.  
This principle implies that the radically confused microscopic experiences of the brain’s tiny parts will                             
not belong to the whole, because each is radically confused with many others. The rationale for EC                                 




of something being my experience that I be able to attend to it, access it, or even report it. If so, it is                                             
likely a conceptual truth that two things could only be two distinct experiences of mine if I were able to                                       
distinguish them – ‘able’ at least in that their confusion was shallow, weak, or asymmetrical. My                               
experiences are ‘for me’, and so should be individuated according to what I can do with them.  
This is a form of ‘quasi­inheritance’, as explained in subsection 4.4 of chapter 3, rather than                               
direct inheritance, and the explanation of why the whole quasi­inherits this experience composed of                           
those of its parts cannot be exactly the same as the explanation of why it directly inherits the                                   
experiences of its larger parts. But we must recall that this proposal is only intended for exclusionary                                 
combinationists, not inclusionary combinationists, and so we need not try to extend explanations based                           
on Basic­Experience Inheritance.  
Rather, quasi­inheritance would be explained either by the conceptual reduction of experiential                       
ownership to some kind of complex causal relation, perhaps together with the relation of underlying, or                               
by the posit of an a posteriori natural law. In the first case, I will naturally underlie, or be underlain by,                                         
the composite experience in virtue of my ontological relationship to my parts, and thereby to their                               
experiences. And if, due to the organisation of my brain matter, the composite experience plays the                               
right causal role, it can be ascribed to me as my experience. In the second case, the question is simply                                       
whether CEI, construed as a law of nature, remains suitably intelligible even after the conditions for                               
inheritance are expanded to state that the whole will not inherit experiences which are confused relative                               
to the bringing into consciousness’ relation, but will experience the composite of them. If too many                               
conditions and exceptions are built in, CEI will seem like an ‘emergence law’, and to that extent an                                   
abandonment of combinationism. But if the conditions for inheritance already included in CEI, prior to                             








For inclusionary combinationists, the relation of composite experiences to their confused parts is just                           
phenomenal subsumption, and thus entails that there is radical confusion (relative to me) in experiences                             
I actually have, namely those I inherit from my tiny parts. All of these are present to me, but so                                       
radically confused with one another that I am inclined mistakenly think them absent. The natural                             
objection is that this sort of mistake is implausible: if our experience is really immensely fine­grained,                               
then that richness “couldn’t help but be manifest to consciousness” (Coleman 2012, p.144). In                           
Chalmers’ formulation of the blurring problem, this appears as the premise that “The nature of                             
consciousness is revealed to us in introspection” (forthcoming­a, p.12).  
Note that it is not enough to point out how radical confusion will naturally lead to an inability                                   
to verbally report or reflectively identify particular confused experiences, for the objector’s contention                         
is not that we cannot distinguish multitudinous fine details of our experiences, but that our experiences                               
are directly grasped as not having such details. They assert that many of our experiences are visibly,                                 
evidently, and manifestly simple (understanding ‘simple’ in terms of a subsumptive notion of                         
experiential parthood, so that parts of my experience are also experienced by me). Let us explore what                                 
that the inclusionary combinationist’s denial of this manifest simplicity amounts to.  
Let the term ‘smooth’ stand for the sort of phenomenal character whose possession by some of                               
our experiences gives rise to the blurring problem. The objector claims that smoothness is structural                             




smooth experiences is a composite brain, but that smoothness is a directly­apprehended structural                         
property of experience. It contrasts with ‘bittiness’, the directly­apprehended structural property of                       
those experiences which present themselves as having distinct elements.  
One response that is unlikely to convince objectors like Coleman and Chalmers is that                           
macroexperience involves an ‘illusion’, in any strong sense of that term. Illusions are when something                             
seems one way, but is not that way – but if consciousness just is how things seem, this discrepancy                                     
cannot arise; the seeming itself cannot be false to itself. Thus if we directly apprehend consciousness as                                 
having a certain structure, then consciousness must really have that structure. At least, this is what the                                 
premise that introspection ‘reveals the nature of consciousness’ would suggest.  
Inclusionary combinationists can say, however, that the full richness of macroexperience is                       
revealed, but is misinterpreted. Thus rather than treating the smoothness of experience as itself                           
misrepresenting anything, they could claim that the objector has misinterpreted smoothness;                     
smoothness is some other property which is easily mistaken for structural simplicity. In particular, they                             
might claim that smoothness is the property of ‘lacking distinguishable elements’, which is compatible                           
both with having no elements and with having only radically confused elements. Bittiness would also                             
be a directly­apprehended structural property of experience, namely ‘having distinguishable elements’.                     
The blurring problem arises because we readily mistake our direct apprehension of a lack of                             
distinguishable details for a direct apprehension of a lack of details.  
This is not an ‘illusion of simplicity’: an illusion is where our experience tells us something                               
false – as when a straight stick placed in water looks bent. Our experience does not ‘seem simple’ in                                     
this sense – it does not feel some way that only simple experiences feel. Rather, it is like the apparent                                       
motion of the sun – a veridical impression prone to an easy misinterpretation. The sun’s motion is not                                   




something mistaken, namely that the sun orbits a stationary earth. Similarly, says the defender of                             
combination, our experiences feel exactly how massively complex but radically confused experiences                       
feel. Insofar as they are ‘telling us’ anything, they are telling us something true – that we cannot                                   
distinguish details within them.  
This response relies on us being prone to systematically misinterpret the directly­apprehended                       
structure of consciousness. Is such systematic misconstrual plausible? Here are two reasons to think                           
12
so. First, when we take lack of distinguishable elements for lack of elements, the sort of inference we                                   
make (taking absence of evidence for evidence of absence) is easy and tempting, and often quite                               
reasonable – indeed, it might be justifiable if we had no independent reason to think that experience                                 
arises from the massively composite brain. This corresponds, in the case of the sun’s apparent motion,                               
to the error of neglecting to account for the motion of our own point of view, which is also an easy and                                           
tempting heuristic, and often appropriate: usually when we see something move it is not because we are                                 
standing on something that is rotating relative to it.  
Second, we make this error in an unsupportive context, where our normal presuppositions do                           
not hold, and it is hard to acquire information to correct them. In the case of the sun’s apparent motion,                                       
we cannot leave our earth­bound position to look from a third point of view (and when we do, on a                                       
shuttle or satellite, the misinterpretation disappears). Moreover, we lack the usual cues that our own                             
standpoint is moving (e.g. air resistance). Similarly, when we interpret the smoothness of our                           
experiences, not only do we lack the usual indications that our experiences are confused, (as described                               
in subsection 1.2) but we are also profoundly limited by the fact that if our experiences are all                                   
massively complex, then we have no idea what a simple experience would be like.  
12  It is not really clear how systematic this misconstrual is: how often does the average person put any interpretation 
on the smoothness of their experiences? One might think that insofar as there is a mistake here, it is one mainly made 




It bears emphasising that we are not in the position of one who has experienced both                               
massively­complex­but­radically­confused experiences and also genuinely simple experiences, who               
could then observe which of the two was ‘smooth’ and which had some other character. Rather, if our                                   
parts’ experiences really are radically confused relative to us, we are in the position of someone                               
experiencing one or the other of these, and trying to determine which without any basis for comparison.                                 
In such an unsupportive context, we might easily go wrong. Nevertheless the intuitive implausibility of                             
accepting a systematic mistake in how we think about our own experience might persist, and might be                                 





There is nothing qualitatively distinctive about a neuron in the auditory cortex, or the                           
corresponding action potential, to mark it out from a neuron, or the firing of a neuron, in the                                   
visual cortex. So how, on this basis, is one to account, say, for the fundamental                             
phenomenological difference between a sound and a flash?...It seems inconceivable in much                       
the same way, and for much the same reasons, that it is inconceivable that an artist, however                                 
skilled, should conjure the simulacrum of a Turner sunset from a palette containing only black                             
and white paints. (1993, p.546) 
Consciousness seems qualitatively rich, but any structure isomorphic with the physical brain would be                           
qualitatively sparse. Combinationists must explain how the diversity of qualities we experience arises                         
from the qualities experienced by our miniscule parts. Note that this statement of the problem draws on                                 
an implicit notion of ‘quality’ and ‘qualitative difference’, and an assumption that while physical                           
structure might explain the ‘structural’ features of experience, it does not fully explain its ‘qualitative’                             




nontheless a pressing one for panpsychists, since they are typically motivated at least in part by                               
anti­physicalist arguments, like the appeal to the ‘inverted spectrum’, which have precisely that                         
conclusion, that the qualities of consciousness are not explicable by any purely structural factors.  
Whether or not there is a special challenge in explaining ‘qualities’, there is room to wonder                               
which features of experience count as ‘qualitative’. The paradigm instances are perceptual sensations of                           
colour, flavour, sound, and so on, but different theorists might also think of any aspect of consciousness                                 
that was regarded as irreducible to physical structure as involving a ‘phenomenal quality’ ­ doubt or                               
certainty, joy or sorrow, desire or resolution, might all be, or involve, some sort of distinctively                               




Let us accept, then, that macroexperiential qualities are to be explained by microexperiential qualities,                           
however exactly ‘qualities’ is understood. Panpsychist combinationists must then choose between what                       
Chalmers calls ‘small palette’ and ‘large palette’ approaches: small­palette approaches claim “that all                         
macroqualities can be generated from just a few microqualities, if we find the right underlying                             
microqualities”, while on large­palette approaches, we “suggest instead that the full range of                         
macroqualities are included among the microqualities… [including] colors, sounds, smells, tastes, and                       
so on” (forthcoming­a, p.26). We can put this by saying that the small­palette approach requires, while                               
the large­palette approach does not, some kind of actual ‘phenomenal blending’ of microqualities into                           




argument given in Roelofs 2014a), is whether there is a coherent and intelligible notion of ‘phenomenal                               
blending’ available.  
Let us define the required sort of ‘blending’ more precisely. It involves a composite experience                             
which, merely in virtue of two (or more) parts of it displaying certain phenomenal qualities, and                               
standing in certain relations, displays a single phenomenal quality, type­distinct from either but                         
reflecting both in such a way that its dependence on them is intelligible. Call the former qualities the                                   
‘ingredients’, and the latter the ‘resultant’. Note that ingredients are meant to persist, not to ‘vanish’                               
into the resultant so as to no longer be instantiated: yet nor is the resultant ‘mere appearance’: the                                   
resultant and ingredients are both genuinely present. Moreover, we only have phenomenal blending                         
when it is intelligible why that resultant arose from those ingredients.  
We can distinguish two forms of phenomenal blending: in the ‘intra­subject’ case a single                           
subject, in virtue of experiencing certain qualities in certain relations, experiences their resultant, while                           
in the ‘inter­subject’ case neither ingredient is itself experienced by the whole, who experiences only                             
the composite experience whose quality is the resultant. To address the blending problem, inclusionary                           
combinationists will appeal to intra­subject, and exclusionary combinationists to inter­subject,                   
blending.  
This definition leaves unspecified what relation between ingredients is necessary for blending; I                         
consider this question in subsection 2.5. Moreover, this definition assumes some understanding of what                           
counts as a single phenomenal quality and what does not; we should not count “the feeling of seeing                                   
red while angry” as a blend of redness and anger, since these are not experienced as a single quality.                                     
For the purposes of this discussion, I would like to apply a deliberately restrictive definition of a single                                   
quality: something which presents us with no qualitatively distinct elements that can be individually                           




confusion laid out in the last section, though not quite the notion that I there called ‘strong confusion’.                                   
Two mental elements are strongly confused if their subject cannot attend to either individually; my                             
definition of ‘a single quality’ is something which does not present uswith multiple targets of attention                                 
(call this ‘strongish’ confusion). These might come apart if we are enabled to pick out elements of                                 
quality X on the basis of other experiences, but could not do so just on the basis of experiencing quality                                       
X. This distinction between strong and strongish confusion will be explained more fully in subsection                             
2.2. 
The notion of phenomenal blending lets us complicate Chalmers’ scheme of small­palette and                         
large­palette approaches, with both extreme and moderate versions of the latter. At one extreme is the                               
view that phenomenal blending is entirely impossible. This position appears to have been held by                             
William James, who insists that “we cannot mix feelings as such, though we may mix the objects we                                   
feel, and from their mixture get new feelings.” (1890, p.157). At the opposite extreme are small­palette                               
approaches, holding that all the phenomenal qualities we enjoy can be explained as compounds of a                               
small number of fundamental qualities. This position appears to have been held by Pierce (1998,                             
pp.35­36) and by Spencer (1899, §60) who suggests that there may be an “ultimate unit of                               
consciousness, [so] that all the unlikenesses among our feelings result from unlike modes of integration                             
of this ultimate unit”.  
In between is the position that some but not all qualities result from blending, as when Lewtas                                 
argues that “orange­experiences result from combining… red­experiences and…               
yellow­experiences”(2013, p.54), but that “we don’t see, and don’t see that we ever could see, how to                                 





Jamesian positions, combined with panpsychist combinationism, would imply a bloated                   
ontology with thousands of fundamental phenomenal properties, for all qualities experienced by a                         
13
composite subject must be experienced by at least one of its parts. This is implausible, since it seems                                   
unlikely that such simple minds could share all the diversity of qualities that human minds have.                               
Lewtasian positions accept some limited phenomenal blending, but are still fairly unparsimonious. If,                         
for instance, there is blending within a sensory modality, but not between the basic qualities of different                                 
modalities (e.g. redness, saltiness, low­pitch, etc.), at least one part of a human mind must experience                               
each item on this fairly extensive list. To maintain panpsychism, as Lewtas does, we must attribute “an                                 
uncomfortably large number of strictly­basic conscious properties” to fundamental particles (2013,                     
p.62). By contrast, small­palette positions are highly parsimonious, with a small set of basic elements                             
generating a vast diversity of observed forms. Thus panpsychist combinationists have good reason to                           
14
hope that the small­palette approach is viable. 
To elaborate on the small palette approach, consider a ‘small palette hypothesis’ that a                           
panpsychist combinationist might endorse: 
There are a small number of basic qualities, which the simplest conscious parts of the brain                               
experience; larger more complex brain parts support experience of the resultants of blending                         
these. For each determinate sort of brain part, up to and including the whole brain, its structure                                 
determines a subset of phenomenal qualities out of all the possible combinations that its                           













experience redness and yellowness in the right relation to blend, via the visual field, but cannot                               
experience loudness and yellowness in the same relation. 
Inclusionary combinationists will regard the blending here as intra­subject, since the ingredients                       
experienced by the parts will be experienced also by the whole, while exclusionary combinationists will                             
regard it as inter­subject. Yet in either version it faces 3 potential objections:  
1. Phenomenal qualities cannot be blended at all (thus the ‘palette’ metaphor is misleading from                           
the beginning);  
2. Even if some can, many others are knowably basic and unblended;   
3. Even if all our qualities might be blended, there is no suitable set of basic qualities out of which                                     
all could be blended.  
In the remainder of this section I consider how combinationists might address these objections. In                             
subsection 2.2, I argue that we have candidate examples of phenomenal blending in our experience, and                               
no compelling argument for denying them that status. In subsection 2.3, I argue that we need not                                 
restrict the possibility of blending to only some familiar qualities, and in subsection 2.4 I argue that we                                   
have no good reason to rule out systematic and ubiquitous blending, of the sort posited by the                                 




I think the best way for combinationists to establish the possibility of phenomenal blending is to claim                                 
that there are actual cases where we are distinctly acquainted, on different occasions, with both the                               
ingredients and the resultant, and can ‘just see’ that the one is a combination of the others. We are thus                                       





The examples most often appealed to involve colours. Lewtas suggests that orange experiences                         
result from blending red­experiences with yellow­experiences (forthcoming, p.54); in a similar vein                       
Chalmers writes that “If the same entity simultaneously is aware of a degree of redness and aware of a                                     
degree of whiteness (at the same location), it is plausibly aware of pinkness (at that                             
location).”(forthcoming­a, p.26) This accords with the historical popularity of what Mizrahi (2009)                       
calls a “’phenomenalist’ view of colour composition” (p.2), on which ‘binary’ colours like orange and                             
pink appear different to us from ‘unitary’ colours like red and blue. Note that this is a candidate for                                     
blending because the component colour experiences are strongishly confused, even though they are not                           
strongly confused. We can in fact focus on the reddishness of orange, and then alternatively on its                                 
yellowishness (so if they are components of it they are not strongly confused), but we could not do so if                                       
we had not on other occasions experienced red and yellow separately, and thereby learnt to recognise                               
them ­ orange itself does not present us with these separate things to attend to (so if they are                                     
components they are strongishly confused). 
Another candidate is aromas, tastes, and flavours – the flavour of a given food or drink being a                                   
blend of tastes and aromas provided by its ingredients.   15
Is there blending across modalities? One example might be the two components of pain which                             
neuropsychology has shown to be dissociable – the affective­motivational (which makes pain feel bad)                           
and the sensory­discriminative (which lets us distinguish pain from other bad feelings, and assign it a                               












into familiar pain that we find it hard to imagine them in isolation, and are surprised when we hear of                                       
subjects with one but not the other. 
There may well be more examples, but these are enough to make the case; if they do not, it is                                       
unlikely that more would. None of them are conclusive: a Jamesian would deny that they involve                               
blending at all. But they provide the combinationist with a strategy for making blending intelligible.                             
Intuitively pink is just red and white together, and it makes sense that experiencing red and white                                 
together should constitute an experience of pink rather than of, say, green, or sourness. Note, however,                               
that even if these examples are accepted, they will be cases of intra­subject blending (case where we                                 
experience both ingredients and resultant ourselves). The possibility of intra­subject blending may                       
suggest, but does not entail, the possibility of inter­subject blending (as the exclusionary combinationist                           
requires). Does a case where one part of me experiences red and another part experiences white make it                                   
just as intelligible that I must experience pink? The exclusionary combinationist needs to claim that it                               
does, because in that case we experience the composite experience that the white and the red compose.                                 
This requires them to claim that we can abstract the relevant relation among qualities from its context                                 




It is sometimes suggested that blending can be conclusively ruled out a priori. Here is a representative                                 
passage from James: 
I find in my students an almost irresistible tendency to think that we can immediately perceive                               
that feelings do combine. “What!” they say, “is not the taste of lemonade compounded of that                               




physical lemonade contains both the lemon and the sugar, but its taste does not contain their                               
tastes, for if there are any two things which are certainly not present in the taste of lemonade,                                   
those are the lemon­sour on the one hand and the sugar­sweet on the other. These tastes are                                 
absent utterly. (1890, p.158) 
What is James’s reasoning here? If he is relying on his general compositional nihilism, on which                               
phenomenal qualities do not combine because nothing does (Cf. Chapter 3, subsection 1.1), then that                             
should not convince us if we are unconvinced by that general view about composition.  
But perhaps James means that because the sourness of lemon is subtly changed by being mixed                               
with the sweetness of sugar, it is not strictly present in the blend. In most contexts this would be                                     
fallacious, since part­whole relations often involve the parts affecting each other, but there may be a                               
special reason for objecting to such mutual adjustment in the phenomenal case, namely the principle of                               
phenomenal essentialism. In chapters 3 and 4 we encountered this principle as part of the incompatible                               
characters argument against sharing; we might employ a similar argument here. If how a quality is                               
experienced is essential to it, and it is experienced differently in different contexts, then it is                               
numerically distinct in those different contexts (Cf. Mørch 2014, p.154 fn19). Hence though parts are                             
often changed by being in a certain whole, phenomenal qualities cannot be, because any phenomenal                             
change makes them a different quality.  
If we grant this argument from phenomenal essentialism, and suppose that in tasting lemonade                           
the sweetness and sourness are phenomenally altered in some subtle fashion, then the taste of lemonade                               
cannot be a blend of the very same qualities as are experienced in other circumstances. But the taste of                                     
lemonade may still be a blend; its ingredients may be the subtly­different ‘counterparts’ of the                             
sweetness and sourness experienced in other circumstances. No plausible version of phenomenal                       
17
17  Does this threaten mind-brain isomorphism? No, if these changes to phenomenal character mirror the physical 




holism can deny that we often experience phenomenal qualities, in different contexts, which are at least                               
similar enough to warrant us calling them ‘the same’. And this same near­identity can be used to make                                   
sense of what James’s students thought: that ‘the same’ qualities are present in the lemonade­blend and                               





Hence blending is incoherent, simply because what it is like to experience the whole (the taste of                                 
lemonade) is not the same as what it is like to experience a part (sourness).  
The fallacy here is to equivocate between systemic and additive senses (Cf. chapter 2,                           
subsection 4.2ff). In the systemic sense of ‘experiencing the sourness of lemon’ (as meaning ‘has an                               
experience of lemony­sourness as their sole taste experience’), claim a is true, but does not imply claim                                 
b. In the additive sense (as meaning ‘has a taste experience of lemony­sourness, perhaps among                             
others’), claim a is question­begging, for if the taste of lemonade is a blend then the subject is                                   
experiencing lemony­sourness (blended with something else). Hence there is no sound argument from                         
a to b.   
18
Hence I see no compelling reason to think blending impossible. That does not mean that                             
blending occurs: we might still insist that while the lemonade­experiences arise from the co­occurrence                           
does not replace a neurone with another? No; isomorphism demands merely that some fine-grained physical 
property or event be replaced with another.  
18  Similar remarks apply to the apparent truism that nothing can display two colours at once to the same observer – 
nothing could both look red and look white at once. In one sense of ‘look red’ and ‘look white’, nothing can do both, 
but this is because to ‘look red’ in this sense definitionally precludes displaying any other visual qualities. But in 
another sense, looking both red and white might just be ‘looking pink’. Pink things look red, but unlike the things we 




of the physical processes that independently produce sweet­experiences and sour­experiences, they are                       
not literally composed of those two. Sweet­experience, sour­experience, and lemonade­experience                   
might be mutually irreducible. But while I cannot demonstrate that these examples do or do not involve                                 
phenomenal blending, it is enough for the defence of combinationism that there is no bar to positing                                 
that they do.  
The Lewtasian position allows for phenomenal blending in some cases, but still rejects the                           
small palette hypothesis on the grounds that many other qualities we experience are knowably                           
unblended. One way to frame this would be to distinguish qualities that display a ‘phenomenologically                             
composite’ character from those that display a ‘phenomenologically simple’ character: only the former                         
can be blends. For instance, maybe pink is visibly a mixture of white and red, but white and red are                                       
both positively experienced as simple, and hence cannot conceivably arise through blending.  
I cannot directly refute this claim, but I think it is at least as plausible that ‘phenomenologically                                 
simple’ character is simply our having no idea of, or a confused idea of, the ingredients in a blend.                                     
Often a quality initially seems simple and unanalysable – until further experience lets us discern the                               
components within it. Dennett describes an auditory example of this phenomenon, in which the sound                             
of a chord played on a guitar appears simple and pure to the untrained ear, but comes to seem                                     
composed of distinct notes when one is familiar enough with the notes individually to recognise them                               
in the mixture (1991, pp.73­74). In a similar vein, wine tasters often say that with practice, one learns to                                     
discriminate the different components of a wine’s taste (the above example of pain is also pertinent).                               
And research showing that, e.g. untrained subjects frequently construe certain odours as increasing the                           
sweetness of a taste, while trained subjects do not (Bingham et al. 1990), reinforces the point that we                                   
are often fallible in distinguishing different sensations (cf. Chuard 2007). Perhaps in all these cases, we                               




can we be that there is such a character in the case of, say, redness? It seems equally reasonable to think                                         




Suppose, then, that all the phenomenal qualities which we experience are such that they might be the                                 
resultants of blending. There remains the problem that there do not appear to be any known qualities                                 
that could plausibly be ingredients for all our qualities in the way that, say, redness and whiteness are                                   
ingredients for pinkness. McGinn expresses this concern when he writes that: 
We cannot […] envisage a small number of experiential primitives yielding a rich variety of                             
phenomenologies… [for] you cannot derive one sort of experience form another: you cannot                         
get pains from experiences of colours, or emotions from thoughts, or thoughts from acts of will.                               
There are a large number of phenomenal primitives. (McGinn 2006, p.96) 
McGinn is probably right that we cannot reasonably hope to get all qualities from any small set of                                   
known qualities, but the combinationist need not think that the basic ingredients are known to us.                               
Instead, the basic ingredients may be ‘alien qualities’, unimaginable but not inconceivable. It is a                             
commonplace that there are such qualities: just as a human born anosmic cannot imagine olfactory                             
qualities, we are all similarly limited regarding the qualities of the many sensory modalities that                             
humans lack. We can entertain and accept the existence of such qualities, but we cannot ‘know what                                 
they are like’.  
Presumably, if familiar qualities can blend, so can alien ones. But can they blend into familiar                               
qualities? For instance, might the familiar phenomenal quality of redness be a blend of two alien                               





However, AQ1 and AQ2 cannot be unimaginable in quite the same way as standard examples,                             
involving tetrachromatic vision, or bat sonar. Our inability to imagine the latter corresponds to our                             
inability to experience them. We lack something, phenomenologically (and neurally) speaking. But we                         
do experience AQ1 and AQ2, whenever we have experiences of red: we lack nothing. How, then, can                                 
they be unimaginable?  
In one sense, we can imagine AQ1 and AQ2, just by imagining redness. But when we do so,                                   
we cannot separate AQ1 from AQ2. They are imaginable together, but not distinctly imaginable. We                             
do not know what they feel like on their own – not because we lack necessary resources, but because                                     
we cannot deploy one resource without also deploying another. That is, they are unimaginable on                             
account of being robustly confused relative to the mental operation of imagination. Call this                           
‘unimaginability by confusion’.  
For a more mundane example of unimaginability by confusion, consider an arachnophobe                       
trying to imagine how their friend, who finds large furry spiders adorable, perceives a tarantula. This                               
imaginative task may be impossible for them, but not because they lack anything. They can imagine                               
spiders, they can imagine finding something cute, and they can connect these imaginings together. The                             
problem is that they cannot generate an image of a spider without also generating a feeling of intense                                   
fear and revulsion, which would constitute a failure to imagine their friend’s experience.   
19
Even accepting the possibility of both phenomenal blending and unimaginability by confusion,                       
it may still seem that the different qualities we experience are too radically heterogeneous to be blends                                 
of the same ingredients. But our ability to recognise two things as akin to one another often depends on                                     
19  The arachnophobe’s imaginative inability is ‘shallow’, since the right sequence of experiences could let them 
imagine a spider without feeling fear (it is also asymmetrical). By contrast, alien qualities are ‘robustly’ (and 
symmetrically) unimaginable-by-confusion: only a profound transformation, possibly requiring gross physiological 
re-organisation, would let human distinctly imagine AQ1 or AQ2. Since blending by definition involves strong 




our ability to recognise and attend to the features they share, and if we cannot pick out their shared                                     
features we may wrongly feel that they are entirely unlike; musical and taste training provide many                               
examples. Hence because we cannot recognise or attend to the basic ingredients, we may get a false                                 
impression of radical heterogeneity.  
Inability to pick out shared features does not always stop us registering similarities. Sometimes                           
two things ‘seem alike’ in some way, without us being able to say how. But this kind of inarticulate                                     
resemblance is commonly encountered among experiential qualities: we frequently describe qualities of                       
one modality using terms drawn from another (warm, harsh, sweet, soft, loud, etc.), or use sensory                               
terminology to describe emotional or cognitive phenomenology. It is an interesting question what                         
determines whether a particular shared feature generates such an inarticulate intuition of similarity.                         
Perhaps we have neural mechanisms designed to identify similarities, which can be activated just                           
enough to produce some recognition of similarity but not enough to identify what the similarity is.                               
Whether such a mechanism is activated or not might depend on subtle details of the wiring among                                 
different brain areas, and of what exactly the similarity­detecting mechanism is sensitive to.  
Thus combinationists can allow for three categories of resemblances among blended qualities:                       
those we can articulate by identifying the common element (e.g. the negative valence in a pain and an                                   
itch, or the redness in orange and purple), those we cannot articulate but only vaguely intuit (e.g.                                 
between redness and warmth), and those we do not register as similarities at all because we cannot                                 










The small­palette hypothesis mentions ‘the right relation to blend’; defending the hypothesis does not                           
require specifying this relation, but to enrich the proposal I will briefly suggest a candidate                             
specification. My proposal is that phenomenal unity and strongish confusion are jointly sufficient for                           
phenomenal blending: whenever I experience two qualities together but cannot distinguish them in any                           
way, I experience them as blended, and more broadly whenever two experiences are unified, but are                               
strongishly confused for some subject, that subject experiences their blended composite (even if they                           
do not experience the ingredients themselves).   
Call this the ‘Blending­As­Default’ extension of the small palette hypothesis. It claims that the                           
negative part of the definition of phenomenal blending (inability to distinguish), together with                         
phenomenal unity, is sufficient for the positive phenomenology of two qualities forming a third. It need                               
not be adopted, but it has some plausibility, and is attractively straightforward. To see its plausibility,                               
first note that phenomenal unity definitely seems like a prerequisite of blending; it would be hard to                                 
experience two qualities as a single quality, if they were not ‘experienced together’. And confusion was                               
part of the definition of blending. Given these two necessary conditions, it is not clear that anything                                 
more is required.  
Consider colours. If redness and whiteness are experienced at two different points in the visual                             
field, there is no experience of pinkness. To blend they must stand in the relation                             
‘experienced­in­the­same­location­as’. But what is this relation but the absence of any experienced                       
spatial differentiation? If they were experienced at different points, they would thereby be made                           
distinguishable, not confused, for it seems constitutive of experiencing things as occupying different                         
points in visual space that we can pick out the one point, and what occupies it, separately from the                                     




Blending­As­Default hypothesis holds that if they are both experienced as in the visual field at all, then                                 
being strongishly confused is sufficient for being experienced as at the same location, and thereby                             
being blended.  
Blending also seems to occur in those aspects of experience which do not distinguish multiple                             
objects: sense­modalities like smell which encode little spatial information, and affective phenomena                       
like mood. It seems characteristic of odours and moods to merge and interpenetrate rather than being                               
compartmentalised, which suggests that blending occurs whenever two qualities are experienced                     
together, but not separable. What is hard is not to blend two qualities but to simultaneously instantiate                                 
them without them blending: this requires the mental infrastructure to direct some mental operation                           
onto one while making sure not to direct it onto the other.  
Even given this suggestion as to the right relation, I have still said nothing positive about what                                 
the basic qualities might be, or which familiar qualities contain which basic qualities in what                             
proportions. But I do not think it is incumbent on panpsychist combinationists to do so, any more than                                   
it is incumbent on philosophical defenders of atomism to say what types of atom there are and what                                   
features they have. They can leave that task for empirical science, in particular for psychophysics,                             
neuroscience, neuroethology, and so on. These disciplines can look for patterns of resemblance and                           
difference among the qualities experienced by humans, and the correlated patterns of resemblance and                           
difference among their brain states; as brain technology becomes more sophisticated, they can also                           
explore the phenomenal consequences of deliberate brain modification. It is harder to make progress in                             
this regard than it is with the basic physical properties, but that is a natural consequence of the                                   
subjectivity of phenomenal qualities.   
A related issue is whether the Small­Palette hypothesis is objectionably ‘mysterious’, in                       




hypothesis is not so much an explanatory achievement as a postulate that things are in principle                               
explainable – rather like the atomic theory of matter is not in itself an explanatory achievement without                                 
any detail as to the varieties of atom, their relations to each other, etc. But it is not objectionable for a                                         
theory of the mind to postulate many unimaginable things. Inconceivable postulates would be                         
objectionable, since they would undermine the theory’s logical coherence. But if we accept the                           
irreducibility of the subjective and private to the objective and public, then we should already be                               
committed to a vast range of unimaginable experiences. The nature of subjectivity is precisely that we                               
can theorise about all of it from outside, but directly know only a tiny fragment.  
So panpsychist combinationists should claim that by comparing the qualities we distinctly                       
experience, we can identify a relation of intelligible composition holding among certain of them. If this                               




Lockwood expresses the mismatch problem by saying that, “the structure we do encounter at the                             
phenomenal level seems not to match, even in coarse­grained fashion, that of the underlying                           
physiology, as revealed by scientific investigation” (1993, p.544). Chalmers’ formulation is that                       
“macrophenomenal [macroexperiential] structure is distinct from macrophysical structure”               
(forthcoming­a, p.13), even though macroexperiential structure is supposedly constituted by                   





This presupposes that we know what microphysical, macrophysical, and macroexperiential                   
structure are. It is actually not easy to say with any comprehensiveness what kinds of structure are in                                   
question, but we can canvas some examples: macroexperiential structure “involve[es] the complex                       
spatial structure of visual and auditory fields, [and] a division into many different modalities”                           
(Chalmers forthcoming­a, p.5), while macrophysical structure is a mathematically­described structure                   
in which “three­dimensional spatial arrangement, and changes therein, seem central” (Lockwood 1993,                       
p.544). Then there is the structure of properties, such as “the scalar structure of mass [and] the                                 
three­dimensional structure of color space” (Chalmers forthcoming, p.13), and the attentional structure                       
of focus and periphery.  
We can express the problem by asking: ‘Why is macroexperiential structure not isomorphic to                           
microphysical structure?’ But this question will have different force on different approaches to                         
composition. On the exclusionary approach to macro­micro relations, we need not expect isomorphism                         
between levels: wholes of various sorts are dependent on, but still importantly different from, their                             
micro­level bases. There is still an interesting question of why macroexperiential wholes have the                           
particular sort of structure they have, but we have no particular reason for expecting them not to: thus                                   
the question might be answered by a shrug and a suggestion that more research needs to be done. By                                     
contrast, an inclusionary approach to micro­macro relations, closer to that of classical mereology, posits                           
a whole as somehow reflecting everything about, perhaps even being identical to, its parts. An                             
inclusionary combinationist thus faces a more urgent threat: if they cannot explain the structural                           
mismatch, they cannot maintain that macroexperience is constituted by microexperience. So any form                         







Chalmers considers and rejects two approaches to the mismatch problem. One is to say that the                               
macroexperiential structure which appears to conflict with macrophysical structure is in fact not present                           
in experience itself but only in its objects: that is, experience represents things as having that structure,                                 
rather than itself having that structure. For example, one might maintain that experience itself is not                               
divided into the visual and auditory sections, but only represents external things as having both visual                               
and auditory qualities. Versions of this proposal appear in Clark 1989, and Stoljar 2001, but face a                                 
number of problems; first, we might think that an experience’s representational content is part of its                               
structure, and thus itself in need of explanation; second, even if it is not, it might still seem that                                     
experience itself displays the relevant structure (as claimed by Alter & Nagasawa 2012, p.91 ); third,                             21
any attempt to give a general reduction of experiential structure to represented structure faces                           
challenges resulting from illusion and hallucination: external objects cannot supply structure to, say,                         
dream experience.  
A second approach that Chalmers considers and rejects is to claim that we can find                             
straightforward exemplifications of macroexperiential structure in the brain, for example in the                       
‘retinotopic’ areas of striate cortex (see Holmes 1944, Engel 1997). However, only some of the brain is                                 
organised like this, and seeing how even the rest of the visual system is organised serves to bring home                                     
the force of the mismatch problem more vividly. Most visual areas handle, not a portion of the visual                                   
field, but a certain aspect of its content, such as colour, movement, or shape (see Zihl et al. 1983,                                     
Heeger et al. 1999, Théoret et al. 2002, Anzai et al. 2007). If we pick out one part of the visual field                                           







name any single area, but will have to describe a set of contributions – that (say) Area 1 is responsible                                       
for its rotation, Area 2 for its redness, Area 3 for its triangularity, etc.  
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A third, more promising, approach is to say that macroexperiential structure corresponds to a                           
particular aspect of macrophysical structure, namely informational structure, the structure of                     
information transfers among physical parts of the brain. This is a specific sort of causal structure,                               
picked out by prioritising how sensitive each element is to the fine details of another’s state. I follow                                   
Chalmers in thinking that “something like this has to be the best option for the panpsychist” (p. 29),                                   
because it is antecedently plausible (and has become more plausible as neuroscience has advanced) that                             
the structure of experience depends not on the spatial location of brain regions but on the informational                                 
relations among them. So in this section I will explore whether this proposal can be made to work.  
There is a further reason for exploring the proposal that macroexperiential structure                       
corresponds to informational structure, to the exclusion of other aspects of physical structure: doing so                             
seems necessary to avoid the dancing qualia problem. This problem (noted briefly in chapter 1,                             
subsection 4.1, and in the introduction to this chapter), is based on the thought that since it is plausible                                     
that we can implement the same functional roles in different sorts of material (carbon, silicon, etc.), it                                 
should be possible also to change the underlying material out of which some subject is made without                                 
affecting their functional structure (thought experiments of this sort are described in Chalmers, 1995b).                           
But if their functional structure is unchanged, then their tendency to register or report a change in their                                   
experiences is unchanged, and so they will not in fact report any change in their experience. It seems                                   
bizarre and implausible that someone’s experience should change ‘before their eyes’, and yet they be                             
entirely unable to detect this change; thus we should avoid accepting that such a thing would result                                 
from the functionally­neutral change in components. Thus we seem pushed towards the conclusion,                         
22  This organisation gives rise to what is called ‘the binding problem’(see Treisman and Gelade, 1980, Duncan and 
Humphreys, 1989, 1992, Treisman and Sato 1990) – when A1 registers rotation, A2 redness, and A3 triangularity, how 




either that systems functionally equivalent to a conscious subject cannot be made out of different                             
materials (the conclusion recommended for panpsychists by Sebastien 2013), or that no feature of a                             
component subject except its functional contributions, that is to say except its contributions to the                             
overall information processing of the whole, can make a difference to the whole’s experiences.  
While none of the above arguments are clearly decisive, together they provide a powerful case                             
that the combinationist should hold macroexperiential structure to be isomorphic to informational                       
structure, and that other aspects of physical structure (such as spatial position) are relevant to                             
experiential structure only indirectly, insofar as they influence informational structure. But is this claim                           
defensible? Chalmers worries:  
From the perspective of physics, high­level information structure[s] are derivative aspects of a                         
more encompassing and more basic macrophysical structure. It is not easy to see why […]                             
macrophenomenal properties should have this structure rather than the more encompassing and                       
more basic structure. (forthcoming p.29) 
(Note that the appeal to what is ‘more encompassing and more basic’ is likely to be more persuasive to                                     
inclusionary than to exclusionary combinationists.) In the next subsection I explain why informational                         




Section 1’s discussion of ‘confusion’ already privileges informational structure, since confusion is itself                         
an informational relation: two elements are confused when information about their individual features                         
cannot be extracted from information about them together. It will be useful to relate this notion to                                 
chapter 4’s discussion of the ‘phenomenal field’. My experiences seem to me to hang together as a                                 




of this idea, we can say that the structure of this field seems not to match many major aspects of                                       
physical structure, such as spatial structure. One half of the phenomenal field does not correspond to                               
one spatial half of anything, and to that extent does not correspond to any spatial part of the brain.  
In chapter 4, subsection 1.3, I suggested that we think of ‘distances’ in the phenomenal field as                                 
measures of ‘attentional proximity’, the tendency of one potential target of attention to bring another to                               
attention. I believe that this analysis implies that radically confused elements, if they are unified, must                               
be co­located in the phenomenal field of the subject for which they are confused. To see this, recall that                                     
to count as radically confused, two underlying experiences must be such that whenever their subject                             
attends to one, they cannot help but attend to the other. But this amounts to saying that each is disposed                                       
to infallibly and immediately transfer attention to the other, and this is simply the highest degree of                                 
attentional proximity. Thus if attentional proximity corresponds inversely to distance in the                       
phenomenal field, perfect proximity means minimal distance. 
Supposing that radically confused experiences sharing a field will occupy the same position in                           
that field, we get the result that phenomenal blending, since it requires confusion and unification,                             
involves two experiences appearing in the phenomenal field as a single item, a single ‘point’. I think                                 
this is a welcome result: blended experiences appear to us as a single experiential element, a single                                 
potential target for attention, a single ‘item’ in consciousness.  
Phenomenal blending can explain one form of structural divergence ­ items which are distinct                           
at one level can function as a single item at a higher level, so that the discernible structure of                                     
macroexperience lacks certain kinds of divisions which are present at the micro­level. This suggests a                             
fuller explanation for the special role of experiential structure: experiential structure determines the                         
structure that we find in experience because it determines our capacities for finding this structure ­ that                                 




and more broadly the ways that we can cognitively access our experience. Because blended experiences                             
are not accessible through distinct attentional acts (i.e. because we cannot distinguish them), they do                             
not strike us as distinct.  
So the combinationist can say that the way we find experience to be structured is determined                               
by informational structure because informational structure determines the different ways that we can                         
attend to and cognitively access our experience: access requires information to flow. But for this                             
explanation to work, we would need to explain not only howmicro­level divisions are glossed over, but                                 
also how macro­level divisions can appear. How, for instance, can activity in a single brain part appear                                 
to the whole person as two distinct experiential elements, perhaps at far distant points in the                               
phenomenal field, which they cannot identify as based in the same part? To contrast with ‘phenomenal                               
blending’, call this ‘phenomenal refraction’. Only by making sense of both phenomenal blending and                           
phenomenal refraction can the combinationist explain why informational structure is privileged in                       
macroexperience.  
To understand how phenomenal refraction is possible, consider a component subject which                       
has two or more separate sets of properties which are independently sufficient for its experiences to be                                 
attended, or more broadly accessed and operated on, by the composite subject. Each set of properties                               
allows it to broadcast information to its surroundings in a way that other component subjects can make                                 
use of. These two independent sets of properties might involve, for instance, waves of electrical activity                               
synchronised to different frequencies, or carried along different sets of connections, or transmitted by                           
different forms of energy (e.g. light and sound). Suppose, moreover, that the information broadcast                           
along these two channels was more or less independent: changing the one had little effect on the other.                                   




both simultaneously – but they might nevertheless be highly dissociated in many contexts.) Call this                             
‘attentional dissociation’.  
In the whole’s phenomenal field, these two distinct ways to attend to the experiences of that                               
part may be at a greater or lesser attentional distance from each other, depending on the extent to which                                     
attending to that experience in one way (accessing certain features of it) disposes us to attend to it in the                                       
other way (accessing other features of it). Since there is no guarantee that attending in one way will                                   
make the other particularly salient, the two ‘attentional targets’ may be at a significant attentional                             
distance, and thus occupy two distant points in the phenomenal field. Indeed, they may not even share a                                   
phenomenal field: they may not fulfil the conditions for phenomenal unity (adumbrational or                         
otherwise). But let us assume that they do share a field, but occupy distinct locations in it. I take this to                                         
merit the label of ‘phenomenal refraction’, since these two ‘attentional targets’ (corresponding to the                           
two ways of attending) will seem to the whole to be two distinct experiences. Yet they together are                                   
grounded in the consciousness of the same microsubject. 
Given the possibility and intelligibility of both phenomenal blending (confusion within a                       
phenomenal field) and phenomenal refraction (dissociation within a phenomenal field), we can see how                           
multiple layers of these phenomena might eventually make a composite subject’s phenomenal field                         
radically diverge in structure from those of its microscopic components. The experiences of the parts of                               
my brain will be refracted through multiple levels of complex informational dissociations, and these                           
refractions will be blended through levels of confusion. The manifest structure of the phenomenal field                             
I encounter in experience will tell me little about the underlying non­informational structure of my                             







Finally, there is the ‘dancing qualia’ problem. It seems bizarre that my phenomenology might change                             
without me even being able to notice, and yet if the phenomenology of my microscopic parts plays a                                   
constitutive role in mine, such undetectable changes might be possible. If, for instance, there is some                               
qualitative difference in the phenomenology associated with carbon atoms and that associated with                         
silicon atoms, that should yield a difference in the phenomenology of functionally equivalent                         
carbon­based and silicon­based brains. But this difference will be undetectable because any difference                         
in reports or responses to measurement would be a functional difference.   23
A particularly vivid expression of this thought, (though not intended as a critique of                           
combinationism), is Block’s (1992) thought­experiment, in which tiny aliens smaller than our                       
elementary particles contrive for enigmatic reasons to simulate our elementary particles by building                         
spaceships that interact with each other in just the way such particles do. We are to suppose that a                                     
human astronaut lands on a planet made out of such ‘ersatz matter’, and gradually replaces all the                                 
matter of their body with such ships, just by innocently eating and breathing. Block’s aim is to make                                   
Anti­Nesting seem absurd by noting that it seems to imply that this unnoticed change should deprive                               
the astronaut of all consciousness; but an opponent of combinationism might ask how the                           
combinationist avoids the similarly strange consequence that this unnoticed change in the astronaut’s                         
parts should make some sort of difference to their experience.  
I believe the combinationist can answer this objection by appealing once again to the link                             










inclusionary approaches. The exclusionary combinationist has an easier task, for they can allow for the                             
experiences of carbon or silicon atoms to constitute my experience without being literally present in it.                               
They can maintain the principle that Chalmers calls ‘organisational invariance’: 
Organisational Invariance (OI): “experience is invariant across systems with the same                     
fine­grained functional organization” (Chalmers 1995b, p.310)  
24
The task for the exclusionary combinationist is to explain why OI holds: how functionally neutral                             
changes in phenomenology get ‘filtered out’ of the whole’s experience.  
The inclusionary combinationist, on the other hand, needs to deny OI. If different                         
microexperiences were constituting my experience, then they would be present in my phenomenology,                         
and my phenomenology would therefore have to be different, even if my functional organisation was                             
entirely unchanged. However, the inclusionary combinationist can maintain a weakened form of OI,                         
and thereby ‘tame’ the undetectable phenomenal changes that they are committed to. In place of OI,                               
they should maintain: 
Organisational Invariance of the Attended (OIA): attended experience is invariant across                     
systems with the same fine­grained functional organization. 
They could then claim that the only undetectable changes in phenomenology they are committed to are                               
unattended ones, and that such changes are not at all implausible. Indeed, Chalmers explicitly                           
recognises that OIA captures the same intuition as OI:  
24  What is ‘fine-grained functional organisation’? Chalmers says that it is whatever level of organisation is “fine 
enough to determine the behavioral capacities and dispositions of a cognitive system” (p.310). One might worry 
about the use of ‘determine’ here: a silicon brain and a carbon brain might produce subtly different behaviours in, 
say, very hot environments, or when held in a centrifuge. But the notion in question has significant intuitive appeal, 
and the responses I discuss will not depend on spelling it out more rigorously. This problem, of how ‘functional 
organisation’ talk can distinguish relevant from irrelevant causal differences, is similar to the point of Lycan’s ‘New 
Lilliputian Argument’, discussed in chapter 6, which seeks to show that functionalism needs a substantive criterion for 




[T]he argument leaves open the loophole that unattended qualia might be invertible. If we are                             
not attending to the fringes of our visual field, for example, a qualia inversion might take place                                 
there without our noticing. (1995b, p.326, original emphasis).  
The problem is that it seems ad hoc to simply declare that all the changes produced by a functionally                                     
neutral switch of carbon with silicon would be unattended, as Chalmers notes: 
But to exploit this loophole would leave one in the unattractive position that qualia are                             
organizationally invariant when they are central enough in one's attention, but dependent on                         
other features when they are not. (Presumably an inverted green experience on the fringe will                             
flip back to red when one attends to it?) Such an asymmetric position would be theoretically                               
unsatisfying in the extreme. (1995b, p.326) 
Before addressing this concern, consider a more aggressive argument, to show that the undetectable                           
phenomenal change must occupy the focus of attention. Whatever process in my brain is at the focus of                                   
attention constitutively involves carbon atoms; we could replace those atoms with silicon while keeping                           
that process at the centre of attention (since any difference in attention is a functional difference), so                                 
surely any resultant phenomenal change should pertain to the phenomenal character of that focally                           
attended process.  
The idea of phenomenal refraction illuminates the flaw in this argument. When we speak of                             
‘whatever process in my brain is at the focus of attention’, we confuse two levels: we try to both carve                                       
brain activity into discrete underlying chunks, and also to pick out the specific target of attention. But, I                                   
have argued, the specific target of attention is not any of the underlying parts, but a certain information                                   
stream whereby certain information about one or more parts is made available to the other parts. So we                                   
need to look at the properties of one or more processes in virtue of which information about them is                                     
made available. These properties will plausibly be ones that make a functional difference, not ones that                               
are functionally inert (like the properties constitutive of the different between carbon and silicon). And                             




difference, as the hypothesis supposes, then they will be phenomenally refracted and appear as distinct                             
items in the phenomenal field.  
We can extend this answer to address Chalmers’ worries by noting that, given the account of                               
phenomenal refraction, it is not at all ad hoc that attended experiences, even experiences moderately                             
close to being attended, are unchanged. Changes in their phenomenal character would require changes                           
in those properties of the components which allowed them to project to focal attention, which will                               
necessarily be functionally relevant ones. The very fact that the changes are undetectable entails that                             
they occur ‘far from’ the attentional centre. Moreover, we can answer the question ‘will a peripheral                               
experience ‘flip back’ when one attends to it?’ by saying that for all intents and purposes, these                                 
experiences cannot be attended, without internal reorganisation so extreme as to make it perfectly                           
plausible that their phenomenal character would be changed thereby. 
This notion of the ‘unattendable’ requires more explanation, especially since I earlier spoke of                           
points in the phenomenal field as essentially potential targets of attention. We should first recognise                             
that the visual field is a misleading analogue here, because its periphery is marked by a definite                                 
boundary, fixed by the anatomy of retina and eye socket. Without this kind of boundary, the periphery                                 
of the phenomenal field might extend extremely far, to points at vast phenomenal distances from the                               
focus. Since phenomenal distance reflects attentional proximity, saying there are ‘vast distances’                       
amounts to saying there is a miniscule degree of attentional proximity: when attending to some focal                               
experience, what is in the far far periphery has barely any tendency to enter attention. This could be                                   
thought of as a lowering of probability, so that the odds of that experience being attended are                                 
negligible, or alternatively as an increase of difficulty, in that it is so hard to attend to the experience in                                       
question that it could only be done by major internal reorganisation, such as might require therapy or                                 




is only a difference of degree between these ‘unattendable’ experiences and experiences which are                           
merely ‘hard’ to focus attention on, due to lack of salience or (situationally) due to distractors,                               
tiredness, etc. They still, however, stand for potential acts of attention – just acts of attention which are                                   
inordinately unlikely, for the actual structure of the brain is completely ill­suited to perform them. I will                                 
describe such experiences as ‘realistically unattendable’, though attendable in principle.  
This talk of unattendable experiences will sound suspicious to anyone who denies the                         
possibility of phenomenal overflow. Can there really be elements in my experience that I cannot focus                               
my attention on? But the availability of both inclusionary and exclusionary versions of combinationism                           
lets the combinationist hedge their bets. If realistically­unattendable experiences are conceptually                     
impossible, then that constraint itself will provide the exclusionary combinationist with a rationale for                           
saying that any feature of the underlying parts’ experiences that is realistically unattendable (so that                             
were it to be in the whole’s phenomenal field, it would occupy this distant periphery) simply                               
corresponds to no element of the whole’s experience. And they thereby avoid undetectable phenomenal                           
changes, and provide a rationale for OI.  
Conversely, if unattendable experience are possible – if something can be there in the                           
periphery of my experience even though the mechanisms that guide my attention preclude it becoming                             




In this chapter I explored the apparent divergence of experiential structure from physical structure,                           




think that our component subjects are physical entities of some sort, while the problems of blending                               
and blurring are specific to views like constitutive panpsychism which build us out of microsubjects.   
My proposed response to these latter two problems combines the observation of radical                         
confusion among microexperiences from section 1, the small palette hypothesis from section 2, and the                             
blending­as­default addition from subsection 2.5. Call this the ‘confused blends’ proposal. It comes in                           
two versions, one exclusionary and one inclusionary. Both versions agree that the experiences of my                             
microscopic parts are radically confused with each other for me ­ I cannot perform any mental                               
operation on one of them without simultaneously doing the same to many others. Consequently, the                             
only elements I can distinguish within my consciousness are composites, with radically confused                         
microexperiences as parts. The quality of these composites intelligibly reflects that of their                         
components, being a ‘blend’ of them in the same way that green is a blend of yellow and blue.  
The inclusionary and exclusionary versions differ not on whether the whole experiences these                         
confused blends, but over whether the whole also experiences their component microexperiences. On                         
the inclusionary approach, the whole experiences them all: thus the phenomenal blending that they                           
posit is among the different experiences of a single subject, and their part­whole relation among                             
experiences can be assimilated to Baynesian subsumption. This commits inclusionary panpsychists to                       
holding that our own consciousness is much more fine­grained than we might think: we mistakenly                             
interpret the phenomenal character of radically confused experiences as indicating structural simplicity.                       
On the exclusionary approach, by contrast, the composite subject experiences the composite                       
experience, but not its minute parts. This means that the blending they posit is inter­subject, rather than                                 
the intra­subject sort we seem to be directly acquainted with, and their notion of experiential                             
composition cannot be Baynesian subsumption. 
For the mismatch problem, which faces all combinationists, I have again defended a proposal                           




Starting from the last chapter’s idea of consciousness as a ‘phenomenal field’ organised by attention,                             
this proposal denies that this field is built up by adding together ‘phenomenal pixels’, each                             
corresponding to a different component subject. Rather, the fields of component subjects are                         
superimposed so that each point in the whole’s field corresponds to some way that the whole might                                 
direct attention.  
If the same component subject has two independent ways of broadcasting information to the                           
others, its experiences will occupy two distinct points in the whole’s phenomenal field. I called this                               
‘phenomenal refraction’, and it underwrites two different responses to the dancing qualia problem, both                           
based on the idea that functionally inert properties of an underlying experience will be phenomenally                             
refracted away from functionally relevant properties. The exclusionary combinationist holds that the                       
former properties are ‘filtered out’ of the whole’s consciousness because the superficial experiences                         
they underlie are so attentionally distant from the whole’s other experiences that they ‘fall outside’ its                               
phenomenal field: the inclusionary combinationist, by contrast, holds that they are experienced by the                           
whole, but are ‘realistically unattendable’, lying in the ‘far periphery’ of the phenomenal field, and thus                               
go unnoticed.  
I think the ‘refracted aspects’ proposal satisfactorily resolves the mismatch problem, but the                         
‘confused blends’ proposal’s success is less clear: in particular, it is not clear that the inclusionary                               






















This chapter concerns ‘mega­subjects’, conscious beings which contain humans, or similar creatures, as                         
proper parts. My primary aim is to defend the viability of versions of combinationism which entail the                                 
existence, and even the proliferation, of mega­subjects, by showing that this consequence is not a                             
reductio ad absurdum. A secondary aim is to expand the range of cases that combinationism can be                                 
applied to, thereby illuminating both how combinationism works, and how we should think about                           
various large composite entities.  
First, let us review some varieties of mega­subject. One type is ‘social mega­subjects’,                         
conscious beings constituted by multiple humans (or other social creatures) in social relations of some                             
kind. These might be populations, institutions, nations, clubs, governments, even families or mobs.                         
These are the mega­subjects to which it is most pre­theoretically plausible to ascribe mental states ­ we                                 
commonly speak of them as pursuing goals, acting on beliefs, and so on, and their possession of                                 
phenomenal consciousness has at least been discussed by philosophers (see esp. Block 1992, Knobe &                             
Prinz 2008, Schwitzgebel 2014).  
Second, there are mega­subjects whose parts are connected by some sort of biological or                           
ecological integration ­ ecosystems, the whole biosphere, or perhaps multi­brained animals. Call these                         




are sometimes regarded as collectively ‘alive’ (cf. Margulis 1998, Lovelock 2000), and a strain of                             
environmentalistic panpsychism advocates the idea of the world’s sentience as offering a way out of a                               
perceived metaphysical impasse reflected in the ecological crisis (Matthews 2003). Things like colonial                         
or eusocial animals (bees, termites, coral polyps, etc.) might also be thought of as something like                               
organic mega­subjects, if their individual animal members were thought conscious, as might pairs of                           
conjoined twins if they were thought to ‘share a body’, and that body was thought a candidate for                                   
consciousness. Note that experience­first and subject­first combinationists will take subtly different                     
views of organic mega­subjects: insofar as the biosphere, say, is a physical substance with physical                             
parts, experience­first combinationists will not say that it itself is a conscious subject, but that it is                                 
something like the ‘body’ of a conscious subject, namely the ‘biosphere­soul’ constituted by all the                             
experiences of the biosphere’s parts.  
Both social and organic mega­subjects display some special sort of organisation; this                       
distinguishes them from ‘aggregative mega­subjects’, mere collections of items which include human                       
beings but lack any special sort of organisation. This includes both relatively ‘natural’ aggregates, like                             
‘everything on planet earth’ (for subject­first combinationists) or ‘all the experiences felt on planet                           
earth’ (for experience­first combinationists), and more ‘gerrymandered’ entities like ‘the fusion of my                         
body and the CN tower’ (for subject­first combinationists), or ‘the sum of all the experiences of all the                                   
mammals in California’ (for experience­first combinationists).  
Finally, there is the ‘cosmic subject’, the conscious whole that encompasses everything in                         
existence; experience­first combinationists can use the term ‘cosmic subject’ for the being constituted                         
by the totality of all experiences in existence. On most forms of combinationism, this will be merely the                                   
largest aggregative mega­subject, but holistic or monistic views would ascribe it a special position as                             





Not all combinationists need believe in mega­subjects, but certain versions of combinationism                       
arguably do imply a world rich in mega­subjects, and section 1 aims to show that this implication is                                   
acceptable. In section 2 I turn to the question of whether any mega­subjects might have unified                               
consciousness, which turns on whether any human beings stand in the relations constitutive of unity. I                               
argue that while human beings probably do not at present stand in robust and informative unity                               
relations to each other, a Sorites­style argument might provide motivation for thinking that we are                             
nevertheless linked by bare phenomenal unity. Finally, in section 3 I examine what combinationists                           




In this section I explain why a combinationist might be committed to the existence of mega­subjects,                               




Most of us accept the existence of the various entities listed in the introduction to this chapter                                 
(ecosystems, nations, sets of experiences, etc.) but normally we do not take them to be conscious. But if                                   
experiential properties are unconditionally inherited by wholes from their parts, then accepting the                         
existence of these large composites will commit us to regarding them as mega­subjects. This is                             





Not all combinationists accept unconditional inheritance: exclusionary combinationists, who                 
provide a different intelligible rationale for conditional experience inheritance, can agree with the                         
commonsense view that all these large composite entities, though they contain and perhaps                         
ontologically underlie (or are underlain by) many conscious experiences, are not conscious and do not                             
have those experiences. An exclusionary combinationist might nevertheless think some of them are                         
mega­subjects ­ a pantheist might make a case for the existence of a cosmic mind, a deep ecologist for                                     
the consciousness of ‘Gaia’ ­ but these claims would have to be advanced or opposed on their own                                   
merits, without directly impacting the plausibility of combinationism. 
In chapter 3 I suggested that physicalist, experience­first, and a posteriori combinationists all                         
have ways to make CEI intelligible without any unconditional experiential inheritance. But subject­first                         
property primitivist a priori combinationists ­ a significant constituency, particularly in the literature on                           
panpsychism ­ must derive CEI from BEI, the unconditional inheritance of ‘basic­experiential                       
properties’. Thus they must hold that any composite containing human beings is at least as conscious as                                 
is implied by having basic­experiential properties, i.e. standing in the relation of basic­ownership to                           
experiences.  
A combinationist committed to BEI might think to free themselves of a commitment to                           
mega­subjects by heavily restricting composition itself. They might claim that our everyday talk of                           
things like the universe, or the biosphere, or the population of Canada, are merely devices for talking in                                   
a plural way about many things, without any commitment to there being, for each of these phrases, a                                   
single referent having a great many disparate things as parts. (Or perhaps our everyday talk does carry a                                   
commitment to such entities, but is wrong to do so.) Then all that exists are fundamental simples and                                   
the relatively few highly­organised composites they compose (such as human beings and other                         





The problem with this solution is that it cuts against the rationale for BEI itself, which was                                 
explained by the heritability of fundamental properties given some level­connecting view of                       
composition. It is hard to reconcile heavily restricted composition with the level­connecting views: for                           
a start, it directly contradicts nihilism, and rules out composition being identity – after all, everything is                                 
self­identical, so it’s not clear where we can find the conceptual room to say, of some things, that they                                     
do not compose any whole. Heavily restricted composition is also probably incompatible with holism,                           
if it rules out the existence of a cosmic whole. It might be compatible with priority pluralism, but even                                     
here the conjunction is a little strange. Wholes are nothing over and above their parts – but nevertheless                                   
there are very few. Most of the things we call ‘wholes’ do not exist – even though their parts do exist,                                         
and they would (if they existed) be nothing over and above those parts. Such a viewmay be consistent                                     




While we might refuse to ascribe experiences to aggregative mega­subjects simply out of intuitive                           
repugnance at the idea, there are a couple of more specific justifications we can give for this                                 
repugnance. Both are already identified in Lycan’s (1979) discussion of a doctrine much stronger than                             
BEI, namely the unconditional upward inheritance of all mental properties. Lycan argues, inspired by                           









would entail mental inheritance; he takes this to be a reductio, revealing the need for functionalists to                                 
add further restrictions on what can be counted as a system’s ‘inputs’, ‘outputs’, and ‘internal states’.  
The argument works thus: suppose that some part (s) of a system (S) is instantiating a program                                 
(P), i.e. there is a one­to­one mapping from some set of its real­world inputs, outputs, and states, to the                                     
logical inputs, outputs, and states used to define that program. Since there is no restriction on what we                                   
can count as the inputs, outputs, and states of a functional system, we can equally well regard the                                   
whole, S, as instantiating the same program (P), just by defining the goings­on in S’s part s as inputs,                                     
outputs, and internal states for S. For instance, if a cell in my brain pairs some input (electrical                                   
stimulation) to some output (firing) whenever it is in some state (polarised), then we can equally say                                 
that my whole brain, or the planet earth, or anything else containing that cell, pairs a corresponding                                 
input (electrical stimulation of that cell) with a corresponding output (firing by that cell) whenever it is                                 
in a corresponding internal state (having that cell polarised). So whenever s is realising P, Swill be too,                                     
and thus if mental states are defined as programs, S will share whatever mental states its part s has.  
Lycan takes mental Inheritance to be absurd for two reasons. First, the whole might “have                             
thousands of explicitly contradictory beliefs” and second, it would be conscious of all its parts’                             
experience, “despite [its] overwhelming inclination to deny it” (p.286). These are problematic insofar                         
as it is plausible, first, that subjects do not generally have contradictory beliefs, and, second, that                               
experiences are usually reportable by their subjects. Call these the problem of Inconsistent Beliefs and                             
the problem of Disavowed Experiences.  
I will not defend mental inheritance, in large part because of these two problems. Rather, I will                                 
try to show that BEI escapes these problems, and is thus more acceptable than mental inheritance, or                                 






inconsistent states and disavowed experiences are prima facie pressing, consider some mega­subject                       
with multiple human parts ­ such as the universe, a philosophy department, or “the contents of this                                 
room”, said to indicate a room with several people in it. Suppose one human part sees a talk, finds it                                       
interesting, and comes to admire the speaker; suppose their friend sees the same talk, but is bored and                                   
ends up disdainful of the speaker. Does it follow that the universe simultaneously feels excited and                               
bored, or that it both likes and hates the talk? It seems absurd to attribute such wildly conflicting mental                                     
states to a single entity, even if we had reconciled ourselves to the universe having mental states at all.  
Similarly, we cannot expect the universe (or even the philosophy department) to issue a joint                             
statement avowing any of these conscious mental episodes, which makes it even less plausible to                             
attribute these mental states to them. This is most obvious with social groups, which do sometimes                               
avow things and so make it obvious that they do not avow all the experiences of their parts. However,                                     
we can see the same concern applied to non­social mega­subjects, in the form of an objection that has                                   
occasionally been raised against cosmopsychist theories, on which the universe has a mind, of which                             
each of our minds is merely a fragment. Objectors suppose that were this the case, the universe would                                   
be aware of each of our experiences, and therefore able to avow or report those experiences. Since each                                   
of us is merely a part of it, the most natural way for it to avow our experiences would be through                                         
producing appropriate utterances through our mouths, and it should be able to report with one human                               
an experience of another human, which would appear at our level as a sort of ‘telepathy’. Yet such                                   










The appropriate response to these problems is to focus on chapter 3’s contrast between ‘basic­having’                             
and ‘full­having’. This distinction was introduced because different views on the nature of experiential                           
properties will make them either ‘systemic’, in that whether some entity instantiates them depends on                             
its total set of properties, ‘additive’ in that their instantiation is not sensitive to their bearer’s other                                 
properties in this way, or a mixture of additive and systemic components. No systemic property can be                                 
inherited, and so the very idea of experiential inheritance might be incoherent. By defining                           
‘basic­experiential properties’ as ‘whatever is additive in experiential properties’ we can discuss the                         
doctrine of basic­experiential inheritance, which will at least be consistent whatever experiential                       
properties are like. The original notion, including both additive and systemic components if any, is then                               
labelled ‘full­having’ in contrast.  
Combinationists who accept BEI should maintain that our intuitions about experience                     
ascription, avowal, and consistency are not properly applied to basic­experiential properties. This might                         
be because full­experiential properties involve systemic requirements that basic­experiential properties                   
do not, and our intuitions are appropriate only to full­experiential properties. But even if                           
basic­experiential properties just are full­experiential properties (because the latter have no systemic                       
components), combinationist who accept BEI can point out that precisely because experiential                       
properties require nothing systemic, they cannot automatically fit our intuitions about ascription,                       
avowal, and consistency, because those seem to make over systemic demands. 
So first, our expectation that experiences be generally consistent applies only to unified                         
experiences, those which are ‘experienced together’. If they are not, they may either not interact at all,                                 
or interact in ways unrelated to their content, so that the mental tension usually generated by a                                 




consistent experiences because we do not normally describe something as the subject of a set of                               
experiences (do not take them to fully­have those experiences) unless they are all unified with one                               
another. But this requirement of overall unity is a systemic requirement, and so does not apply to                                 
basic­having.  
Similarly, the principle that people can usually report and reflect on their experiences is true                             
only of experiences that they fully­have, not those they basically­have. Partly this is again a matter of                                 
unity, specifically ‘access­unity’, the joint accessibility of two experience’s contents. Partly it is also a                             
matter of causal control: to fully­have an experience, a subject must display overall behaviour                           
(including reporting behaviour) that is guided by that experience and its content. But causal control is                               
again a systemic requirement, missing from basic­having.   
What does basic­having involve, then, if it does not involve conscious unity or behavioural                           
control? On physicalistic or experience­first accounts of experience it might involve very little, perhaps                           
just the ontological qualification of having an experience occur ‘in’ you. For on those accounts,                             
experiential ownership might be primarily a matter of causal relations among physical events, or                           
phenomenal relations among experiences. However, BEI is primarily of interest to subject­first                       
primitivists about consciousness, and for them the most natural account of experiential ownership                         
involves a relation of subject to experience which is irreducible to any non­experiential relation, or to                               
any purely inter­experience relation. This core would be part of basic­having, and BEI would imply                             
that any composite containing a human being will bear this core relation to the experiences of its parts,                                   
and would thus be, in this inert and disunified sense, ‘conscious’.  
So the universe, for instance, ‘has’ many millions of experiences, including mine and yours, but                             
only in the basic sense. These experiences are grouped into clusters by their unity relations, and each                                 




organisms: they have experiences in the full sense, while the universe does not. When one part sees a                                   
talk and enjoys it, the universe does indeed ‘have’ that enjoyment, but only in the basic sense. This is                                     
why it doesn’t avow it, and isn’t under any pressure to be consistent about it.  
The choice of experience­first or subject­first views will determine exactly what BEI entails                         
about mega­subjects. On the subject­first view, each of us is a physical thing that is conscious in the                                   
full sense, and we are parts of various physical wholes which are conscious in the basic sense in virtue                                     
of our being so (a monist will reverse the ‘in virtue of’). On the experience­first view, we are                                   
experiential things, based in our bodies, and parts of various larger experiential things, up to and                               
including the ‘world soul’, which are based in the larger physical things of which our bodies are parts.                                   
These larger experiential things, unlike us, are only subjects of the experiences that constitute them in                               
the basic sense.  
If basic­having involves something irreducibly experiential, then there is in a sense ‘something                         
it is like’ to be the universe. But if the universe’s experiences are not unified, there will not be any one                                         
single unified ‘thing it is like’: being the universe would be like simultaneously but separately being                               
each of the individual minds in it (though the next section will complicate this claim). The key point is                                     
that the defender of BEI can accept a major difference between normal human subjects and                             
mega­subjects: their commitment is simply to the idea that this difference is entirely accounted for by                               




In the last section I took for granted that the experiences of mega­subjects are not unified with one                                   




saw in chapter 4 that there are many senses of ‘the unity of consciousness’, which may be dissociable                                   
from each other. This opens up the possibility that some forms of unity may in fact run much more                                     




Phenomenal unity, the mere experienced­together­ness of a set of experiences, has been conceptually                         
distinguished from representational unity (representing things as connected) as well as from                       
access­unity and other forms of what I have called ‘dispositional unity’, unity that consists in the                               
tendency towards certain sorts of causal interactions. Some philosophers accept the further claim that                           
phenomenal unity is irreducible to and dissociable from these other forms of unity, though others deny                               
this. Suppose for now that we accepted the irreducibility of phenomenal unity, and its dissociability                             
from other forms of unity: there could then be a sort of ‘bare phenomenal unity’, in which experiences                                   
were phenomenally connected, but causally isolated and insensitive to each other. This sort of unity                             
might then not be noticed by creatures like us, who run phenomenal and dispositional unity together                               
because we are so familiar with cases that combine the two.   
If bare phenomenal unity is coherent, perhaps it obtains among the experiences of distinct                           
individuals, connecting up all the experiences of the mega­subjects they compose. We might, in the                             
spirit of Russellian monism, take phenomenal unity to be the categorical basis of some basic physical                               





Unrestricted Unity (UU): All experiences in the universe are phenomenally unified with each                         
other, i.e. form a single phenomenal field.   
3
Alternatively we might restrict this unity to certain mega­subjects: perhaps phenomenal unity still                         
requires some degree of causal integration, as much as is found in social mega­subjects but not in                                 
merely aggregative ones. Note that UU is not a specifically combinationist doctrine: any account of                             
conscious unity needs to say something about how phenomenal unity relates to richer forms of unity,                               
and what sort of underpinnings it requires. If phenomenal unity is a fundamental relation which can                               




Is there any positive reason to posit bare phenomenal unity among the experiences of distinct people?                               
There is at least one reason, if we accept the metaphysical fundamentality of phenomenal unity,                             
denying its reducibility to any more basic set of relations. Consider two sets of experiences, one clearly                                 
enjoying phenomenal unity (e.g. the experiences of some human being), one intuitively not (e.g. the                             
experiences of the entire universe). These experiences will differ greatly in their tendencies toward a                             
number of forms of interaction, in ways reflecting the underlying causal connections between them. But                             
all these underlying causal connections ­ nerve fibres, radio signals, electrical or gravitational fields,                           
etc. ­ are matters of degree. We can imagine an arbitrarily gradual sequence of steps between the two                                   







There need be no point where any fundamental break occurs, from the perspective of these                             
causal tendencies. But experiences are either phenomenally unified or not, even though the change in                             4
the relevant underlying factors can be made so gradual that it consists of many miniscule changes, none                                 
of which seem a plausible candidate for ‘the big transition’. Structurally, this is a sorites paradox: no                                 
tiny step can suddenly produce unity (just as no single­hair­removal can make someone bald), but a                               
transition from disunity to unity must occur at some point (just as progressive removal of hair must                                 
eventually make someone bald).  
Analyses of the sorites paradox abound, and I do not wish to wade into their details. But                                 
broadly speaking, most solutions involve the idea that the word being applied has or could have had a                                   
wide variety of fractionally different meanings, ranges of reference, or degrees of application. For                           
instance, the vagueness of ‘bald’ lies in the fact that any of a range of maximum numbers of hairs is an                                         
equally good candidate for the meaning of ‘bald’.   
5
Solutions in this broad category work well enough for words like ‘bald’, whose meaning can be                               
specified in more basic terms (number of hairs). The different acceptable ranges of application can be                               
understood as different precise descriptions in these more basic terms. But for a fundamental concept                             
which does not admit of further analysis, matters are much harder. Being indeterminately bald just                             
means having a number of hairs we are unsure how to classify, but what is it to be indeterminately                                     













The impulse to reject vagueness for what is fundamental provides the basis of one of the most                                 
popular arguments in support of universalism about composition (Lewis 1986 p.212, Sider 1997),                         
which takes ‘existence’ to be a fundamental concept and infers that composition cannot be restricted in                               
accordance with any vague criterion, for vagueness about whether some things compose a whole would                             
entail vagueness in whether that whole existed. Since most of the plausible criteria by which                             
composition might be restricted are vague, it seems to follow that composition cannot be restricted.                             
This argument could be rejected by endorsing metaphysical vagueness, which may apply even to                           
fundamental matters (see Van Inwagen 1990 pp.213­283, Barnes & Williams 2009, Wilson 2013­c),                         
but there is dispute over the coherence of this idea (see Lewis 1993, 1988, Evans 1978, Eklund                                 
forthcoming).  
Consequently, there are four things we could say about phenomenal unity, and different                         
combinationists will find different options attractive: 
1. Treat phenomenal unity as vague on account of a multiplicity of acceptable ranges of                           
application, thereby accepting that it is reductively analysable in terms of some underlying                         
dimension – most likely dispositional unity.  
2. Treat phenomenal unity as fundamental, but subject to metaphysical vagueness.  
3. Treat phenomenal unity as fundamental and hence non­vague, and conclude that there must be                           
some apparently arbitrary moment when two sets of experiences suddenly become unified with                         
each other.  
4. Treat phenomenal unity as fundamental and hence non­vague, and conclude that if there is                           
phenomenal unity at any point, there must be phenomenal unity at all points along any                             
relevantly gradual spectrum.  
In the fourth case, since “the flow of interaction in the universe is inherently unbounded, and no merely                                   




be led into universalism about phenomenal unity by an argument analogous to that which leads many                               
into universalism about composition.   
6
Universalism about unity is very counter­intuitive, but it is important to note that we do not                               
really have any compelling empirical evidence against it. UU is either conceptually incoherent (if                           
phenomenal unity cannot come apart from more robust forms of unity), or it is invulnerable to                               
empirical disconfirmation (because phenomenal unity, when distinguished from other forms of unity,                       
has no distinctive empirical marks). If it is coherent, its evaluation will turn upon its theoretical virtues                                 
and vices, and here a case can be made both for it (that it is more parsimonious than alternatives, and                                       




The usual reason for rejecting the possibility of phenomenal unity in mega­subjects is the idea that our                                 
individual consciousness is manifestly ‘bounded’, in a way incompatible with our experiences being                         
unified with any others. In section 3 of chapter 4, I elaborated this through the notion of ‘epistemic                                   
boundedness’: each of us knows about the experiences of others only in virtue of knowing about                               
non­experiential things. But, as I observed in subsection 3.5, the epistemic boundedness of human                           
consciousness might be disputed: it might be maintained that our experiences do, independently of                           
what they tell us about non­experiential facts, convey to us some sort of information about other                               







First consider aggregative mega­subjects experiencing bare phenomenal unity. In chapter 4 I                       
argued that if bare phenomenal unity is possible, it is experienced by the parts as ‘minimal                               
A­relatedness’, the relation between two experiences when each reliably adumbrates the other – i.e.                           
represents the other as something not­given but continuous with what is given in that experience – and                                 
when this adumbration secures reference independently of any specific information regarding what is                         
adumbrated. That is, each experience involves an unspecific awareness of the existence of a broader                             
background encompassing its specific object, but with no idea what this background is, beyond its                             
being ‘this further thing’: moreover, each subject’s awareness of ‘this further thing’ refers successfully                           
to the other’s experience. If all human experiences are linked by the minimal A­relation, then they are                                 
not strictly epistemically bounded, though they may be bounded with respect to specific information:                           
my experience informs me simply that there is a wider experiential world than is revealed to me                                 
individually.  
So we should ask two questions: is it plausible that human phenomenology is pervasively                           
characterised by pure openness? And is it plausible that each human’s experience of pure openness                             
refers to the experiences of others? I think we should answer both questions with a cautious ‘yes’.  
First, there is nothing implausible about pure openness in human experience. Indeed, arguably                         
it is more phenomenologically accurate to describe our awareness as constantly ‘opening out’ onto an                             
assumed, implicit, world of things not yet given, than it is to just list the specific objects of our                                     
experience, as though what we are primarily conscious of is a collection of discrete items, one thing                                 
after another. Of course it is specific items that tend to occupy our attention: the presence of the world                                     
as the universal background against which they appear is comparatively easy to ignore or forget about.                               





For this feeling of openness to imply unity among all the experiences of a mega­subject, it                               
would need to connect somehow to the experiences of other people, in particular by referring to them in                                   
virtue of features of them, but independently of any specific information it carries about them. Here                               
again it is hard to have any confidence about whether such a connection exists, because it is hard to say                                       
conclusively what does or does not suffice for one thing to refer to another. But reference is commonly                                   
assumed to flow along causal or ontological links ­ if I am in a position to refer to something, I will                                         
also be in a position to refer to ‘whatever caused it to be here’, or ‘whatever it is a part of’. In                                           
particular, I am usually able to refer to something in virtue of its causal or ontological relations tome.                                     
So all the defender of UU needs is some sort of causal or ontological relationship that extends widely                                   
through the universe, and this is not hard to find: the very fact of sharing a world might work, as might                                         
might spatial distance, causal influence considered independently of strength or directness, or shared                         
constitutive dependence on the same set of natural laws.   7
If it is not implausible to claim that the many experiences of different subjects are ontologically                               
connected just from sharing a world, and have a pervasive character of opening out onto a world prior                                   
to specifying its character or content, then the defender of UU can take these facts to explain, and to                                     











Whether or not bare phenomenal unity pervades the universe, do any mega­subjects enjoy unified                           
consciousness in a stronger sense, involving informative adumbration? The natural place to look would                           
be at social mega­subjects, which often display complex and functionally useful information                       
processing.  
I have already suggested, in subsection 6.1 of chapter 4, that we routinely have an                             
adumbrational awareness of other people’s experiences: indeed, this may well be the only way that                             
experiences we do not share can perceptually appear to us. But this sort of adumbration does not yield                                   
conscious unification. On the version of the adumbration proposal that denies transparency, what is                           
necessary is for my experience to adumbrate someone else’s, but in these cases the other’s experiences                               
are adumbrated by external physical objects like a word or gesture. On the version that accepts                               
transparency, the problem is different: the adumbration makes me aware of an experience rather than of                               
the content of that experience. Since experience is naturally transparent ­ that is, its only                             
phenomenologically manifest features are its representational content ­ to be aware of an experience                           
primarily as an experience, as an event ‘in someone else’s head’, is actually an alienated and                               
misleading way to be aware of it, when compared to ‘seeing through it’ to its content in the way that its                                         
subject does. So on either version of the adumbration proposal, this sort of routine inter­personal                             
adumbration does not break through the epistemic boundedness of our consciousness.  
In order for my experiences to be substantively unified with another person’s, they would have                             
to indicate to me what it is like to be that person, as a concealed aspect directly continuous with my                                       
own experience. I would have to get insight into how the world seems to them, in a way that came to                                         
me as automatically and immediately as my own experiences do, not requiring (though perhaps being                             
amplified by) my focusing on any particular object. Perhaps the best model we have for this sort of                                   




so constantly concerned with, that we cannot think of or perceive anything without it occurring to us                                 
how they would think of or perceive that thing. In cases like this ­ which typically involve parents,                                   
teachers, or mentors of some other kind ­ we might naturally say that we have the other person ‘in our                                       
heads’.  
But this kind of relation to another person’s thoughts fails a different part of the test for being                                   
A­related: we are not aware of their experiences in virtue of any actual relation to their present                                 
experiences, but in virtue of a sort of ‘internalisation’, whereby we have constructed a working                             
simulation of them in our own heads. It could, after all, persist even after they themselves have died.                                   
For our present experiences to be really unified with theirs, in a way that goes beyond bare phenomenal                                   
unity, we would have to have the same sort of automatic and immediate awareness of how things seem                                   
to them, but have it in virtue of a present flow of information.  
Perhaps there are actual cases where this happens, with people who are both closely attuned to                               
each other’s ways of thinking and also directly involved in some co­operative activity (Cf.                           
Bhattacharya & Petsche 2005, Nagel 1971, p.409). But perhaps even in those cases the degree of                               
sensitivity is not high enough for us to say that their experiences are unified, or perhaps whether it is                                     
high enough is semantically indeterminate because our notion of ‘conscious unity’ is vague. Certainly,                           
though, we can imagine hypothetical cases where, by providing more efficient technologies of                         
communication, we enable two people’s experiences to exchange information even more fully and                         







If we accepted Bayne & Chalmers’s subsumptive analysis of phenomenal unity, or more broadly the                             
idea that when two experiences are phenomenally unified there is a single thing it is like to have both                                     
together, then UU implies that there some single thing it is like to be the entire universe, some single                                     
experience subsuming all others. How should we think of this universal experience?What could it be                               8
like? Unfortunately I have little positive to say: I do not think we can do much to get our heads around                                         
such a dizzyingly remote idea.  
In principle we could sympathetically imagine being the universe, simply by simultaneously                       
imagining being all the individual organisms in it, at once, together. But obviously this is not possible                                 
in practice for humans, because we cannot combine so many experiences at once, because many of                               
them will be deeply alien to us, and because we find it hard to imagine multiple experiences without                                   
connecting them in a way that would misrepresent their actual disunity.  
Perhaps the last chapter’s ideas could be illuminating here: does the universe experience                         
everything in a confused way, as a single giant quality that is a blend of the qualities of all our                                       
experiences? Or does it experience them as laid out in an phenomenal field structured by attention? But                                 
the notion of confusion is defined in terms of various sorts of ‘mental operations’, and while we have a                                     
good intuitive idea of what it means to speak of a human mind performing mental operations on its                                   
contents, we have no idea what it means in the case of the universe. Similarly, the notion of attentional                                     
proximity breaks because we have no idea what would count as the universe as a whole attending to                                   
one particular experience. Admittedly, we can still think of a phenomenal field as structured by causal                               







It might then make sense to say that the phenomenal fields of a mega­subject’s human parts                               
would be distinctively­structured regions of the mega­subject’s field. If one accepted the last chapter’s                           
idea that the distant periphery of a human phenomenal field contains experiences that are phenomenally                             
unified but realistically unattendable, that might suggest that these far peripheries of each of our                             
phenomenal fields would shade gradually into parts of the far peripheries of other people’s. But it is                                 
unclear how much of our sense of experienced as ‘organised’ and ‘laid out’ remains meaningfully                             
applicable, once we abandon the possibility of directing or shifting attention.  
Both phenomenal blending and the phenomenal field are notions drawn from our own,                         
distinctively human, sort of phenomenological structure, and are imperfect guides to what a very                           
different sort of consciousness might be like. We probably just cannot imagine what it is like to be the                                     
universe, though we may draw some consolation from the thought that the universe itself probably                             
cannot imagine that either, since it probably (supposing pantheism to be false) lacks the cognitive                             
architecture necessary to do anything that would count as imagination. Similarly, in any strong and                             
reflective sense of ‘knowledge’, it does not know what it is like to be itself, though it basically­has                                   




We usually assume that the only experiences going on in a human being are those ‘in the brain’: I have                                       
tended to follow this assumption in treating brains, heads, and whole human bodies are experientially                             
equivalent subjects, sharing the same set of experiences (or, on the experience­first view, as each being                               
the basis for the very same subject and its experiences). But what if there were experiences occurring                                 




that bestowed consciousness or some body part, or it might be one way of thinking about the shared                                   
body of some pairs of conjoined twins, or it might simply be a consequence of the truth of                                   
panpsychism, according to all human tissues, like all physical things, contain experiences. The human                           




What should panpsychists say about the experiences of my non­neural body parts? Note that                           
exclusionary combinationists will likely deny any sort of mega­subject here: even if there is such a                               
thing as the whole body, or the aggregate or all experiences going on in it, it will not be a subject of the                                             
non­brain experiences in any interesting sense at all. Without the kind of complex cognitive capacities                             
that are distinctive of the brain, there is nothing remotely like phenomenology. But this simply reflects                               
that exclusionary combinationists deny BEI.  
What about inclusionary combinationists? What they say will depend somewhat on whether                       
they take a subject­first or an experience­first view. Subject­first combinationists will say that there is                             
one entity, the whole human body, which simultaneously has both the experiences based in the brain                               
and the experiences based elsewhere, though because not all of these experiences are causally                           
integrated or contribute to intelligent control of the body, it has the non­neural experiences only in the                                 
basic sense. Moreover, if any of these experiences are not unified with one another, and if                               
full­ownership requires unity among all of one’s experiences, then the body does not have any                             






because all of the experiences in the brain are unified with one another. (Of course, in addition to the                                     10
brain and body there will be any number of intermediate groupings, like the body’s top half: I focus on                                     
the brain and whole body for simplicity.)  
Experience­first combinationists, on the other hand, will focus on two distinct but purely                         
experiential beings: one more extensive, but not sufficiently organised to be said to constitute a subject                               
in the full sense, the other containing fewer experiences but constituting a subject in the full sense. The                                   
latter being would be based in your brain, and by extension in the whole body too, though neither brain                                     
nor body should strictly be called a conscious subject. The former, more extensive, experiential being                             
is based specifically in the whole body, as no proper part of that body is ontologically sufficient for all                                     
of the experiences it includes at any one moment.  
If we do have two subject­like beings, one more extensive (identical to or based in my body)                                 
and one more integrated (identical to or based in my brain), it is an open question which is a better                                       
candidate for being identified with ‘me the person’. Just as non­panpsychists must decide how heavily                             
to weight the brain’s special role in consciousness, panpsychists must decide how heavily to weight the                               
brain’s special role in unified, causally integrated consciousness.  
It might be thought obvious that only the the less extensive, more integrated, entity could be                               
‘me’, because if I were the other, I would have many thousands of additional experiences which, to all                                   
introspective appearances, I do not seem to have. But this is a cogent argument only if we assume that                                     
any experiences I have must be available for cognitive use (reflection, inference, report, and so on) and                                 









then the experiences of my arms, legs, hair and so on will be ‘realistically unattendable’ in the sense                                   
explained in chapter 5, subsection 3.4: so distant from the centre of my phenomenal field that the ‘shift                                   
of attention’ needed to focus on them would involve radical physiological re­organisation. Ironically,                         




To see that this issue is relevant not only to panpsychists, suppose that by some series of unfortunate                                   
events, likely involving the intervention of technologically advanced aliens, my left foot becomes                         
conscious. Perhaps it just feels discomfort when flexed, and comfort when extended, with greater                           
intensities proportional to increases in the degree of flexion or extension. My foot is part of me, and it                                     
is now experiencing these sensations: BEI would entail that my body, considered as a whole, had these                                 
experiences in the basic sense. At the same time, this is not the usual, full, sense of experiencing: my                                     
usual methods of introspection will not reveal the foot­experiences, I will deny any knowledge of it,                               
and if ‘I’ enjoy flexing my foot, while the foot itself feels discomfort, then it seems wrong to say that                                       
any single being is experiencing a conflict among their feelings.  
One question is which entity to regard as ‘me’, as ‘Luke Roelofs’. A subject­first                           
combinationist might say that I am the whole body and now begin to basically­have new experiences                               
which are not unified with my existing ones, and which do not control me – i.e. experiences which I                                     
have only in the basic sense, not the full sense. The tricky thing about this is that if I am having this                                           
new foot­based experience, which is not unified with my other experiences, then none of my                             
experiences are unified with all my other experiences. But in that case I cease to have even my                                   




the full sense, and if the experiences in my foot become more complex and start to govern goal­directed                                   
behaviours on the part of my foot (e.g. tapping out messages in morse code with a toe), we might say                                       
that my foot has those experiences in the full sense. On this way of describing the case, one entity (my                                       
body) first has some experiences in the full sense, and then comes to only have experiences (including                                 
those directly flowing on from its old experiences) in the basic sense. Another being (my brain)                               
experiences more continuity, being a full subject of similar experiences at all stages. If we wanted to                                 
capture the continuity that ‘I’ seem to experience, we might think that the brain is a better candidate for                                     
being ‘me’ than is the whole organism.  
Experience­first combinationists would say that there is, at first, a single complex, integrated,                         
stream of experiences based in my brain and, by extension, in my body, which constituted (perhaps was                                 
identical to) a subject (me). Over the course of this thought experiment all that happens is that another                                   
stream of experiences, constituting another subject, comes into existence, based in the same thing that                             
constitutes me (though depending specifically on a different part thereof). The sum of these two sets of                                 




Suppose panpsychist combinationists are asked “If every part of my body is having experiences, why                             
am I not having those experiences?Why are they not part of my consciousness?” (Cf. Rosenberg 1998,                                 
Chalmers 2013a, p.5; Margaret Wilson 1999, pp.128­130, raises this problem especially for Spinoza’s                         
version of panpsychism). The question may seem especially forceful when we observe that any precise                             
boundary between the brain and the rest of the body will seem arbitrary when we look closely ­ why                                     




misconceived. It is like asking ‘why is my neck not included in my head ­ why does my head exclude                                       
the neck?’ We can carve reality in many ways, but once we have singled out one section, there is no                                       
explanation for why it does not include other sections except that we did not choose to cover them with                                     
the terms we were using.  
That is not to say there are no substantive questions here. One question is: why are the                                 
experiences of my non­neural body parts not reportable by me? But the answer is straightforward: they                               
do not broadcast information to other subjects (or to each other) in the way that would allow for that. A                                       
more difficult question concerns self­reference. When we ask ‘why do certain experiences not belong                           
to me?’, the meaning of the question depends on the meaning of those last two words, and                                 




In this chapter I have explored what combinationism can tell us about conscious beings with humans as                                 
parts: this could include social groups, ecological systems, mere aggregations, or the cosmos itself.                           
Certain versions of combinationism are committed to BEI (basic­experience inheritance), and BEI                       
implies the existence of a certain sort of mega­subject, one which ‘has’ experiences only in the basic                                 
sense. More precisely, BEI implies that if some collection containing human beings composes a whole,                             
that whole will be such a mega­subject. But the distinction between basic and full ‘having’ also                               
provides the tools for explaining away the counter­intuitiveness of this implication.   
I also examined the issue of conscious unity in mega­subjects. According to the adumbration                           
proposal of chapter 4, the experiences of different human beings are generally not dispositionally or                             




However, the adumbrational proposal does not tell us how much dispositional unity is necessary for                             
phenomenal unity, and if the answer is ‘very little’ or ‘none’, it does not tell us how broadly                                   
phenomenal unity extends. These questions are not specific to combinationism: the adumbrational                       
proposal simply tells us what these questions correspond to for the component subjects involved.   
In particular, if phenomenal unity is a fundamental relation which can exist without richer                           
forms of unity, then there may be a case, based on the theoretical virtues of simplicity and                                 
non­arbitrariness, for ‘Universalism about Unity’, the doctrine that all experiences anywhere are                       
phenomenally unified. The adumbrational proposal does not in itself affirm or deny this, but it tells us                                 
what this would mean for human consciousness: that human consciousness is suffused with a basic                             
awareness of its own continuity with an indeterminate ‘something more’, and that this awareness                           
successfully refers to all other experiences that exist. For richer forms of unity we would need richer                                 
forms of interaction, and current forms of social communication, though they probably fall short of                             
conscious unity in the everyday sense, differ from it only in degree. The sort of progressive deepening                                 
and tightening of inter­personal links that might underwrite conscious unity will be discussed in more                             
detail in chapter 8.  
Finally, the analysis of mega­subjects bears on how panpsychists should think about the human                           
body and its myriad experiences both inside and outside the brain. A panpsychist who accepts BEI will                                 
recognise the existence of both a brain­based subject, which fully has all and only the brain­based                               
experiences, and a body­based subject that basically­has both the non­brain­based experiences and the                         
brain­based ones. ‘The person’ as we normally think of themmight be identified with one or the other:                                   
if we chose the latter, we would arrive at the surprising conclusion that each of us is in fact a sort of                                           
mega­subject ourselves, an experiential universe extending well beyond the central focus of the brain.                           




that all combinationists must accept: I have simply tried to show where some of the more radical                                 

























Our thought about, reference to, and knowledge of, ourselves is complicated if some parts of us are also                                   
thereby thinking about, referring to, and knowing, themselves. In this chapter I examine these                           
complications, arguing that they push combinationists towards a set of claims which systematically                         
lower the importance of knowing exactly which subject we are.   1
Not all conscious parts of a self­conscious being need be self­conscious: microsubjects of the                           
sort discussed in chapter 5 are probably incapable of thinking about subjects of experience as such, or                                 
thinking of themselves as subjects of experience, just as a cat or a worm, even if conscious, is probably                                     
incapable of such thought. But many parts of a human being are large and complex enough to be at                                     2












parts which share the human being’s whole consciousness (e.g. their head), as well as such awkward                               
entities as the brainstem­and­left­hemisphere, or the­brain­minus­one­lobe. And even for the                   
experience­first combinationist there will be many experiential sections that comprise many or most,                         
but not all, of the whole’s experiences. In chapter 1, subsection 4.2 I called these ‘large overlapping                                 
sections’ of human subjects: when I speak of ‘parts’ in this chapter I should be assumed to have parts                                     
like this in mind.  
A combinationist might sidestep all the problems in this chapter by embracing a highly                           
restricted view of composition, according to which all that exists is the whole and parts of it small                                   
enough to be conceptually incapable of self­consciousness (e.g. Van Inwagen’s view on which only                           
organisms, cells, and fundamental particles exist). But (for reasons discussed in the introduction to the                             
last chapter) this kind of restricted view sits very uneasily with combinationism, since it suggests that                               
certain wholes are something over and above their parts, the opposite of the combinationist project.                             
Moreover, even this attempt at evasion will fail if all conscious beings, even microsubjects, are                             
self­conscious. So I will assume in this chapter that the combinationist’s principle of composition is at                               
least liberal enough to generate the problems I discuss.  
Another sort of ‘restrictive’ solution would say that even though large sophisticated parts of me                             
exist, and could think ‘I­thoughts’ were the rest of me removed, they do not think such thoughts when                                   
connected to the other parts of me ­ only the whole is capable of this kind of thinking, whatever the                                       
intrinsic capabilities of its parts. This implies that being connected to each other prevents my parts from                                 
thinking I­thoughts: but what sort of prevention is this? If it is simply that my parts’ thoughts cannot                                   
count as I­thoughts, despite being intrinsically just like I­thoughts, then we have ‘solved’ the problems                             
I will consider only by verbal fiat. But it is not plausible that being connected to other parts could                                     




could arise. The only satisfying and plausible sense of ‘prevents’ would thus have to be something                               
more like ‘interfering with’ or ‘disrupting’: being connected to other parts makes each part’s thoughts                             
diverge from I­thoughts in some important way, despite being still significantly akin to them. But then                               
we can demand an explanation of how the ‘almost­I­thoughts’ of the parts diverge from genuine                             
I­thoughts, and the answer will come through engaging with the sorts of considerations discussed in the                               
following sections. 
I distinguish three particular problems, which I call the Problem of Oblivious Parts, the                           
Problem of Self­Reference, and the Problem of Self­Identification. In sections 1, 2, and 3, I discuss                               
these problems in turn, arguing that the first two can be removed, but the third remains:                               
combinationism limits my ability to know which of a number of subjects is me.  
The first problem is simply this: it seems that the parts of me do not recognise that they are                                     
surrounded by other parts – by distinct and even discrete subjects with whom they interact. At least, I                                   
have no inkling of such a recognition, which suggests there is none. Yet in general it seems that                                   3
intelligent subjects can notice when they are in constant close interaction and communication with                           
discrete subjects, i.e. they notice when there is ‘someone else’ there. I could not be cohabiting and                                 
co­operating closely with other people and remain ignorant of this, but the large conscious parts of us                                 
are, according to combinationism, living and acting with other subjects, apparently without any                         
awareness of this. Indeed, the intuitive attractiveness of Anti­Combination reflects that there seems to                           
be no recognition within the group of communicating subjects that constitutes me that there is such a                                 
group. Call this the Problem of Oblivious Parts.  
The second problem concerns the reference of first­person terms in conscious thoughts that are                           





if thoughts can belong to multiple subjects, which of them is the referent? This question becomes                               
particularly pressing when some of those subjects differ from others in their possession of the feature                               
that the thought self­ascribes: for then the thought’s truth or falsity will depend on which subject it                                 
refers to. Once we abandon the assumption of a unique subject for each judgement, first­person                             
judgements give rise to a conflict between accurate self­knowledge, and reliable self­reference. Call                         
this the Problem of Self­Reference.  
The third problem is the one which has been most often employed to argue against                             
combinationism (Merricks 2001, pp.103, Unger 1980, pp.461­462; cf. Olson 2003, pp.329­331; cf                       
Appendix subsections 6.4 and 6.5): who am I? Am I a human being, or a human head which thinks it is                                         
a human being? If they think all the same thoughts, it is hard to see how any of them could tell. Call                                           
this the Problem of Self­Identification.  
Note that satisfactory responses to the first two problems might make the third harder. To                             
address the Problem of Oblivious Parts we might say why our parts are in an epistemic situation which                                   
they cannot distinguish from that of the whole – but this will then make it even harder to explain how                                       
any of these subjects could identify themselves. And to address the Problem of Self­reference, we                             




There are two basic ways to respond to the Problem of Oblivious Parts. One would be to claim that the                                       




they are not alone, and hold some attitude toward the other parts which they are attached to. The other                                     
is to accept that they are oblivious, and explain why.  
I think combinationists have good reason to go for the second approach: any awareness of                             
accompaniment in my parts should be inherited by me. Since the relevant awareness would be too                               
cognitively sophisticated for it to be plausible that it was isolated from the whole’s other experiences,                               
or uninvolved in the control of overall behaviour, it would meet the conditions in any plausible version                                 
of conditional experience inheritance. It would be bizarre for our brains to develop the machinery for                               
social cognition and then cut it off from the rest of the brain’s function, and doubly bizarre for such a                                       
structure to be present in every single one of our large, cognitively sophisticated, parts.  
So I will suppose combinationists take the second approach, of explaining why our parts might                             
fail to recognise each other, when connected in the ways that they are connected. Note that not only do                                     
our parts not recognise each other as subjects, they do not recognise each other as external things at all.                                     
Yet it is not plausible that they do not perceive each other at all, in any sense: they are in constant, vital,                                           
sensitive contact. Hence they must perceive each other as extensions of themselves. More precisely,                           
they interpret the signals they receive from each other as telling them either of their own voluntary                                 
actions, or of events going on ‘in them’. In this regard they are in something like the opposite position                                     
to a schizophrenic suffering from ‘thought insertion’, who perceives their own internally generated                         
thoughts and experiences as produced by outside forces. Where the schizophrenic perceives what is                           










Since some of our parts employ the very mechanisms that we do, whatever it is that lets them                                   
categorise things as internal and external, as ‘self’ and ‘other’, must also be what lets us do that. If                                     
combinationists claim that our parts miscategorise each other as ‘self’, they must think that we could                               
make a similar miscategorisation in the right circumstances. That is, they are committed to: 
Parity Claim (PC): If we were connected to another subject in the way that our parts are                                 
connected to each other, we would not regard that subject as a distinct entity, but instead would                                 
ascribe their decisions, thoughts, and experiences to ourselves.  
The Parity Claim is not uncontroversial or trifling: it strikes at the heart of a certain conception of                                   
self­knowledge, implying that we are not infallible about whether certain experiences and thoughts and                           
feelings are ours. So there is a real burden on combinationists to show that PC might nevertheless be                                   
true and intelligible. To discharge this burden, I will defend a certain schematic account of how we                                 
make judgements of self and other, which I will call the ‘Patterning Principle’: 
Patterning Principle (PP): Our spontaneous impressions of whether an event is external or                         
5
internal, and of whether it is our voluntary action or not, are determined by the patterns of                                 
correspondence and divergence we detect between it and other things.   
Obviously the Patterning Principle is still incomplete insofar as it leaves open what exactly the relevant                               
patterns are, and how they are detected. But even in this schematic form, it allows for the Parity Claim,                                     
since both internal and external events can stand in the same patterns, and so we might self­ascribe                                 
actions or events which in fact occur externally and independently of us, if we detect the right pattern in                                     
them. This allows combinationists to say that because of the pattern of interactions among the parts of                                 







others. Each thus feels itself to be alone and responsible for all the mental activity in the whole human,                                     
which then inherits this unanimous judgement of solitude. 
I think that most of us are inclined to accept some role for patterns of correspondence and                                 
divergence in determining our impressions of internality, externality and causal responsibility, but only                         
a limited one. At some point, we tend to think, we fall back on a direct metaphysical insight into certain                                       
events beings ours, either in the sense of being our actions or of being ‘in’ our own minds. Thus I think                                         
we normally tend to endorse a ‘hybrid’ view, with some role for detecting patterns and some role for                                   
direct insight. It is this direct insight that poses problems for combinationists: shouldn’t each of our                               
parts know automatically that some of the thought­processes that guide this human body are theirs,                             
while others are not? So the strategy I will pursue on behalf of combinationism is to argue that                                   




The most plausible role for patterning considerations is to determine our impressions of the causal                             
relations among external events. What makes it seem to us that one event we perceive is caused by                                   
another? Surely the answer has to be ultimately in terms of some sort of covariation, things either                                 
changing at the same time (or in quick succession) or remaining constant together while other things                               
change. Whether we express this in the language of Bayes’ Theorem or in that of Humean laws of                                   
association, the basic idea seems clear enough: we respond to regularity among the changes we                             
perceive in the world. To put a name to this general idea, I shall speak of observing ‘harmony’ between                                     




‘harmonising’. This notion is meant to be a placeholder for a more detailed account of the statistical                                 
relations that we respond to.   6
But, given some idea of which external events are causing which, how do we identify some of                                 
these events as our own actions? There has been a lot of empirical work on this question, but for the                                       
most part it is accepted that we rely on considerations of patterning: the dispute, for instance, between                                 
the ‘comparator model’ (see Helmholtz 1866, Blakemore et al., 2002, Frith 2012, Carruthers 2012)                           
and the ‘multifactorial model’ (see Synofzik et al. 2008, Moore & Haggard 2008, and David et al.                                 
2008) is a dispute over the particular weighting and mix of factors used, over whether there is a single                                     
privileged comparison or not. What is agreed on is that some brain system has to compute, based on                                   
signals from perception and from the internal processes that produce action, which events are ‘done by                               
me’. This idea is borne out by the possibility of ‘tricking’ subjects into self­ascribing responsibility for                               
externally caused events by manipulating their perceptions (Nielsen 1963, Ramachandran &                     
Rogers­Ramachandran 1996, Lynn et al. 2010, Ebert & Wegner 2010, cf. Wegner 2002), or by direct                               
brain stimulation (Desmurget et al. 2009, cf. Fried et al. 1991).  
So we might say: we identify external events as our own voluntary actions when and only when                                 
we perceive them as harmonising with our internal decisions and volitions – that is, if we see our arm                                     
move just after we’ve consciously decided to move our arm, the harmony between these two events is                                 
what gives us our strong impression that the arm rose becausewe raised it. However, this presupposes                                 
that we already self­ascribe the conscious decision, which just pushes the question back a step. It would                                 
be an obviously vicious regress to say that we regard it as our own decision because it harmonises with                                     












It is regarding internal events that the Patterning Principle is contentious. Don’t we categorise mental                             
events simply by modality: what we learn of through sight and hearing and so on is external, while                                   
internal events are those we learn of by ‘introspection’, or ‘acquaintance’, or some such non­perceptual                             
awareness. But given the Adumbration Proposal of chapter 4, this does not settle the matter: our basic,                                 
non­perceptual awareness of experiences involves both the revealed aspects ­ our own experiences,                         
fully given to us ­ and the concealed aspects ­ the experiences of other subjects ­ of a whole                                     
phenomenal field. Whenever our experiences are unified with those of others, we will learn of both sets                                 
of experiences via ‘introspection’ or ‘acquaintance’, and some further mechanism will be needed to                           
discriminate the two. Could that mechanism involve ‘harmony’? 
Certainly some internal events may fit neatly into the very same model as external events, e.g.                               
imagination: some experiments suggest that faint sensory stimuli may be miscategorised as imaginary                         
when they match what subjects were independently attempting to imagine, i.e. when they harmonise                           
with a prior intention (Perky 1910, cf. Segal 1972). But many of the events we experience as being ‘in                                     
our minds’ are not preceded by any distinct decision to produce them – our decisions, thoughts,                               
impulses, and so on seem to be ‘ours’ on their own, with no need for us to compare them with any other                                           





First, we might self­ascribe events not just when they harmonise with particular other events,                           
but also when they harmonise with our background psychology, reflecting the fact that our mental                             
events are typically “caused by a combination of our background beliefs, desires, and interests”                           
(Campbell 1999, p.617). We might focus in particular on the mass of dispositional intentions, desires,                             
and goals that could be called the ‘the background will’ (as contrasted with ‘the occurrent will’, our                                 
present conscious feelings of desire and intention). The background will is the underlying structure of                             
what we want or intend to do in different situations, given different contingencies, when confronted                             
with different stimuli. It is probably impossible to ever fully articulate this structure – we cannot write                                 
out a list of what we would want or do in every possible situation – but there does seem to be a                                           
significant determinacy in it. Even a libertarian must recognise that there is a complex and subtle set of                                   
persistent facts about us in virtue of which we are inclined to will some things, and in virtue of which                                       
we perceive things as unwanted or desirable, frustrating or welcome. 
Note that we are not considering the obviously regressive idea that a subject judges some                             
thoughts to be theirs because of its fitting well with the background psychology that they have already                                 
judged to be theirs: the background psychology need not be self­ascribed, indeed need not be the object                                 
of any kind of thought or awareness, in order to govern and guide what self­ascriptions are in fact                                   
made. This evaluation of harmony could be, and probably is, largely unconscious and inaccessible to                             
rational reflection: often the only way we can find out what it is we really want is to expose ourselves                                       
to actual or hypothetical cases and see how we react. 
Nevertheless there is a significant problem with this proposal: we can regard a thought as ‘ours’                               
despite its content being wildly out of character, just as we can think that someone else is thinking                                   




for us seems neither necessary nor sufficient for being perceived as ‘ours’. Thus the defender of PP                                 
should supplement the appeal to background psychology with other factors.  
A second option is to appeal a sort of stability: the thoughts and feelings which we ascribe to                                   
ourselves flow into one another, affecting and being affected by other things we self­ascribe, and by our                                 
own will (background or occurrent), while external things remain fixed as our attention, plans, or ideas                               
flow over them. For example, contrast a perception of a red square with an idea of a red square that                                       
occurs to me unbidden: the latter will shift, recede, disappear or transform according as I attend to it,                                   
ignore it, suppress it, connect it with something else, consider something related or something                           
unrelated, and so on. And those changes which thus affect it are themselves similarly mutable: while                               
we do not choose each step, we can intensify or inhibit things voluntarily if we try to. By contrast, the                                       
perceived square either stays constant during all those fluctuations, or else changes in a manner                             
uncorrelated with them. We might say that while neither is positively voluntary, the perception resists                             
my will, whereas the idea does not. This is just a version of the long­standing idea that we identify                                     
things as external by their resistance to, or at least independence of, our will (e.g. Descartes 1985, V2                                   
pp.26­27, 55, Locke 1836, p.484, Berkeley 2008, p.41).  
Again we might worry about vicious regresses: doesn’t perceiving things as responsive to ‘our                           
will’ require having first self­ascribed our will? But as with the first suggestion, this misunderstands the                               
proposal. PP says that our spontaneous impressions of some X being ‘in us’ or ‘outside us’ are based on                                     
detecting harmony between it and some Ys, but does not require that the Ys be themselves the objects                                   
of any judgement or impression. We might not even be conscious of the Ys, yet still have our conscious                                     
awareness of X affected by its harmony with them.  
But aren’t there inner mental states which are stubbornly resistant to our efforts to ignore or                               




the pain of a toothache or illness, which are pretty entirely indifferent to our will, are best viewed as a                                       
special sort of external perception, where the perceived object is inside the body and invisible to other                                 
senses (though sometimes visible to medical examination). This stable pain is a perception of                           
‘something bad happening in my tooth’, just as a sudden flash of pain might be a perception of the                                     
tooth being struck or broken.  
On the other hand, obsessive or haunting ideas and feelings which refuse to go away are not, it                                   
seems to me, genuinely indifferent to our will. Rather, they recur and return constantly, in spite of                                 
being partially inhibited, or at least modulated, by our efforts to dispel them. Consequently they are                               
hard to pin down or analyse exactly – their aspect is affected by our efforts to attend to and analyse                                       
them, just like ordinary thoughts and unlike the pain of a toothache. So it seems to me that neither case                                       
of persistent involuntary pain – physical or emotional – conflicts with the application of the patterning                               
principle given here.  
A final idea is that the ‘efferent copy’ mechanism employed in the monitoring of motor actions                               
could also be present with thoughts, feelings, and other mental events. Feinberg (1978) and Campbell                             
(1999) in particular suggest this, advocating regarding thought ‘as a motor process’. The idea is that the                                 
brain processes that produce actions or thoughts do not just produce those actions or thoughts, but also                                 
produce ‘efferent copies’, signals reporting that such­and­such an action or thought has been produced.                           
These copies are processed by a ‘comparator’, some brain system that also takes in feedback from the                                 
actual execution of these actions and thoughts, and from other internal and external events, and                             
monitors the correspondence or lack of correspondence among them. Since the comparator could                         
operate below the level of conscious awareness (cf. Campbell 1999, pp.617­618), it would easily                           
account for cases where something seems internal to us despite not cohering with other consciously                             




of self­consciousness found in schizophrenic patients. But it might seem extravagant for every single                           
conscious event to be part of such a monitoring process, with every whim, twinge, flicker of doubt or                                   
snatch of memory generating a copy to be submitted to a comparator mechanism. If so, we might posit                                   
a comparator­type monitoring mechanism for some but not all mental events, relying on the first two                               
proposals to explain our impressions of the others.  
I conclude that the sort of ‘harmony’ which leads us to regard events as occurring ‘in our own                                   
mind’ can be something less than conformity to a definite and coherent prior volition: it can be any                                   




If we adopt PP, along with the above suggestions about how to understand ‘harmony’, we must                               
conclude that whether some thought or action seems to be ‘mine’ depends not on whether it really is,                                   
but on its correlation with various other events and dispositional properties. If two subjects interact                             
harmoniously, so that what each does harmonises with the psychology of the other, then they will each                                 
self­ascribe everything the other does that they are aware of; if they are set up so as to interact in this                                         
way all the time (call this ‘harmonious connection’) then they will go their whole lives without ever                                 
realising they are not alone.  
I think it is plausible that the parts of a human being are harmoniously connected. The electrical                                 
behaviour of a brain part, and the physiological structure that underlies that behaviour, is very sensitive                               
to that of surrounding parts, and has developed in constant interaction with them for years. Moreover,                               




information, the timescale on which they act, and so on. It is hard to imagine better conditions for                                   
harmonious connection.  
In chapter 4 I argued that in a unified whole, each part’s experience (or their objects)                               
adumbrates the other parts’ experiences (or their objects). This adumbration can be more or less                             
informative as to the concealed aspect, and its concealment can be more or less salient. Moreover, I                                 
suggested that in human minds, each part would adumbrate the others very informatively, while the fact                               
of concealment would have very low salience. PP helps to explain why this is: concealment is not                                 
salient to the parts because there is harmonious interaction between the revealed and concealed aspects,                             
i.e. between their own experiences and the others’.   
This means that in one sense the parts are all aware of roughly the same thing – the same                                     
unified experiential whole. But they differ in which parts are revealed and which concealed, as well as                                 
in how informatively the concealed parts are adumbrated by the revealed parts. We might compare the                               
composite mind to a social institution whose members identify with it very strongly. Labour is divided                               
among different members (e.g. one undertakes research, one decides on policies in light of research,                             
and a third implements policies), and the whole can be described as performing all the members’ tasks                                 
as long as there is the right sort of communication between them (e.g. the researcher informs the                                 
decider what policies the data support, the decider picks one and informs the executor, and the executor                                 
implements the policies which the decider picks). Moreover, we may imagine the members constantly                           
updating each other with summaries of their progress. Each is thereby aware of the overall activities of                                 
the group as a whole, and so in a sense they are all aware of the same things. But each particular                                         





Of course, in a human institution the parts recognise their distinctness: the decider distinguishes                           
sending instructions to do X from actually doing X, the executor distinguishes doing X because of                               
receiving instructions from doing X for their own reasons, etc. But we can imagine them growing more                                 
and more slavish and automatic in their relations to the organisation, losing sight of its actual structure                                 
or the possibility of working outside that structure, so that when the decider sees good reasons for                                 
policy X, they ‘simply implement X’, as oblivious to the mechanism they rely upon (instructions sent                               
to the executor) as we are oblivious to the mechanism by which we ‘just raise our arm’. And when the                                       
executor receives instructions to do X, they feel simply that ‘X is a good idea’, as oblivious to the                                     
origins of that perception (instructions sent from the decider) as we are oblivious to the origins of our                                   
hunches, impulses, and perceptual judgements. The thinking parts of one human being are likely to be                               
far more slavish and automatic in their relations to each other than human members of an institution                                 
ever are, and hence unable to draw the distinctions which our imagined humans did not bother to draw.  
Note that I have left open exactly what mechanisms implement and determine ‘harmony’ in the                             
actual human brain, or in any other possible brain. That is an empirical question: PP just says that                                   
something about their interactions is responsible. However we filled out the details, PP is opposed to                               
the ‘hybrid’ account on which we have direct insight into the fact that certain events occur in our own                                     
minds, or are our own decisions, allowing us to self­ascribe certain events simply because they really                               
are ours. I do not think that the hybrid account can be conclusively refuted; however, all                               
combinationists need is that PP be a live option. For then they have a response available to the Problem                                     
of Oblivious Parts, and that problem is neutralised. They might, however, claim in addition that PP is                                 
independently preferable to the hybrid account, either because it is simpler (in appealing to a single                               
broad type of factor), or because it is more naturalistic, in eschewing appeal to direct metaphysical                               
insight into causal facts. They might also claim that the patterning principle is better able to explain the                                   








Our usual understanding of first­person thoughts and utterances combines two plausible ideas, which                         
seem to conflict when we accept combinationism. In this section I consider possible replacement                           




Consider an example: a human being thinks to themselves truly “I weigh 60kg”, and since this thought                                 
is going on inside their head, it seems prima facie that if the head is a conscious subject it also thinks                                         
this thought. But what does it thereby think? If it thinks that it weighs 60kg, it will be wrong, since it                                         
weighs far less than that – and this error will not be due to faulty evidence, bad reasoning, or any kind                                         
of rational failing on the head’s part. By contrast, if it thinks that the person weighs 60kg, it will be                                       
correct, but will be in the strange position of referring to someone else by thinking ‘I’ – and doing so                                       
apparently without any conscious attempt at insincerity, play­acting, quotation, etc. A similar dilemma                         









Security of Self­Reference: A subject consciously thinking a first­person thought always                     
refers to themselves by the first­person term in that thought – there is no risk of it referring to                                     
something else, or failing to refer.  
Epistemic Optimism: A subject who commits no ‘epistemic wrongdoing’ (e.g. never believes                       
something for which they have insufficient evidence, etc.) will not inevitably and                       
systematically believe falsehood.  
I will call these theses ‘Security’ and ‘Optimism’ for short. Security is the more straightforward, since                               
it seems basically definitional of first­person terms that they refer to their users. Optimism is less                               
straightforward because it does not seem like a conceptual truth. Indeed, it is implausible if construed                               
as a necessity claim ­ it certainly seems that subjects could be trapped in a deceptive environment                                 
where they are systematically wrong, as we imagine whenever we entertain some sceptical hypothesis.                           
But we usually assume that we are not in such an environment ­ that the actual world is not a sceptical                                         
scenario. It is an interesting and vexed question what justifies this assumption, but we do at least seem                                   
to make it, and consequently there is something unsettling about a theory which implies that a great                                 
many subjects are in precisely such a situation.   8
It is hard to combine Security and Optimism when a self­ascription of an unshared feature is                               
shared (such as in the judgement ‘I weigh 60kg’). For the whole they are compatible, since the ‘I’ in the                                       
thought refers to the whole, its subject, and the thought is true. But what does the head (or the frontal                                       
lobe, or the top half, or any component subject that shares the thought) refer to by the ‘I’ in this                                       
thought? If it refers to the whole human being, then Security is violated, for someone has referred to                                   
someone else with ‘I’. On the other hand, if it refers to itself then it thinks something false (that a head                                         
weighs 60kg), and not due to any violation of epistemic rationality, any failure to properly respond to                                 






human being does. This blameless error will not even be a random fluke event, but a systematic sort of                                     
error which the head, considered as a subject, can never escape or even detect. Thus Optimism is                                 
violated.  
Experience­first combinationists will need different examples (since they do not regard my                       
head as a component subject) but the same problem will arise. For instance, suppose that one                               
well­integrated subset of my experiences contains all and only my left­hemisphere­based experiences,                       
and constitutes a component subject: suppose also that it shares with me some such thought as ‘I am in                                     
full and direct motor control of two arms’, or ‘I receive sensory stimulation from all the nerves in this                                     
body’, or even just ‘I am a maximal conscious being, not contained within any other’. Here again,                                 
Security and Optimism seem to be at odds.  
In the remainder of this section I review some available accounts of the reference of                             
first­personal terms: some accept Security and give up Optimism, other accept Optimism and give up                             




It may be impossible for an introspective self­ascription ­ a self­ascription of a conscious state, based                               
on knowledge ‘from the inside’ ­ to be shared by subjects who do not share the property ascribed.. This                                     
will be the case if we adopt what I will call the ‘containment’ model of introspection, on which an                                     
introspective thought about an experience (or that thought’s neural realisation) contains the experience                         
itself as a proper part (or contains its neural realisation as a proper part). Shoemaker (1994) defends                                 




on which an experience, and an introspective thought about it, are metaphysically separate events                           
whose connection is entirely contingent. On the containment model introspection does not involve the                           
arising of second­order mental states that are merely caused by first­order ones, but rather builds                             
additional cognitive structure around first­order mental states in such a way that the complex formed of                               
first­order state and additional cognitive structure is a second­order mental state.   9
If we accept the containment model, then no introspective self­ascription could be shared with                           
component subjects that do not also share the experience self­ascribed. For any component subject that                             
had the introspective thought would contain as a proper part a component subject that had the                               
self­ascribed experience, and would inherit this experience. The only way it might not inherit the                             
experience would be if that proper part was isolated from all its other parts, in which case it is hard to                                         
see how it could possibly give rise to the introspective thought in the first place.  
For instance, suppose that when I visually experience redness, processes occurring in my                         
occipital lobe­and­brainstem are intrinsically sufficient for the occurrence of this experience, whereas                       
introspection requires the activity of my frontal lobe. On the ‘distinct existences’ model, the                           
introspective self­ascription “I am visually experiencing redness” might be something entirely going on                         
in the frontal lobe, which does not visually experience redness though it receives signals of such                               
experiences from the occipital lobe (and, in accordance with the Patterning Principle, self­ascribes the                           















we considered the frontal lobe as a subject thinking “I am visually experiencing redness”. But on the                                 
containment model, the introspective self­ascription contains the ascribed experience as a part, and so                           
cannot be ascribed to any subject containing the frontal lobe but excluding the occipital lobe. Rather,                               
the self­ascription would be an event spread over both lobes, ascribable only to a subject containing                               
both (note that defenders of the two models might agree entirely about the causal story linking                               
occipital­lobe events to frontal­lobe events: they simply point to larger or smaller sets of those events                               
when asked ‘what is the introspective thought’?).  
However, even if combinationists adopt the containment model, a residue of the Problem of                           
Self­Reference might remain for introspective self­ascriptions. For consider the frontal lobe itself, or                         
more realistically a component subject that contains it but excludes the occipital lobe (e.g. my brain’s                               
occipital­lobe complement’). What is it like to be this subject, when an introspective self­ascription is                             
being thought? Having denied that it experiences redness, and thus denied that it is thinking “I am                                 
experiencing redness”, it becomes unclear just what it is thinking. Perhaps it is not thinking anything ­                                 
perhaps it is too gerrymandered a being to have any conscious states at all. But if it is consciously                                     
thinking, perhaps it is thinking an ‘incomplete’ thought, whose content we might render as “I am                               
experiencing that”, where ‘that’ is accompanied by a phenomenology adumbrating the occipital lobe’s                         
experiences, and thus refers to phenomenal redness. And in relation to this incomplete thought, there                             
would be a conflict between Security and Optimism, for if the ‘that’ refers to phenomenal redness, and                                 
the ‘I’ refers to the frontal lobe, then the thought will be false even as the whole brain’s complete                                     
thought is true.  
Admittedly this notion of an incomplete introspective thought is odd, for according to PP the                             
frontal lobe cannot distinguish self­ascribing redness­experience in the normal way, which involves the                         




frontal lobe does have some phenomenological grip on redness, by its informative adumbration of the                             
occipital lobe’s experience ­ but what is this like? Perhaps the best thing for combinationists to say is                                   




One response to the conflict between Security and Optimism would be to simply give up Optimism                               
while retaining Security. The natural way to achieve this would be a doctrine of relativised reference,                               
with a single though having different contents, and a single term different referents, relative to each                               
subject thinking it. We cannot evaluate the thought’s referential properties absolutely, but only relative                           
to one of the subjects that thinks it.  
Heller 2000 has already employed the           
idea of multiple contents for first­person terms,             
though in a diachronic case involving personal             
fission. He defends the coherence of multiple             
contents for one token thought or word using               
the example diagram to the right, showing “a               
crossword puzzle with words in each square instead of letters”(p.375). He writes that “the                           








The cost of this strategy is that the thought may be false relative to many subjects. If the                                   
thought “I weigh 60kg” means that the head weighs 60kg, as thought by the head, and that the brain                                     
weighs 60kg, as thought by the brain, and so on, then it will be false on most relativisations. Similarly,                                     
if the thought “I am experiencing redness”, as thought by the frontal lobe, means that the frontal lobe is                                     
experiencing redness, then it will be false for the frontal lobe. And this amounts to abandoning                               




Alternatively, we might maintain Optimism while abandoning Security, by adopting a doctrine of                         
privileged reference. Whenever any part of me thinks a first­personal thought, it refers not to itself but                                 
to the whole human being – and thus the thought is true, barring some epistemic failure or misfortune.                                   
The semantics of ‘I’ are not what we had thought (a straightforward ‘the subject thinking/speaking this                               
thought/utterance’), but rather include a criterion by which to privilege one particular subject over all                             
others. This criterion might be mereological (e.g. “the maximal subject thinking this thought”), or                           
organisational (e.g. “the most integrated subject thinking this thought”), or ontological (e.g. “the most                           
fundamental subject thinking this thought”).  
Something like this view has already been defended. For instance, Noonan 2010 affirms that                           
human animals (essentially biological beings) can think first­personal thoughts, but that these thoughts                         








animal. And Heller 2000 says that “When a part of a person has an ‘I’ thought, it is a thought about the                                           
person, not about the part. (That is why not one of my ‘I’ thoughts is a thought about my brain or a part                                             
of my brain.)”(p.377)  
The cost of this view is that it makes some subjects are apparently unable to refer to themselves                                   
in a first­personal mode, which we might find implausible. It seems that the point of first­personal                               
thoughts is that they let subjects think about themselves, without having to pick themselves out by                               
some fallible description.   
12
One option is to say that which subject is privileged depends on what concept is employed in                                 
the first­personal thought, so that we can in a sense choose what to refer to with ‘I’ by choosing what                                       
concept to employ in our ‘concept of self’. Thus Parfit at one point declares that, if persons have                                   
biological persistence conditions, then the first­person pronouns used in his 1984, from page 291                           
onwards, all refer to ‘series­persons’ rather than persons (a ‘series­person’ is a series of psychologically                             
connected persons). Heller expresses the principle thus: “A cat’s ‘I’ thought would only refer to a cat if                                   
the cat’s concept of self involved the concept of a cat, just as [a normal human person’s] concept of self                                       
involves her concept of a person.”(p.378) Similarly when a human head thinks first­personal thoughts,                           
it might do so using a ‘concept of self’ which involves the concept of a whole human, not a head. But                                         
13
the head is not precluded from ever thinking of itself first­personally, since if it (and, simultaneously,                               














would then refer to itself. This might or might not be a sufficient mitigation of the loss of Security:                                     14
moreover, it has the strange result that if someone says “I am a human head”, and really has                                   




Some readers might find relativised or privileged reference satisfying, despite their substantially                       
abandoning Security or Optimism. Others might find both unacceptable, or might at least hope for an                               
approach which can preserve both theses. I will outline two candidates for such an approach. The first                                 
turns on the idea of indeterminate reference. This is the idea (often employed in discussions of                               
vagueness, e.g. Lewis 1986 p.212, Lewis 1993, pp.28ff) that a referring term may have a set of                                 
referents, with no fact as to which one of those is the referent. For the thought involving that term to be                                         
true, it must be ‘super­true’, true for all candidate referents, while for it to be false it must be                                     
‘super­false’, false for all candidate referents. If it is neither super­true nor super­false, it is                             
indeterminate in truth­value.  
Now, one use of indeterminate reference would be as an adjunct to the privileged reference                             
approach, if we thought that the criterion for privilege did not pick out a single unique referent (e.g. we                                     
might think, with Unger, that there cannot be a single unique maximal human being). But we could also                                   









indeterminately referred to by its first­personal terms. Thus it could be true (‘super­true’) that I am                               
inside a building, false (‘super­false’) that I am an elephant, but indeterminate whether I am a head.  
This lets us say that while not all subjects can hope for true first­personal thoughts if they do                                   
everything right, they can at least hope for their thoughts to not be determinately false, since there will                                   
always be at least one subject for which they are true, barring epistemic failing or misfortune. And it                                   
lets us say that while subjects cannot always securely refer to themselves by means of ‘I’, they can at                                     
least indeterminately refer to themselves, along with many other subjects. The cost of this strategy is                               
that neither thesis is retained in its determinate form. Self­reference is not determinately secure, and                             
some subjects are still denied any hope of systematically being right about themselves. Someone really                             
attracted to Epistemic Optimism might find this an underwhelming sort of vindication: thinking                         




We can combine the best elements of privileged reference and relativised reference through what I call                               
a ‘dual reference’ approach, on which a subject thinking first­personal thoughts refers both to itself, in a                                 
relativised way, and also to the privileged subject, the thing which our first­person ascriptions are                             
actually true of (absent epistemic failing or misfortune), and moreover affirms a certain relationship                           
(possibly identity) between the two subjects it refers to.   
For an example of how this might work, suppose there are three senses of ‘I’, a broad one (‘IB’)                                     
and two narrow ones, one ‘relativised’ and one ‘privileged’ (‘IR’ and ‘IP’). IR refers to whichever                               




thought best fits a certain criterion. But ordinary uses of ‘I’ are actually uses of IB, which is more                                     
complex:   
“φ(IB)” means “φ(IP) and ((IR = IP) or (IR have a certain relation to IP))” 
So for instance, when the thought “I weigh 60kg” occurs in someone’s brain, each of the overlapping                                 
subjects thinking that thought is thinking that they either are, or are somehow related to, the whole                                 
human, which weighs 60kg. As long as each of those subjects really is related to the whole in the                                     
manner claimed, they will all think something true, even while referring to themselves.  
This is still a very schematic proposal: it leaves open what exactly makes one subject the                               
‘privileged’ one – merely being the biggest, or being the most well­organised, or the most ontologically                               
fundamental, or some combination of factors. It also leaves open what exactly the relation asserted                             
between the two subjects is – merely proper parthood, or something stronger. 
But even at this level of abstraction, this approach faces significant difficulties. For a start, it                               
seems an awfully complex concept to be wrapped up unrecognised in the simple word ‘I’. Perhaps this                                 
will be tolerable if we think that self­reference is a very complex cognitive achievement, accomplished                             
only by a handful of higher animals, but it will seem strange if we think that ‘all consciousness is                                     
self­consciousness’.  15
Second, there seems to be a big difference between the formula’s two disjuncts – being                             
identical to something, and being merely related to it. Generally when we think disjunctions whose                             









rest content with the disjunction. For example, if I ask “is my mother dead?” the answer “she is either                                     
dead, or sick” will not satisfy me, even if it is all I can presently know.Why should it be that when we                                             
ascribe some feature to ‘ourselves’, we leave open whether we actually have that feature, or are merely                                 
related to something that does, and feel no dissatisfaction with that uncertainty?   
16
Finally, the dual­reference proposal may just push the problem back a step. If we still have IR                                 
available to us, it seems we should be able to think thoughts using it, like “IR weigh 60kg”. If we can’t                                         
think this, why not? If we can, why is this not the thought we do think in everyday situations when we                                         
think that we weigh 60kg? Isn’t that what we take ourselves to be thinking? Indeed, isn’t that what we                                     
set out to think?  
I think these difficulties are resolved if we formulate the dual reference approach using the                             
concept of ‘harmonious connection’ developed in the last section. Then φ(IB) would mean: 
“φ(IP) and ((IR = IP) or (IR am a proper part of IP harmoniously connected to the other parts)” 
Note that this still leaves open what makes one subject the privileged one. All that is added is a                                     
specification of what the crucial relationship is: harmonious connection, i.e. being connected such that                           
what each does is so co­ordinated with the psychology of the other that each perceives the other’s                                 
doings as their own.    
17
I believe that this version of the dual­reference approach addresses the above objections, as                           
long as the Patterning Principle is true. For then being something, and being a harmoniously connected                               











same factors to assert either – harmonious interactions over a period of time. Since these factors                               
generate our sense of self, it is not surprising that they be involved in the meaning of our self­referential                                     
terms. And given how we actually make judgements of identity and parthood, we will naturally neglect                               
the difference between the two disjuncts of the formula for IB.  
What about the difficulty over the availability of the narrow senses of ‘I’? Even if subjects do                                 
typically think in terms of IB, governed by the above formula, can they nevertheless formulate thoughts                               
involving IR, or IP? I think the answer is that they can, but only when they undertake a special, and                                       
usually unmotivated, effort to refine and specify their meaning. We do not generally have any reason to                                 
think in such terms, nor any inclination to do so: when we try to think directly and immediately of                                     
‘ourselves’, we do not ascend to the heights of precise formulations, but descend into the intuitive                               
vividness of our natural, spontaneous self­apprehension, which is a matter of perceiving harmony. 
Nevertheless these thoughts are possible, for those who endeavour to formulate them. Thoughts                         
involving IP will be equivalent to thinking about the largest, most integrated, or most fundamental being                               
involved in that thought – so they will not refer to any of the other subjects, which are mere parts of                                         
that thing. But this does not threaten Security, because this is not the primary sense of ‘I’, and that                                     
primary sense allows all the other subjects to refer to themselves.  
Conversely, thoughts involving IR will have different contents for each subject, and will be true                             
for each only if they ascribe a feature which is shared by all those subjects. Those subjects for whom                                     
the thought is false will go wrong through misidentifying themselves with the whole for which it is                                 
true. But this does not threaten Optimism, because neither they nor the whole are justified in endorsing                                 
these thoughts involving IR, in the first place. As I will explain in section 3, these subjects and the                                     
wholes they compose should all be agnostic about their own identity. They can be sure of which                                 




part of it. Here it is important that these errors are not ones that occur in the ordinary course of life, for                                           
in the ordinary course of life we talk and think in terms of IB, not IR. These are errors that result from a                                             
special decision to use pronouns in an unusual way, combined with a decision to keep using the sorts of                                     
evidence that would normally be relevant. Thus they are traceable to an epistemic mistake, and do not                                 
threaten Epistemic Optimism.  
I conclude that if PP holds, then the dual­reference approach to the meaning of first­person                             
pronouns is defensible, and that approach resolves the Problem of Self­Reference by preserving both                           
Security and Optimism. Even if that approach is rejected, combinationists have options: they can                           
preserve Security with the relativised reference approach, they can preserve Optimism with the                         
privileged reference approach, or they can preserve a weakened form of both with the indeterminate                             
reference approach. Of these, I think the privileged reference approach is probably the best, though in                               
sacrificing Security it is inferior to the combination of the dual­reference approach and PP. Since I                               
argued in the last section that the PP may well be true, I conclude that combinationists are well­placed                                   




When many harmoniously­connected subjects overlap, how is any of them to determine which it is?                             
Equivalently, how do I know if I am a human being, a human brain, or something else? I will refer to                                         
this epistemic task as ‘self­identifying’: to self­identify relative to some subjects is to know which of                               







we cannot self­identify relative to many of the overlapping, harmoniously connected subjects present in                           
a human being, though we can be sure that we are among the most cognitively sophisticated. In the                                   




I will consider two classes of subjects relative to which we might wonder about self­identification,                             
which I call ‘experientially equivalent’ and ‘experientially different’ subjects. It is fairly easy to show                             
that experientially equivalent subjects cannot self­identify relative to each other; in the next subsection                           
I argue that if PP is true, many experientially different subjects will also be incapable of                               
self­identification relative to each other.  
By ‘experientially equivalent subjects’ I mean subjects who differ only in parts which make no                             
contribution to experience, such as a whole human being and their head. These are clearly different                               
things, but they will also, on plausible assumptions about the basis of experience, have exactly identical                               
mental lives. (Of course, if subjects are constituted by their experiences, there may be no such thing as                                   
experientially­equivalent subjects: perhaps any two subjects that share the same experiences are                       
identical. So the experience­first combinationist faces the problems of the next subsection, not those of                             
this one.)  
To see why experientially equivalent subjects would be unable to self­identify, observe that the                           
only way to self­identify seems to be making connections between first­personal and third­personal                         
knowledge. We learn empirically about the existence of various subjects, and learn that various things                             




judgements true of ourselves. By comparing the set of judgements we know to be true of ourselves with                                   
those we know to be true of various subjects, we can deduce which of those subjects we are. So for                                       
instance, if I hear someone say “the guy who gave the talk this morning spoke too fast”, and I have                                       
memories of giving a talk this morning (and evidence that only one person did so), I can infer that the                                       
guy being referred to, who spoke too fast, is myself.  
Given this, it will be impossible for two subjects to self­identify relative to each other if exactly                                 
the same things are true of both, such as two qualitatively identical people located in qualitatively                               
identical surroundings on either side of a symmetrical universe. Self­identification will also be                         
impossible if exactly the same experiential judgements are true of both, even they differ in other ways,                                 
such as a real human walking around, and a qualitatively identical human brain held in a fluid­filled                                 
container being fed electrical stimulation precisely mirroring those received by the former human’s                         
brain.  
So the mere possibility that subjects be unable to self­identify cannot be considered a reductio.                             
What matters more is the actuality of it: combinationism likely implies that real people (and their parts)                                 
are all in fact unable to discriminate themselves from a large number of other subjects. All experiential                                 
facts will be equivalent among experientially equivalent subjects, so how could they self­identify                         
relative to each other? Each will affirm of itself the same set of experiential judgements, and if it has                                     
accurate information about the set of subjects, will know that the same set of judgements is true for                                   
each. Hence there is nothing by which to discriminate among them.  
It might be thought that a whole human being could discriminate itself from its head by the fact                                   
that it, for instance, had direct first­personal knowledge of the position of its legs. But, given the                                 
plausible idea that certain brain events are necessary and sufficient for leg­experiences (as suggested by                             




on the other), the head will have experientially­identical knowledge of the position of the legs                             
harmoniously connected to it.  
This conclusion can be reinforced by observing that if one of these subjects were able to                               
self­identify, its self­identifying judgement (e.g. “I am a head”) will also be made, falsely, by the other                                 
(e.g. the human will think it is a head). So any success in self­identification for one would mean a                                     




What about subjects who differ significantly in their experiencing parts – such as the brain and its                                 
occipital­lobe­complement? Unlike experientially equivalent subjects, they are not prevented from                   
self­identifying relative to each other by the lack of an experiential difference. However,                         
self­identification requires not just a difference in experiences, but a consequent difference in                         
judgements about those experiences, and it seems that in many cases an introspective judgement made                             
by one subject will have to be shared by others (e.g. wholes containing it as a highly­integrated part)                                   
even if it is true of one but not the other.  
Consider section 2’s example where my occipital lobe experiences redness, and my frontal lobe                           
subserves introspective judgements. Whenever the whole brain judges that it is experiencing redness,                         
the occipital lobe complement will make the same judgement, even if it is not. If introspective thoughts                                 
contain their objects as proper parts, perhaps the occipital lobe complement will not have the                             
introspective thought in full, but it will have an incomplete thought in which it adumbrates redness as                                 




employed, this judgement made by the frontal lobe is true, it will not allow the occipital lobe                                 
complement and the whole brain to self­identify, since each makes introspective judgements that are, if                             
not identical, indiscernible from their own subject’s perspective. To get different judgements requires                         
not just different experiences, but also independent mechanisms for forming judgements based on those                           
experiences.  
The Patterning Principle explains why this difficulty arises. Harmoniously connected subjects                     
make introspective judgements not based strictly on their actual experiences, but on all those                           
experiences which they learn of via harmonious interactions, including those of other subjects. So even                             
when experiences differ, the judgements may be based on the same set of experiences. This problem                               
could be seen as the descendant of chapter 4’s ‘boundary problem’, since it involves the failure of                                 
‘positive epistemic boundedness’ ­ knowing which experiences are and are not one’s own. But isn’t                             
boundedness phenomenologically evident? In a sense: our experience gives us a clear sense of some                             
boundaries, namely those of the set of experiences belonging to whatever harmoniously­connected                       
whole we are part of. And for that whole, this phenomenological impression of boundaries will be                               
accurate ­ it will encompass just those experiences the whole has. But even for the whole this may not                                     
qualify as positive epistemic boundedness, for if the whole cannot know that it is the whole, it cannot                                   
know that these experiences are all its own.  
Recall the social analogy discussed in subsection 1.4: our parts are like especially slavish and                             
deferential employees of an institution, who do not bother to distinguish what they do from what the                                 
group does. Consequently if, so to speak, one member of the group sends around a query asking “is                                   
anyone doing job X?”, and some other member replies saying “yes, I am”, each member will                               
self­ascribe both the question and the answer: each member will feel as though they introspected upon                               




in X, they cannot recognise this fact without ‘asking the question’, and as soon as they do so, that other                                       
subject will ‘pipe up’, interfering with the first subject’s attempts to ascertain which experiences they                             
are and are not having.  
Something that the social analogy does not capture is the variety of sizes among these parts –                                 
the brain’s parts are also made of smaller parts, and so on. The smaller a component subject is, the less                                       
of the mind’s processing is fully revealed to it (known ‘directly’) and the less informatively the                               
processing of other parts is adumbrated. At one extreme, to the whole everything is revealed (setting                               
aside adumbration of external things), while at the other extreme, a single neurone may experience only                               
a very small element of the phenomenal field as revealed, with the rest of it being adumbrated in very                                     
uninformative terms, merely as the background which its own experiences open out onto.  
For these reasons, I believe that even experientially quite different subjects will be unable to                             
self­identify relative to each other. How far does this go? Fortunately, there is a limit: the whole brain                                   
will not be precluded from discriminating itself from a single neurone. Even if two experientially                             
different subjects cannot form different negative judgements (one thinking ‘I am experiencing x’, the                           
other thinking ‘I am not experiencing x’), they may still form larger or smaller sets of positive                                 
judgements.  
Self­ascribing an experience plausibly requires understanding what experience it is, as well as                         
understanding what it is for a subject to have an experience; one cannot affirm what one does not                                   
understand. So whatever it adumbrates, no subject incapable of understanding that subjects have                         
experiences will self­ascribe any experience. It follows that each component subject will only                         
self­ascribe experiences insofar as it is conceptually capable of doing so. This means that if it seems to                                   
me introspectively that I am experiencing redness, I cannot be sure that this feeling is strictly and                                 




experience to self­identify), but I can be sure that I am a subject with enough cognitive sophistication to                                   
understand what redness­experiences are and self­ascribe them. Thus I can at least know that I am not a                                   
neurone, given the plausible premise that neurones are not capable of that. But if many overlapping                               




It seems, then, that accepting experiential combination means accepting that we cannot self­identify                         
relative to a fairly large class of subjects: we cannot know exactly who we are. This might be a reductio                                       
ad absurdum of experiential combination, or merely a surprising but bearable result. Which it is will                               
turn out to depend on what view we take on certain independent questions, which I discuss in these                                   
final two subsections.  
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There would be something unsettling in the impossibility of self­identification if it meant that                           
we were each necessarily ignorant of an important fact, namely ‘who we are’. However, it is hard to                                   
say exactly what sort of fact this is for us to be ignorant of. What is it for one particular subject, out of                                             
all those which exist, to beme?Wemight think that it is a fairly trivial fact. When I declare “I am Luke                                             
Roelofs”, the truth conditions for that utterance are that it was made by Luke Roelofs ; when I ask “who                                       
am I?”, the question thus appears to be equivalent to asking “who is presently speaking?” The answer                                 
to this question can be supplied by the objective statement that “Luke Roelofs is presently speaking”,                               
which we can discern empirically without any special need for self­identification. Experiential                       






presently speaking?” would refer to a multitude of subjects (and possibly to subtly different senses of                               
the word ‘speaking’), but could still be completely objective and non­indexical, with no special need                             
for self­identification.  
Various other facts can be conveyed by self­identifying judgements. If you already know that                           
Luke Roelofs is from London, and I tell you, while we are sitting in Toronto, that ‘I am Luke Roelofs’,                                       
that will enable you to know the objective fact that someone from London is presently in Toronto. But                                   
this kind of objective information is only contingently conveyed by self­locating judgements: being                         
incapable of self­location will not stop us from learning all the objective facts about howmany subjects                                 
there are, how related, with what properties and what histories.  
Some people may feel, though, that the fact that I am a certain subject is a fact beyond just                                     
these ordinary objective facts. To bring this out, imagine a complete objective description of the world                               
– an exhaustive litany of everything that exists and everything that happens, physical and mental, at                               
each point in space and time. This description includes no indexical terms like ‘I’ or ‘now’, or ‘this’,                                   
and privileges no particular subject over any other. It is, so to speak, ‘centreless’. This description does                                 
not say who you are. It says, of course, that various thoughts and utterances in the world contain                                   
indexical terms, and it specifies which worldly subject these worldly thoughts refer to. But that will not                                 
allow you to know which subject you are, without supplying some already­indexical knowledge (cf.                           
Perry 1979, Lewis 1979, Nagel 1986, Seager 1990, Hellie 2013, forthcoming­b, p.14­15). Yet surely                           
there is a fact of the matter as to which subject you are! It is a fact you have had to live with all your                                                 








And it seems a very important fact, in many ways (cf. Hellie 2013 pp.309­310). So what does this                                   
objective description leave out?  
The importance of what is left out becomes obvious when we ask what a subject who knew                                 
only these objective facts could actually do with them. Suppose that among the objective facts is ‘Luke                                 
Roelofs’ trousers are on fire’. If I am Luke Roelofs, this fact gives me a good reason to remove my                                       
trousers; if I am not it gives me no such reason. If I do not know whether I am Luke Roelofs, then this                                             
objective knowledge, however complete, is practically useless to me, because I must act based on                             
where I am.  
Recognising the practical importance of self­identification still lets us ask what it is that has                             
this importance. Perry considers the idea that there are propositions of ‘limited accessibility’:                         
propositions that only a certain person can express. When I say ‘I am Luke Roelofs’, what I express                                   
with that sentence is not the same as what other people express with ‘I am Luke Roelofs’ (which would                                     
be false, not true), or what other people express with ‘Luke Roelofs is Luke Roelofs’ (for I could know                                     
the latter while doubting the former), and so must be a proposition which nobody except me could                                 
express: “Others can see, perhaps by analogy with their own case, that there is a proposition that I                                   
express, but it is in a sense inaccessible to them.”(1979, p.179)   21
But these ‘inaccessible propositions’ are not the only way to make sense of what is left out of                                   
the objective world­description. On Perry’s preferred account, we must recognise belief states that do                           
not correspond to any single object of belief: anyone can believe the proposition ‘Luke Roelofs is Luke                                 










belief state that gives rise to the sentence ‘I am Luke Roelofs’ (or ‘I live in Toronto’). What is unique                                       
about me is that I can believe that proposition by being in that state, while other people would believe                                     
different propositions in that state, and would have to be in different states to believe the same                                 
proposition.  
So combinationists could plausibly maintain that there is nothing left out. There are no                           
irreducibly indexical facts for us to be ignorant of, merely indexical ways of expressing objective facts.                               
There is nothing in the meaning of “I am Luke Roelofs” – nothing involved in this being true – beyond                                       
the fact that Luke Roelofs typed it. But even granting this, it is undeniable that self­identification has                                 




So if self­identification is important, its importance comes from its practical role. But what sort of role                                 
is this? How much does knowing what to do require self­identification? We can divide this into two                                 
questions: if I knew what my ultimate goals were, would I need to self­identify to know how to pursue                                     
them? And do I need to self­identify to know what my ultimate goals should be?  
On the question of pursuing given goals, while self­identification in general is vital,                         
combinationists can maintain that the kind of self­identification their theory rules out is not. This is                               
because the alternatives among which we might be unable to decide – that we are a whole human being                                     
or a harmoniously­connected part of one – do not relevantly differ in what powers they make available.                                 
If a given hand and arm reliably do what I wish to have done, the further fact of whether I include them                                           




trousers are on fire, this will rationalise the same actions whether I am Luke Roelofs or Luke Roelofs’                                   
head, because Luke Roelofs’ head has access to the same ‘levers’ as the whole.  
This is not to say, obviously, that a human head has the same causal powers as a whole human                                     
being. But whatever a human being can do intentionally and deliberately with its body, the head can                                 
also bring about intentionally and deliberately, though often less directly. For instance, although they                           
differ in weight, the head has control over enough external weight (the rest of the body, which it can                                     
manipulate using the fibres that connect it to the neck) that it can indirectly exert the same gravitational                                   
forces on things (e.g. can trip the same weight sensors) as the whole. What matters is not what ‘IR’ can                                       
do, but what ‘IB’ can do.  
This applies even to experientially different parts, like a single cerebral hemisphere. The same                           
objective fact that gave me reason to remove my trousers if I was Luke Roelofs (‘Luke Roelofs’                                 
trousers are on fire’) will, if I am in fact a single one of Luke Roelofs’ cerebral hemispheres, give me                                       
reason to do something closely related: to initiate the movements in one half of Luke Roelofs’ body                                 
that partly constitute trouser­removal, while influencing the other hemisphere to initiate the                       
corresponding movements in the other half of that body. More precisely, what I have called                             
22
‘influencing the other hemisphere’ is a subtle mixture of monitoring its activities, checking that it is                               
initiating those movements, and sending signals that will stimulate it to do so. The important point is                                 
that from the first hemisphere’s perspective, this will feel just like initiating both sets of movements at                                 
once. Thus the actions called for by the fact ‘Luke Roelofs’ trousers are on fire’ if I am Luke Roelofs or                                         
am one of his cerebral hemispheres are indistinguishable actions for me: the two levels of uncertainty                               
cancel out, so that although I am not sure which action to perform, I am equally uncertain which action                                     






when it comes to knowing which action to perform to promote my goals, the uncertainty produced by a                                   
failure of self­identification ‘comes out in the wash’.   
23
What about knowledge of ultimate ends? Views which make self­interest especially important                       
will make self­identification crucial. This includes views on which morality demands promoting only                         
one’s own good, or especially one’s own good, or views on which ‘prudence’ (a non­moral form of                                 
practical rationality) demands such things. Whether someone is me would then be crucial to howmuch                               
reason I have to promote their good, and it will be a major disability not to know who I am (see e.g.                                           
Hare 2007). The same applies to views on which, while my reasons for promoting my own good are the                                     
same as my reasons to promote others’, the permissible means of doing so do differ – e.g. it is                                     
permissible to inflict things on yourself which you must not inflict on others.  
On the other hand, at least three coherent views of practical rationality make self­identification                           
unnecessary. The first is the view that all subjects have, ultimately, the same reasons. Call this Ethical                                 
Neutralism (following Broad 1953). For example, a utilitarian must say that all subjects, ultimately,                           
have reason to do whatever best promotes total utility, whether theirs or someone else’s. On such a                                 
view, knowing which subject’s utility is one’s own utility is irrelevant because your reason to promote                               
utility is unaffected by whose it is.  
Second, one might think that some category of wholes (all wholes, maximal wholes, highly                           
integrated wholes, etc.) have absolute moral and rational priority over their parts. Call this Ethical                             
Holism. On this view, each subject has reason to promote the wellbeing of the largest, best­integrated,                               









privileged whole, is a mistake and an illusion. Cerebral hemispheres have reason to work for the good                                 
of the whole human, regardless of their own fate – and perhaps human beings have reason to work for                                     
the good of their civilisation, their biosphere, or even their universe, regardless of their own fate.  
Third, even a view which sharply distinguishes self­interest and altruismmay then adjust this to                             
allow the interests of beloved relatives and partners to acquire the status of self­interest. If, as Aristotle                                 
says, ‘a friend is another self’ (2007, p.165), perhaps caring for our friends is more like caring for                                   
ourselves than like caring for others. Call this ‘Self­Referential Altruism’ (cf. Broad 1953). And if this                               
is granted, it might be that our own parts are similarly ‘morally bound’ to us, and to each other, so that                                         
their interests count as ‘self­interest’ for us and for each other.  
So is the impossibility of self­identification a crippling problem? If one already holds to Ethical                             
Neutralism, Ethical Holism, or Self­Referential Altruism, then it is not a problem; if one is undecided                               
as to ethical matters, but attracted to experiential combination, this might serve as motivation to adopt                               
one of these three views (compare Parfit’s discussion of the relation between ethics and his                             
reductionism about persons, 1970, pp.26­27, 1984, pp.321­347). Each of these views could be worked                           
out in different ways, but there are at least ways to work them out which secure that unimportance. On                                     
the other hand, if one is strongly committed to the sort of view that makes the strict self­other                                   




In this chapter I have discussed three problems facing experiential combination that in various ways                             
involve self­knowledge: the Problem of Oblivious Parts, the Problem of Self­Reference, and the                         




but not the Problem of self­identification. Combinationism renders self­identification impossible                   
relative to the set of our experientially equivalent parts, and probably also relative to the set of our                                   
cognitively sophisticated parts. Rather than showing how self­identification is still possible,                     
combinationists have to bite the bullet and claim that self­identification is not important: knowing                           
which set of harmoniously­connected overlapping parts we belong to is all we need.   
For convenience, we can group together the theses I have recommended for combinationists,                         
and call them ‘the anti­individualist proposal’. This proposal comprises: 
● First, the patterning principle, according to which our spontaneous impressions of which events                         
are internal or external depend not on whether they really are, but on pattern­detection                           
mechanisms; 
● Second, the dual­reference approach to the semantics of first­person terms, on which the truth                           
conditions for first­person ascriptions deal primarily with whether the self­ascribed property                     
belongs to the maximal, most integrated, most fundamental, or otherwise privileged one of all                           
the subjects of that ascription; 
● Third, an acceptance of the impossibility of self­identification relative to the set of our large,                             
conceptually sophisticated parts;  
● Fourth, a Perry­style account of indexical thoughts and utterances, on which they do not                           
express ‘propositions of limited availability’ but only distinctively action­guiding ways of                     
believing mundane objective facts; 
● Finally, some view like ethical neutralism, ethical holism, or self­referential altruism, on which                         
I and my cognitively sophisticated parts have the same moral reasons for action.  
Together these theses amount to a major deflation of the importance of being any specific individual.                               
No special proposition or fact corresponds to ‘me being me’, beyond some subject being self­identical ­                               
which is fortunate because, according to the patterning principle, my brain and its parts are not set up to                                     
detect any such special facts. Consequently I cannot know exactly which subject I am, but knowing that                                 
would not affect the truth or falsity of my self­ascriptions, or the rightness or wrongness of my actions.                                   
Individually, each of these claims might seem wild, but together they each make the others more                               





























In this chapter I first summarise the combinationist proposals I have made in previous chapters,                             
reviewing their strengths, weakness, versions, and alternatives. I then illustrate my version of                         
combinationism by applying it to a thought­experiment involving the fusion of two persons into one –                               
or, in combinationist terms, two persons becoming conscious parts of a composite person. Over the                             
course of this thought experiment, subjects like us become subjects like our parts, and I believe it is one                                     




My guiding thought in this work was that there was a widespread idea that minds can’t compose other                                   




demonstrated. In chapter 1 I defined a number of versions of this idea: Experiential Simplicity,                             
Anti­Nesting, and Anti­Combination. I then tried to show that these theses, and in particular                           
Anti­Combination, the claim that a whole’s consciousness cannot be fully explained by that of its parts,                               
mattered to several debates in the metaphysics of mind, and in chapter 2 I looked at what it would take                                       
to reject Anti­Combination (and a fortiori Experiential Simplicity and Anti­Nesting), and to endorse its                           
negation, a view I called ‘experiential combinationism’. In the following five chapters I examined the                             
challenges facing combinationism, and the resources available to combinationists for responding to                       
them.  
I deliberately left open several questions about the nature of consciousness, composition, and                         
explanation, yielding a range of types of combinationism. Combinationists can be physicalists or                         
primitivists about consciousness, panpsychists or non­panpsychists, and universalists, nihilists, or                   
something in between about composition. They can regard subjects of experience as constituted by sets                             
of experiences, or as ontologically prior material substances, and they can affirm or deny the possibility                               
of ‘phenomenal overflow’, conscious experience without cognitive access. They may regard wholes as                         
grounded in, grounding, or identical with their many parts, and they may regard the explanation of                               
wholes by parts, in the experiential case and elsewhere, as an a priorimetaphysical necessity or as an a                                     
posteriori law of nature. All I have presupposed is that consciousness is an aspect of the natural world,                                   
and that within the natural world facts about wholes are fully explained by facts about their parts and                                   
the relations among them.  
I cautiously believe that combinationism is true, but my aim in this work has been simply to                                 
show that it is defensible. Partly this has involved responding to arguments against combinationism, but                             








I will refer to the set of theses which I think provide the best prospects for consistent, intelligible,                                   
mental combination as my ‘core proposal’. It combines the inheritance proposal of chapter 3 with the                               
adumbration proposal of chapter 4 and the refracted aspects proposal of chapter 5. Its three main                               
components are TSE, CEI, and UA:  
Token­Sharing of Experiences (TSE): Particular experiences can belong simultaneously to                   
two different entities.  
Conditional Experience Inheritance (CEI): A whole has an experiential property whenever                     
one of its parts does and that part is appropriately related to its other parts, simply in virtue of                                     
the part having that experiential property and being appropriately related to the other parts.  1
Unification­by­Adumbration (UA): A subject has a unified experience of X­and­Y­together                   
whenever they experience X, and experience Y, and these experiences are A­related. 
From these, we can derive UCAP:  
Unified Composites from A­Related Parts (UCAP): A composite subject enjoys conscious                     
unity whenever its component subjects are A­Related.  
These theses together provide an explanation of composite subjects with unified consciousness, based                         







Many of these principles contain gaps whose filling­in depends on background theory: this                         
makes the core proposal compatible with any of the versions of combinationism noted above. CEI                             
speaks of being ‘appropriately related’, meaning ‘related in those ways which are conceptually required                           
to ascribe ownership’. Many authors have argued that it would be a conceptual mistake to ascribe                               
disunified experiences to the same subject, or to ascribe experiences to a subject that do not govern it                                   
causally in the right ways: a combinationist’s prior views about these requirements will determine their                             
conception of what it is to be ‘appropriately related’.  
The ‘A­relation’ was likewise defined conditionally, but always involves ‘perceptual                   
adumbration’, the relation between what is given in an experience and what is indicated as not­given                               
but present through its connection with what is given. If consciousness is transparent, so that its content                                 
is its only phenomenologically manifest feature, then the A­relation is the OA­relation, the relation                           
between experiences when their contents bring each other to veridically adumbrate each other. If                           
consciousness is not transparent, then the A­relation is the EA­relation, the relation between                         
experiences when they bring each other to veridically adumbrate each other. 
Whether the A­relation, and the unity it is meant to explain, is between experiences or between                               
their contents, it provides a way to make phenomenological sense of unity between the experiences of                               
distinct subjects: component subjects in a unified composite are aware of their experiences (or their                             
contents) as revealed aspects of a more extensive whole, whose other aspects are revealed only through                               
the other experiences theirs is unified with. By taking different views on the ‘minimal A­relation’,                             
involving entirely uninformative adumbration, combinationists can reconcile the adumbration proposal                   








Complex Contents from Informative Adumbration (CCIA):A subject’s experiences jointly                   
represent complex contents whenever, and in proportion as, they informatively adumbrate each                       
other’s contents. 
Agential Integration from Salient Concealed and Non­Salient Concealment (SCNC): A                   
subject’s experiences are disposed to guide its behaviour in an integrated way whenever, and in                             
proportion as, they adumbrate each other’s contents as highly salient, while finding no salience                           
in their concealment. 
The first two make the intuitive ideas of exclusivity and privacy compatible with the token­sharing of                               
experience, while the latter two employ the notion of adumbration to explain richer forms of                             
experiential structure than just phenomenal unity.  
Finally, in chapter 5 I added the ‘refracted aspects’ proposal, a claim regarding the structural                             
organisation of consciousness at each mereological level. On this proposal, a given subject’s set of                             
unified experiences is experienced by them as organised according to the different ways that subject                             
can direct their attention, so that experiences of different components that are coupled for attentional                             
purposes will appear together, while experiences of the same component that are attentionally                         
dissociated will appear apart.   
Despite their technicality, the inheritance proposal and the adumbration proposal are meant to                         
capture two fairly simple ideas. The inheritance proposal is meant to capture the idea that if wholes are                                   
nothing over and above their parts, then wholes having experiences is nothing over and above their                               
parts having experiences (and conversely if parts are nothing under and below their wholes). This is                               
made plausible in particular by what I called ‘the easy case’, where a highly­integrated composite has                               




to the composite. The adumbration proposal is meant to capture the idea that the complex structure of                                 
our consciousness consists in certain relations among experiences. This second idea can develop in                           
many directions, corresponding to the sorts of conscious structure which one might wish to explain, and                               
I have not attempted to vindicate every aspect of it. Rather, I have focused on those features which                                   




Explicit rejections of experiential combination are much more common than explicit endorsements, and                         
implicit rejections are more common still. So we must consider reasons why someone might reject                             
combinationism, to see whether these reasons apply to my core proposal.  
Two particularly pressing objections are the incompatible characters argument and the                     
boundary argument. The first claims that a composite subject could not have a unified consciousness,                             
for each experience it got from one of its parts would have to display two different phenomenal                                 
characters, one reflecting its unification with the rest of the whole’s experiences, the other reflecting its                               
unification only with the other experiences of that one part; the second claims that a composite subject                                 
having unified consciousness would destroy the distinct consciousnesses of its parts, by depriving them                           
of their essentially ‘bounded’ character.  
I think that my core proposal resists both of these arguments, by analysing conscious unity as a                                 
relation by which one experience alters the phenomenal character of another, without thereby becoming                           




containment­bounded ­ there are things it does not include ­ but which also reflects the other                               
experiences it is unified with, so as to have the same phenomenal character for both whole and part.  
But there is also the opposite objection, that consciousness in something’s parts is compatible                           
with any sort of consciousness, or a lack thereof, in the whole. To address this ‘explanatory gap’, we                                   
must ask what what explains the principles of the core proposal. In particular, can we ‘see why’ TSE,                                   
CEI, and UA are true?  
TSE is a claim of metaphysical possibility, and so can be supported just by showing flaws in                                 
arguments against it; UA is a claim of phenomenological equivalence, and so can be supported by                               
phenomenological reflection. But CEI is harder, since it appears to assert a necessary connection                           
between two distinct states of affairs. The core of the explanatory gap that critics allege faces                               
combinationism lies here, in the transition from the consciousness of parts to the consciousness of                             
wholes. The possibility of justifying it depends on what prior commitments a combinationist has: if                             
they accept an a posteriori account of reductive explanation, on which facts about wholes can be                               
explained by facts about their parts even without being deducible from them a priori, then CEI could                                 
be taken as a metaphysically contingent law of nature. Combinationism would still be distinct from                             
Strong Emergentism because its composition principles were simple and general in application, or                         
because they involved shared token properties, or because the properties they ascribed to whole and                             
part were conceptually akin. Since CEI meets all these criteria, it has an excellent claim to being a                                   
non­emergent a posteriori principle of composition, if such things are possible.  
If reductive explanation requires a priori deduction, however, then the status of CEI depends                           
on whether ‘experiential ownership’ ­ the relation a subject bears to its experiences ­ is intelligibly                               
reducible to other relations. Since a physicalist combinationist, or an experience­first primitivist                       




be explained is that experiential ownership obtains between the composite and the experiences of its                             
parts, and whatever underlying facts constitute ownership­facts can be built into the specification of                           
CEI. But the subject­first primitivist a priori combinationist posits something irreducibly experiential                       
in the ownership relation, and so to explain CEI they must appeal to another principle, BEI: 
Basic­Experience Inheritance (BEI): A whole has a certain basic­experiential property                   
whenever one of its parts does, simply in virtue of the part having that property.  
BEI implies that a human being undergoes all the experiences of their parts, and that any whole that                                   
includes a human being undergoes that human being’s experiences, albeit only in the ‘basic’ sense,                             
stripped of any implication of unity and causal integration. Insofar as basic­experiential properties still                           
involve something phenomenological, this commits the subject­first primitivist a priori combinationist                     
to being an ‘inclusionary’ combinationist, accepting phenomenal overflow and as many mega­subjects                       
as there are wholes containing conscious parts.  
And why is BEI true? BEI follows from three premises: that basic­experiential properties are                           
fundamental properties, that either wholes or their parts are entirely grounded in the other, and the                               
principle HF: 
Heritability of Fundamental Properties (HF): If a property is fundamental, and if one of the                             
level­connecting views of composition is true, and if the heritability of that property would not                             
yield demonstrable incoherence, then that property is both­ways inherited.  
I argued in section 5 of chapter 3 that it is plausible that HF is an a priori truth, following necessarily                                         
from a proper understanding of ‘fundamental’ and ‘composition’. Since combinationists will accept a                         
level­connecting view of composition, and since it is only combinationists who regard                       





So the core proposal can close combinationism’s explanatory gap in a few different ways,                           
given the right premises. I have tried to present those necessary premises as convincingly as possible,                               
but I do not expect everyone to accept them, and I am not absolutely confident of them myself. But I                                       
think they suffice to make combinationism a live option.   
Despite my efforts to be ecumenical, I doubt that I have exhausted the logical space available                               
for combinationism. A combinationist might reject all versions of my core proposal. For one thing, they                               
might abandon any sort of an inheritance principle, instead explaining each mental property of a whole                               
by a particular configuration of different mental properties instantiated by components. This allows for                           
the retention of Strong Exclusivity and Strong Privacy, and may avoid some of the surprising                             
implications of BEI. But to be explanatory, this type of combinationism would probably require                           
specific and powerful analyses of mental states – i.e. a definite theory of what mental states we have,                                   
what their natures are, and how each can be constituted out of other mental states. This goes against the                                     
methodological neutrality enabled by my use of general principles like CEI.  
Alternatively, one might look elsewhere for a bonding relation to generate conscious unity,                         
rather than relying, as I have, on perceptual adumbration. I am not sure what other relation among                                 
experiences would constitute unity when seen from the whole’s perspective, but there may be one.  
If rival versions of combinationism are developed by others, along the above lines or along                             
lines I have not anticipated, they may well be inspired less by the general idea of combinationism itself,                                   
and more by some specific idea about the mind’s nature that has combinationism as an implication.                               
These versions will still face the challenges that I have discussed and suggested responses to, and I                                 
hope that anyone developing such a view, even if they do not adopt any of the theses I have                                     







The core proposal is meant to make sense of how some unspecified whole’s consciousness might be                               
explained by the consciousness of its parts, without reference to any particular sort of parts or wholes.                                 
But there are specific challenges that arise when we extend it to certain sorts of subjects, most notably                                   
to the microsubjects that might compose us, the megasubjects that we might compose, and any large                               
parts of us that are sophisticated enough to entertain self­referential thoughts. In chapters 5, 6, and 7, I                                   
outlined some additional theses that combinationists might use to tame these problems.  
Microsubjects raise the problems of blending and blurring ­ how a qualitatively homogeneous                         
but structurally fine­grained mass of experiences can explain the qualitatively diverse but structurally                         
coarse­grained consciousness we have. They also intensify the problem of structural mismatch through                         
their role in the ‘dancing qualia’ problem, though I believe the refracted aspects proposal noted in the                                 
last section resolves that problem. To address the problems of blending and blurring, I offered the                               
‘confused blends’ proposal: that for straightforward physical reasons, microexperiences will be                     
radically confused with one another, and under those circumstances they will compose an experience                           
whose structure is not apparent to its subject but whose quality is a blend of its parts’ qualities. The                                     
idea of phenomenal blending ­ based on familiar examples like the presence of redness in orange and                                 
pink ­ is meant to provide an intelligible way for the microexperiences to make a difference to the                                   
whole’s experience, even to be present in it (on the inclusionary version of the proposal), without                               
appearing as distinguishable elements.  
The problem around megasubjects is simply that their existence seems implausible, yet some                         
forms of combinationism seem to imply it. In particular, a priori combinationists who regard                           




containing a human being basically­has that human’s experience. Moreover, combinationists who                     
regard phenomenal unity as a fundamental relation, and who value simplicity and generality of laws,                             
are under pressure from an anti­vagueness argument to accept the following claim: 
Unrestricted Unity (UU): All experiences in the universe are phenomenally unified with each                         
other, i.e. form a single phenomenal field. 
However, I argued in section 6 that the forms in which combinationists may be committed to these                                 
views do not support the implications that make them seem implausible. Those who accept BEI should                               
regard basic­experiential properties as dissociable from the forms of unity that would produce                         
consistent, co­ordinated, rational overall behaviour, and those who treat phenomenal unity as                       
fundamental should similarly regard it as distinct and dissociable from the forms of unity that would                               
give each component a salient, informative, awareness of the experiences of the others.  
Finally, component subjects capable of self­referential thought raise the problems of Oblivious                       
Parts, Self­Reference, and Self­Identification. For each such subject we seem to face a conflict between                             
their self­knowledge and their integration into a whole capable of self­knowledge. In chapter 7 I offered                               
the ‘anti­individualist’ proposal, which combines the following claims:  
● A subjects’ impressions of whether an event occurs in their own minds, or by their own will,                                 
are not based on whether it really does, but on whether it harmonises with that subjects’                               
psychology; 
● First­person terms in their primary use have a dual reference, picking out both whichever                           
subject we consider them relative to, and also whichever of the subjects using them is largest,                               
most integrated, or otherwise privileged; 
● We cannot self­identify relative to some of the large complex parts of our brain, and rationally                               
should be agnostic about our own identity; 
● There is no genuine knowledge that a subject agnostic about their own identity lacks, but only a                                 





While I think the core proposal does a good job of addressing claims of explanatory gaps and latent                                   
incoherence, I am much less confident about the success of these extensions. One worry is that we may                                   
have to accept a range of very odd minds whose existence is unexpected and whose structure is                                 
unfamiliar. But we should have no problem accepting the existence of a wealth of unfamiliar minds, if                                 
it allows us to see our own specific type of mind as a natural product of a systematic and intelligible                                       
material universe. We could reasonably think that our experience acquaints us with both a fundamental                             
intrinsic property – phenomenality – and a particularly human sort of structure, but that these two need                                 
not always go together.  
What is most troubling about applying combinationism to our parts is that it forces us to lower                                 
our estimate of how much a mind must know about itself. According to inclusionary versions of the                                 
confused blends and refracted aspects proposals, there is much in our consciousness that we have not                               
recognised and cannot report, both the wealth of distinct but radically confused phenomenal particulars                           
that blend into each ‘pixel’ of our phenomenal field, and the reaches of causally isolated experiences                               
that lie so far from the centre of this field that they are realistically unattendable. This will be a hard pill                                         
to swallow for anyone who thinks that ‘our consciousness’ just means ‘what we are conscious of’, and                                 
thus ‘what we have cognitive access to’: but then, that idea is the hallmark of exclusionary                               
combinationism, which avoids these implications at the cost of losing the option of grounding CEI in                               
BEI.  
Perhaps more seriously, according to the anti­individualist proposal of chapter 7, the large parts                           
of a human being are systematically blind to their status as parts, and as a result the human being is                                       
unable to ascertain whether they are the whole or just a large part. This may even involve a systematic                                     
sort of ‘introspective indiscernibility’ between having a certain experience and informatively                     




both inclusionary and exclusionary combinationists are pushed towards it if they allow for large                           
sophisticated parts of a human being to be conscious in their own right.  
Note, however, that this sort of substantial fallibilism is compatible with maintaining that                         
consciousness is inherently self­knowing, that it essentially incorporates a deep sort of acquaintance                         
with its own nature. It is just that this direct insight need not always enable attention, imagination,                                 
recognition, and conceptualisation, need not always be rightly interpreted, and need not always allow                           
for self­identification. We already accept this, insofar as we accept the possibility of consciousness in                             
creatures like worms and fish, who cannot think about their experience the way we do. Combinationism                               
simply suggests that forms of this dissociation of insight from conceptualisation are present in human                             
minds.  
These implications will probably be enough to drive many people away from combinationism.                         
And readers already firmly convinced of Anti­Combinationism may find many points in this work to                             
hold up as reductios of the whole idea, or even as reflecting an unlivable and disturbing world in which                                     
individuals have vanished, being either ‘swallowed up’ by a greater whole or ‘torn asunder’ into                             
microscopic parts. But I hope that at least some readers will find the costs of one or another form of                                       




The best way to get a sense of what it is like to be a component subject in a unified mind is to imagine                                               
becoming one, and so most of this chapter is devoted to a thought­experiment involving the fusion of                                 




chapters; my secondary aim is to argue that combinationism expands our options for understanding                           
survival and identity in cases of fission and fusion.  
In subsection 2.1, I set up the thought­experiment: two human brains are implanted with                           
communicating radio devices until they are as integrated as two parts of one brain. In subsection 2.2 I                                   
distinguish some of the observable outcomes which might result from this set­up, labelling them                           
‘merging’, ‘domination’, ‘dissociation’, and ‘dissolution’. In subsection 2.3 I argue that (given the                         
‘merging’ outcome) the thought­experiment qualifies as a ‘fusion case’ in the sense discussed in the                             
literature on personal identity, relative to almost all theories of personal identity. In subsection 2.4 I                               




Suppose that some technologically­advanced Martians decide, for reasons best known to themselves,                       
that they would like to be able to combine many humans into a sort of ‘hive mind’ creature, with a                                       
single consciousness controlling many bodies and drawing upon the cognitive resources of many                         
brains. Suppose that a team of their best scientists gets funding for a series of experiments aimed at                                   
creating such a ‘multi­human’.  
They do this by implanting specially designed pairs of electrodes into the brains of two human                               
participants, such that when a certain circuit in one brain fires, it activates an electrode, which sends a                                   
radio signal to the other, which immediately generates a surge of current in the other brain. This allows                                   
activity in one brain to produce or influence activity in the other brain, and hence allows the thoughts                                   




number and sophistication of these electrodes were increased enough, the causal connections between                         
the two brains could eventually be as fast, as complex, and as reliable as the connections between the                                   
two hemispheres of either brain individually. At this point, if we did not distinguish a signal going                                 
down an axon from one sent via radio, we could meaningfully say there is a single, highly­integrated                                 
nervous organ, with parts in two different skulls. 
Of course this description simplifies what will be an incredibly fraught and complicated                         
process. The Martians are ahead of us technologically by two or three hundred years, but not by                                 
thousands, so while they can create and implant these electrodes, they have limited foresight about, and                               
control of, what happens next. To prevent messy failures that only deplete their supply of humans, they                                 
run the procedure carefully and gradually, over a period of months or years, so that increases in the                                   
bandwidth of the implants are interspersed with periods of exploration, assimilation, and adjustment by                           
the human participants, who can spend time working out what signals they can now send and receive                                 
and how to respond to these developments.  
Moreover, let us suppose that the experimenters design the implants to mimic nerve cells as                             
closely as possible. Obviously there are limits, since nerve cells do not emit or receive radio signals,                                 
but they may incorporate things like neurotransmitters, axons, ion channels, and so on. In particular, the                               
manner in which the implants ‘multiply’, spreading to connect more and more circuits across the two                               
brains, could be made responsive to the way in which the participants use it. Just as neuronal                                 
connections become stronger or weaker based on the history of their activity, so can the links between                                 
implants, and between each implant and its brain. This way the experimenters need not constantly be                               







So far I have described the various hi­tech interventions which our Martian scientists are making into                               
the brains of their human subjects. The goal of these interventions is to create a single being, with a                                     
unified mind and coordinated, intelligent behaviour across both bodies, which combines the                       
personality, memories, and values of both humans. But their success in this endeavour is not                             
guaranteed. While I will focus on the ‘good cases’ in which they succeed, other results are possible, and                                   
the outcome is determined not simply by the set­up and techniques used, but also by the way the                                   
humans handle the process. They have to undergo a transformative, potentially traumatic experience,                         
and their temperament, and attitudes to each other, will make the difference at each stage between                               
experiencing it as communion or as invasion.  
We may distinguish four ‘ideal types’ of outcome, allowing that actual outcomes may be                           
intermediate between them, or entirely unexpected. The intended outcome can be called ‘merging’; this                           
is when there is a unified mind that controls both bodies and is recognisably continuous with both                                 
original people. The combinationist can still say that this is actually one of three minds, since the                                 
originals can survive as parts of it. But they display no more independent thought or sense of                                 
individuality than the conscious parts of a human brain.  
The second­best outcome for the Martians is to have a single mind controlling both bodies but                               
displaying continuity with only one of the original two minds. In such a case, we must surmise that the                                     
other mind has been suppressed, assimilated, or somehow subsumed into the resultant being without                           
enough of its personality being at all manifest in that being’s behaviour. Call this outcome                             
‘domination’. For instance, one of the two participants might be aggressive, defensive, and unwilling to                             
allow another access to its thoughts, while the other is submissive, deferential, and values acceptance                             




to interfere more and more with the latter’s mental processes, while resisting any countervailing                           
interference. By the end, one human has in effect ‘colonised’ and ‘assimilated’ the other’s brain into                               
itself, and thereby taken control of their body.  
Third, we might end up with two recognisably separate minds, controlling different bodies or                           
alternating in control of both bodies, despite the organic connectedness of their brains. This would be                               
somewhat similar to a case of dissociative identity disorder: two psychologically distinct but internally                           
integrated personalities control (simultaneously or sequentially) a single organic structure. These two                       
would probably be recognisable as the original people, who had built up psychological barriers to                             
replace the physiological ones that had previously separated them; a combinationist might still think                           
there are, strictly, three minds here, but the composite mind they formed would be closer to familiar                                 
social mega­subjects like a club than to an ordinary human mind. Call this outcome ‘dissociation’.  
This might arise if both participants were very concerned to maintain the privacy of their own                               
mental processes, but had little desire to explore or enter into those of the other. At each stage of the                                       
experiment, they might respond to the new way of influencing each other’s minds by setting up,                               
independently or cooperatively, policies and habits to minimise its effect.  
Finally, the process might be too traumatic and too invasive for either subject to survive. They                               
might both end up so deeply psychotic and fragmented that the resultant being is not recognisable as                                 
either, and perhaps not even as a single individual. This might mean that neither body’s behaviour was                                 
coherently interpretable at all, or even that at a certain point both bodies collapse into catatonia or                                 
epilepsy, having somehow killed each other from within, and never wake up. One or both might even                                 
become traumatised to the point of violent paranoia, seeking out the other’s physical body and stabbing                               





So to get the philosophically most interesting ‘merging’ result, we might need to run the                             
experiment several times. But we may suppose that the Martians experimenters have as much concern                             
for human life as human experimenters have for the life of rodents. My reason for sketching these four                                   
possible outcomes is that it will be illuminating to refer to them at various points, noting how the way                                     
the participants handle a particular aspect of the process might make one or the other outcome more                                 
likely. While I will focus on the responses which most conduce to the merging outcome, these will be                                   




The next three subsections relate this thought experiment, and combinationism, to the literature on                           
personal identity over time, a diachronic question which I have so far largely avoided. Readers                             
interested only in the application of a strictly synchronic account of mental combination to the above                               
thought experiment may skip them without much loss.  




c) The relations between each original person and the resultant person are sufficient, considered                           
in themselves, to count each pair as identical, i.e. as the same person at two different times.  
Assuming we grant a), whether b) and c) are satisfied depends on our theory of personal identity, and                                   




is the theory that our identity depends on an immaterial substance, a view which conflicts with the                                 
weak metaphysical naturalism I have been assuming.  
On one view, a person survives as long as their distinctive psychology, or something                           
organically developed out of it, is realised (Shoemaker 1984, Noonan 2003). On another view, what                             
matters is not psychological continuity but continuity of the substrate of psychology, whichever organ                           
underlies the person’s psychology (Unger 1990, Nagel 1986). This means a person survives as long as                               
their brain survives and remains functional, even if it changes radically in what sort of psychology it                                 
supports. Another view focuses not on psychology but on phenomenology, defining the persistence of                           
persons in terms of phenomenally­continuous streams of consciousness, or in terms of the substrate                           
which enables them (Dainton 2008, Bayne 2010, Ch.12).  
My thought­experiment would count as fusion according to any of these theories, if the                           
‘merging’ outcome is observed. The resultant being will be psychologically and phenomenally                       
continuous with both original people, and the mechanisms that bring about this continuity have been                             
designed to mimic those operative in a normal human brain. Merely being spatially scattered, or using                               
electromagnetic waves rather than electrochemical depolarisations, should not preclude the formation                     
of a psychologically and phenomenally unified mind.  
A third view of personal identity identifies persons with animals, i.e. organisms with biological,                           
not psychological or phenomenal, persistence conditions (Van Inwagen 1990, Olson 1997). Merely                       
fusing the minds is then not enough to fuse the persons, if the organisms remain separate. However,                                 
most animalists say that the crucial thing for an animal’s persistence is the ‘control centre’ of their                                 
self­regulation, which primarily means the brainstem, which coordinates breathing, heartbeat,                   
digestion, sleep, and so on. And in my thought­experiment the connections can occur in both the                               








Suppose that we do have a fusion case. How should we understand it – do the participants survive, and                                     
if so, as who? An initial issue concerns how to interpret the plausible claims that there are at first two                                       
people, and by the end one person (and vice versa in fission cases). A combinationist will not say that                                     
there are only two subjects at the beginning, or only one at the end, because they allow that within each                                       
human subject there may be many other component subjects. They can however accommodate the                           
intuitive counts, if they count by partial identity rather than by identity (cf. Appendix, subsection 6.2).                               
The initial situation features two subjects with whom all the other subjects present overlap                           
significantly, and the final situation features one subject with whom all the other subjects present                             
overlap significantly.    3



















1. Recognise continuity: the processes described are constructive, not destructive, and while the                       
people involved change, this change is gradual, organic, and often beneficial in terms of                           
overall capacities.   
2. Recognise transformation: a major change has been effected, and the final outcome is                         
importantly different from the initial state of affairs.  
3. Coherence: any description must fit into an well­motivated logical framework, allowing us to                         
recognise both the continuity and the transformation in a single consistent language.  
There is extensive discussion of what description best meets these demands (see, e.g. Wiggins 1956,                             
Parfit 1971, Lewis 1976, Nozick 1981, Perry 1971, Noonan 2001). Saying that one of the original two                                 
subjects survives as the resultant subject while the other ceases to exist can accommodate the continuity                               
in one subject’s development and the transformation in the other’s, but must choose arbitrarily which to                               
regard as the survivor, and thus fails to meet the third demand. And saying that both original subjects                                   
survive, each individually identical with the resultant subject though distinct from the other, recognises                           
the continuity of the process while yielding logical incoherence by making identity non­transitive. The                           4
most popular option, saying that both original people cease to exist and that the resultant person is                                 
newly created with the memories of having lived for many years, can accommodate the sense of                               
transformation, and can be made consistent by including a ‘non­branching clause’ in one’s criterion of                             
identity, but struggles to capture the sense of continuity in the procedure.  
To mymind, the right thing to say is that both original people survive, and that they become the                                     
resultant person not individually but collectively, by composing it. They both live on in this new whole,                                 
despite neither being on their own identical to it. This option is not often explicitly defended (though                                 
see Moyer 2008 for a four­dimensionalist version), but I think it is the most pre­theoretically appealing                               






claim more fully in the Appendix, section 5). One merit of combinationism is that it lets us extend this                                     
attractive description of the fission and fusion of inanimate things to that of persons, an extension I                                 
spell out in this chapter.   
I do not claim that this approach is preferable to all others; rather than comparing it to its rivals,                                     
I wish merely to defend it from objections. My claim is that if combinationism is true, this approach to                                     
fission and fusion is viable. It might still not be true, and combinationists might prefer some other                                 
approach. Combinationism does not directly imply any thesis about diachronic persistence or change; it                           
is entirely synchronic in content. Consequently, combinationism does not in itself address any of the                             
technical problems arising from the persistence of composite entities, e.g. whether a thing which loses a                               
part becomes identical to the complementary part, which it had previously been distinct from. The aim                               




In what follows I will exhibit and defend what I call the ‘mereological approach’ to fission and fusion.                                   
We can more precisely characterise the mereological approach in terms of the following two theses: 
Part­Persistence: In fusion cases, each original person becomes a part of the resultant person,                           
and in fission cases, each resultant person was previously a part of the resultant person, and                               
these facts, perhaps along with other facts, explain the sense in which these persons survive                             
these processes.  
Pair­Persistence: In fusion cases, the original persons composed a pair (i.e. a mereological                         
fusion of two persons) which became a person, and similarly in fission cases, the original                             





The mereological approach could be glossed as the disjunction of these theses, allowing for three                             
versions, which affirm one, the other, or both. Note that neither thesis claims that the parts of persons,                                   
or pairs of persons, are themselves persons at the times when they are parts, or pairs, of persons. The                                     
mereological approach is consistent with saying this, but is also consistent with saying that ‘person’ is                               
not an essential kind, so that a conscious subject may be a person at one time, but then become a                                       
non­person (e.g. a pair of persons) while remaining a conscious subject. Most definitions of ‘person’                             
require a degree of over­all intelligence and coherence, which things like pairs of persons generally                             
lack.    
5
I find the mereological approach attractive, because it seems right to say that in fusion two                               
people become one composite person, and that in fission one person becomes two people, and that this                                 
description captures the core of why these are not cases of people dying or being destroyed, i.e. not                                   
failures to persist. In particular, I am attracted to the idea that each participant in my                               
thought­experiment survives by becoming one part of the resultant person, remaining a continuously                         
conscious subject but ceasing to be a maximal, autonomous, person.  
Why might we reject the mereological approach? One obvious worry is that surviving as a part                               
of a person, or a pair of persons, is simply not comparable to surviving as a person, and gives us no                                         
interesting sense of continuity in fission or fusion cases. But both Part­Persistence and Pair­Persistence                           
include the phrase ‘along with other facts’. The mereological approach does not claim that any survival                               













fission survives in a stronger sense than someone who is eaten and digested into their component                               
molecules, whether or not we choose to say that the latter person ‘has become a scattered mass of                                   
molecules’. The difference is that in one case, but not the other, the person’s parts continue to display                                   
much of the sophisticated psychological and phenomenal life of the original person. They keep doing                             
the things that originally made them the parts of a person, even though they are now persons in their                                     
own right.  
This leads into the real objection: that parts of persons and pairs of persons lack psychological                               
and phenomenal properties. If this claim were true, then it would be hard to see how these entities                                   
could be identical with persons at other times on account of psychological or phenomenal continuity.                             
This is where I believe combinationism is relevant: if Anti­Combination is true, then ascribing                           
psychological or phenomenal properties to parts or pairs of persons will be superfluous and prodigal. If                               
Anti­Nesting or Simplicity were true, there would be conclusive reason not to. I think this is the major                                   
objection to the mereological approach, so in the coming sections I will address this objection, drawing                               
on the arguments of the previous chapters. I will defend the ascription, to parts and pairs of persons, of                                     
psychological and phenomenal properties of the sort that could allow them to be continuous with                             




In this section I discuss my thought­experiment of fusion with a focus on the two human individuals                                 
involved. My aim is to show that what happens to them can be understood as an extreme form of                                     








At first, the two participants will be related somewhat like two conversational partners, or two people                               
with pagers. Each can, by thinking a certain way, produce a certain kind of experience in the other.                                   
Depending on where the implants are first put, this might be one seeing lights when the other thinks                                   
hard about math, or one hearing words whenever the other feels sad, or something else. Each                               
participant may struggle, at first, to distinguish ‘normally occurring’ experiences from those produced                         
by the other. But suppose we give them a supportive environment, where they can talk normally with                                 
each other (so as to ask “do you feel anything when I do this?”), and have time and inclination to                                       
practice controlling and interpreting the implants. This will probably let them devise a                         
mutually­understood ‘language’, and come to perceive implant­generated experiences as signals                   
betokening another mind, just as we perceive words, hand gestures, or facial expressions. 
In learning this language, the participants would be employing the correlation or lack thereof                           
between their own volitions, the reported volitions of the other, the experiences they undergo, and the                               
reported experiences of the other (thereby conforming to the patterning principle of chapter 7, section                             
1). Assuming that each was honest and open, they could distinguish experiences arising spontaneously,                           
experiences voluntarily produced by them, and experiences produced voluntarily or unintentionally by                       





With time, they will also be able to reliably discern, from incoming signals, what effects they                               
are producing in the other – paralleling the ability to, for instance, read in someone’s face how they feel                                     
about one’s utterances. Even before this they can guess, infer, or wonder about their effects on the other                                   
– including how the other is judging them based on ‘hearing their thoughts’. Each may thus become                                 
‘self­conscious’ about whether the electronic relaying of their thoughts is impressing, amusing,                       
disgusting, etc. the other. They may then make efforts to reduce or control the amount of information                                 
they send out, either by avoiding the thoughts which send out signals, by using feedback information to                                 
find ways of thinking those thoughts without being detected, or by learning which thoughts the other                               
finds hardest to identify. Each might, that is, try to develop a ‘poker brain’ in the same way that we can                                         
develop a ‘poker face’.  
Participants could also try to control the other’s knowledge of their mind by asking the other to                                 
deliberately ignore the signals they receive, to direct their attention away from them. If they trust each                                 
other, they may simply request this, much as we might request that someone look away while we                                 
change clothes or type a password. If these ways of politely ignoring the other, and the ways of                                   
establishing a ‘poker brain’, became habitual, they might eventually lead to the ‘dissociation’ outcome,                           
with the individuals surviving as two separate minds in effectively one brain. But if they do not trust                                   
each other, then in order to ensure their privacy, each participant must ascertain whether the other is                                 
attending to the signals they are receiving via the implant. But then each must, to protect their own                                   
privacy, invade the other’s privacy. This lays the ground for a conflict which might end in                               
‘domination’, if one wins conclusively, in ‘dissociation’, if both manage to repel the other, or in                               
‘dissolution’, if each psychologically cripples the other.  
Fortunately, the participants may display emotional responses besides defensiveness. In the                     




right circumstances can be contrived, the participants may relish the connection which their implants                           
give them, and spend much of their time engaged in silent but energetic conversation. No doubt they                                 
will also want a degree of privacy, so expedients like the ‘poker brain’ will be employed to some                                   
extent, but not so as to become automatic and inflexible. What will secure this happy result? Primarily                                 
it will be the temperaments of and relationships between the participants selected – perhaps for best                               
results they should be a pair who have already established a strong and stable friendship or romantic                                 
partnership, who feel comfortable exposing their own mental lives and are enthusiastic about getting to                             
see the other’s. Psychological health and stability will also be important, to handle productively the                             




Suppose that the experimenters have, by luck, wise choice, or trial­and­error, selected two stable and                             
mature human beings who are willing to be merged with each other but refuse to either conquer or be                                     
conquered. Is the communication they become capable of ‘telepathy’? Do they, at any point, have                             
telepathic access to each other’s minds – and do the parts of our brains have telepathic access to each                                     
other’s minds?  
If telepathy means direct, unmediated awareness of another’s experiences, then no: the access                         
is mediated by the electrical connections (radio waves or nerve signals) which link the two subjects.                               
This means that the access is fallible, for something may interfere with the signals travelling along                               
those connections. In this sense, what the two participants have is no more telepathic than is an                                 





Is the electrical communication perhaps somehow ‘less filtered’? It might be, especially at first.                           
When we talk, we can exert a lot of control over the signal that gets to the other person, crafting it to be                                             
misleading or uninformative. But when the implants are first put in, there is none of that: each receives                                   
a signal that varies based simply on what the other is actually thinking or feeling, not on what they                                     
wish to claim they are thinking and feeling. But deliberate control, and with it insincerity and                               
deception, can arise simply from each coming to understand how the connection works. So in a sense                                 
we might say that the participants have telepathic access at first (when they are probably unable to                                 
make sense of it) but then lose it as they become more aware of the implants’ workings.  
In a third sense, telepathy would mean literally sharing experiences. Are there single token                           
mental events which both subjects ‘have’? To some extent this will depend on what it is to ‘have’ an                                     
experience, the topic of chapter 3, section 4. In the sense of ‘control’, the two participants may share                                   
an experience, if the behaviour of both is guided by it. But this differs only in degree from the way that                                         
my decision might guide the behaviour of many other people, via my verbal instructions to them. The                                 
more important point is that two discrete subjects cannot both metaphysically underlie a single                           
experience, since a single event cannot be occurring simultaneously in two substrates. Whatever is                           
going on in one brain will be an experience of that subject, and not the other, and if an experience is                                         
realised in a dispersed manner, spread across both brains, then it belongs to neither individually, for                               
neither is sufficient to underlie it: rather, that experience belongs to the composite of both, and each has                                   
some part of it, some component experience.  
6
So I conclude that in any strong sense, telepathic communication does not (and probably                           








way, and they may in some cases do so with little room for insincerity or pretence. Yet they do not                                       
know each other’s experiences directly, the way they know their own experiences, and they do not                               
literally share experiences. This is a consequence of accepting (albeit in weak forms) the privacy and                               
exclusivity of experience. If the two participants are discrete, Weak Privacy precludes them knowing                           
the same experiences directly, and Weak Exclusivity precludes them sharing it.  
Because the procedure involves no telepathy, we could not use it for direct inter­subject quality                             
comparisons. Suppose we connect one normally sighted participant and one blind participant. Or                         
suppose we connected two participants who were, unbeknownst to us, spectrum­inverted relative to                         
each other, one seeing green whenever the other would see red, and so on.  What would happen?  
7
Maybe one participant would report, with surprise, having a kind of experience whose quality                           
they could not previously have imagined. But this might also happen when two experientially­normal                           
subjects are connected, if the signals each received stimulated their brain in previously unknown ways.                             
Or maybe they would simply report experiencing familiar qualities under new circumstances or in new                             
arrangements – because the incoming signal caused the same kind of brain activity as normal sensory                               
stimuli. In either case, the type of quality which the receiving subject experiences supervenes on events                               
going on in their brain, and thus depends on the experiential capacities of that subject and their brain.                                   











Our two participants will come to enjoy unified consciousnesses when they stand in the relation which                               
constitutes unity. Here I assume the analysis of chapter 4, according to which this relation is the                                 
A­relation, defined in terms of adumbration, the phenomenological structure in which a subject is                           
aware of something given as intimately connected with something not given.  
How we think about the progression of A­relatedness in this procedure will depend on what we                               
think is true at the start, when our two subjects are simply two normal humans, perhaps isolated and                                   
perhaps communicating normally. As noted in chapter 6, section 2, anyone who regards phenomenal                           
unity as a fundamental relation will be under pressure from an ‘anti­vagueness’ argument to posit it                               
running universally among all experiences. If we accepted this sort of universalism then we should say                               
that right from the beginning, each participant’s consciousness involves a phenomenology of pure                         
openness, and thereby referred to the experiences of the other. If we rejected Universalism, we would                               
instead say that phenomenal unity appeared at some moment when the connections among their                           
experiences were sufficiently informative, though it may be indeterminate at which precise moment                         
they first qualified.  
What about richer forms of unity? In chapter 4 I proposed that richer forms of unity involved                                 
mutual, informative, veridical, adumbration of each other by the parts’ experiences. Crucially, to                         
qualify as conscious unity each part must be adumbratively aware, not of the other’s experiences as                               
external events, but of how things seem to the other. That is, each participant must see the world                                   
through the other’s eyes, and have an awareness of this other perspective constantly in the background                               
of their own perspective.  
In our thought­experiment, the increasing richness of, and sensitivity to, the signals travelling                         
between the two brains could easily generate increasingly informative adumbration of this sort. As the                             




own, they will come to perceive the latter experiences as the revealed aspect of ­ the expression of ­ a                                       
mental process that is not fully given but whose content they increasingly can discern. By extension,                               
the absence of certain experiences in their own minds, and the particular combinations of experiences                             
they do have, will also come to seem meaningful, adumbrating a whole other stream of consciousness.                               
Eventually, when each experience of either participant conveys something not just of their other                           
experiences, but of the experiences of the other participant, we will be able to call the whole set unified                                     
because each experience will be felt as merely one fragment of a conscious whole that includes both                                 
minds.  
Through this process, we will also find pairs of experiences in the two participants interacting                             
to yield more complex experiences. For instance, when one of the participants perceives something, the                             
signals received by the other may activate a memory of a similar thing perceived in the past, and the                                     
signals of this memory received by the first may then contextualise and colour their perception of this                                 
new thing just as their own memories would. This growing disposition to think together will likely be                                 
accompanied by a growing difficulty in thinking separately: when relevant thoughts from the other                           
subject spring to both minds so quickly and readily, it will be hard for either not to be influenced by the                                         
other’s on­going thoughts.  
In chapter 6, subsection 2.4, I offered the analogy of ‘internalisation’: when someone has                           
exercised a formative influence on us, we can come to involuntarily and unreflectively see the world as                                 
they would see it, with this seeing becoming a constant background to our own seeing. What stops that                                   
from counting as conscious unity is that it is in virtue of a past interaction, not a present one, which is                                         
precisely what the procedure we are imagining changes. Each participant’s constant background                       
awareness of the other’s perspective is a product of an ongoing interaction ­ though this need not mean                                   




unwelcome, it will prompt defensive measures, or cause a traumatic breakdown in one or both psyches.                               
But even if it is welcomed, there will still have to be a process of attunement and mutual learning, to                                       




As the procedure progresses, the two participants are likely to spend less time attending specifically to                               
one another, and more time attending jointly to external things. In the early ‘conversations’, each                             
focuses on how to convey things to the other and on how to interpret the other’s own expressions. Their                                     
goals are to learn about the other, or to cause the other to believe certain things (true or false) about                                       
them. This contrasts with shared attention, where they are not attending to each other, but are rather                                 
aware of each other in the background of something they are both attending to, and which they are                                   
attending to partly because they know the other is attending to it.  
To illuminate this shift, we might compare two people first meeting, engaged in ‘getting to                             
know’ one another, with two old friends jointly considering a shared problem. In the latter case, each                                 
may ask the other for their view on a particular part of the question, and will maintain a constant                                     
awareness of what the other knows, may not know, can do, refuses to do, and so on, but only in the                                         
same way that they maintain a constant awareness of their own capabilities and knowledge, without                             
having to focus attention on them (Cf. mindset pragmatics, Stalnaker 1970, Hellie forthcoming­a).  
The growth of shared attention corresponds to one aspect of the growing dispositional unity                           
between their consciousnesses: their experiences tend more and more to transfer attention, so that if one                               




to them only via signals from the other). This will contribute to a growing difficulty in assigning                                 
responsibility to one participant or the other. Each time one begins to focus on an action, the other                                   
becomes aware of this, and has a few related ideas, which the first immediately becomes aware of, and                                   
so on. Eventually every action performed by either body will be the product of multiple rounds of                                 
feedback between both minds, making it all but impossible to isolate the exact contribution of each. 
Similar things will occur with rapid and habitual actions, because at some point it will be                               
possible for one participant to initiate actions in the other’s body, perhaps acting via a momentary urge                                 
it can prompt in the other’s consciousness or perhaps bypassing the latter. Even if the second                               
participant is able to inhibit the action just as they can inhibit their own, at this stage they will likely                                       
have become fairly comfortable with each other and not automatically prone to inhibiting every                           
impulse they receive from the other. For instance, if one participant is graceful and perceptive and the                                 
other clumsy and oblivious, the first may start adjusting the second’s posture to avoid the trips and                                 
spills they were previously prone to. The second, seeing no reason to block out this helpful                               
intervention, allows it to become habitual, so that every action performed with the second body is a                                 
blend of contributions from both minds.  
But even while it becomes harder to assign responsibility to just one participant, it also                             
becomes less practically important to do so. Normally we care which of two people did something,                               
because we need to know what to expect from those people in the future. But if neither participant will                                     
act separately in the future, this prospective need becomes less urgent. It is also normally important to                                 
assign responsibility so as to allocate rewards and punishments, but with the two participants so closely                               





There will also be long­term effects on each participant’s personality. Just as people often                           
change to reflect and accommodate their families, the participants will be prone to absorb values,                             
beliefs, and habits from each other – while any sharply opposing or incompatible traits are likely to be                                   
removed, either violently (in a case tending toward domination) or by persuasion and negotiation (in a                               
case tending toward merging). Any persistence of sharp conflict increases the odds of dissociation or                             
dissolution.  
Drawing on my defence of the patterning principle in chapter 7, section 1, we might say that                                 
their background psychologies and background wills are more attuned to each other. If the participants                             
perceive events as their own voluntary actions to the extent that those events harmonise with their                               
psychology, then they will start experiencing each other’s actions as their own. For instance, when I                               
decide to picture a yellow flamingo, and the image of a yellow flamingo arises, the close                               
correspondence between what I intended and what happens makes me feel that I imagined the flamingo                               
voluntarily. Now if one participant decides to picture a yellow flamingo, which is noticed by the other,                                 
who is generally better at visual imagination, their habitual response might be form an image of a                                 
yellow flamingo and transmit it to the first participant. The first participant, experiencing an intention                             
followed by a matching image, will likely feel as though they have voluntarily imagined that flamingo                               
(cf. Perky 1910). The distinction between doing something oneself, and doing it with the other’s help,                               
becomes increasingly irrelevant as these options become indistinguishable in speed and reliability. 
Arguments over responsibility may still arise, when something goes wrong and each tries to                           
blame the other. But these are unlikely to end with any clear answer: rather, the participants need to be                                     
willing to let go of the question. Only if they can think of their actions as ‘ours’, rather than trying to                                         







of chapter 4, the salience of concealment must be low, and each participant’s adumbration of the other                                 
must be experienced as adequately informative, if they are not to perceive each other as threats. This is                                   
partly about getting more information through the implants, but also partly about needing less                           
information, and being willing to trust the other even without exhaustively knowing every detail of                             
their processing.  
Can each participant not still consciously decide to ‘take charge’ of their own mind and make a                                 
decision that is their own, not shared? Supposing the other is supportive and does not deliberately                               
interfere, isn’t individual responsibility still available, by carefully ‘screening out’ incoming signals?  
There are three difficulties facing such efforts at individual responsibility. First, as noted above,                           
it will grow harder and harder to discern which thoughts come from outside and which from inside.                                 
Second, many internally­generated thoughts will now reflect the past influence of the other, and may                             
even require consultation with the other in order to properly understand them (for instance one                             
participant may have been persuaded of a certain belief by the other, but remember the conclusion                               
better than they remember the arguments).  
The third and most interesting difficulty is that autonomous decision­making requires                     
distinguishing, not only between what is one’s own and what is another’s, but also between what is                                 
one’s own and what is a random passing whim or chance thought. Occasionally I might get the urge to                                     
slap an annoying person, but it does not follow that if I gave into that urge every time it arose I would                                           
be acting more autonomously, for it may be that a concern for civility and mutual respect is a far more                                       
important part of ‘who I really am’ than this occasional urge.   
Because acting autonomously means finding our real will, amongst a certain amount of random                           
statistical ‘noise’, we need to engage in ‘soul­searching’. By this I mean a kind of calm taking stock of                                     




stable and which are fleeting. This effort at ‘self­consultation’ contrasts with the sort of blinkered                             
focusing where we just pursue to completion what we have embarked upon, pushing aside all new                               
thoughts and feelings that emerge, attending only to the implications of a particular line of thought or                                 
the means to a particular end. While this makes us more likely to successfully complete our task, it                                   
impedes efforts to establish our true wishes, and increases the risk of devoting ourselves to something                               
we do not really want.  
So acting autonomously requires ‘soul­searching’, which requires openness to one’s ‘whole                     
mind’, a lowering of thresholds for admission to attention. But in our thought­experiment, this kind of                               
openness will actually invite thoughts stimulated (even if unintentionally) by the other. The attempt to                             
block out or ignore thoughts coming from the other requires the opposite of soul­searching: vigilantly                             
keeping watch over one’s thoughts and driving away any that do not fit certain criteria. Thus the                                 
distinction ‘talking to the other person vs. doing it myself’ comes increasingly to line up with the                                 
distinction ‘soul­searching vs. blinkered focusing’. We can find parallels to this in real life: talking with                               




I will end this section by defending one of the presuppositions of the mereological approach to fusion:                                 
that the two original participants survive as parts of a person, retaining many psychological and                             
phenomenal characteristics. Many people would describe the merging outcome by saying that the two                           




The mereological approach can accommodate this claim of the participants’ non­existence in at least                           
two superficial senses, but implies they are strictly false.  
The first superficial sense is that the two participants have ceased to be salient things, or things                                 
which it is useful to think in terms of. It is no longer sensible for someone trying to understand the                                       
situation to organise their thoughts around ‘participant 1’ and ‘participant 2’. The second superficial                           
sense explains this fact; each participant has lost a significant degree of ‘independence’, in that their                               
body’s actions are no longer primarily controlled by their own mental processes, and their mental                             
processes are no longer primarily controlled by their own mental processes a moment before. But                             
despite these facts about the two participants, a defender of the mereological approach will maintain                             
that they still, strictly speaking, exist. The success of fusion is not marked by a change in which things                                     
exist, but by a shift in the salient divisions, whereby the distinction between the two individuals                               
becomes increasingly irrelevant. Each one’s story is not a story of something being destroyed, but of                               
something growing and forming new connections to an external thing – an external thing which, if the                                 
experiment succeeded, probably managed to elicit intense feelings of friendship, love, and acceptance.  
Here are two ways to support this analysis. The first is to simply point out that in all                                   
fundamental intrinsic respects, the type of thing happening in each brain at the end is the same as what                                     
was happening at the beginning. Neurons fire, stimuli produce responses, information is processed and                           
filtered and integrated to enable a coherent and meaningful worldview. Why think that these neural                             
events no longer support a conscious state of their own?  
One might say that they no longer support a conscious state of their own because they                               
contribute to supporting a larger conscious state. But this follows only given the rejection of                             
combinationism, which claims precisely that supporting a conscious state of their own can be a way of                                 




destroyed, and they no longer display the same psychology as before. But any theory of persistence                               
must account for the way that our psychologies change over time, and one of my major aims in this                                     
section has been to show that what happens to these participants is just an extreme version of things                                   
that happen to all of us when we become intensely related to someone – shared attention, long­term                                 
shifts in personality, or finding that we best understand our own desires by discussing them with                               
another.  
Second, in addition to the above reasons for accepting psychological and phenomenal                       
continuity between the original people and the eventual parts, we can support the mereological                           
approach by an argument analogous to that discussed in subsection 3.3 for phenomenal unity. Either the                               
participants survive, or there was a precise moment when they disappeared, or it is vague matter exactly                                 
they vanished. Since it seems impossible to find a non­arbitrary millisecond for each participant when                             




In this section I shift to consider the whole composed of the two human participants. Its perspective is,                                   
at first, much less familiar to us, and harder to make sense of. Nevertheless, I argue, we have                                   
conceptual tools available that can give us some idea of what it is like to be a pair of people mid­way                                         













Having defended the presuppositions of Part­Persistence at the end of the last section, I will begin this                                 
section with a defence of the presuppositions of Pair­Persistence, namely that pairs of persons exist and                               
possess psychological and phenomenal properties.  
First note that subject­first and experience­first combinationists will conceive of ‘pairs of                       
persons’ differently, because they conceive of persons differently. For the former, a person is a physical                               
organism (or organ), and so a pair of persons is just a pair of organisms (or organs) whose members                                     
happen to be intelligent and rational. For the latter, a person is constituted by a set of suitably related                                     
experiences, and so a pair of persons is an aggregate of experiences forming two suitably related                               
clusters. On either conception, do such entities exist? Well, do pairs of things in general exist? We                                 
cannot simply appeal to ordinary language here, because the way that we talk about pairs can seem                                 
sometimes plural (‘that pair are really getting on my nerves’) and sometimes singular (‘there is a pair                                 
of lawyers outside’), and moreover because grammatical number is an unreliable guide to real                           
singularity, at least in English (consider ‘a pair of pants’, or ‘they’ as neuter singular).  
What we need to consider is whether pairs have a place in our best overall ontology, and here                                   
there is much dispute. One particular argument, analogous to the anti­vagueness arguments of                         
subsections 3.3 and 3.5, presents unrestricted composition (which would imply that pairs exist) as the                             
only way to avoid vagueness about existence. The thought­experiment of personal fusion makes this                           
argument especially vivid, by exhibiting a gradual progression from the participants being merely a                           
normal pair (and hence, we suppose for reductio, not composing anything) to them being highly                             




something – how much integration does there need to be, precisely? Any precise answer will seem                               
arbitrary, and so it seems there must have been something from the beginning.  
Even if we do suppose that pairs exist, the question is whether they have any psychological or                                 
phenomenal properties, since the best way to make sense of a pair becoming the eventual person (or of                                   
a person becoming a pair, in the case of fission) is to say that there is continuous instantiation of such                                       
properties. Now, many mental properties seem bizarre to attribute to a pair of persons, once we are                                 
clear that this ascription is not to be merely distributive: obviously we can say ‘there’s a happy pair’,                                   
meaning that each member individually is happy, but can the pair be happy itself?  
But recall chapter 3’s distinction between ‘full­ownership’ and ‘basic­ownership’ of                   
experiences, the former defined as the relationship subjects have to ‘their’ experiences, and the latter                             
defined as the additive elements of the former. In chapter 6, section 1, I argued that if we suppose                                     
basic­ownership is dissociable from full­ownership, we can endorse BEI while explaining away the                         
appearance of non­mentality in large disunified composites. This same analysis can be used to explain                             
how a pair of persons can have phenomenal properties: not all the same ones as its component persons,                                   
but the basic­experiential ones. The pair contains and underlies the same experiences as its parts – but                                 
they, and not it, also have their overall behaviour intelligently guided by those experiences, and                             
(depending on the truth of UU) they and not it may have their experiences in a unified way.  
Psychological properties are trickier, because their causal role in guiding intelligent behaviour                       
seems so much more central to them. Here I think the defender of the mereological approach ought to                                   
adopt a slightly different strategy. In chapter 3 I observed that the causal element of ownership was a                                   
matter of degree: a given set of beliefs and desires, together with all associated phenomenology, may                               
explain more or less of the events occurring in a certain entity. Even in the best cases (e.g. the mind                                       




molecules through different tubes, or the object’s slight deformation by the earth’s gravity and rotation.                             
Usually we only ascribe a mental state to an entity if that mental state, and others it operates together                                     
with, controls ‘a great deal’ of the events occurring in that entity; hence we can say that a human being                                       
believes a certain film is good, but not that the earth’s biosphere believes that film is good, because that                                     
belief explains much of what occurs in the human but a miniscule fraction of what occurs in the                                   
biosphere.  
But suppose we instead relativise ascriptions to a degree of control. That is, we might say that                                 
the above belief is instantiated to a high degree by the human being, and to a very low degree by the                                         
biosphere. This would let us say that the pair of people instantiates the psychology of each person about                                   
half as much as the person themselves. As the experiment progresses, the mental states of each                               
participant acquire a greater and greater control over events happening in the other brain and body, and                                 
thereby come to be instantiated by the whole pair to a greater and greater degree.   10
Thus we can say coherently that if the pair of persons exists at the beginning of the procedure,                                   
it has phenomenal and psychological properties – though it has the former in the basic rather than full                                   
sense, and has both only to a fairly low degree. Similarly, we can say that in fission, a person has                                       
continuity of psychology, though they end up instantiating psychological properties about half as                         
strongly, and having experiences only in the basic sense. Whether this is enough to say that one entity                                   
has phenomenal and psychological continuity from the beginning to the end of the procedure will                             













Even supposing that the pair exists, and has psychological and phenomenal properties, does it have                             
unified consciousness – do all the experiences it basically­has form one phenomenal field, one ‘thing it                               
is like’ to be that entity? On the account of unity given in chapter 4, this turns on whether its two sets of                                             
experiences are A­related.   
In subsection 3.3 I argued that combinationists face a vagueness argument pressing them to be                             
either reductivist or universalist about phenomenal unity, either analysing phenomenal unity as ‘a                         
sufficient degree of dispositional unity’, where ‘sufficient’ is semantically or epistemically vague, or                         
else positing it from the very beginning. The alternative is for phenomenal unity to be metaphysically                               
vague, or for the transition to occur at some precise but seemingly arbitrary point.   
Whenever the composite begins to enjoy phenomenal unity, it has a single phenomenal field,                           
and we can describe the process from then on in terms of the changing configuration of items in this                                     
field. In chapters 4 and 5 I envisaged experiential elements arrayed in the phenomenal field according                               
to their tendencies to interact, with greater proximity indicating greater sensitivity. On this picture, the                             
composite’s field will have two large clusters of closely­unified experiences at some significant                         









Talking about what it is like to be the composite will naturally make us wonder whether and how the                                     
composite can introspect. Similarly we might wonder when it can attend to things as a single whole,                                 
and when it can conceptualise its own experiences as its own.  
In the early stages of the procedure, each person has good access to its own experiences, but                                 
quite limited access to those of the other brain. Each will thus form introspective impressions of only                                 
part of the composite’s phenomenal field: or at least, introspective impressions in which the rest of the                                 
field features hazily and peripherally. Similarly, if attending to something is a matter of placing it at the                                   
centre of one’s phenomenal field, then at first the composite cannot do this, for each person can only                                   
place an experience at the centre of one cluster or the other within the field. This is still a sort of                                         
‘introspection by the composite’, or ‘attention by the composite’: the composite is introspecting on, or                             
placing something at the centre of, half its experiences at a time, using a different brain each time. But                                     
this falls short of what we might think of as ‘proper’ introspection and attention, which involve the                                 
whole phenomenal field. These, I will argue, become possible for the composite only when it can act                                 
simultaneously with both brains, and connect its two acts properly.  
Let us start with attention. If one participant’s attending to something serves to draw the other’s                               







each other, represented geometrically by their closeness to the other. By the two centres of the clusters                                 
moving together, they come to form an element which will be made central to the overall field. Thus                                   
the composite has, using both of its brains, placed something at the centre of its phenomenal field, i.e.                                   
attended to it.  
For proper introspection, the composite needs to not only have each brain introspect but have                             
each enquire with the other about the other’s part of the field, and incorporate what they are told into                                     
their own view. It may never get a complete survey of the phenomenal field in a single brain, but this                                       
does not mean it never gets a complete survey: the complete survey is distributed across the two brains.                                   
This allows the composite to think about its own thoughts, but it does so by means of each participant                                     
separately identifying and then putting together ‘what I am experiencing’ and ‘what they are                           
experiencing’. These two impressions will be distinguished as introspective and testimonial,                     
respectively, and so the composite can think of itself as such only on the basis of first thinking of each                                       
part as a distinct part.  
But as the procedure progresses, the consequent ‘we­thoughts’ will follow the antecedent                       
‘I­thoughts’ automatically, as any attempt at introspective stock­taking by one participant automatically                       
prompts the other not only to also take stock, but to listen to its partner and share its own results. With                                         
increasing automaticity, it will become less salient to each that it is hearing things from someone else.                                 
By contrast, the impressions in each brain of what ‘we’ are experiencing will growmore salient, not to                                   
mention easier to focus on, for segregating out only the experiences from one’s own brain will come to                                   
take more and more effort. Eventually, for a participant to introspectively review all and only what they                                 
individually are experiencing, without attending also to what the other is experiencing, will come to                             








While in one sense the composite has gained new capacities throughout the procedure, there is also a                                 
respect in which it has steadily lost capacities. In particular, it has lost various capacities to do one thing                                     
without a certain other thing happening. The implants ensure that certain mental or bodily actions taken                               
with one body will have automatic consequences in the other body – such as the other participant                                 
knowing what was done, or feeling some emotion, or supplying some useful or disruptive feedback. It                               
is often worthwhile and overwhelmingly tempting to prioritise speed and efficiency over carefully                         
scrutinising every step in a mental process, and so when there is no strong reason to keep things                                   
separate, a useful pattern of action may become so habitual that its components cannot occur                             
separately.  
This loss of capacities is a form of confusion, as defined in chapter 5. The composite mind                                 
becomes unable to perform one mental act without simultaneously performing another, just as each                           
participant’s mind may be unable to attend to the microexperiences of its microscopic parts without                             
simultaneously attending to many others. At first this confusion will be weak and shallow: shallow                             
because the effect in the second mind might still potentially be inhibited or avoided, and weak because                                 
even once both mental actions have occurred, the separateness of the two brains’ attentional systems                             
will allow for distinct attention. But over time, as the links become stronger and faster, and as the two                                     
brains’ capacities for attention become more and more coupled together, there may be instances where                             
it becomes in practice impossible even to attend separately. Obviously this will not happen for all                               




each moment which body’s eyes are generating which visual experiences. But pairs of events which                             
there is no reason to keep distinguishing may become strongly, robustly, and symmetrically – i.e.                             
radically – confused.  
Since confusion is subject­relative, this does not guarantee that the parts suffer the same                           
confusion. They may suffer confusion between a given thought or experience of theirs and the feedback                               
that it automatically prompts from the other brain, but this is still confusion among events in their own                                   
brain, contrasting with confusion among events in the two brains.  
This raises the interesting possibility of the whole experiencing phenomenal qualities which its                         
parts cannot, blended out of, and thus nothing over and above, the qualities experienced by its parts. To                                   
see this, imagine that one subject is rather like a spectrum­invert relative to the other, outwardly the                                 
same but seeing different qualities ­ seeing gred, grue, and grurple where the other sees red, blue, and                                   
purple. For these to blend they must be both phenomenally unified and radically confused; this is                               
unlikely to happen with perception (due to the separateness of eyes) so we should focus on imagination.                                 
Consider the whole visually imagining the colour blurple, a blend of gred and blue, by imagining gred                                 
in one brain, and blue in the other, without separating the two. What is this like for the parts, e.g. the                                         
subject who can see and imagine blue but not gred? Since their blue­experience is part of a complex                                   
content with the other’s gred­experience, it adumbrates that other experience in some fairly informative                           
way. Yet since the link is not telepathic, they do not experience and cannot even imagine gred, and by                                     
extension do not experience and cannot imagine blurple. Yet at the same time, this joint imagination is                                 
entirely satisfactory within the psychological economy of the merged minds, generating no sense of                           
dissatisfaction or frustration in either part.  
Thus the subject imagining blue has an experience which adumbrates gred informatively,                       




lacking access to the quality gred. This is a hard description to make sense of, but not impossible. I                                     
think the best way to make sense of how the adumbration can be highly informative without actually                                 
conveying the character of gred is to think of it as a sort of acquaintance that enables recognition but                                     
not recall; the subject will recognise next time the other subject is imagining gred, but cannot                               
themselves visualise or otherwise capture the quality – as when we say “I don’t know how to describe                                   
it, but I would recognise it if I saw it again”. And the best way to make sense of its producing no sense                                             
of frustration or curiosity is to appeal to the Patterning Principle: the subject imagining blue thinks they                                 
can imagine gred, and indeed blurple, because whenever they try to (by resolving to imagine ‘that                               
quality’) this prompts the other to imagine gred, thereby composing blurple, and all the feedback that                               
any subject (composite or component) gets is ‘success: quality visualised’. In fact much of that                             




When I think about the procedure our two imaginary humans have undergone, I find combinationism                             
more attractive. If minds cannot be parts of minds, then there must be some moment when two become                                   
one, and I find it hard to accept any such abrupt transition in a gradual process. Even if minds can be                                         
parts of minds, but component minds do not explain the mentality of their composite, then when we                                 
have explained the behaviour of the composite in terms of the two original minds closely and                               
automatically co­operating (as I think we can), it would be superfluous to posit a further distinct mind                                 
belonging to the whole. Yet if the whole gives as much indication of being an intelligent conscious                                 
subject as any of us do, then it seems arbitrary to deny it that status. I find myself forced to look for                                           




whole are not only compatible but are two sides of the same coin. Over the course of this work I have                                         








Anti­Combination: The experiential properties of a conscious subject cannot be explained by the experiential (and topic­neutral)                               
properties of, and relations among, its parts. 
Anti­Nesting: A conscious subject cannot have parts which are themselves conscious subjects.  




Composition Principle (schematic): If a set of parts p1, p2, p3… possess properties F1, F2, F3… and stand in relations R1, R2, R3… then                                               
they compose a composite c which possesses property G. 
Conditional Experience Inheritance (CEI): A whole has an experiential property whenever one of its parts does and that part is                                       
appropriately related to its other parts, simply in virtue of the part having that experiential property and being appropriately related to                                         
the other parts. 







Epistemic Optimism: A subject who commits no ‘epistemic wrongdoing’ (e.g. never believes something for which they have                                 
insufficient evidence, etc.) will not inevitably and systematically believe falsehood.  
Essential Boundedness (EB): The set of experiences belonging to any subject is bounded.   
Experiential Combinationism: The experiential properties of a conscious subject may be fully explained by the experiential (and                                 
topic­neutral) properties of, and relations among, its parts.  







Explanatory Gap between Subjects (EGS): It is never the case that the existence of a number (one or more) of subjects of experience                                             






Location Inheritance: A whole is located at a given point or region of space whenever one or more of its parts is, simply in virtue of                                                   
the part being located there.  
Mass Additivity: The mass of a composite entity is equal to the sum of the masses of its parts.  
Monistic Conditional Experience Inheritance (CEIM): A whole has an experiential property whenever one of its parts does and that                                     
part is appropriately related to its other parts, and that part has that experiential property simply in virtue of the whole having that                                             
experiential property, and the part being appropriately related to the other parts. 





No Summing of Subjects (NSS): It is never the case that the existence of a number (one or more) of subjects of experience with certain                                                 












Part­Persistence: In fusion cases, each original person becomes a part of the resultant person, and in fission cases, each resultant                                       
person was previously a part of the resultant person, and these facts, perhaps along with other facts, explain the sense in which these                                             
persons survive these processes.  



















































































In this appendix, I will explain how several existing debates in philosophy of mind are substantially                               








Anti­Combination: The experiential properties of a conscious subject cannot be explained by                       
the experiential properties of, and relations among, its parts.  
In section 1, I review the roles of Experiential Simplicity and Anti­Combination in a historically                             
popular argument against materialism; in section 2, I review the role of Experiential Simplicity in                             
driving a range of influential intuitions; and in section 3, I review Anti­Combination’s role in a major                                 
contemporary argument against panpsychism. In section 4 I discuss various cases of synchronically                         
divided people, moving in section 5 to diachronically divided people, i.e. people who split in two, or                                 
conversely who fuse together. In section 6 I consider what I call ‘problems of multiplication’, a family                                 
of puzzles whose most notable member is Peter Unger’s ‘Problem of the Many’. In section 7, I review                                   
recent defences of Anti­Nesting by materialists, and in section 8 I briefly consider some of the issues                                 
raised by collective mentality. Finally, section 9 discusses the relevance of combinationism to                         
mereological nihilism.  
One theme that comes out repeatedly in this discussions is the links among the mereological                             
denials: accepting the weaker ones, such as Anti­Combination, pushes us towards accepting the                         
stronger ones, such as Experiential Simplicity. This underlines the importance of my investigation of                           
Anti­Combination, even when theses like Simplicity and Anti­Nesting receive more widespread                     
discussion.  
Since the influence of the mereological denials is sometimes implicit and even                       
unacknowledged, in some sections I adopt a somewhat hermeneutic stance, not reporting explicit                         
endorsements of the mereological denials but rather elucidating how they play an tacit role in the                               
framing of a debate or in the evaluation of options. Obviously this sort of claim is always open to                                     





indivisibility of the mental in passing, as when Lowe simply declares that “the self patently does not                                 
consist of a plurality of lesser ‘selves’ acting cooperatively, despite the picturesque ‘homuncular’                         
descriptions of mental functioning advanced by some philosophers. Such descriptions are not                       




There is a long tradition of arguing for Experiential Simplicity as a step towards the rejection of                                 
materialism. Since it seems central to almost all material things that they be divisible into material                               
parts, Experiential Simplicity would preclude subjects of experience being material things.    
1
Not all arguments for simplicity are relevant to combinationism. In particular, some arguments                         
seek to show that all real substances must be simple, not just minds (see, e.g. Leibniz 1967, pp.88­89).                                   
What is relevant is the claim that something distinctive about our mental life would be impossible, were                                 
we composites. An argument of this sort appears in the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant calls it                                   
‘the Achilles of all dialectical inferences of the pure doctrine of the soul’ (A351): apparently invincible                               
but in fact fatally flawed. This label has been employed by recent interpreters, in particular in Lennon                                 



















The first clear presentation of ‘the Achilles’ comes in Plotinus (1956, pp.255­258, 342­356) with subtly                             
different versions then appearing in Proclus (1963, p.163) and Avicenna (1952, pp.47ff). It becomes                           
extremely popular during the early modern period, with a highly abbreviated version appearing in                           
Descartes’ Meditations (1985, Volume 2, p.59), and other versions being given by Butler (1860),                           
Mendelssohn (2002), Clarke (1978, Volume 3, p.759), Bayle (1991, pp.128­134), and other less                         
well­known figures like Francois Lamy (1701, pp.118­119) and Ralph Cudworth (1837). Kant judges                         
the argument a failure, but only because its conclusion (Experiential Simplicity) and the negation                           
thereof are equally beyond the possibility of human knowledge. The argument survives into the 19th                             
and 20th centuries in figures like Lotze (1894, p.158) and Brentano (1987, pp. 290­301), before                             
receding somewhat from view before the advance of both anti­metaphysical attitudes and reductive                         
versions of materialism. 
Many of these authors go on to argue from the mind’s simplicity to its immateriality,                             
immortality, or both, but I will not directly examine these further steps. The exact form that the                                 
2
argument takes, and the forms of mental unity appealed to, differ among different authors, but a                               
recognisable structure underlies many disparate versions, in which we suppose for reductio that mental                           
life inheres in a composite, distinguish an exhaustive array of possibilities, and show that each must                               









failing to notice them, but from assuming that their problems are sufficiently obvious to go without                               
saying.  
The argument proceeds thus: if a composite had mentality, we might explain this by reference                             
to mentality in only some of its parts, or by reference to mentality in all of its different parts, or                                       
independently of the mentality of its parts. Let us provisionally call the first option ‘partition’, the                               
second ‘combination’, and the third ‘emergence’ (without implying any definite affinity with any                         
particular account of ‘emergentism’, strong or weak).  
Partition is the most obviously unsatisfactory, for it merely pushes the question back one step –                               
does the part responsible for the whole’s mental life itself have parts? If so, we may repeat the question,                                     




Several authors disregard the ‘emergence’ option entirely, and take experiential combination to be                         
simply ‘what follows’ from materialism. Here are three examples: 
[S]uppose that the composite were thinking; then every part of it would be a part of the thought,                                   
but the parts would first contain the whole thought only when taken together. (Kant 1781,                             
A352) 
If we could be divided, each separate part of us would have the power of consciousness in                                 







We, therefore, the living beings that we call ourselves, are indivisible. (Hinxman Duke 1847,                           
summarising an Achilles argument in Butler 1897, quoted p.85) 
If [the soul] had the nature of body… there would be a particular soul… answering as a distinct                                   
and independent entity to every local experience. (Plotinus 1956, p.257)  
5
But why is the alternative (in which the composite has mentality independently of whether the parts do)                                 
rejected? When reasons are given, they usually involve claims like the following, which Rozemond                           
(2008) calls ‘homogeneity principles’: 
…every Power or Quality that is or can be inherent in any System of Matter is nothing                                 
else than the Sum or Aggregate of so many powers or qualities of the same kind,                               
inherent in all its Parts. (Clarke 1978, VIII p.759) 
…the action of a composite… is an aggregate of many actions or accidents, which is                             
distributed among the multitude of substances… (Kant 1781, A352)  
…no acting power can be produced in the whole, the source of which is not to be                                 
found in the constituent parts… (Mendelssohn 2002, s.II)  
6
These claims might be read as requiring that every property of a whole be found in the parts, but that                                       
would be an uncharitably extreme reading susceptible to many easy counterexamples. Instead, they                         
7
seem to be expressing something like ‘general combinationism’, the idea that the part­whole relation is                             
explanatory, however we understand the relevant sort of explanation (cf. Chapter 2, especially                         














On this reading, the proponents of the Achilles argument need a further premise to entirely rule                               
out the ‘emergence’ option. An opponent might accept the homogeneity principles, but claim that the                             
non­mental properties of the parts may transparently explain the mental properties of the whole. To rule                               
this out requires a premise denying that the mental can be transparently explained through the                             
non­mental, i.e. an assertion of the irreducibility of the mind, which I believe the authors in question                                 
plausibly would accept. Given these two premises (‘irreducibility’ and ‘homogeneity’, or in my terms                           
anti­physicalism and generalism combinationism), and given the inadequacy of ‘partition’, we can                       




The combination option is often divided into two versions: the ‘whole­in­part’ view and the                           
‘part­in­part’ view. On the former, when a composite object has some mental state, all of its parts have                                   
that mental state, so that each part has the whole mental life of the composite. On the latter view, each                                       
part has only a partial form of the composite’s mental life, which ‘add up’ when taken together. There                                   
are specific objections given to each version, but the most fundamental objection to both is that                               
“representations that are divided among different beings… never constitute a whole thought” (Kant                         
1781, A353). This claim is repeatedly brought out by means of an analogy between the parts of a                                   
composite subject and a plurality of separate people, examples of which have already appeared in                             
chapter 1, subsection 2.1, and chapter 3, subsection 1.1. As I argued in chapter 3, the most charitable                                   
interpretation of this move is that it functions to make vivid the appearance of an explanatory gap                                 





EGS). Insofar as it is the claim of an explanatory gap that lies behind this rejection, the success of the                                       
proposals I have made means the failure of the Achilles argument.  
This reading of the argument would fit neatly with my earlier suggestions about the                           
homogeneity principles used to rule out composites having mental life even though their parts do not:                               
in both cases the argument relies on the idea that properties of a whole should be transparently                                 
explainable through its parts. The analogy to groups of humans serves to show that attributing mental                               
life to the parts will do nothing to entail or explain the mental life of the whole.  
Several more specific reasons are given for rejecting particular forms of experiential                       
combination. The part­in­part view is sometimes criticised on the grounds that some particular sort of                             
mental state could not arise from other mental states. So it may be claimed that multiple simple ideas                                   
could not add up to any more complex idea, so that the whole’s thoughts would be just as crude and                                       
basic as those of its smallest parts (e.g. Bayle 1991, p.130). Alternatively, it may be claimed that it is                                     
simple ideas in the whole that are most difficult to explain, since they cannot be divided up into parts to                                       
attribute to parts of the thinker (e.g. Avicenna, 1952, p.48). Or it might be claimed that many unclear or                                     
confused ideas could not add up to any clearer or more distinct ones (e.g. Mendelssohn 2002, s.II).  
Another argument turns on the intensity of feelings: if a given feeling is ‘spread out’ among                               
many parts, and each receives only a fraction of its intensity, then the whole will be unable to add them                                       
together to form an intense feeling (e.g. Bayle 1991, p.131). A final argument focuses on how                               
inter­modal contrasts and comparisons could be made if each part of the composite were only aware of                                 
one or other sensory modality (e.g. Plotinus 1956, pp.346­347).  
Most of these specific objections have been addressed implicitly by some part of the present                             
work ­ for instance, the concerns over inter­modal integration and complex thoughts touch on the                             





touch on the possibility of phenomenal blending, discussed in chapter 5. The objection to the                             
whole­in­part view is the opposite: it avoids all the above specific difficulties at the cost of being                                 
unsatisfying as an explanation. If it has to ‘build in’ the whole’s entire mental life at the level of the                                       
parts, little is gained in our understanding of the basis of the mind, since the mental life of the parts will                                         
appear just as in need of explanation as that of the whole.  
While these arguments often appeal to relatively diverse and theory­specific doctrines about                       
mental structure, I have tried to suggest that there is a common thread to many versions: the feeling that                                     
properties of composites must be explained through their parts, and that consciousness cannot be thus                             
explained. That is, the common­thread argument has as its premises general combinationism,                       
anti­physicalism, and Anti­Combination. The defence of combinationism is thus a defence of the                         




While few contemporary philosophers of mind explicitly endorse Simplicity, they often appeal to                         
intuitions about thought experiments in which the composite nature of some entity is salient. David                             
Barnett has argued that the best explanation for some of these intuitions is that “our naïve conception of                                   
a conscious being demands that conscious beings be simple” (2008, p.309). This section discusses                           
some of these thought­experiments, evaluating what role mereological considerations may be playing,                       
with Barnett’s claim as a convenient point of reference.  
Note one initial problem for Barnett’s diagnosis: in everyday life people seem quite happy to                             
attribute consciousness to animals which are, to all appearances and by many accounts, composite.                           





human bodies are occupied by conscious beings”(p.313); second, “as our bodies are ordinarily                         
presented to us, it is easy for us to ignore their composite aspect”, for when the parts “appear to be                                       
spatially continuous with one another, the whole body presents itself to our minds, not as a system of                                   
independently existing parts, but rather as something like an ‘extended simple’.”(p.314) 
In an attempt to make these claims more compelling, Barnett imagines seeing a human body                             
through a series of ‘magical goggles’ which allow us to see its fine structure down to the level of                                     
subatomic particles. Looked at in this way, Barnett claims, our willingness to ascribe consciousness to                             





First consider two famous thought­experiments from Block 1992: the Homunculus­Head and the                       
Nation of China. In both scenarios, the outward behaviour of an intelligent human person is                             
functionally simulated by a vast collection of individual people, all able to see an array of inputs                                 
analogous to the person’s sensory inputs and a bulletin board that records the analogue of the person’s                                 
present internal state. In the ‘Homunculus Head’ case, these many people are miniscule in size, and                               
locked in the hollowed­out cranium of an outwardly­normal human body. In the ‘Nation of China’                             










Each ‘homunculus’ has a very simple, inflexible, job, defined by a single input, a single output,                               
a single internal state, and a single change of internal state. If the bulletin board is displaying the right                                     
state, and the right input comes in, that homunculus must implement their allotted output and change                               
the internal state. By allocating a homunculus to each square of the hypothetical machine­table which                             
entirely captures the input­output function of a human being, we could specify a system functionally                             
identical to that human being, and thus according to functionalism – the doctrine that all mental state                                 
types are identical with some functional type – the stipulated system must be conscious.  
Block hopes that these cases undermine functionalism, because “there is prima facie doubt                         
whether [such a system] has any mental states at all – especially… ‘qualitative states’”(p.76), a doubt                               
that then transfers to functionalism itself. More forcefully, he later refers to the attribution of                             
consciousness to such systems as “an absurdity” (p.79). Barnett argues that our responses to these cases                               
really reflect the Simplicity intuition. I think there is something to Barnett’s diagnosis, though I suspect                               
it is over­stated. One reason for caution is that Block gives something close to a direct response to a                                     
mereological construal of his thought­experiments, namely the ‘Tiny Alien Spaceships’                   
thought­experiment described in chapter 5, subsection 3. Barnett responds that we are only inclined to                             
attribute consciousness to the system of tiny spaceships because we attend to its strong isomorphism                             




Here is a second reason for caution about reading Block’s examples as related to the Mereological                               
Denials. Block 1981 offers a different thought­experiment, which serves a similar argumentative                       





device controlled by a rudimentary mechanism searching a vast look­up table which contains every                           
possible one­hour­long intelligent­seeming English conversation. If allowed to search this                   
galaxy­spanning list at superluminal speeds, the device could easily simulate intelligent conversation                       
(for an hour) merely by finding on its list a ‘canned’ conversation which matches its present one up to                                     
the last­received utterance. This device, Block thinks, is obviously not intelligent – its appearance of                             
intelligence derives from the intelligence exercised by its designers in exhaustively distinguishing the                         
cogent from the non­cogent strings. The point is that intelligent behaviour does not entail intelligence,                             
nor consciousness (insofar as intelligence is a sign thereof); the structure of the internal mechanisms                             
involved may be such as to ‘defeat’ any initial assumption of intelligent causes for intelligent                             
behaviour.  
The intuition that the Homuncular systems are not conscious might derive from similar                         
considerations – not the component subjects, but the structure of information­processing. Just as the                           
real intelligence in the Blockhead lies in the design of the huge look­up table, so we might think the                                     
real intelligence in the Homuncular systems lies in the design and allocation of the fantastically precise                               
individual roles – the running of the system gives an illusion of intelligent behaviour because of this                                 




















Something similar goes for another famous thought­experiment, John Searle’s ‘Chinese Room’                     
(1980/2003), which Barnett also diagnoses as an instance of the Simplicity intuition. Here we imagine a                               
monolingual English­speaker imprisoned in a room with a huge look­up table correlating strings of                           
Chinese with each other. The content of this table is such that when one string is sent into the room as                                         
‘input’, the string which the table instructs the human to send out as ‘output’ is an appropriate,                                 
intelligent, response. The system can pass the Turing test in Chinese, but the human operator ex                               
hypothesi understands no Chinese at all. Does the system itself (human+room+table+…) understand                       
Chinese? Searle thinks it intuitive that it does not, and Barnett suggests that this is because it is so                                     
obviously a composite. Searle’s own diagnosis, however, focuses not on the mereology of the system                             
but the way it processes information: it manipulates symbols merely as syntactic units, not as                             
meaningful representations.  
So with both Block’s and Searle’s thought­experiments, there are rival explanations available                       
for the intuitions they elicit. However, both authors go on to offer adjusted versions of their                               




In response to opponents who attribute understanding to the Chinese­Room system as a whole, Searle                             
imagines the human operator “memoriz[ing] the rules in the ledger and the data banks of Chinese                               
symbols, and [doing] all the calculations in his head” (1980/2003, p.337). Searle thinks it remains just                               
as intuitive that this person does not understand Chinese; but now the composite nature of the ‘system’                                 
is no more obvious than that of a normal Chinese speaker, so Barnett’s Simplicity diagnosis does not                                 





preserved in this adjusted version, Barnett cannot use that intuition in his case for the Simplicity                               
intuition.  
Conversely, Block’s adjustment strengthens the case for the Simplicity diagnosis. He imagines                       
a Homuncular system whose homunculi are related in such a way as to match the parts of the actual                                     
human brain in all respects which empirical psychology can discern. This is a significant change of                               
internal structure, and Block thinks that it does make a real difference to the plausibility of attributing                                 
many mental states to the system – in particular, he thinks it is plausible to attribute propositional                                 
attitudes, memories, beliefs, and so on. But “there is perhaps as much doubt about the qualia of this                                   
homunculi­headed system as there was about the qualia of the homunculi­headed Functional simulation                         
discussed earlier”(1992, p.306). 
If the original intuition (that such an attribution is not only ‘doubtful’ but ‘an absurdity’)                             
persists into this case, then the most obvious explanation seems to be mereological – the only notable                                 
difference between the ‘psychofunctional Homunculus­Head’ and a normal human is that the former                         
contains component subjects. So this intuition is germane to Barnett’s Simplicity diagnosis. That is, we                             
might plausibly think that the negative intuition about the initial Homuncular systems’ consciousness                         
was over­determined: it reflected both the Simplicity intuition and also a judgement that the structure of                               
information processing involved was inappropriate. Having removed the latter factor, any residual                       
negative intuition may be attributed to the Simplicity intuition.  
In fact, Barnett himself offers a similar thought­experiment. He first observes that while we can                             
“consider what it might have been like to be Descartes as he wrote the Meditations, or to be Hobbes as                                       
he fled the English Civil War”, it seems absurd to “consider what it might have been like to be this pair                                         
of philosophers during these events”(2008 p.312). To remove the confounding factor of degree and                           





someone’s cerebral hemispheres, training them to exactly imitate the role played by those hemispheres,                           
and then putting them into someone’s head as a replacement for the hemispheres. Ex hypothesi, the                               
person continues to behave exactly as before, and all psychology above the level of the hemisphere                               
remains true of them. Yet they are now the limiting case of a psychofunctional Homunculus­Head.                             
Barnett thinks it is still absurd to think that the pair themselves might be conscious.  
In conclusion, it seems to me that some but not all of the intuitions Barnett discusses admit of                                   
non­mereological explanations. If we refuse to attribute consciousness to Searle’s Chinese Room and                         
Block’s original Homunculus­Heads, this may well be due to their manner of information­processing,                         
not their mereological structure. However, negative intuitions about the psychofunctional                   
Homunculus­Heads, and Barnett’s hemisphere­imitating­Early­Moderns, probably reflect the             
Simplicity intuition. This supports a limited endorsement of Barnett’s suggestion that the idea of the                             
simple soul still exercises an influence in contemporary philosophy of mind, even though most                           
philosophers reject it. But Barnett proceeds no further: he takes intuitions as evidence of                           
naïvely­accepted principles, but does not seek for or provide arguments that might explain the                           
attractiveness of those principles. Given the connections among the mereological denials, noted                       




Much existing discussion of experiential combination stems from the recent revival of interest in                           









composition, from the ‘combination problem’ supposed to face panpsychism (Seager 1995, p.280). To                         
a significant degree, the viability of panpsychism turns on its explanatory potential, and to a significant                               
degree its explanatory potential relies on experiential combination. Consequently many critiques of                       
panpsychism involve arguing for Anti­Combination, and the arguments that arise in this process have                           




A certain widespread narrative about reasons for considering panpsychism starts with dissatisfaction                       
about physicalism as an explanation of consciousness (Nagel 1986, Seager 1995, Chalmers 1995,                         
Strawson 2006). If a non­mental understanding of physical matter leaves an ‘explanatory gap’ between                           
physics and consciousness, and all physicalistic attempts to ‘close the gap’ are abandoned, one natural                             
alternative is to accept the fundamentality of consciousness. Yet consciousness does not seem to                           
actually vary independently of the physical, suggesting that they are linked by a posteriori nomological                             
necessities, even if not by a priori conceptual necessities. The resultant picture is one on which                               
fundamental psychophysical laws ‘bridge the gap’, connecting physical and mental properties in an                         
epistemically opaque way, just as different physical properties are related by fundamental physical                         
laws.  
So far this is not necessarily panpsychist; strong emergentists might also posit fundamental                         
psychophysical laws. The next move is to point out that fundamental laws tend to be simple and                                 







basic elements – not attaching a basic element to a precisely­specified sort of rare and complex                               
structure. Moreover, it is arguably this simplicity and generality that makes physics an explanatorily                           
satisfying framework – by contrast, the more narrowly applicable ‘emergence laws’ posited by                         
emergentists seem unsatisfyingly ad hoc. Consequently, we should expect psychophysical laws to put                         
consciousness more or less everywhere: if the mental is fundamental (Cf. Blamauer 2011), then                           
panpsychism is the natural conclusion.  
This is not the only argument for panpsychism; there are other considerations about intrinsic vs.                             
relational natures, and about reconciling physical with mental causation, which have been appealed to                           
(Strawson 2006, Coleman 2009, Rosenberg 2004). But this two­stage argument (labelled by Seager                         
1995 the ‘genetic argument’ for panpsychism) is my interest here, and this argument saddles                           
panpsychism with a certain explanatory burden. Because it seeks to add new fundamental laws only at                               
the basic level, it still needs to explain how complex things like human minds are ‘built up’ from the                                     
basic experientiality of matter. In short, it must be able to provide the sort of transparent, intelligible                                 
explanation of human­level consciousness that physicalism could not.  
Unfortunately, there is a widely­voiced fear, coming from both opponents of and sympathisers                         
of panpsychism, that this explanation is impossible: that experiences simply do not combine in the                             
necessary way. Sometimes this appears simply as an admission of bafflement at the idea (e.g. Nagel                               
1986, p.50), but just as often it is claimed as conceptually evident that no set of facts about a multitude                                       
of related minds can explain a composite mind: as Van Cleve puts it, “the prospect of this seems no                                     
brighter than of the mental following from the purely physical.”(1990, p.219, cf. chapter 3, section 1)                               
Others have argued that even with experiential combination, panpsychism would necessarily yield a                         






If there are billions of phenomenally­qualitied ultimates bustling away in the composite                       
structure of my mind… the different phenomenalities of each one ought to be accessible to                             




Not all panpsychists are combinationists. Indeed, while most panpsychists deny Simplicity (because                       
they attribute consciousness to familiar composite objects like brains) and Anti­Nesting (because they                         
attribute consciousness to the simpler parts of such objects), there are still exceptions. Leibnizian                           
‘monadists’ could affirm Experiential Simplicity by maintaining that all and only fundamental physical                         
simples are conscious, and each of us is one of them, while Tononi (2009, 2012) provides an example                                   
of a panpsychist (or something extremely close to it) affirming Anti­Nesting.  
But even among panpsychists who accept Experiential Compositeness and Experiential                   
Nesting, we can distinguish those who do and those who do not endorse Experiential Combinationism.                             
There are a number of subtle boundaries to draw here, which have been marked with a number of                                   
different labels, such as ‘constitutive’ and ‘emergent’ (Chalmers forthcoming­b), ‘reductive’ and                     
‘emergentist’ (Goff 2010), ‘constitutive’ and ‘non­constitutive’ (Mørch 2013), or ‘constitutive’ and                     
‘causal’ (Mørch ms). Sometimes, by contrast, the distinction drawn is between different sorts of                           
emergence, such as ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ (Chalmers 2006), ‘conservative’ and ‘radical’ (Seager                       
forthcoming), or ‘weak’, ‘strong’, and ‘brute’ (Mørch ms).  
Some of these distinctions concern the panpsychist’s metaphysical claims ­ does                     
microexperience ground macroexperience? Others concern the panpsychist’s explanatory claims ­ does                     
microexperience explain macroexperience, and if so by what standard of intelligibility? Different                       





imply a priori deducibility). But overall a rough division can be marked out between a camp of                                 
panpsychists who seek a tighter relationship (explanatory and metaphysical) between conscious wholes                       
and parts, and those who prefer to loosen this relationship as much as is compatible with retaining some                                   
theoretical advantage for panpsychism over non­panpsychist forms of physicalism and radical                     
emergentism. In this work I have used the labels ‘constitutive’ and ‘emergentist’ for these two broad                               
camps, taking the former to be committed to combinationism.   
12
This dependence on experiential combination is sometimes used as an argument within the                         
panpsychist camp, against constitutive versions and in support of emergentist versions. It is also often                             
used as in attacks on panpsychism as a whole, by critics who assume that the only or best forms of                                       
panpsychism must be constitutive. One common reason for this assumption is the perception that                           
non­constitutive panpsychism offers no explanatory advantage over non­panpsychist emergentism.                 
Whatever the merits of this assumption, the important point is that ‘the combination problem’ has been                               
used as a weapon against constitutive panpsychism, both by other panpsychists and by external critics.                             




In this section I consider cases intermediate between what we would normally count as one person and                                 












persons. I will argue that this kind of intermediate case is much easier to accommodate and make sense                                   




Difficulties of individuation arise particularly in two complementary pathological cases: the split­brain                       
syndrome and dissociative identity disorder.  
The details of the split­brain case are complex, and have been ably explained by others                             
(Gazzaniga et al. 1962, Sperry 1964, Nagel 1971), so I will merely note the essentials: when the major                                   
direct connection between the two cerebral hemispheres is severed, the patient behaves normally in                           
everyday life but shows dissociated responses when given dissociated stimuli. That is, if some stimulus                             
is presented only to the sense organs connected to one hemisphere, the other remains unaware of it, and                                   
the patient responds (intelligently, flexibly, and to all appearances consciously) only with the means                           
available to that hemisphere, such as one hand, and speech in the case of the dominant hemisphere,                                 
while simultaneously ignoring it (intelligently, flexibly, and to all appearances consciously) with the                         
means available to the other hemisphere.  
There is thus a lack of mutual availability between what seem to be two streams of processing,                                 
each associated with different identifiable physical structures, but with little difference in personality.                         
Dissociative Identity Disorder (previously called Multiple Personality Disorder) presents a                   
complementary profile: multiple ‘alters’ which may differ radically in personality, including memories,                       





where different alters claim to be simultaneously present, or to have ‘telepathic’ access to each other’s                               
thoughts, have also been reported).  
There are many views on how to describe these cases. They might involve two people sharing a                                 
head, or merely a single person whose thoughts and experiences are dissociated from each other in                               
interesting ways. We might take the same line on both cases or we might, impressed with the                                 
differences between them, describe them in different ways – e.g. Tye 2003 rejects a ‘two person’                               
account of the split­brain case in part because he thinks that Dissociative Identity Disorder offers a                               
more compelling picture of what ‘two people in one body’ looks like. A particularly interesting                             
approach to the split­brain case is suggested by Bayne & Chalmers 2003: a single subject has a single                                   
phenomenal field within which are two functionally divided clusters of functionally unified                       
experiences. In a slogan, there is phenomenal unity without access­unity. Other approaches involve the                           
right hemisphere being a highly sophisticated but wholly unconscious automaton, or the patient’s mind                           
being unified most of the time and then split only during experiments, or conscious unity being                               




A lot of non­pathological cases suggest the beginnings of ‘internal division’, when mental conflicts                           
become so intense as to prompt descriptions like ‘I am at war with myself’, or ‘I am enslaved by my                                       
passions’. This phenomenon is summarised by Isaiah Berlin thus: 
'I am slave to no man'; but may I not be a slave to nature? Or to my own 'unbridled' passions?                                         
Are these not so many species of the identical genus 'slave' ­­ some political or legal, others                                 
moral or spiritual? Have not men had the experience of liberating themselves from spiritual                           





of a self which dominates, and, on the other, of something in them which is brought to heel?                                   
(1957, p.17) 
Berlin is critical of this line of thought, but documents its extensive history, in Kant, Rousseau, Plato,                                 
the Stoics, and others. In some writers the inner division does not seem to be strictly a mereological                                   
one: when Kant distinguishes the transcendental and the empirical self, the relation between them is                             
clearly something more abstruse than that of two parts of one whole. But in other writers, of whom                                   
Plato and Freud are the most notable examples, it does seem to lead to an account of the mind as really                                         
composite, containing reason, spirit, and appetite (2000, p.111 ff) or ego, superego, and id (1923). And                               
even writers who do not speak of particular parts do sometimes discuss of the importance of                               
establishing and maintaining a singleness of psyche, i.e. of avoiding inner division (Korsgaard 2009,                           
Frankfurt 1987). Others analyse even everyday decision­making as involving the collaboration of                       
‘homunculi’, quasi­agential systems in the brain (Selfridge 1959, Dennett 1991, cf. De Sousa 1976). 
It is not clear how much of this talk is best taken as asserting a literal compositeness in human                                     
minds, and even if a given statement does assert compositeness, it is not clear what type of entity the                                     
parts are meant to be – Platonic ‘appetite’, for instance, seems to be a mental being of some sort, with                                       
goals that guide its actions, but should we think of it as a conscious subject with its own                                   
phenomenology? And if I fail to achieve genuine unity of self, what or who are the things which exist                                     
in place of the single self which does not exist? I certainly do not mean to insist on a literal,                                       
metaphysical, reading of all such talk, but I think it indicates a realm of interesting questions about the                                   
individuation of persons, just as the pathological cases in their own way raised such questions.  
Finally, alongside these real cases we can place a variety of interesting imagined cases                           
employed in philosophical thought experiments. Parfit 1984 slightly adjusts the split­brain case by                         
giving each hemisphere autonomous control over half the body, allowing ‘the patient’ to                         





Moreover, he imagines being able to switch quickly and safely between a divided and an undivided                               
mode, putting additional pressure on the idea that in the divided mode there are two distinct people (and                                   
connecting this example with the fission and fusion cases discussed in the next section). Van Inwagen                               




The questions raised by these cases are complex and multifarious, and go well beyond the mere truth of                                   
combinationism. I do not wish to take a stance on the proper description of each of the normal,                                   
pathological, and hypothetical beings described. Rather, I think that how we approach questions about                           
them is systematically shifted by the truth or falsity of combinationism. This is best seen by considering                                 
an entity for which we are not intuitively inclined to support an analogue to Anti­Combination, i.e.                               
something we naturally regard as explanatorily divisible.  
For instance, consider the question: how many brains does the split­brain patient have? We                           
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might say ‘two’, or we might (more likely) say ‘one’: the plausibility of the two answers could be                                   
adjusted by imaging progressively greater surgical disconnection. But even when we are not sure which                             
answer to give, this uncertainty seems merely semantic: rather than being baffled by the situation, we                               
are merely unsure how to describe a physical situation which we intuitively understand fairly well. This                               
is because we can always shift away from a language of discrete countable brains, and explain what is                                   
going on in terms of the neural parts and their relations to one another. We could say, for instance, that                                       







way they were before. And insofar as brains are explanatorily divisible – insofar as knowing that brain                                 
parts exist and knowing how they are related suffices to explain everything about whole brains – this                                 
tells us everything we need to know.  
If conscious minds too were explanatorily divisible, then we might similarly duck the question                           
of number and give an adequate explanation of the mental situation in terms of a change in the relations                                     
among two mental parts which were already there in the normal case. But if we accept                               
Anti­Combination, a description in terms of parts will simply not address our questions about the                             
presence or absence of a single whole mind, and conversely a description in terms of a single mind will                                     
leave open whether or not there are a plurality of component minds. The two modes of description                                 
stand independent, and hence we face a stark choice between them: as Nagel puts it, “Something… in                                 
the ordinary conception of experience, leads to the demand for an account of these cases which the                                 
same conception makes it impossible to provide.” (1971, p.409) 
As well as removing this sense of deep difficulty, a combinationist framework would often be                             
more flexible, because relations among parts can be matters of degree, whereas being one mind or two                                 
minds cannot (it is little help to say that the split­brain patient has one­and­a­half minds). Moreover,                               
this lets us finesse the question of whether, and at what point, experiences of internal division literally                                 
threaten the metaphysical singleness of the person. If all persons are, even in the best cases, structures                                 
of interacting sub­persons, then a loss or gain of agreement and coordination among these components                             
can involve both a literal division in the mind, and also a mere change of degree in the character of a                                         
single composite mind. There need be no sudden shift from one mind having difficulties to two minds                                 
in uneasy co­operation, but only a gradual degeneration in the quality of interactions.  
So an account of experiential combination would provide greater conceptual flexibility in                       









The last section reviewed difficulties in synchronic individuation; this section shifts to difficulties in                           
diachronic individuation in cases of ‘fission’ and ‘fusion’. In these cases, though we can count persons                               
easily enough at the beginning and end of a certain process, we struggle to connect those counted                                 




Fission here means that relations supposedly sufficient for numerical identity hold between a single                           
person at one time and two or more persons at later times; fusion means that such relations hold                                   
between a single person at one time and two or more persons at earlier times. I will sometimes just talk                                       
about fission for convenience, but everything said will apply also to fusion.  
What counts as fission or fusion depends on the criteria for personal identity. For example, if                               
having appropriately­caused apparent memories (what Shoemaker 1970 calls ‘quasi­memories’) of a                     
past person’s experience is sufficient for being that person, a fission case need only involve two people                                 
who simultaneously quasi­remember the same past person’s experiences (see Williams 1956, and,                       
according to Noonan 2003, pp.51­52, Leibniz 1981, p.245). But if identity requires sameness of brain,                             
then producing apparent memories in some other brain is irrelevant, and a fission case must involve                               





same brain’ as the same past person. A case like this, inspired by the split­brain syndrome, has become                                   
the standard example, appearing prominently in the work of Wiggins (1967), Shoemaker (1984), and                           
Parfit (1971, 1984).   
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A variety of accounts can be offered of how to analyse such cases, holding variously that the                                 
original person does not survive at all and thus should fear fission, that they survive as one or other                                     
resultant person, that they survive as both somehow, that they survive as both yet are identical to                                 
neither individually, or that they were never a single person to begin with. But all options come with                                   
some significant drawback. Thus it has been seen as an attraction of some theories, in particular those                                 
on which the person is a simple immaterial substance of some kind, that they need not allow fission                                   
cases to arise at all (cf. Noonan 2003, pp.15­17). On such views, defended be, e.g. Swinburne, 1997                                 
and Chisholm 1976, persons are metaphysically indivisible, and such things as continuity of brain and                             
memories are merely usual indicators of, but not constitutive of, the persistence of such persons. Thus                               
while the relations that provide evidence of personal identity can be split, those constitutive of it are                                 
not, and there are no genuine fission or fusion cases.  
But why is this a theoretical advantage? For even if human persons are metaphysically                           
indivisible, and hence immune to fission and fusion, the same surely cannot be said for all things.                                 
Ships, rocks, axes, planets, droplets, waves, amoebae, bushes, and all the rest of the world’s furniture                               
are never claimed to share the indivisibility of persons, or to possess any deeply unified soul. For these                                   
objects, therefore, fission cases remain possible – indeed, in many cases actual. So what theoretical                             











unlike such risible expedients as claiming that only Canadian persons are metaphysically indivisible?                         
Precluding fission for one particular subset of persons does nothing to remove the problem of fission,                               
but merely restricts its scope slightly. By contrast, precluding fission for persons is often regarded as an                                 
effective (albeit costly) way of removing a problem.  
The natural explanation is that the problem of fission for persons is not merely one instance of                                 
a general problem of fission for material things, but a distinctive problem which does not arise for                                 
material things. That is, persons (and by extension conscious subjects in general) differ essentially from                             
other objects in a way that would make their fission, were it possible, distinctively problematic. The                               
identity conditions of persons hold them to a higher standard than those for material objects. I think a                                   
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major reason why fission and fusion of persons seems so problematic is Anti­Combination. When                           
Anti­Combination is held together with Simplicity, so that persons are both explanatorily and                         
metaphysically indivisible, no problem arises. But if one abandons Simplicity while retaining a tacit                           
commitment to Anti­Combination, fission cases are possible yet incomprehensible.  
Some authors say this explicitly. For instance, Zuboff 1990 says of a brain­chopping sort of case:  
[W]e may easily think of the brains themselves in terms of fractions. Thus, though we might be                                 
a bit puzzled about [the identity of whole brains], if we like we can just fall back on talking                                     
about there being half of the original brain with you and half now over there with the other. But                                     
one could never talk about the subject or his experience like that. (p.41) 
Similarly, Unger discusses the doctrine that “A subject is absolutely indivisible. A subject's body and                             










The role of Anti­Combination in making person­fission seem less tractable than fission of other things                             
is best seen by contrasting the significance of extrinsic determination of identity in each case. This is an                                   
issue that arises especially on the ‘no­branching’ approach to fission, according to which the original                             
survives as neither of the resulting persons, and hence ceases to exist. Shoemaker, Parfit, Nozick, Van                               
Inwagen, and others have all advanced something like this view. The problem is that this move allows                                 
for identity to be determined by ‘extrinsic’ factors, in a way which is intuitively troubling. That is (to                                   
adapt the formulation defended by Noonan, 2003, p.137), it allows for a single series of events to                                 
constitute either the continuous survival of a single person, or else the death of one person and the                                   
immediate production of another, depending on what happens somewhere else, to someone else who is                             
not involved in those events. 
For instance, in the brain­bisection case, if the left half­brain were destroyed and the right                             
transplanted into a new body, the original person would survive in that body. But if the right half­brain                                   
were also transplanted into a new body, the original person would not survive, and someone else would                                 
wake up in the new body. The events involving the left half­brain have every intrinsic factor relevant to                                   
personal survival, but may not count if something else happens independently in another room. To                             
many this has seemed inappropriate (see e.g. Williams 1956, 1970, Noonan 2003, Ch.7, 12).  
Now contrast this with the case of something explanatorily divisible, like a rock (I take the                               
following examples from Unger 1990, pp.164­166). Suppose we split it in half. Now we have two                               
rocks, and intuitively neither is the original. Suppose we had taken the same rock, and sanded away                                 
precisely one half of it; intuitively the remaining portion is the original rock, now smaller, despite the                                 





was not identical with the original. Paradox? Extrinsic determination of identity? While we may be                             
uncertain what exactly to say of the original rock’s fate, there is no deep intuitive difficulty. For we                                   
have a language available that can describe everything that happened in a non­paradoxical manner: we                             
can say that the original rock was composed of two rocky halves.  
When the rock is split, these two physical objects simply stop being physically connected as                             
they had previously been; each persists through the process, and neither’s identity depends on extrinsic                             
factors. When we sand away half of it, one of these two physical objects is destroyed, while the other                                     
remains intact – again, the persistence of each depends entirely on changes in its intrinsic properties. It                                 
seems to me that these descriptions give rise to no profound metaphysical puzzlement: they are                             
straightforward and perspicuous. They do leave some uncertainty about what to say has happened to                             
original rock, but this is merely a question of how to describe events which we perfectly well                                 
understand. But the same does not hold true of person­fission, because knowing what happens to a                               
person’s parts seems to leave open the fate of the person themselves.  
Moreover, there is a way to describe the whole rock’s fate which does not involve any                               
objectionable extrinsic determination of identity. We do this by saying that what has happened in the                               
splitting case is that the rock has become a scattered object; it persists, but no longer counts as a single                                       
rock (since those must be all in one piece). It is now a pair (i.e. a mereological fusion) of rocks, a                                         
change in status concomitant to each half’s change from the category of ‘integrated portion of a rock’                                 
to that of ‘rock’. Now, if we allow that the rock in the second case persists as its one remaining half, it                                           
remains true that the extrinsic fact of the other half’s existence determines whether the remaining half is                                 
or is not identical to the original rock. But look at what is being determined extrinsically here: not                                   
whether that half­sized bit of stone is the original rock or is an entirely discrete object, but whether it is                                       





the original rock, a question we could never cogently have expected to be determined intrinsically. It                               
obviously cannot be an intrinsic fact about one part of me whether there are any other discrete parts;                                   
that logically must depend on the existence of other things.  
By saying that the rock persists not as a rock but as a pair of rocks, we have ‘domesticated’ the                                       
troubling kind of extrinsicness found in no­branching accounts of person­fission, by turning it into the                             
natural and expected extrinsicness of whether there is more of something. We can do this because for                                 
the half­sized rocky object, the alternative to being identical with the original rock is not being an                                 
entirely different thing, but being part of it, and to that extent ‘retaining’ the intimate connection which,                                 
in the absence of other parts, would have sufficed for a judgement of identity. If combinationism is                                 




Rejecting anti­combination would not in itself resolve the issues around personal fission and fusion.                           
But it would allow us to extend to persons whatever resolution we might think we have in the case of                                       
rocks and other divisible physical things, by adopting the ‘mereological approach’ to fission and fusion                             
described in chapter 8, subsection 2.5. We might describe the two fission­products or                         
fusion­ingredients as parts of the one person they came from or became, and thereby finesse the                               
difficulty over extrinsic determination. We might say that a person survives fission as a pair of persons                                 
(and that fusion turns a pair into a person), or we might not say that but maintain that ‘what matters’ is                                         
preserved because their parts survive (and that fusion preserves ‘what matters’ because each person                           





we employ, for the substantial truth is given by an account of what has befallen the parts of the persons                                       
involved, leaving indeterminate which person­level description best fits this.   
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Obviously there are still significant questions and puzzles. For one thing, different accounts of                           
what a person is will yield different accounts of what a part of a person is: if persons are conscious                                       
bodies, the relevant parts of them may be conscious organs, or conscious half­organs or sub­organs; if                               
persons are essentially psychological beings defined by their memories, commitments, and personality                       
traits, then the relevant parts of them may instead be sub­personas, clusters of drives and values which                                 
need not be realised in any specific organ. Another issue concerns the qualitative similarity of parts. If                                 
someone splits into two indiscernible copies, what parts of them survive as each copy? Conversely, if                               
two people merge, the resultant person might display recognisable personality traits from each,                         
allowing for at least some cogency in observationally identifying the ‘parts’ each has become. But it                               
might not: they might be seamlessly blended, or the two original people might have been so intensely                                 
similar that whatever seems like an echo of one is equally an echo of the other. While I cannot here try                                         




The previous sections considered abnormal cases in which it seems intuitively that something odd is                             
happening to the subjects involved. By contrast, the arguments considered in this section involve                           










and Peter Unger, suggest that under standard materialist assumptions, any situation we would count as                             
containing “one person” actually contains multiple overlapping persons. This is held to be sufficiently                           
absurd to motivate revising or abandoning those standard materialist assumptions so as to avoid such                             




I distinguish three arguments of increasing complexity, each turning on divisibility: the first, divisibility                           
into salient, functional parts like heads and brains; the second, divisibility into arbitrary parts like top                               
halves; the third, divisibility into overlapping parts with equal claim to be ‘the whole’. In each case,                                 
three plausible premises seem to imply that these parts are conscious subjects in their own right,                               
thinking and feeling simultaneously with the whole.  
Those premises are: that the parts in question are intrinsically suitable to be conscious; that                             
consciousness is an intrinsic property; that the effects of the other parts on the parts in question are not                                     
such as to harm, suppress, or disrupt its consciousness­generating activities. The first premise is                           
supported by the observation that the parts in question would plausibly remain conscious if the other                               
parts were removed, as long the right external support (supplies of nutrients, air, and water, etc.) were                                 
provided. The second and third premises are intuitive; it seems that I could be conscious even if                                 
everything I think about was in fact illusory, and it seems that what the neck, say, provides to the head                                       






The first sort of multiplication problem involves parts which ordinary language already                       
recognises. For instance, Merricks claims that admitting the existence of brains leads to an                           
“unacceptable multiplication of thinkers”:  
[W]ithin the region occupied by a human organism there is a conscious human                         
organism and a conscious brain. The brain is not identical with the organism; they                           
differ in properties and parts. So… there are at least two conscious entities within                           
that region… (2001, p.49) 
The second sort of multiplication involves not just familiar, well­organised parts of things, but all the                               
other parts they have, such as small parts (e.g. ‘my cells’), arbitrary sections (e.g. ‘my left half’),                                 
complements of more intuitive parts (e.g. ‘all of me except my left foot), and maybe even scattered                                 
parts (e.g. ‘my left foot plus three cells from my right ear’). Plausibly, for many such parts, I could                                     
continue to exist, and to think, if I came to consist of nothing more than them – for instance, if I                                         
became ‘all of me except my left foot’, I would still be a conscious thinker.  
The third form of multiplication, laid out canonically in Unger 1980 and sometimes called ‘the                             
Problem of the Many’, involves all­but­indistinguishable entities which differ only in their                       
‘questionable’ microscopic parts. For instance, consider an atom which is only indeterminately part of                           
me, perhaps just barely adhering to a skin cell. Such peripheral atoms seem to be neither determinately                                 
part of me, nor determinately outside me. Now consider the entity which contains all of me except this                                   
atom, and the entity which contains this atom as well. Not only do both seem to be conscious thinkers                                     
(by the argument above), they also both seem to be ‘equally strong candidates’ for being me – there is                                     
no non­arbitrary reason to privilege one as a person and relegate the other to being a mere person­like                                   






From the above reflections Unger concludes that if persons are divisible material things, then                           
either there are trillions of people where we thought there was only one, or there are none at all.                                     
Judging the first option absurd, he has at times either denied the existence of people, including himself                                 
(1979), or endorsed substance dualism (2004).  
Merricks’ response is more subtle, since he remains technically a substance monist. But in                           
order to avoid admitting that “my thoughts are not mine alone, but shared” (p.49), Merricks denies the                                 
existence of brains, other internal organs, arbitrary sections, and all­but­one of the all­but­indiscernible                         
entities involved in the Problem of the Many. My atomic parts exist, but they only compose one thing,                                   
which has special emergent conscious properties. Thus consciousness is intrinsic, but my                       
foot­complement, were it to exist, would differ from me intrinsically, not just in lacking a foot but in                                   
lacking certain irreducible mental powers not determined by the microphysical facts. Merricks admits                         
that we could never identify, from the outside, which precisely­specified set of atoms is the one which                                 
composes the person, and which sets compose nothing: thus although he is not a substance dualist, his                                 




Merricks and Unger both adopt views which avert the threatened multiplication of minds, but since                             
neither extends these views to other things, they must still accept the multiplication of most material                               
objects. This sort of multiplication is considered acceptable: but why?  
Here is one answer: our practice of counting objects is fundamentally a tool for organising,                             





that one table” or “there are three tables in this room”, what I should intend, and perhaps all I do intend,                                         
is to guide people’s attention to, and inform people about, the nearby matter and its suitability for                                 
resting things on. The difference between ‘two tables’ and ‘one table’ is not really a numerical                               
difference, but a difference in the things that can be done with the matter in question – e.g. whether it                                       
can be placed in two separate rooms and remain useful. Since we are not really concerned with the                                   
numbers of things, we should not be worried by the multiplication of things. Resources for the                               
development of this approach can be found in Lewis 1993. There he reviews several proposed                             
responses to a more­or­less Ungerian problem, rejecting some and endorsing others, in particular                         
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endorsing the appeal to ‘partial identity’. 
What is partial identity? Lewis, following Armstrong (1978) suggests that “the real opposite of                           
identity is… not distinctness in the sense of non­identity, but rather distinctness in the sense of                               
non­overlap”. Where two things overlap, they “are not entirely identical, not entirely distinct, but some                             
of each.”(p.33) That is, the sharing of parts is treated as a partial form of identity. With a larger or                                       
smaller overlap, then, things can be said to be more or less identical. What is useful about this way of                                       
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speaking is that it lets us interpret everyday talk of “two things” as meaning not “two distinct things”                                   
but “two wholly or largely discrete [i.e. non­overlapping] things”.  
This offers a way of interpreting numerical statements about multipliable entities: rather than                         
interpreting “there is one chair here” as “there is a chair here such that all chairs here are identical to                                       
that chair”, we should interpret it as “there is a chair there such that all chairs here significantly overlap                                     
with that chair.” Similar treatments will be possible for other numbers. Of course, howmuch overlap is                                 









things are similarly vague and context­sensitive. For crowds, a bit of overlap is par for the course; for                                   
chairs, absolute discreteness is the expected standard. The important thing is that the apparent conflict                             





If we can learn to live with widespread multiplication of objects, why not with multiplication of                               
persons too? Merricks and Unger both deny that persons are on a par with objects in this regard: it is                                       
this difference between multiplication of inanimate objects (tolerable) and multiplication of conscious                       
subjects (intolerable) that drives them to posit a profound ontological divide between the two. But why                               
is multiplication of conscious subjects specifically so absurd?  
One argument is that if subjects were ‘multipliable’, our self­knowledge would be undermined,                         
since we could not know which of the many subjects we were. I do not know, for instance, if people                                       
really refer to me with their words and thoughts about ‘Luke’, or to some overlapping person. Merricks                                 
claims that “there seems to be no way to tell whether one is the ‘maximal’ object… or just one of the                                         
countless wannabes.”(2001, p.103; similar points are made by Unger, 1980, p.461­462). In chapter 7 I                             
argued that while there is something to this concern about self­identification, but that given certain                             
theses about the metaphysics and semantics of indexical reference, and the ethics of self­interest, a                             
limited inability to self­identify is unproblematic.  
But even beyond these epistemological concerns, both authors display sheer intuitive revulsion                       








2001, where he describes it as “simply incredible”(p.95). Indeed, the need to avoid positing “a mighty                               
host of conscious, reflective, pain­ and pleasure­feeling objects now sitting in my chair”(2001, p.95) is                             
his primary argument for consciousness being something over and above the microphysical. But he                           
rejects analogous arguments about inanimate physical objects, because “unlike the claim that there are                           
two conscious beings wearing my shirt, the claim that there are two objects upon the pedestal [where                                 
we would normally say ‘a statue stands’]… is not absurd.”(p.106)  
Similar judgements of relative absurdity appear in Unger’s later work . Discussing a situation                         
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that we would normally describe as ‘one person eating chocolate’, he says: 
The thought that there are, in my situation, many individuals all experiencing is far                           
more disturbing, to my mind, than the thought that, in this situation, there are many                             
entities each chewing, or many each digesting. With the digesting of some chocolate                         
candy, say, there seems little more at stake than just a matter of our choosing what                               




I believe that a large part of this differential absurdity stems from Anti­Combination. Because the                             
doctrines that can make multiplication tolerable turn on partial identity, they cannot be extended                           
straightforwardly to explanatorily indivisible persons. The proposal that we count things by                       
discreteness, not distinctness, made sense because two things which share 99.9% of their parts are, to                               
all intents and purposes, the same thing – the shared parts, and their powers, are what interest us, not                                     
what they are grouped with. To put it another way, the second thing is not really anything ‘in addition                                     








explanatorily indivisible, so that the consciousness of a whole cannot be reductively analysed into the                             
consciousness of its parts, then even when two subjects share 99.9% of their physical parts, all the                                 
consciousness of the second is something entirely new, not to be explained in terms of a negligible                                 
addition to the already­recognised consciousness of the shared portion. Its experiential features – its                           
perspective, its phenomenal field, its stream of consciousness – are entirely ‘in addition to’ those of the                                 
first subject. Call this ‘Additionalism’ about experience.  
Given Additionalism, we cannot allow that I and a trillion other subjects can be ‘counted as                               
one’ because our streams of consciousness ‘overlap almost entirely’, or that we should treat our talk of                                 
‘persons’ as just a device for talking about the mental parts, or mental ‘stuff’, that distinct persons                                 
comprise, and may almost entirely share. This is what makes multiplication of thinkers seem                           
intolerable: each additional thinker must be regarded as a whole new person, implausibly squeezed into                             
the same head, rather than as just a new and slightly different way of drawing a boundary around the                                     
same mental reality.  
Of course, if Experiential Simplicity is true, then the problems do not arise in the first place,                                 
just as if Experiential Simplicity is true, then fission and fusion cases for persons cannot arise. If we                                   
hold fast to there being an important difference between conscious subjects and inanimate objects in all                               
these cases, perhaps what this should teach us is that conscious subjects are not divisible things. What                                 
is difficult, it appears, is to accept Anti­Combination while denying Experiential Simplicity (a lesson                           
suggested also by the discussions in sections 1 and 7).  
Additionalism flows from Anti­Combination. Undermining Anti­Combination will therefore               
undermine Additionalism, and with it much of the intuitive support for Unger’s and Merricks’                           
arguments. The problem of self­identification is not directly removed by denying Additionalism, but it                           





combinationism removes the absurdity of multiplication of subjects. It does not necessarily make such                           




In section 1 I discussed a historically popular argument deriving Experiential Simplicity from                         
Anti­Combination. In contemporary philosophy of mind, explicit defences of Simplicity are rare , but                         
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there is some debate over the weaker principle I have called ‘Anti­Nesting’: that while a subject of                                 
experience may be composite, its parts cannot themselves be subjects. Anti­Nesting is defended by                           
Putnam (1965) and Tononi (2012), and criticised by Block (1978) and Schwitzgebel (2014).  
Putnam’s influential formulation of functionalism stipulates, in his suggested schematic                   
definition of ‘pain’, that “No organism capable of feeling pain possesses a decomposition into parts                             
which separately [satisfy this definition]”(1965/2003, p.215), this stipulation being intended “to rule                       
out such ‘organisms’… as swarms of bees as single pain­feelers.”(p.216) But, as Schwitzgebel notes,                           
Putnam “doesn’t explain why this possibility is absurd for actual swarms of bees, much less [for any]                                 
possible future evolutionary development of a swarm of conscious bees...”(2014, p.11)  
A more developed defence of Anti­Nesting comes in Tononi’s explanation of what he calls ‘the                             
exclusion principle’, part of his ‘Information Integration Theory of Consciousness’. Consciousness is                       












Tononi’s defence of this principle involves two major themes: phenomenology and parsimony. First, he                           
appeals to the phenomenological claim that “experience is exclusive” (p.59), already discussed in                         
chapter 4 section 1. I argued there that any plausible sense of the ‘boundedness’ of experience fails to                                   
provide an argument for Anti­Combination or Anti­Nesting. Physical objects can overlap and contain                         
each other, but also have definite borders, and can be said to ‘encompass what they do, and nothing                                   
more.’ And the fact that we lack conscious access to a given process hardly entails that the process is                                     
not itself conscious – clearly it could be conscious in another mind, and even for our own mind there                                     
might be processes that are phenomenally conscious but not access­conscious. The argument makes                         
sense only with the unmotivated premise that were two consciousness things to compose a third, each                               
would be conscious of everything the other was conscious of.  
Tononi’s other justification for the Exclusion Principle is that to allow nesting or overlapping                           
consciousnesses would be unparsimonious, since given the ‘most conscious’ complex (the one with the                           
most integrated information), we gain nothing explanatorily by positing additional, ‘less conscious’,                       
complexes. But (as Schwitzgebel points out) it is not obvious how parsimony considerations apply to                             
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parts, but taking this to be a case of causal competition or ‘overdetermination’ (enough to motivating                               
denying the existence of one or the other) is a significant departure from common sense.   
In fact, I believe that parsimony­based arguments for Anti­Nesting rely on Anti­Combination:                       
it is Anti­Combination which makes experiential nesting seem unparsimonious. If positing experiential                       
parts does not in itself explain the experiential whole, then the latter, being unexplained, must be a                                 
further posit. That is, it counts against parsimony just as it would had we not posited the parts. But then                                       
if (as is likely) the explanatory power of the parts largely pre­empts that of the whole (they cause the                                     
same effects, rationalise the same actions, etc.), having both will seem a needless multiplication of                             
entities. This is just another manifestation of ‘Additionalism’ about experience, as described in the                           
previous section: given Anti­Combination, each mind is an additional posit.  
Conversely, if experiential combination is possible, then the whole is no additional posit at all:                             
‘positing’ the whole is merely drawing out the consequences of already­posited parts and their                           
relations. There is then no offence against parsimony, any more than in accepting the existence of                               
macroscopic physical objects, having already accepted the existence of their component atoms.                       
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Indeed, it may well be that ruling out Nesting requires offending against ‘theoretical simplicity’, i.e.                             
introducing additional independent stipulations (such as Tononi’s Exclusion Principle) into one’s basic                       














Block and Schwitzgebel both offer thought­experiments meant to undermine whatever intuitive appeal                       
Anti­Nesting may have . Block’s thought­experiment has already been noted in relation to the problem                           
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of ‘dancing qualia’ in chapter 5 subsection 3.3: suppose that a normal human being, just by eating and                                   
breathing, absorbed microscopic conscious beings into their body and brain: surely they would remain                           
a conscious being, in defiance of Anti­Nesting. 
Schwitzgebel describes beings he calls “Antarean Antheads”, outwardly elephantine aliens                   
from a planet near Antares whose ‘brains’ are in fact a swarm of minute insects, individually conscious                                 
but of rudimentary intelligence, living inside a ‘mobile hive’ which their aggregate wrigglings and                           
scent signals control intelligently just as our bodies are intelligently controlled by the aggregate                           
synaptic firings of our trillion neurones. He suggests that for humans to re­interpret the Antheads’                             
actions and utterances (in which they come across as “sanitary, friendly, and excellent                         
conversationalists”, 2014, p.9) as non­conscious and non­intelligent when the mechanisms responsible                     
were discovered, would be grossly implausible, not to mention an offensive sort of human chauvinism.  
In both thought­experiments, a certain sort of leverage is exerted: granting that we are                           
materialists, and reject Simplicity, we will attribute consciousness to humans and aliens made out of                             
ordinary matter. Given that, would it not be absurd to completely reverse that attribution because of the                                 
additional presence of consciousness in some parts of that matter? This strategy will fail against an                               
opponent who accepts Experiential Simplicity, since they will not grant the comparison. But it seems to                               










position. Moreover, since I argued in subsection 7.1 that the only compelling argument for                           




In this section I discuss collective mentality, arguing that Anti­Combination contributes significantly to                         
a general aversion to collective phenomenal consciousness even among those who accept other forms                           
of collective mentality.  
Philosophical discussion of collective mentality takes off from the widespread tendency in                       
natural language for the behaviour of social collectives to be described and explained in mentalistic                             
terms. Both populations and institutions can be spoken of as believing things, wanting things, or doing                               
things in order to attain given ends (as can small groups like ‘Tim and Bob’). The initial question for                                     
philosophers is how to interpret this language – whether it expresses commitment to a distinctive                             
phenomenon, or is merely a figure of speech. The deflationary attitude is expressed by Quinton:  
Groups are said to have beliefs, emotions, and attitudes and to take decisions and make                             
promises. But these ways of speaking are plainly metaphorical. To ascribe mental predicates to                           
a group is always an indirect way of ascribing such predicates to its members…To say that the                                 
industrial working class is determined to resist anti‐trade union laws is to say that all or most                                 
industrial workers are so minded. (1975, p.17) 
Certainly it seems that much mentalising talk of collectives fits this ‘distributive’ model, where the                             
group is said to be P simply because all or most members are P. And even some cases where the very                                         
same predicates do not apply to both group and members may admit of an equally deflationary                               





certain outcome need carry no more commitment to mentality than to say that evolution operates as if it                                   
wants organisms to be better adapted to their environments.   
However, it is far from clear why all mentalising talk about groups should be taken in a                                 
deflationary way. Consider cases where a stable, highly­organised institution extracts information about                       
some matter, processes that information through a series of internal events, and uses it to guide                               
institutional policy. There is certainly no necessity that any single member of the group should be                               
apprised of all the information, and privy to all the deliberations, and also involved in all of the                                   
executions, and yet the overall process seems like it might merit literal mentalistic description.                           
Consider, moreover, hypothetical advanced societies, which might enhance the speed, reliability, and                       
density of communication channels greatly, so as to remedy any deficits in that regard with present day                                 
social groups.   
When we focus on these kind of highly­organised groups, their mere                     
being­composed­of­mental­parts becomes more and more salient. Insofar as this status makes us feel                         




While some philosophers, like Quinton, have been dismissive of collective mentality, others have                         
devoted much theoretical effort to analysing it. These analyses sometimes involve commitment to                         
genuine, though reducible, collective intentionality, though different accounts locate the distinctiveness                     
of collective intentionality in different aspects of intentionality: some in the content of what each                             





(Searle 1990), and some in the possession of the intentional state by a collective subject (Velleman                               
1997). And different accounts disagree on whether collective intentionality, however construed, can be                         
reduced to individual intentionality – i.e. intentionality which is individual in content, mode, and                           
subject. Depending on analysis, collective intentional states may be a special type of intentional state                             
possessed by an individual, intentional states each token of which is shared, i.e. had collectively, or an                                 
intentional state belonging to a collective.  
Collective intentions have received the most attention, but people also ascribe collective                       
beliefs, desires, and so on – i.e. all the cognitive and conative apparatus of agency. Pettit & List 2011,                                     
for instance, argue at length for recognising group agents who hold beliefs and desires which rationalise                               
their actions, doing so in a way that is in practice, but not in principle, irreducible to the beliefs, desires,                                       
and actions of individual members. They claim that this locates them between Hegel (their emblem of                               
wholly irreducible, strongly emergent, collective agents) and Hobbes (for whom collective agents                       
reduce straightforwardly to individual agents authorised by others).  
However, genuine conscious experience in social groups is widely rejected by contemporary                       
philosophers. Even those authors who go furthest in defending a range of genuine collective mental                             
states stop short of collective consciousness. For example, Gilbert (20020 and Huebner (2011) both                           
argue in support of collective emotions, but do so in large part by trying to break the link between                                     
emotion and consciousness, arguing that genuine emotions may be devoid of phenomenology. Thus                         
they prevent “the implausibility of collective consciousness… impugn[ing] the possibility of collective                       








Why is it so obvious that social groups are not conscious? Usually this is taken as unargued                                 
common­sense, or a basic intuition. But it is actually hard to see what could justify such an intuitive                                   
belief. When we believe that something lacks consciousness, this is usually because its behaviour does                             
not display the kind of flexible, intelligent, goal­seeking that characterises the behaviour of higher                           
animals. But in favourable cases, social groups can display just such a pattern of behaviour, so                               
something must be defeating this prima facie evidence of consciousness. Sometimes we discount                         
apparent evidence of consciousness when we discover that the mechanisms that produced it are                           
actually structured in an insensitive or inflexible way, aiming merely to simulate intelligence, as in                             
computer programs like ‘cleverbot.com’, which are designed to give a superficial impression of being a                             
conversational partner by deploying a series of stock phrases (cf. subsection 2.3 of this appendix). But                               
this defeater is not present in the social case, for social groups often seem to gather, integrate, and                                   
deploy information about their surroundings in a flexible, responsive, open­ended way.  
Alternatively, the defeater might be some difference of degree between the processing going on                           
in a social group and that going on in a human or animal brain: for instance, the signals among its                                       
components travel slower, or need to go further, or carry less information. Schwitzgebel argues against                             
this, suggesting that large, institutionally dense nation­states like the USA are at least on a par with                                 
ordinary mammals in informational complexity – in the relevant respect, “a rabbit brain is not clearly                               
more sophisticated”(2014, pp.20­21). Moreover, even if a difference in degree of sophistication                       
justified denying that collective consciousness is actual – because all presently­existing social groups                         
are less sophisticated in their structure than a rabbit’s brain – it would not justify denying that collective                                   
consciousness is possible, since technological or social transformation might make up this deficit. And                           








I believe that a major contributor to the widespread denial of collective consciousness is Additionalism                             
about conscious experience, which is a consequence of Anti­Combination. In the words of Searle,                           
“Most empirically minded philosophers think that [collective mentality] must reduce to individual                       
[mentality]."(1990, p.404) There is a wish to avoid irreducible, strongly­emergent group minds which                         
stand above individual minds; such beings are regarded as mysterious, unparsimonious, and even                         
ethically threatening. This may allow for groups to have genuine intentionality, if that intentionality can                             
be reductively explained through their parts. But it does not allow for collective consciousness, because                             
consciousness in a whole is always something over and above consciousness in its parts. For instance,                               
Petit & List 2011 devotes much space to distancing themselves from the ‘animation theory’, on which                               
“group agency [is] the product of an… organicist force” which is “equally [as] mysterious” as the                               
vitalist’s explanation of life (p.9); they take a sort of ‘weak emergentist’ position, on which group                               
agency is a distinctively useful way of regarding social groups, which enables explanations which                           
would otherwise be in practice impossible, or at least very hard, but involves no new supra­personal                               
forces.   
Yet if Anti­Combination is false, then this conflict between reducibility and genuine collective                         
consciousness disappears: social groups can be nothing over and above their members, while still being                             
conscious in just the same way that individual members are. Of course, the detailed analysis of how                                 
collective consciousness arises from individual consciousness will be complex, and probably admit of                         
as disagreement as there has been over the right analysis of collective intentionality. And                           
combinationism would not necessarily entail that collective consciousness is ubiquitous or even actual;                         





of social analogies to the structure of the human mind, allowing us not only to illuminate the social                                   




Since experiential combination involves parts and wholes, its scope of application depends on which                           
things compose wholes. Those who hold ‘universalism’ about composition will have many more                         
wholes composed of, and composing, conscious subjects, and so may approach the question of                           
experiential combination with different theoretical needs from those who hold that composition is                         
restricted in some manner, so that some sets of things do, while others do not, compose wholes.  
But one view of composition has an especially pressing need for experiential combination. In                           
the view of both its proponents and its detractors, mereological nihilism, the view that no sets of things                                   




Nihilist theories generally seek to reconstrue all our talk about composite objects so as to quantify only                                 
over simple entities arranged in and behaving in various ways. But even philosophers very close to                               






For instance, Peter Van Inwagen (1990) and Trenton Merricks (2001) both assert that mental                           
activities cannot be performed ‘cooperatively’ by multiple agents, while physical activities can. When a                           
baseball shatters a window, Merricks says, “every atom arranged baseballwise causes something, and                         
when what one of them causes is added to what each of the others causes, the ‘sum’ is the shattering of                                         
the window”(p.111) Physical effects can be seen as the aggregate effect of many microscopic activities                             
of physical parts. Yet “it does not seem that… when what one of my atoms does is added to what each                                         
of the others does, the ‘sum' is my consciously deciding.”(p.111)  
Similarly, Van Inwagen says that where we thought there was a shelf supporting books, or the                               
sun shining, there are in fact “simples… arranged shelfwise [that] cooperate to support weight” and                             
“simples… arranged siderially [that] cooperate to produce light”(p.118). Yet “I do not see how we can                               
regard thinking as a mere cooperative activity… surely, planning for tomorrow or feeling pain cannot                             
be activities that a lot of simples can perform collectively” (p.118) Mental activities demand a singular                               
subject, which must be either composite or simple, and if simple must plausibly be immaterial (cf. the                                 
first footnote to section 1). Since both philosophers reject substance dualism for independent reasons,                           
they conclude that there must be at least some composites, namely conscious composite organisms.  
Sider, defends nihilism against this allegation, but does so essentially by registering being                         
unpersuaded Van Inwagen’s somewhat dogmatic presentation of the disanalogy between mental and                       
physical activities:  
Perhaps van Inwagen’s belief in metaphysical singularity has something to do with the                         
character of conscious experience? A subject’s simultaneous experiences are experienced by                     
that subject as being in some sense part of one conscious episode, and as experienced by a                                 






I believe that there are two issues driving this dispute. One is whether consciousness and other mental                                 
phenomena can be reduced to a non­mental bases; the other is Anti­Combination. Merricks and Van                             
Inwagen accept both, and so must reject any nihilistic account of human consciousness. A                           
non­combinationist who was also a physicalist could consistently be a nihilist, analysing facts about                           
consciousness into facts about the physical properties of and relations among fundamental particles.                         
But a non­physicalist nihilist must, I think, reject Anti­Combination, and so my inquiry into grounds                             




It may at first seem strange that combinationism, a doctrine making reference explicitly to parts and                               
wholes, should serve to defend nihilism, the explicit denial of parthood relations. But the type of                               
relations which combinationism claims between parts and wholes are precisely those relations which                         
the nihilist is able to give their eliminative account of: if all the facts about mental wholes are fully                                     
explicable through facts about their parts, then nothing is lost if the former facts are eliminated in                                 
favour of sole reliance on the latter. If the parts, so to speak, do all the work, then cutting out the whole                                           
becomes defensible if we have independent motivations (e.g. parsimony) for doing so.  
To clarify, distinguish two (exclusive but not exhaustive) theses:  
Non­Singular Mentality: all mental properties are such that they may be possessed                       
collectively by many things, without being possessed by any single thing.   
This contrasts with: 






I take it that all nihilists who are also naturalists are committed to Non­Singular Mentality, since they                                 
attribute experiential properties to the collections of particles which we would normally describe as                           
human beings. If experiential properties are instantiated at all, then naturalistic nihilists must attribute                           
them to groups.   
Now consider ‘combinationismN’, which I define as follows:  
Experiential CombinationismN: The experiential properties of a jointly­conscious collection                 
of things may be explained by the experiential properties of, and relations among, those things. 
This is just normal experiential combinationism with the mereological terms replaced with                       
nihilist­friendly stand­ins (indeed, if composition is in some sense identity, then combinationismN is in                           
some sense equivalent to combinationism). My claim is that nihilists who do not wish to identify each                                 
of us with a simple substance should be committed not just to Collective Experiences, but also to                                 
combinationismN. This is because their general strategy of reconstruing apparent talk of composites in                           
terms of simples will translate combinationism into combinationismN, while being unable to thus                         
translate other, non­combinationist, views of consciousness like Van Inwagen’s and Merrick’s.  
For instance, if we fleshed out combinationism with some claim like:   





misapprehending what is really true, namely that there is a set of micro­subjects which have                             
experiences and all of whose experiences stand in the A­relation to those of the others. 
If they then stipulated the a definition in terms of A­relatedness for the phrase ‘are arranged                               
subject­wise’, they might express this by saying that there are no composite subjects, there are just                               









If I am correct in the interpretive and dialectical claims made in this appendix, then Anti­Combination,                               
the denial of experiential combination, has a huge impact on the way we think about minds.                               
Anti­Combination is, for a start, crucially involved in two different arguments against materialism, the                           
historically popular ‘Achilles’ argument, and the more recent argument from the need to avoid                           
multiplication of subjects. Moreover, Anti­Combination determines whether we can reasonably accept                     
collective consciousness, or consciousness in psychofunctional homuncular systems, or consciousness                   
in organisms like a swarm of bees. It makes a number of problem cases profoundly less tractable for                                   
persons than for inanimate objects, and it dooms panpsychism as an explanatory project. 
Of course I am probably not entirely correct in all these claims, and at each point there are                                   
potentially other ways to defuse or circumvent any consequence of Anti­Combination. But hopefully I                           





























































































































Coleman, S. (forthcoming). Panpsychism and Neutral Monism: How to Make Up One’s Mind. In Bruntrup and                               
Jasolla (eds), Panpsychism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Copeland, B. (1993). The Curious Case of the Chinese Gym. Synthese, V95:2 pp. 173­186 
Corbetta, M, Miezin, F., Dobmeyer, S., Shulman, G., and Petersen, S. (1990) Attentional modulation of neural 
processing of shape, color, and velocity in humans. Science V248, pp.1556–1559 
Cotnoir, A. (2013). Composition as General Identity. In K. Bennett and D. Zimmerman (eds.) Oxford Studies in 
Metaphysics, volume 8. Oxford: OUP, pp.295–322 
Creary, L. (1981). Causal Explanation and the Reality of Natural Component Forces. Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly 62, pp.148–157. 
Crick, F., and Koch, C. (1990). Towards a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness. Seminars in Neuroscience, 
V012: pp 263­275 
402
 Cudworth, R. (1837). The True Intellectual System of the Universe: Wherein All the Reason and Philosophy of 
Atheism is Confuted, and Its Impossibility Demonstrated. Originally published 1678, reprinted in Works, New 
York: Gould & Newman 
Dainton, B. (2000). Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience. London and New 
York: Routledge 
Dainton, B., Précis of ‘Stream of Consciousness’, Psyche V10:1, 2004 
Dainton, B. (2008). The Phenomenal Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press  
Dainton, B. (2010). Phenomenal Holism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67, pp.113­139 
Dainton, B. (2011). Review of Consciousness and its Place in Nature. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
V83:1, 238­261. 
David, N., et al. (2008) The ‘‘sense of agency” and its underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms. Consciousness 
and Cognition 17 (2008) 523–534 
De Courcillon, Louis, Sur la Religion (1684) by Louis de Courcillon, Abbe de Dangeau (1643­1723), and his close 
friend Francois Timoleon, Abbe de Choisy 
Delaney, C. (1972). Sellars’s Grain Argument. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50:1, pp.14­16 
Della Rocca, M. (2008). Spinoza. Routledge  
Dennett, D. (1978). Where am I? In Brainstorms. MIT Press  
Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Penguin Press.  
Dennett, D. (1992). The Self as Centre of Narrative Gravity. in F. Kessel, P. Cole and D. Johnson (eds.) Self and 
Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives.  Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 
Descartes, R. (1985) Meditations on First Philosophy. Originally published 1641, in The Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes, 2 vols., Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R., and Murdoch, D. (trans and eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press  
Desmurget, M., Reilly, K.T., Richard, N., Szathmari, A., Mottolese, C., & Sirigu, A. (2009)  Movement intention 
after parietal cortex stimulation in humans. Science, 324, 811­813 
De Sousa, R. (1976). Rational Homunculi. In Rorty, A. (ed.) The Identities of Persons, University of California 
Press, pp.217­238 
Diaz­Leon, E. (2011). Reductive Explanation, Concepts, and a priori Entailment. Philosophical Studies V155, 
pp.99–116 
Doré F. (1986). Object permanence in adult cats (Felis catus). Journal of Comparative Psychology V100:4, 
pp.340–347. 
Dretske, F. (1994). Introspection. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94, pp.263­278 
Dubner, R., and Zeki, S. (1971). Response properties and receptive fields of cells in an anatomically defined region 
of the superior temporal sulcus in the monkey. Brain Research 35:2, pp.528–32 
Duke, Henry H. (1847) A Systematic Analysis of Bishop Butler's Treatise on the Analogy of Religion to the 
Constitution of Nature, so far as relates to Natural Religion. To which is added, some considerations on certain 
arguments therein advanced. London: Joseph Masters  
Duncan, J., & Humphreys, G. W. (1989). Visual search and stimulus similarity. Psychological Review, V96, 
pp.433­458.  
Duncan, J., & Humphreys, G. (1992). Beyond the search surface: visual search and attentional engagement. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance V18:2, pp.578­88; discussion pp.589­93 
Ebert, J., and Wegner, D. (2010). Time Warp: Authorship Shapes the Perceived Timing of Actions and Events. 
Consciousness and Cognition V19, pp.481–489 
Eklund, M. (2008). Deconstructing ontological vagueness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy V38:1, pp.117­140 
Elder, C. (2008). Against Universal Mereological Composition. Dialectica, 62, pp. 433­54 
403
 Engel, S., Glover, G., & Wandell, B. (1997). Retinotopic organization in human visual cortex and the spatial 
precision of functional MRI. Cerebral Cortex V7 :2, pp.181­192 
Eriksen, C., St. James, J. (1986). Visual attention within and around the field of focal attention: a zoom lens model. 
Perceptual Psychophysics V40, pp.225–240 
Evans, G. (1982). The Varieties of Reference. Ed. John MacDowell. Oxford University Press 
Feinberg, I. (1978). Efference Copy and Corollary Discharge: Implications for Thinking and its Disorders. 
Schizophrenia Bulletin V4, pp.636­640 
Fine, K. (1975). Vagueness, Truth, and Logic. Synthese V30:3­4, pp.265­230 
Fine, K. (1982). Acts, Events, and Objects. In Language and Ontology: Proceedings of the 6th International 
Wittgenstein Symposium, Holder­Pichler­Tempsky, pp.97­105  
Fine, K. (1999). Things and their Parts. Midwest Studies in Philosophy V23, pp.61­74 
Fine, K. (2001). The Question of Realism. Philosophers' Imprint  V1:2, pp.1­30 
Fishman R. (1997). Gordon Holmes, the cortical retina, and the wounds of war. The seventh Charles B. Snyder 
Lecture. Documenta Ophthalmologica 93, pp.9­28 
Frankfurt, H. (1987). Identification and Wholeheartedness. in Schoeman, F. (ed.), Responsiblity, Character, and 
the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, Cambridge University Press, pp.159­176 
Freud, S. (1949). The Ego and the Id. Originally published 1923, trans. J. Riviere. London: The Hogarth Press Ltd 
Fried, I. et al. (1991) Functional Organization of Human Supplementary Motor Cortex Studied by Electrical 
Stimulation. Journal of Neuroscience, 11(11) 3656­3666 
Friedman, M. (1974). Explanation and scientific understanding. Journal of Philosophy V71, pp.5­19 
Frith, C. (2012). Explaining Delusions of Control: The Comparator Model 20 Years On. Consciousness and 
Cognition 21, pp.52–54 
Gallese, V., Keysers, C., & Rizzolatti, G. (2004). A unifying view of the basis of social cognition. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 8:9, pp.396­403. 
Gaudry, J. (2008). http://panexperientialism.blogspot.ca/2008/05/does­physicalism­entail­cosmopsychism.html  
Gazzaniga, M., Bogen, J., and Sperry, R. (1962). Some Functional Effects of Sectioning the Cerebral Commissures 
in Man. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 48:2, p. 1765 
Geach, P. (1967). Identity. The Review of Metaphysics 21:1, pp.3 ­ 12 
Gerrans, P. (2001). Authorship and Ownership of Thoughts. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, V8:2/3, pp. 
231­237 
Gibbard, A. (1975). Contingent Identity. Journal of Philosophical Logic V4, pp.187­222. 
Gilbert, M. (2002). Collective guilt and collective guilt feelings. The Journal of Ethics, 6: 115­143. 
Gillett, C. (2002). The dimensions of realization: A critique of the standard view. Analysis, 62, pp.316–323. 
Gillett, C., and Rives, B. (2005). The Non­Existence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as 
Default Hypothesis. Nous, V39:3, pp.483­504 
Goff, P. (2006). Experiences Don’t Sum. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13, No. 10–11, 2006, pp. 53–61. 
Goff, P. (2009a). Why Panpsychism doesn’t Help us Explain Consciousness. Dialectica 63:3, pp.289­311 
Goff, P. (2009b). Can the panpsychist get round the combination problem? In D. Skrbina (ed.) Mind that Abides: 
Panpsychism in the New Millennium. John Benjamins.  
Goff, P. (2010). There is No Combination Problem. in M. Blamauer (ed.) The Mental as Fundamental. New 
Perspectives on Panpsychism. Ontos 
Goff, P. (2011). Property Dualists should be Panpsychists. 
http://consciousnessonline.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/property­dualists­should­be­panpsychists.pdf  
404
 Goff, P. (2012). There is More than One Thing. In Goff, P. (ed) Spinoza on Monism. Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 
113­122 
Goff, P. (forthcoming). Real Acquaintance and Physicalism. In P. Coates and S. Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal 
Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 
Goff, P. (forthcoming a). The phenomenal bonding solution to the combination problem. In G. Bruntrop and L. 
Jaskolla (Eds.) Panpsychism, Oxford University Press 
Goldman, A. (2008) Simulating Minds. Oxford University Press. 
Goodman, N. (1951). The Structure of Appearance, 1st edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Gopnik, A. (2000). Explanation as orgasm and the drive for causal understanding: The evolution, function and 
phenomenology of the theory­formation system. In F. Keil and R. Wilson (eds.) Cognition and Explanation. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. pp.299­323 
Grahek, N. (2007). Feeling Pain and Being in Pain (2nd Edition). MIT Press. 
Grimm, S. (2009). Reliability and the Sense of Understanding. In De Regt, H., Leonelli, S., and Eigner, K. (eds.) 
Scientific Understanding: Philosophical Perspectives. University of Pittsburgh Press, pp.83­100 
Grossberg, S., & Mignolla, E. (1985). Neural dynamics of form perception: Boundary completion, illusory figures, 
and neon color spreading. Psychological Review V92, pp.173–211 
Gurwitsch, A. (1964). The Field of Consciousness. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 
Hare, C. (2007). Self­Bias, Time­Bias, and the Metaphysics of Self and Time. The Journal of Philosophy, Volume 
104:7, pp.350­373 
Harman, G. (1990). The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. In Philosophical Perspectives 4, edited by J. Tomberlin: 
Ridgeview Publishing Co.  
Haugeland, B. (2002). Authentic Intentionality. In M. Scheutz (ed.), Computationalism: New Directions. MIT 
Press, pp.159­175 
Heeger, D., Boynton, G., Demb, J, Seideman, E. & Newsome, W. (1999) Motion opponency in visual cortex. 
Journal of Neuroscience V19, pp.7162­7174  
Helle, R. (2013). The Stoic Case for Cosmic Holism and Cosmopsychism in De Natura Deorum II. Master’s 
Thesis, University of Oslo 
Heller, M. (2000). Temporal Overlap is Not Coincidence. Monist 83:3, p.362­380 
Hellie, B. (2005). Noise and Perceptual Indiscriminability. Mind 114: 481–508.   
Hellie, B. (2010). An Externalist’s Guide to Inner Experience. in Bence Nanay, ed., Perceiving the World. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Hellie, B. (2011). There It Is. Philosophical Issues, 21:110–164. 
Hellie, B. (2013). Against Egalitarianism. Analysis, 73:304–320. 
Hellie, B. (forthcoming­a). How We Do. In N. Charlow & M. Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modals. Oxford University 
Press. 
Hellie, B. (forthcoming­b). Love in the Time of Cholera. In B. Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? 
Oxford University Press. Accessed 2014 http://individual.utoronto.ca/benj/love.pdf  
Helmholtz, H. v. (1866). Handbuch der Physiologischen Optik. Leipzig: Voss. 
Hempel, C. and Oppenheim, P. (1948). Studies in the Logic of Explanation. Philosophy of Science, Vol. 15, No. 2, 
pp. 135­175 
Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York: Free Press. 
Horgan, T. (1993). From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World. Mind 
V102.408, pp.555­586 
405
 Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. (2002). The Intentionality Of Phenomenology And The Phenomenology Of 
Intentionality. In D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford 
University Press. 
Horgan, T., and Potrc, M. (2012). Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism. In P. Goff (ed.) Spinoza on Monism, 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp.51­76  
Holmes, G. (1944). The organization of the visual cortex in man. Proceedings of the Royal Society, Series B, 
V132, pp.348­361 
Huebner, B. (2011). Genuinely Collective Emotions. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, V1:1, pp.89­118 
Hurley, K. (1998). Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press. 
Hume, D. (1888). Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L. A. Selby­Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Original work 
1739. Partly reprinted in Perry 1975.) 
Husserl, E. (1970). Logical Investigations, trans J.N. Findlay, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
Husserl, E. (1982). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, 
trans F. Kersten, Dordrecht:  Kluwer Academic Publishers 
Husserl, E. (1989). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second 
Book, trans R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer, Kersten, Dordrecht:  Kluwer Academic Publishers 
Husserl, E. (2001). Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic. 
Lectures given between 1920 and 1926, trans. A. Steinbock, Springer 
Jackson, F. (1993). Block's Challenge. In Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D M Armstrong. 
New York: Cambridge University Press 
Jackson, Frank. 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics. Oxford University Press. 
Jackson, F. (2003). From H2O to Water: The Relevance to a priori Passage. In Lillehammer, H and 
Rodriguez­Pereyra, G., eds. Real Metaphysics. London: Routledge pp.84­97 
James, W. (1890). The Principles of Psychology. Harvard University Press.  
James, W. (1909). A Pluralistic Universe. Longman, Greens, & Co. 
James, W. (1916). Talks To Teachers On Psychology; And To Students On Some Of Life's Ideals. Henry Holt and 
Company 
Jaskolla, L. and Buck, A. (2012). Does panexperientialistic holism solve the combination problem?  Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, V19:9­10, pp. 190­199 
Jenkins, C. S. (2011). Is metaphysical dependence irreflexive? The Monist V94, pp.267­276. 
Johansson, I. (2004). On the Transitivity of the Parthood Relations. In H. Hochberg and K. Mulligan (eds.) 
Relations and Predicates, Frankfurt: Ontos, pp. 161­181. 
Johnston, M. (2007). Humans Beings revisited: My body is not an animal. In Oxford studies in metaphysics. V:3, 
ed. D. Zimmerman, Oxford University Press, pp.33­74 
Johnston, W., Dark. V. (1986) Selective attention. Annual Review of Psychology V37, pp.43–75 
Kant, I. (1999) Critique of Pure Reason. Originally Published 1781, trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood, Cambridge 
University Press  
Kelly, S. (2003). Edmund Husserl on Phenomenology. in Robert C. Solomon (ed.) Blackwell Guide to Continental 
Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp.112­142 
Kelly, S. (2004). On seeing things in Merleau­Ponty. In: T. Carmon (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to 
Merleau­Ponty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kellman, P., & Shipley, T. (1991). A theory of visual interpolation in object perception. Cognitive Psychology 
V23, pp.141–221 
Kim, J. (1998). Mind in a Physical World. MIT Press 
406
 Kim, J. (1999). Making Sense of Emergence. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the 
Analytic Tradition, Vol. 95, No. 1/2, Reduction and Emergence "The Thirty­Third Oberlin Colloquium in 
Philosophy", pp. 3­36 
Kim, S. (2011). Multiple realization and evidence. Philosophical Psychology V24:6, pp.739–749 
Kind, A. (2001). Putting the Image back in Imagination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research V62(1), 
pp.85­109. 
Knobe, J., and J. Prinz. 2008. Intuitions about consciousness: experimental studies. Phenomenology and Cognitive 
Science 7: 67–83. 
Korsgaard, C. (1989). Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit.  Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, V18:2, pp.109­123 In J. Dancy (ed.) Reading Parfit, Wiley 
Korsgaard, C. (2009). Self­Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Kriegel, U. (2004). Consciousness and Self­Consciousness. Monist 87, pp.182­205  
Kriegel, U. (2009). Subjective Consciousness: A Self­Representational Theory. Oxford University Press  
Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
Lamy, F. (1701). De la connoissance de soi­meme. 2nd ed. Chez Nicolas le Clerc. (Trans in Schachter 2002) 
Lane, T. and Liang, C. (2011). Self­Consciousness and Immunity. Journal of Philosophy 108 (2), pp.78­99 
Langland­Hassan, P. (2013). Craniopagus Twins and the Possibility of Introspective Misidentification. 
http://consciousnessonline.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/langland­hassan­co5.pdf  
Leibniz, G. W. (1967). The Leibniz­Arnauld Correspondence. Trans. and ed. by H.T. Mason. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press 
Leibniz, G. W. (1981). New Essays on Human Understanding. Trans. Eds. P. Remnant and J. Bennett, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Leibniz, G.W. (2012). The Discourse on Metaphysics, in The Discourse on Metaphysics and Other Writings,  Latta 
and Montgomery (trans.), revised by Peter Loptson (ed), Broadview Press, pp.57­102 (originally published 1686) 
Lennon, T., and Stainton, J. (eds.) (2008). The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology. Studies In The History Of 
Philosophy Of Mind, V7, Springer 
Leopold, A. (1949). A Sand County Almanac. New York: Oxford University Press 
Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap. Pacific Philosophy Quarterly V64, pp.354­361 
Lewis, D. (1971). Counterparts of persons and their bodies. Journal of Philosophy V68, pp.203­211. 
Lewis, D. (1976). Survival and Identity. in The Identities of Persons, A. Rorty (ed.), Berkeley: California 
Lewis, D. (1979). Attitudes De Dicto and De Se. The Philosophical Review, V88:4, pp. 513­543 
Lewis, D. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell 
Lewis, D. (1988). Vague Identity: Evans Misunderstood. Analysis, 48:3, pp.128­130 
Lewis, D. (1991). Parts of Classes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
Lewis, D. (1993). Many, But Almost One. in Ontology, Causality, and Mind: Essays in Honour of D. M. 
Armstrong, eds. John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Lloyd Reinhardt, Cambridge University Press, pp.23­45 
Lewis, D. (2003). Things qua Truthmakers. In H. Lillehammer & G. Rodriguez­Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: 
Essays in honor of D. H. Mellor. Routledge, pp.25­38 
Lewtas, P. (2013). What is it like to be a Quark? Journal of Consciousness Studies, V20:9­10, pp.39­64 
Lipton, P. (2009). Understanding without Explanation. In De Regt, H., Leonelli, S., and Eigner, K. (eds.) Scientific 
Understanding: Philosophical Perspectives. University of Pittsburgh Press, pp.43­64 
Loar, B. (1990). Phenomenal States. Philosophical Perspectives V4, pp.81­108 
Locke, J. (1836). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. (Originally published 1689), T. Tegg and Son.  
407
 Lockwood, M. (1989). Mind, Brain, and the Quantum. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Lockwood, M. (1993). The Grain Problem. In Robinson, H. (ed.) Objections to Physicalism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World. (See Vol. I, trans, by Elizabeth 
Hamilton and E. E. Constance Jones [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894], p. 158.) 
Lovelock, J. (2000). Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lowe, E. J. (1996). Subjects of Experience. Cambridge University Press 
Lycan, G. (1979). A new lilliputian argument against machine functionalism. Philosophical Studies 35, pp.279­287 
Lynn, M., Berger, C., Riddle, .T, and Morsella, E. (2010). Mind control? Creating illusory intentions through a 
phony brain–computer interface. Consciousness and Cognition V:19, pp.1007–1012 
Madden, R. (2012). The Naive Topology of the Conscious Subject. Nous 100:0, pp.1–15 
Margulis, L. (1998). Symbiotic Planet: A New Look at Evolution. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
Markosian, E. (1998). Brutal Composition. Philosophical Studies 92:3, pp.211­249 
Masrour, F. (forthcoming). Unity of Consciousness: Advertisement for a Leibnizian View. In Sensory Integration 
and the Unity of Consciousness, eds. C. Hill and D. Bennett. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Matey, J. (2013). Representing the Impossible. Philosophical Psychology, V26:2, pp.188­206 
Matthews, F. (2003). For Love of Matter: a Contemporary Panpsychism. SUNY Press, Albany NY 
Maxwell, G. (1979). Rigid Designators and Mind­Brain Identity. In Savage, C. (ed.) Perception and Cognition: 
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 9. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, pp.365­403 
McGinn, C. (1989). Can we Solve the Mind­Body Problem? Mind V98, pp.349­66 
McLaughlin, B. (1992). The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism. In A. Beckermann, H. Flohr & J. Kim (eds.), 
Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter  
McQueen, K. (2013). A Priori Entailment and the  Metaphysics of Science. Doctoral Dissertation,  Australian 
National University. Accessed February 2014: 
http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/PENULTIMATE%20DRAFT%20%28for%20submission%20with%20
margins%29.pdf  
McQueen, K. (2014a). A Priori Entailment and Mass Additivity. Accessed February 2014: 
http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/A%20Priori%20Entailment%20and%20Mass%20Additivity%20­%20
WEB%20%26%20SW.pdf  
McQueen, K. (2014b). Reductionism, Levels, and Metal Rods. Accessed February 2014: 
http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Reductionism%20levels%20and%20metal%20rods.pdf  
McTaggart, J. (1988). The Nature of Existence. V1, ed. C. D. Broad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Melloni, L., Molina, C., Pena, M., Torres, D., Singer, W., and Rodeiguez, E. (2007). Synchronization of Neural 
Activity across Cortical Areas Correlates with Conscious Perception. The Journal of Neuroscience, V27:11, pp. 
2858 –2865 
Mendelssohn, M. (1767/1789/2002). Phaedon or, The Death of Socrates. Originally published 1767, trans. C. 
Cullen, 1789, Schiller Institute Inc. http://www.schillerinstitute.org/transl/mend_phadn_cullen.html (accessed July 
2013) 
Merleau­Ponty, M. (1962). The Phenomenology of Perception. Originally published 1945, trans. Colin Smith. 
Routledge and Kegan Paul 
Merricks, T. (2001). Objects and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Merricks, T. (2005). Composition and Vagueness. Mind 114, pp.615­637 
Michotte, A., Thines, G., & Crabbe, G. (1964/1991). Amodal completion of perceptual structures. In: G. Thines, A. 
Costall, & G. Butterworth (Eds.), Michotte’s experimental phenomenology of perception (pp. 140­167). Hillsdale, 
NJ: Erlbaum. 
408
 Mijuskovic, B. L. (1984). The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments: The Simplicity, Unity, and Identity of Thought 
and Soul From the Cambridge Platonists to Kant: A Study in the History of an Argument. Martinus Nijhoff. 
Mill, J. S. (1843). A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. 8th Edition Published 1882, Harper & Brother, 
New York.  
Miller, H., Gipson, C., Vaughan, A., Rayburn­Reeves, R., and Zentall, T. (2009). Object permanence in dogs: 
invisible displacement in a rotation task. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, V16:1, pp.150­155 
Mizrahi, V. (2009). Is Colour Composition Phenomenal?  in D. Skusevich and P. Matikas (eds), Color Perception: 
Physiology, Processes and Analysis, Nova Science Publishers, pp. 185­202. 
Mole, C. (2010). Attention is Cognitive Unison: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
Molnar, G. (2003). Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Moore, J., and Haggard, P., (2008) Awareness of action: Inference and prediction. Consciousness and Cognition 17 
136–144 
Mørch, H. H. (2013). Comments On Sebastian: What Panpsychists Should Reject: On The Incompatibility Of 
Panpsychism And Organizational Invariantism. 
http://consciousnessonline.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/hassel­comments­on­sebastian.pdf  
Mørch, H. H. (2014). Panpsychism and Causation: A New Argument and a Solution to the Combination Problem. 
Doctoral Dissertation, University of Oslo 
Nagel, E. (1961). The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation.  
Nagel, E. (1963) Wholes, sums, and organic unities, in: D. Lerner (Ed.) Parts and Wholes (New York, The Free 
Press). 
Nagel, T. (1971). Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness. Synthese 22 pp.396­413.  
Nagel, T. (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review V83 pp.435­450 
Nagel, T. (1986). The View From Nowhere. Oxford University Press. 
Nagel, T. (2004). Panpsychism. In D.S.Clarke, Pansychism: Past and Recent Selected Readings, State University 
of New York Press, originally published Cambridge University Press, 1979 
Nanay, B. (2010). Perception and Imagination: Amodal Perception as Mental Imagery. Philosophical Studies, 
V50, pp.239­254 
Nieder, A. (2002). Seeing More than Meets the Eyes: Processing of Illusory Contours in Animals. Journal of 
Comparative Physiology A, V188, pp.249­260 
Nielsen, T. (1963). Volition: Towards a New Experimental Approach. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology V4, 
pp.225­230 
Noë, A. (2005). Real presence. Philosophical Topics, 33, pp.235–264 
Noonan, H. (2003). Personal Identity, 2nd ed. First edition 1989. Routledge  
Noonan, H. (2010). The Thinking Animal Problem and Personal Pronoun Revisionism. Analysis 70:1, pp.93­98 
Nozick, R. (2003). Personal Identity Through Time. in Personal Identity, eds. Martin and Barresi, Blackwell, 
pp.92­115, originally in Philosophical Explanations, Belknap, 1981, pp.29­48, 50­51, 58­61, and 69 
Olson, E. (1997). The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology. Oxford University Press. 
Olson, E. (2003). An Argument for Animalism. In Personal Identity, (eds) Martin and Barresi, Blackwell, 
p.318­335 
Parfit, D. (1971). Personal Identity. Philosophical Review 80, pp.3­27. 
Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press  
Parfit, D. (1999). Experiences, Subjects, and, Conceptual Schemes. Philosophical Topics 26, pp.217­270 
Paul, L. A. (2002). Logical Parts. Nous V36:4, pp.578­596 
409
 Perky, C. (1910) An Experimental Study of Imagination. American Journal of Psychology V21, pp. 422–452.  
Perry, J. (1972). Can the Self Divide? The Journal of Philosophy, V69, pp.463­488 
Perry, J. (1979). The Problem of the Essential Indexical. Nous 13, pp.3­21.  
Pettit, P. and List, C. (2011). Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents. Oxford 
University Press 
Phillips, I. (2014). The temporal structure of experience. In V. Arstila and D. Lloyd (Eds.), Subjective Time: the 
Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Temporality, pp. 139–158. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Plato (2000). The Republic. (Originally published 360BCE). Tom Griffith (trans.), G. R. F. Ferrari (ed.), 
Cambridge University Press 
Ploner, M., Freund, H. J., and Schnitzler, A. (1999). Pain Affect without Pain Sensation in a Patient with a 
Postcentral Lesion. Pain 81: 211­14. 
Plotinus (1956). Enneads. Trans. and eds. Stephen Mackenna and B. S. Page, Faber and Faber limited, 
http://archive.org/stream/plotinustheennea033190mbp#page/n11/mode/2up (accessed july 2013) 
Polger, T. (2008). Two confusions concerning multiple realization. Philosophy of Science V75, pp.537–547. 
Powell, C. T. (1990). Kant's Theory of Self­Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press  
Prete, F. (2004). Complex Worlds from Simpler Nervous Systems (ed.). MIT Press 
Prinz, J. (2011). Is Attention Necessary and Sufficient for Consciousness? In C. Mole, D. Smithies and W. Wu 
(eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press  
Prinz, J. (2012). The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience. Oxford University Press 
Proclus (1963). The Elements of Theology. Trans. and ed. E. R. Dodds. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
Putnam, H. (1965/2003). The Nature of Mental States. In O'Connor, T., Robb, D., and Heil, J., (eds) Philosophy of 
Mind: Contemporary Readings. Routledge, pp.223­235  
Raffman, D. (1994). Vagueness without Paradox. The Philosophical Review, V103:1, 1994, pp. 41­74 
Raffman, D. (2012). Indiscriminability and phenomenal continua. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):309­322  
Raffman, D. (forthcoming). Unruly Words: A Study of Vague Language. ?? Press 
Ramachandran, V. S. (1995). Filling in the gaps in logic: Reply to Durgin et al. Perception V24, pp.841–843 
Ramachandran, V.S & Rogers­Ramachandran, D. (1996). Synaesthesia in Phantom Limbs Induced with Mirrors. 
Proceedings of the Biological Sciences, V263:1369, pp. 377­386 
Raymont, P. (2005). Conscious Unity http://philpapers.org/archive/RAYCU.1.pdf  
Recanati, F. (2012). Immunity to error through misidentification: what it is and where it comes from. In S. Prosser 
and F. Recanati (eds), Immunity to Error through Misidentification, Cambridge University Press pp.80­121 
Roelofs, L. (2014a). Phenomenal Blending and the Palette Problem. Thought, V3:1, pp.59­70 
Roelofs, L. (2014b). What are the Dimensions of the Conscious Field? Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 
21, Numbers 7­8, pp. 88­104 
Rosen, G. (2010). Metaphysical dependence: grounding and reduction.  In Hale and Hoffman, Modality: 
Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.109­136. 
Rosenberg, G. (1998). The Boundary Problem for Phenomenal Individuals. In S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak and A. 
Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness: The First Tucson Discussions and Debates (Complex Adaptive 
Systems). Mit Press. 
Rosenberg, G. (2004). A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Rosenthal, D. (1986). Two concepts of consciousness. Philosophical Studies, 49: 329–359 
410
 Rosenthal, D. (2007). Phenomenological overﬂow and cognitive access. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, V30:5­6, 
pp.522­523 
Rozemond, M. (2008). The Achilles Argument and the Nature of Matter in the Clarke Collins Correspondence. In 
Lennon, T., and Stainton, J. (eds), The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology. Studies In The History Of Philosophy Of 
Mind, V7, Springer 
Russell, B. (1903). The Principles of Mathematics. Cambridge University Press  
Russell, B. (1919). Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, London: Routledge 
Russell, B. (1985). The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. In D. Pears (ed.) The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. 
LaSalle, IL: Open Court, pp.35–155 
Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson. 
Sartre, J. (1956). Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology.  Originally published 1943, 
trans. Hazel E. Barnes, New York: Philosophical Library 
Sato, A. & Yasuda, A. (2005). Illusion of sense of self­agency: discrepancy between the predicted and actual 
sensory consequences of actions modulates the sense of self­agency, but not the sense of self­ownership. Cognition 
94:3, pp.241­255 
Schachter, J. (2002). Pierre Bayle, Matter, and the Unity of Consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 
V32:2, pp. 241­265 
Schaffer, J. (2010). Monism: The priority of the whole.  Philosophical Review 119, pp.31­76. 
Schaffer, J. (2012). Why the World has Parts. In P. Goff (ed.) Spinoza on Monism, Palgrave Macmillan, pp.77­91 
Schechter, E. (2010). Two Unities of Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy, V21:2, pp.1­25 
Schiffer, S. (1987). Remnants of Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Schilder, P., and Stengel, E. (1931). Asymbolia for pain. Archives of Neurology & Psychiatry, 25(3): 598­600. 
Schwitzgebel, E. (2014). If Materialism is True, the United States is Probably Conscious. 
http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/USAconscious­140130a.pdf  
Seager, W. (1990). ‘The Logic of Lost Lingens’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 19, pp.407­428. 
Seager, W. (1995). Consciousness, Information and Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, V2­3, 
pp.272­88 
Seager, W. (2001). The Constructed and the Secret Self. In Andrew Brook and Richard DeVidi Self­Reference and 
Self­Knowledge. pp.247­268 
Seager, W. (2010). Panpsychism, Aggregation and Combinatorial Infusion. Mind and Matter, V8:2, pp. 167­184 
Seager, W. (forthcoming). Panpsychist Infusion. In Panpsychism, (eds) Bruntrup, G. and Jaskolla, L., Oxford 
University Press  
Searle, J. (1990). Collective Intentions and Actions. in Intentions in Communication, ed. by Philip R. Cohen, Jerry 
Morgan, and Martha E. Pollack. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press  
Searle, J. (1980/2003). Minds, Brains, and Programs. In O'Connor, T., Robb, D., and Heil, J., (eds) Philosophy of 
Mind: Contemporary Readings. Routledge, pp.345­365 
Searle, J. (2000). Consciousness, Annual Review of Neuroscience, V23, pp.557–578 
Sebastien, M. (2013). What Panpsychists should Reject: On the Incompatibility of Panpsychism and the Principle 
of Organisational Invariance. http://mindingthebrain.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/ppoi.pdf   
Segal, S. (1972). Assimilation of a Stimulus in the Construction of an Image: The Perky Effect Revisited. In P.W. 
Sheehan (Ed.), The Function and Nature of Imagery, New York & London: Academic Press, pp. 203­230 
Selfridge, O. (1959). Pandemonium: A Paradigm for Learning. Symposium on the Mechanization of Thought 
Processes, HM Stationery Office 
Sellars, W. (1963). Science, Perception and Reality. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
411
 Setiya, K. (2008). Practical Knowledge. Ethics V118:3, pp.388­409. 
Shani, I. (2010). Mind Stuffed with Red Herrings: Why William James’ Critique of the Mind­Stuff Theory Does not 
Substantiate a Combination Problem for Panpsychism. Acta Analytica, 25:4, pp.413–434.  
Shoemaker, S. (1968). Self­Reference and Self­Awareness. Journal of Philosophy 65, pp.555­567. 
Shoemaker, S. (1970). Persons and Their Pasts. American Philosophical Quarterly 7:4, pp.269­85. 
Shoemaker, S. (1984). Personal Identity. B. Blackwell. 
Shoemaker, S. (1994). Self­Knowledge and "Inner Sense": Lecture II: The Broad Perceptual Model. Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 271­290 
Shoemaker, S. (1997). Parfit on Identity. In ‘Reading Parfit’, ed. Jonathan Dancy, Blackwell Oxford, pp. 135­148 
Shoemaker, S. (2000). Realization and mental causation. In B. Elevich (Ed.), Proceedings of the 20th world 
congress, vol. 9: Philosophy of mind (pp. 23–31). Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center. 
Shoemaker, S. (2003a). Self, Body, and Coincidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63, pp.287­306. 
Shoemaker, S. (2003b). Consciousness and Co­Consciousness. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of 
Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 
Sider, T. (1997). Four­Dimensionalism. Philosophical Review 106:2, pp.197­231. 
Sider, T. (2001). Maximality and Intrinsic Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63:2, 
pp.357­364. 
Sider, T. (2007). Parthood. Philosophical Review V116, pp.51–91 
Sider, T. (2011). Writing the Book of the World. Oxford University Press 
Sider, T. (2013). Against Parthood. In K. Bennett and D. Zimmerman (eds.) Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 
volume 8. Oxford: OUP 
Siegel, S. (2006). Which Properties are Represented in Perception? In Szabo Gendler & Hawthorne (eds.) 
Perceptual Experience, Oxford : Clarendon Press, pp.481­503 
Siewert, C. (forthcoming). Speaking up for Consciousness. Forthcoming in Current Controversies in Philosophy of 
Mind, Routledge. http://charlessiewert.com/attachments/article/66/SpeakingUpFinal.pdf  
Simons, P. (1987). Parts: A Study in Ontology. Clarendon Press 
Skrbina, D. (2005). Panpsychism in the West. MIT Press  
Smart, J. J. C. (1981). Physicalism and Emergence. Neuroscience V6, pp.109­113 
Smithies, D. (2011). Attention is Rational­Access Consciousness. in C. Mole, D. Smithies and W. Wu (eds.), 
Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press 
Sperry, R. (1964). Brain Bisection and Mechanisms of Consciousness. In John C. Eccles (ed.), Brain and 
Conscious Experience. Springer­Verlag 
Spinoza, B. (1994). Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order, in E. Curley (ed. and trans.), A Spinoza Reader, 
Princeton University Press, pp.85­265 (originally published 1677) 
Sprigge, T. (1983). The Vindication of Absolute Idealism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press  
Stephens, G. L., and Graham, G. (2000). When Self­Consciousness Breaks: Aliens Voices and Inserted Thoughts. 
The MIT Press. 
Stoljar, D. (2001). Two Conceptions of the Physical. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 62:2, 
pp.253­281.  
Stoljar, D. (2006). Comments on Galen Strawson ­ Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism. 
Journal of Consciousness Studies 13:10­11, pp.170­176. 
Strawson, G. (2006). Realistic Monism ­ Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 
13:10­11, pp.3­31. 
412
 Strawson, G. (2006). Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism. In A. Freeman (ed.), 
Consciousness and its Place in Nature: does physicalism entail panpsychism? Imprint Academic  
Strawson, G. (2009). Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics. Oxford University Press 
Strawson, G. (2013). Self­Intimation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, October 2013, published online: 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11097­013­9339­6/fulltext.html  
Strawson, P. F. (1974). Imagination and Perception. In Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays, London: 
Methuen, pp.45­65 
Swinburne, R. (1984). Personal Identity: The Dualist View. Oxford: Blackwell 
Swinburne, R. (1986). The Evolution of the Soul. Oxford University Press. Revised edition 1997. 
Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., and Newen, A. (2008). Beyond the comparator model: A multifactorial two­step 
account of agency. Consciousness and Cognition V17, pp.219–239 
Théoret, H., Kobayashi, M., Ganis, G., Di Capua, P. and Pascual­Leone, A. (2002) Repetitive transcranial 
magnetic stimulation of human area MT/V5 disrupts perception and storage of the motion aftereffect. 
Neuropsychologia V40:13, pp.2280­2287  
Titchener, E. B. (1909). A textbook of psychology. New York: Macmillan. Accessed August 26 2013: 
http://archive.org/stream/textbookofpsycho00edwa/textbookofpsycho00edwa_djvu.txt  
Tononi, G. and Balduzzi, D. (2009). Qualia: The Geometry of Integrated Information. Computational Biology 
V5:8 
Tononi, G. (2012). Integrated information theory of consciousness: an updated account. Archives Italiennes de 
Biologie. 150:2­3, pp.56­90 
Tononi, G., and Koch, C. (2014). Consciousness: Here, There, but Not Everywhere. 
http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1405/1405.7089.pdf  
Treisman, A., and Gelade, G. (1980). A feature­integration theory of attention. Cognitive Psychology, V12:1, 
pp.97–136. 
Treisman, A., and Sato, S. (1990). Conjunction Search Revisited. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, V16:3, pp.459­478 
Treue, S., and Maunsell, J. (1999). Effects of attention on the processing of motion in macaque middle temporal 
and medial superior temporal visual cortical areas. Journal of Neuroscience, V19:17, pp.7591­7602 
Trout, J. (2002). Scientific Explanation and the Sense of Understanding. Philosophy of Science 69:2, pp.212­233  
Tye, M. 1992. Visual qualia and visual content. In The Contents of Experience, edited by T. Crane. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity. MIT Press 
Tye, M. (2009). A New Look at the Speckled Hen. Analysis, V69:2: pp.258­263. 
Unger, P. (1979). There Are No Ordinary Things. Synthese 41:2, pp.117 ­ 154. 
Unger, P. (1980). The Problem of the Many. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5:1, pp.411­468 
Unger, P. (1990). Identity, Consciousness, and Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Unger, P. (2004). Mental Problems of the Many. In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics , Vol. 1, ed. Dean Zimmerman. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Unger, P. (2006). All the Power in the World. Oxford University Press 
Van Cleve, J. (1990). Mind­Dust or Magic? Panpsychism Versus Emergence. Philosophical Perspectives V4, 
pp.215­226. 
Van Inwagen, P. (1990). Material Beings. Cornell University Press 
Varzi, A. (2006). A Note on the Transitivity of Parthood. Applied Ontology, V1:2, pp.141­146. 
Watzl, S. (2010). The Significance of Attention. Doctoral Dissertation, Columbia University 
413
 Watzl, S. (2011). Attention as Structuring of the Stream of Consciousness. In C. Mole, D. Smithies & W. Wu 
(eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press 
Wegner, D. (2002). The Illusion of Conscious Will. MIT Press. 
Wiggins, D. (1967). Identity and Spatio­Temporal Continuity. Oxford University Press 
Wilson, A. (2009). Disposition­manifestations and Reference­frames. Dialectica 63, pp.591–601. 
Wilson, M. (1999). Objects, Ideas, and “Minds”: Comments on Spinoza’s Theory of Mind, in Ideas and 
Mechanism: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy, Princeton University Press, p. 126­140,  
Wilson, J. (1999). How Superduper does Physicalist Superdupervenience need to be? Philosophical Quarterly 
V49:194, pp.33­52 
Wilson, J. (2002). Causal Powers, Forces, and Superdupervenience. Grazer Philosophische Studien V63, pp.53­78 
Wilson, J. (2005). Supervenience­based Formulations of Physicalism. Nous V39:3, pp.426–459 
Wilson, J. (2009). The Causal Argument against Component Forces. Dialectica 63, pp.525–554. 
Wilson, J. (2010). Metaphysical Emergence: Weak and Strong. in Metaphysics and Science, Stephen Mumford and 
Matthew Tugby, eds. Accessed online September 2013: http://individual.utoronto.ca/jmwilson/MEWaS.pdf  
Wilson, J. (2012). Fundamental Determinables. Philosophers' Imprint V12:4, pp. 
Wilson, J. (2013­a). Nonlinearity and Metaphysical Emergence. In Mumford and Tugby (eds.), Metaphysics and 
Science, Oxford University Press, pp.201­229 
Wilson, J. (2013­b). No Work for a Theory of Grounding. Inquiry, pp.1­45 Access online 2013 
http://individual.utoronto.ca/jmwilson/NWfaTG.doc   
Wilson, J. (2013­c). A Determinable­Based Account of Metaphysical Indeterminacy. Inquiry V56:4, pp.359–385. 
Wilson, J. (forthcoming). Metaphysical Emergence.  
Wilson, J. and Biggs, S. (2013). Abductive Two­Dimensionalism: A New Route to the A Priori Identification of 
Necessary Truths. Accessed September 2013: http://individual.utoronto.ca/jmwilson/A2D.docx  
Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The Blue and Brown Books. New York: Oxford  
Wu, W. (2011). Attention as Selection for Action. In C. Mole, D. Smithies & W. Wu (eds.), Attention: 
Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press 
Zihl, J., von Cramon, D., and Mai, N. (1983). Selective disturbance of movement vision after bilateral brain 
damage. Brain V106, pp.313­340  
Zuboff, A. (1990). One Self: The Logic of Experience. Inquiry V33:1, pp.39­68. 
Zuboff, A. (1982). The Story of a Brain. In D. R. Hofstadter and D. C. Dennett (eds.) The Mind's I: Fantasies and 
Reflections on Self and Soul. New York: Basic Books, pp.202­220 
 
414
